

This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

+ *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.

+ *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.

+ *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.

+ *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search


Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at `http://books.google.com/`

A HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR

BY

Bertram Benedict A.B.

H 799.19.85 (1)



The gift of

Mrs. A. C. Holden

HARVARD COLLEGE LIBRARY






Underwood & Underwood

WOODROW WILSON

Twenty-Eighth President of the United States



A HISTORY
OF THE
GREAT WAR

IN TWO VOLUMES

BY
BERTRAM BENEDICT, A. B.
Editor in chief for
BUREAU OF NATIONAL LITERATURE, (INC.)
Publishers of
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS

VOLUME I

PUBLISHED BY
BUREAU OF NATIONAL
LITERATURE, (Inc.)
NEW YORK

H 799.19.85 (1)



Copyright, 1919
by
BUREAU OF NATIONAL LITERATURE, (Inc.)

PREFACE

The Great War burst in August, 1914 upon an American public opinion helpless, on the whole, to form an adequate appreciation of the War's inner significance. Even when our own national honor became definitely involved, we were long hazy concerning the fundamental issues which were being decided in the trenches of northern France and Belgium. At one end of the scale, the super-patriot proclaimed that the War traced back its origin solely to the overweening ambitions of Kaiser William II, and at the other end, the super-Socialist cried aloud that the War was due solely to the cold-blooded machinations of capitalists bent upon profit; and between these two extremes there was a general intellectual muddle. International alliances and manoeuvres, national jealousies, colonial rivalries, racial clashes, artificial and unnatural political boundaries, industrial expansions, imperialistic ambitions, economic competitions, abnormal nationalistic psychologies, these forces played upon international relations in a fashion alien to American experience. Of the political alignment of Europe, most Americans knew little and cared less.

There were, of course, explicable reasons for our general indifference to foreign affairs. In the first place, we were geographically cut off from Europe. Only a fortunate few among us had enjoyed the opportunity to visit foreign shores. Whereas the great bulk of the upper and middle classes of Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Austria-Hungary, were enabled, if they so desired, to pay at least an occasional brief visit to some foreign country—where the language, the political institutions, the social structure, the economic status, the popular prejudices, the national outlook, were different from their own. It is as difficult to be interested in the affairs of a land one has never visited and expects never to visit as to be uninterested in the affairs of a land one has visited.

In the second place, as the great majority of the upper and middle classes of the United States had never visited European countries, the great majority of the American working-class had no close political or economic connections with their fellow-workers of Europe.

The American Federation of Labor was strictly a non-political organization, and as such was unconnected with the various political parties of the European workers; and other political movements in America based on class interests had not earned for themselves the right to be taken seriously in American political life.

In the third place, there was a large and influential foreign-language press in the United States. Each of these newspapers and magazines in foreign tongues naturally paid close attention to the political developments in the country from which had emigrated that particular foreign element to which it catered. Accordingly, most of even the better-informed periodicals printed in English in the United States felt that there was little demand for extensive treatment by them of the extra-American problems which interested our groups of foreign origin.

Finally, and most important of all reasons, the international policy of the United States was one of isolation from European political ambitions. The Englishman understood that his country was allied with France and Russia. He naturally experienced at least slight curiosity to understand the reasons for such alliance and its implications. He wanted to know also the problems and circumstances of both his country's allies and its rivals—Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy. The German understood that his country was allied with Austria-Hungary, Italy and Turkey. He naturally experienced at least slight curiosity to understand the reasons for such alliance and its implications. He wanted to know also the problems and circumstances of both his country's allies and its rivals—Great Britain, France and Russia. But the citizen of the United States was ever confident that the political alliances of Europe could not touch his welfare. His country's colonial possessions were neither important nor calculated to arouse strong national pride; his land was almost entirely self-dependent; and the Monroe Doctrine was a stout bulwark between the Old World and the New. The intelligent European recognized that any day a quarrel between two insignificant nations of the Balkans might send him to the battle-front within two weeks; in the United States, the future chairman of the Committee on Public Information was by no means alone in believing that the Ukraine was a musical instrument.

But now the War has changed all that. Indeed, had America but recognized the fact, the first submarine ended the possibility of American isolation with honor from a world-conflict. At a stupefying cost, we have learned our lesson—the forces which are most dominant in the twentieth century are forces of world-wide scope; and now at

last the United States recognizes that occasions may again arise which will demand that the United States appear again as gladiator in the arena of the world.

Indeed, the accessibility of America to international forces is due not only (and perhaps not fundamentally) to political movements, but also to economic and intellectual movements. There was hardly a big business unit in the United States in 1914 whose roots had not spread into foreign soil; and by 1919, that tendency had been accelerated many-fold. Capital is international. Big business is international. The mines of Chile, the quarries of South Africa, the looms of England, the wheat-fields of Argentina, the silk-worm farms of Japan, the forests of Canada, the factories of France, the ranches of Australia, from what quarter of the globe will the future American search for raw materials be absent? What large business centre in any of the Continents will be untouched by agencies of American banks? What large foreign loan will American investors disregard? As a matter of fact, what important event anywhere in the world will have no effect upon American industry?

And if capital and big business have become international, how much more unqualifiedly international have ideas become! The feeling for higher wage-scales in a single country in Europe may upset American industry and all dependent upon American industry. A new idea in the smelting of precious metals more than a decade ago helps to determine today the cost of living all over the world. American psychologists sit at the feet of an Austrian physician, and American novelists and playwrights follow the trails blazed by Wells and Bennett and Galsworthy and Shaw; conversely, the movement in modern philosophic thought most stimulating to the entire philosophic world claims America as its cradle, and the whole world mourned as its own loss the death of Theodore Roosevelt. At the close of the actual hostilities of the War, two of the greatest nations of modern times and some of their less powerful neighbors were in the inexorable grip of ideas developed less than seventy-five years ago by an exiled and penniless German journalist, and entrusted by him to pages repugnant both in dogmatism and in obscurity. In the framing of peace, certain political groups in Europe found their creeds most adequately personified by Woodrow Wilson; certain political groups in the United States found their aspirations most satisfactorily crystallized in the leadership of Georges Clemenceau, or of David Lloyd-George, or of the Russian cooperatives, or of the *Confédération générale du travail,* or of the British Labor Party. The United States may exclude persons, may reject institutions, may ban commodities;

but of the making of books there is no end. No Great Wall of China can prevent either the emigration or the immigration of an idea; and the entire future of America may be profoundly affected by a new theory launched by an obscure thinker in an obscure land and promulgated in an obscure way by obscure followers.

But whatever the roads which the America of the future will travel, nothing is more imperative than American understanding of the problems she must meet on the way. Those problems will be the problems bequeathed by the most stupendous fact of modern times, the Great War. America will rise or fall in the future ordeal of nations by fire as she is alive or blind to the lessons of that holocaust. America's future foreign policy will be determined largely by America's future political leaders, and those future political leaders will be selected according to the convictions of the American people. Accordingly, for many years nothing will aid America better than a general public appreciation of at least the outstanding features of the experience through which she and the whole world have just staggered—the causes of the War, the conduct of the War, the conclusions of the War.

To further such a general public appreciation, this history has been written. Its purpose is thus a broad rather than a specialized appeal. I have therefore ranged far and wide in the literature of the subjects I have treated, relying in large measure upon the investigations of specialists in their respective fields. A bibliography of works covering in greater detail the events chronicled in these pages will be found at the end of Volume II.

B. B.

New York City, April 1, 1919.

TABLE OF CONTENTS, VOLUME I

	Page
PREFACE	i
THE ROOTS OF THE WAR	1
The Congress of Vienna	1
The Holy Alliance	4
THE SUPPRESSION OF NATIONALITIES	6
Belgium	7
Italy	7
Norway	8
The Rise of Germany	9
Alsace-Lorraine	15
Italia Irredenta	16
Ireland	17
Poland	21
Finland, Baltic Provinces and Lithuania	23
Ukraine	24
Armenia	26
Czecho-Slovakia	27
The Land of the Magyars	28
The Land of the Roumans	29
The Land of the Bulgars	30
Jugo-Slavia	31
ECONOMIC AND TRADE RIVALRIES	35
The National Industrial Revolution	35
The International Industrial Revolution	36
THE SUPPRESSION OF LIBERALISM AND THE GROWTH OF MILITARISM	43
In Germany	43
In Russia	55

	Page
GERMAN DIPLOMATIC DOMINATION, 1870-1911	57
The Isolation of France	57
The League of the Three Emperors	58
The Triple Alliance	59
The Machinations of Bismarck	62
Accession of William II	63
The Alliance between France and Russia	64
The Dreyfus Affair	66
The Fashoda Incident	68
The Beginning of Anglo-German Rivalry	69
The Berlin-to-Bagdad Railroad	72
The Entente Cordiale	75
The First Moroccan Crisis	77
The Triple Entente	83
The Revolution in Turkey	85
Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria	86
THE DECLINE OF GERMAN DIPLOMATIC DOMINATION, 1911-1914	90
The Second Moroccan Crisis	90
The Turco-Italian War	93
The Balkan Question Again	95
The First Balkan War	96
The Second Balkan War	99
GERMANY PREPARES FOR WAR	103
The Prelude	103
The Pretext	105
THE FOURTEEN DAYS	108
Preliminary Period, June 28-July 23, 1914	110
July 23	114
July 24	118
July 25	122
July 26	127
July 27	128
July 28	132
July 29	135
July 30	140
July 31	145
August 1	151
August 2	158

Page

August 3 161
August 4 164
August 5 168

THE UNITED STATES AND THE WAR, AUGUST 1, 1914-APRIL 6, 1917 169
Neutrality in Thought and Action 169
Possible Dangers to America 172
The American Policy of Isolation 176
The Monroe Doctrine 179
Immigrant Stocks in America 193
The Effect upon America of the German Treatment of Belgium 197

Diplomatic Negotiations between the United States and Great Britain 200

Diplomatic Negotiations of the United States with Germany and Austria 211
Shipments of Munitions 211
German Plots in the United States 218
The German Submarine Warfare 219
The "Lusitania" Case 223
The "Arabic" Case 237
The "Ancona" Case 238
The Question of Armed Merchantmen 240
The "Sussex" Case 240
The "Deutschland" and the "U-53" 245

Peace Proposals 247

The Diplomatic Break with Germany 260

Armed Neutrality 265

The War Message 273

THE UNITED STATES AND THE WAR, APRIL 6, 1917-NOVEMBER 11, 1918 282
Alien Enemies 286
The Selective Draft 296

	Page
American Expeditionary Force	307
Food Control	310
Early Activities of the Red Cross	319
Flag Day Address of President Wilson, 1917	331
Liberty Loans	334
Control of Exports, Prices and Fuel	339
The Pope's Peace Proposal and Its Reception	348
War with Austria	351
Government Control of Transportation	359
Trading with the Enemy Act	373
Alien Property Custodian	376
The Espionage Law	378
Conscientious Objectors	382
Prayers for Victory	386
Sabbath Observance in the Army and Navy	387
The War and Public Education	389
Indirect Peace Negotiations	391
Address of Premier Lloyd-George, January 6, 1918	394
"The Fourteen Points"	402

ILLUSTRATIONS, VOLUME I

	Opposite Page
Woodrow Wilson ..... *Frontispiece*	
King George—President Poincaré—King Albert—King Victor Emmanuel—Emperor Yoshihito	1
Map—Europe in 1914.....	16
Map—Races in Europe.....	28
Luxury in German Trenches—Captured German Tank—Observation Post in the Vosges.....	32
Joffre—Petain—Foch—Diaz—Gouraud	64
The Devastation of War.....	80
Bullard—Bliss—Pershing—Liggett—Dickman	96
Airship Station from Above.....	112
Lansing—Clemenceau—Lloyd George—Orlando—Venizelos	128
The End of a German Gotha—Anti-Aircraft Gun at the Front—A Fokker in Range.....	144
Morgenthau—Whitlock—Gerard—Page—Sharpe	160
German Dead on the Battlefield—Abandoned Tank—The Effect of Fire	192
Booth—Mott—Davison—Mulligan—Cutler	208
Food for the Guns—Carrier Pigeons—The Beginnings of a Camp	224
Wounded in the Last Drive—German Prisoners Giving Aid to Wounded Tommy—Wounded Anzacs Treated at the Front....	256
Taft—Schwab—Hoover—Creel—Hurley	272
Troops at Camp	288
Baruch—Palmer—Garfield—Ryan—Hines	320
A Fleet of Transports at Sea—Smoke Screens.....	336
Reconstruction of Damaged Airplanes—Above the Clouds over Paris—Tractor Towing Airplane.....	352
Gompers—Willard—Walsh—Fosdick—McCormick	384



© Underwood & Underwood

DESCRIPTION OF PICTURES ON REVERSE SIDE

Upper Left Hand Corner—George V., King of England, 1910—.

Upper Right Hand Corner—Raymond Poincaré, President of the French Republic, 1913—.

Center—Albert I., King of Belgium, 1909—.

Lower Left Hand Corner—Victor Emmanuel III., King of Italy, 1900—.

Lower Right Hand Corner—Yoshihito, Emperor of Japan, 1912—.

A History of the Great War

THE ROOTS OF THE WAR

For many years after the end of the most stupendous war in the history of the modern world, no historian will be able to describe it adequately and impartially. Authentic sources of information were barred not only during the struggle, but also for many years previously to it; and belligerents in the heat of battle minimize their own shortcomings and magnify those of their opponents to the point of virtual falsification. Clarifying treaties and arrangements are kept from the light of public knowledge, and for many years after the signing of the final terms of peace official and unofficial custodians of the truth will impart their information only in the light of the interests of their respective countries. And, finally, no nation drawn into the vortex of the war will be free from bias, while even neutral lands will have their prejudices.

On the fundamental fact concerning the holocaust, however, there can be no disagreement. Belligerent and neutral, friend and foe, pro-German and pro-Ally, democrat and autocrat, militarist and pacifist, capitalist and Socialist, nationalist and internationalist, conservative and radical, Christian and agnostic,—all agree on this one point:

The War was no isolated phenomenon, but had its roots deep down in the relations between the countries of the world as they shaped themselves for many decades before August 1, 1914.

The Congress of Vienna

Adequately to understand the causes of the Great War, it is necessary to go back exactly one hundred years before 1914, and to con-

sider the partition of Europe as arranged at the Congress of Vienna, which met at the close of the Napoleonic Wars in 1814. In surprisingly many instances, the Congress of Vienna parallels the Congress of Paris in 1919. In both conferences, the victorious nations had been drawn together by the fear of a common foe and his threat of domination—in 1814, France under Napoleon and in 1919, Germany under Kaiser William II. In each case, the victorious nations were aware of a background of unrest which at all cost had to be suppressed—in 1814, the democratic ideas emanating from the French Revolution and in 1919, the Bolshevist ideas emanating from the Russian Revolution. In each case, the world had given of the best of its manhood and of its resources until all civilization itself seemed to be imperilled, and in each case there was determination to decrease armaments and to preserve peace at any cost for a long time in the future. In each case, a high principle of deliberation was asserted—in 1814, Talleyrand's principle of "legitimacy" and in 1919, Wilson's ideal of the self-determination of all nationalities. In each case, the conferees maintained, at least officially, a resolution to collect the nations of the world into an orderly arrangement—in 1814, the Holy Alliance and in 1919, the League of Nations. In each case, the final decisions of the conference lay in the hands of five great Powers—in 1814, Great Britain, Austria, Russia, Prussia and France, the latter finally included as an equal instead of as a defeated foe; and in 1919, Great Britain, France, Japan, Italy and the United States. In each case, the victorious nations had signed a preliminary agreement to fight as a unit until their common foe had been defeated. And in each case, the results of the deliberations would or rather could determine the destinies of practically the entire population of the earth.

But the Congress of Vienna degenerated almost from its inception into an unprincipled scramble for territory, irrespective of nationality, irrespective of ethical claims, irrespective of treaty and high purpose. Each of the great Powers asserted itself as its armed strength permitted, and the resulting arrangements were those of might, not right. The chief territorial re-adjustments were as follows:

About three-fifths of Poland was given to Russia. Austria and Prussia each obtained about one-fifth.

Belgium was given to Holland, and placed under the rule of the King of Holland.

About two-fifths of Saxony was given to Prussia.

Prussia was given also large slices of territory to the west and east of the Rhine, separated from Prussia proper, however, by the new German Confederation.

The new German Confederation was composed of the thirty-eight independent German states which Napoleon had reconstructed from the hundreds of separate states which had composed the Holy Roman Empire.

Napoleon's attempt to reconstruct a unified Italy, however, was disregarded, and Italy was split up again into separate principalities.

Austria was given the Italian territory of Venice, Lombardy and Tuscany, together with the connecting province of Modena. Austria maintained similarly her sovereignty over Bohemia (the land of the Czechs) and the lands of the Slavs to the south and east of the Magyar section of Hungary.

Finland was handed over to Russia.

Norway was given to Sweden.

Switzerland was constituted a free and independent country.

England's gains were colonial, consisting of Ceylon and the land around the Cape of Good Hope, from which spread her later expansion into Africa.

The problems of Turkey and the Balkan peninsula were not touched, Turkey retaining control over Constantinople and Greece and over the Slavonic population of what are now Servia, Bulgaria, Roumania, Montenegro and Hungary.

It needs but a glance at the arbitrary disregard of the principles of nationality represented in these settlements to see how rigorously and inevitably they determined the future enmities and alliances between the great Powers of Europe from which the Great War burst forth on August 1, 1914.

The Holy Alliance

Obviously, the ruthless consolidations of territory perfected at the Congress of Vienna could be maintained only by an organization of the great Powers for that purpose. Accordingly, Tsar Alexander I of Russia launched a pact which Austria and Prussia immediately signed, in order to clarify the principles to govern the new map of Europe.

Alexander was a man of strong religious and mystical feeling, and in theory the new alliance was but an application to international problems of the teachings of Christianity—hence its name. Under the leadership of Metternich, the Austrian premier, however, the Holy Alliance became in practise a pact whereby all the great Powers agreed to crush liberalism and democratic ideas wherever they reared their heads. To that end, Metternich developed the new doctrine of the right of the Concert of Europe to intervene in any country in order to prevent the spread of "impractical" and "revolutionary" teachings.

The Holy Alliance was officially proclaimed in 1816, and France, Spain, Sardinia and Naples soon also aligned themselves under it. Great Britain gave a nominal approval of its principles, although she soon came to dissent vigorously from the autocratic application of those principles by Metternich.

In 1820, the Holy Alliance utilized its powers in Italy to crush the revolutions of Piedmont and Naples. Three years later, France under the direction of the Holy Alliance restored absolutism in Spain. But when the Holy Alliance attempted to project itself into South America and suppress the movement for freedom in the Spanish colonies there, President Monroe of the United States, supported by England, barred the way with the doctrine which soon came to be called by his name. The successful struggle of Greece for independence from Turkey, consummated by 1827, also weakened the strength of the Holy Alliance, and the revolutions throughout western Europe in 1848 saw the decline of its influence. Nevertheless, the extent to which it cast its shadow before it into the problems of a later day may be seen by the fact that it was under the influence of the principles of the Holy

Alliance that Russia intervened in 1849 to put down a revolution of Hungary against Austria—and in the internal arrangements of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, with its consequent relations with the countries of the Balkan peninsula, the seeds of the Great War of 1914 sprouted most prolifically.

So that the result of the Napoleonic Wars set into motion three definite movements which transfixed and transfigured all world politics for the next hundred years, and reached their climax when the Imperial German Government dispatched its troops through Belgium on August 2, 1914:

I —The Suppression of Nationalities.
II —Economic and Trade Rivalries.
III—The Suppression of Liberalism and the Growth of Militarism.

I—THE SUPPRESSION OF NATIONALITIES

A "nationality" may be defined as a section of the human race which possesses a community of language, a similarity of ethical and political standards, a joint body of traditions, a unity of political aspirations, and a consciousness of similarity among the individuals comprising it. Nationality is thus determined neither by origin nor by race. For instance, ethnologically and historically Alsace and Lorraine are more closely related to Germany than to France; but in the decades preceding 1870 they had become so integral a part of the French nation that their forcible annexation by Germany in 1870 was the annexation of a land and a people away from the nationality of which they had become a part to a nationality with which they had little in common.

It was the French Revolution at the very end of the eighteenth century which let loose upon the western world the consciousness of nationality. Before that time, the allegiance of the individual citizen was to his ruler as an individual, not to his country as a political entity; and the ruler held power only by grace of God, and was responsible only to God—the citizens of the state recognized no authority of their own over their rulers. The ideals promulgated by the French Revolution, however, soon resolved themselves into ideals of what is called today political democracy. And, paradoxically enough, it was Napoleon, the destroyer of the French Revolution, who unconsciously spread the ideals of the Revolution throughout Europe as he led his French armies over the vast territory conquered by him.

In the hundred years following the violation of the principles of nationality by the Congress of Vienna, the course of national movements throughout Europe might be roughly summarized as follows:

In western Europe, suppressed nationalities achieved self-expression; in central and eastern Europe, they remained suppressed.

In Western Europe

Nationalities Achieving Self-Expression Before 1914

Belgium

A glance at the map of Europe will show the strategic position of both Holland and Belgium. It is through Holland that the Rhine finds its way to the sea and through which accordingly all shipping on this deep and navigable stream may be controlled. In addition, Belgium enjoys command over the approach to England by sea.

Belgium chafed under the rule of Holland for fifteen years after the Congress of Vienna, but found no opportunity for revolt until 1830. In that year, a revolt broke out in France and crossed the border into Belgium, which declared itself independent of Dutch rule. Of the five chief signatories of the Congress of Vienna, England and France came to the rescue of Belgium—the former because she wanted a buffer state against threatened encroachments of either France or Prussia along the English Channel; and France because she was anxious to assert her freedom from the control of Prussia, Austria and Russia. By 1839, the great Powers, including the signatories of the Congress of Vienna, had guaranteed independence for Belgium and agreed to respect her neutrality.

Italy

Well might Metternich call Italy after the Congress of Vienna a mere "geographical expression." To the north, much territory was in Austrian hands. To the south, the kingdom of Naples was in Spanish hands. And in the center, stretching across the entire Italian peninsula, were the lands of the Pope.

In 1848, the smouldering feeling for nationality in Italy gave vent to a revolution throughout almost the entire peninsula, inspired by the fall of Metternich as premier of Austria in that year. However, the revolution finally failed in Italy as in Austria, and Austria was successful in regaining her hold over the lands in Italy assigned her by the Congress of Vienna, except in Piedmont, where the king of Sardinia was able to make a stand for Italy.

Several years later, however, Italian unity began to assert itself around this same King of Sardinia, Victor Emmanuel II. Assisted by one of the greatest statesmen of all time, Cavour, and with the support of a strong Republican leader, Mazzini, an alliance was perfected with France. When Victor Emmanuel managed to embroil himself in war with Austria in 1859, France came promptly to his rescue. Austria was soon defeated, and was compelled to withdraw from all Italian territory except Venetia. But France insisted that the war end before Venetia could be conquered, as France did not desire to see Italy become too powerful.

The south of Italy was comprised in the kingdom of Naples, whose king refused to align himself with the king of Sardinia as the latter began to establish a nucleus around which Italian national feeling asserted itself. Accordingly, a bold leader, Garibaldi, gathered around himself a band of followers with which he proceeded in 1860 to conquer Sicily in the name of the king of Sardinia, soon thereafter crossing over into Naples itself. The king of Sardinia utilized the occasion to dispatch an army into the Papal States, annexing all of them except the country immediately surrounding the city of Rome. On November 7, 1860, the king of Sardinia and Garibaldi joined forces; and except for Venetia and Rome, Italy had become one nation.

When Prussia attacked Austria in 1866, Italy came to the assistance of the former, and was rewarded by being given all of Venetia. The naval attack against Trent and Trieste, however, failed; and thus there came into existence "Italia Irredenta"—Italy Unredeemed—around which much of the diplomacy of the Great War of 1914-1919 turned. In 1871, the territory around Rome was annexed to the kingdom of Italy, and the capital was transferred to Rome.

Norway

After the Congress of Vienna, Norway enjoyed practical autonomy under Swedish rule. Until 1885, little desire for separation manifested itself. After that year, however, a strong national feeling broke out, to be checked only when Russian aggression against Finland threatened both countries of the Scandinavian peninsula. In

1905, the defeat of Russia at the hands of Japan seemed to remove the menace of the Slav, and in that year a peaceful separation between Norway and Sweden was achieved.

The Rise of Germany

From the chaos of the hundreds of little states of the Holy Roman Empire, Prussia emerged as a great Power under Frederick the Great in the middle of the eighteenth century. The Congress of Vienna left Prussia with almost the same territory as comprised in the Prussia of 1914, with the exception of the dividing wedge provided by the thirty-eight states of the new German Confederation. The German nationality was thus divided among three contiguous territories—Prussia, the German Confederation and German Austria, although there were also some Slavs comprised within the southern states of the German Confederation.

The first force to weld together the German people into a trenchant national consciousness was economic. In the several decades after the Congress of Vienna, the Industrial Revolution crossed over from England into Germany; and the era of steam transportation could but serve to bring into a close geographical unity the separate countries among which the German people was distributed. It soon became evident, however, that to utilize the fruits of the Industrial Revolution, the different elements in Prussia would have to be brought into close economic unity. Accordingly, a customs union ("Zollverein") was organized; and from this economic unification sprang a consciousness of ethnological unity which soon gave birth to a national Prussian spirit. Having formed a customs union within Prussia, Prussia successfully undertook to form one within the German Confederation; and the road for German unity was thus paved. Austria was not included in the new Zollverein, and her influence over the Confederation was thus appreciably weakened.

The dominating force in the German Confederation was Austria, and when William I came to the throne of Prussia in 1858, he was induced by his ministers to foresee the inevitable removal of Austrian influence before Prussia would be able to proceed in the political unification of the German people. He was shown that war was a matter

of but a few years, and to that end he developed to the fullest the military resources of his kingdom. The direct management of his purposes he entrusted to Otto von Bismarck, whom he called to his side as Prime Minister in 1862 and who soon revealed himself the outstanding statesman of his age. By this time, the nationalistic spirit of Prussia was in full bloom. Some years before, the country had presented an unbroken intellectual and emotional front against the purposes of French chauvinists to annex Prussian territory along the Rhine. German philosophers from Kant through Hegel were in the forefront of philosophic thought. History, science, literature, music, art, all were those of a young giant just beginning to be conscious of his strength. Prussian nationalism was now an accomplished fact—there remained now only the task of creating from it as foundation a German nationalism.

War with Denmark—In order to effect the expulsion of Austria from the German Confederation, Bismarck picked a quarrel with Denmark concerning the Danish provinces of Schleswig and Holstein. In this one instance, the principle of nationality seemed to be on the side of Prussia, for these two provinces were populated almost entirely by Germans, although the provinces had belonged to Denmark for centuries and although they had enjoyed practical autonomy under Danish rule until 1863.

Bismarck invited Austria to join with Prussia in establishing Schleswig-Holstein as an independent unit within the German Confederation. Denmark refused her assent, the two Powers declared war against her, defeated her, and forced her to surrender the provinces to Prussia and Austria jointly, in October, 1864.

War with Austria—The pretext for the crushing of Austria was thus afforded. Bismarck proposing a plan whereby the two provinces should be virtually placed under Prussian domination and Austria refusing sanction to such a plan, a temporary arrangement was patched up whereby Schleswig was placed under Prussia and Holstein under Austria.

Bismarck then secretly made arrangements with France to remain neutral in case of an Austrian-Prussian war and with Italy to join

forces against Austria in order to free Venetia from Austrian rule and to incorporate it in the rapidly-forming Italian nation. Russian neutrality was bought by promise of Prussian assistance in quelling Polish revolt against Russian domination. Then, by various pretexts centering around the disposition of Schleswig and Holstein, Austria was led to get the German Confederation to declare war against Prussia in June, 1866.

Prussia immediately countered by declaring that this act absolved Prussia from her membership in the Confederation and formally withdrew from it; and practically all the states of the German Confederation joined Austria when war was formally declared between Prussia and Austria on June 14, 1866. Prussia came into the field with a proposal for the reformation of the territory inhabited by Germans and demanded first that the North German states accept that proposal. On their refusal, Prussia occupied them, crushed all resistance, then utilized her magnificent military organization under von Moltke to defeat Austria so decisively at the battle of Sadowa (July 3) that the war was practically ended there, and with it was ended Austria's influence in the German Confederation. Prussia immediately added to her own territory by annexing land from the North German states, and from the remainder created the North German Federation, of which Prussia became the President and with which she united into something of a federal empire with more or less autonomous states.

The four large South German states then voluntarily and for their self-protection formed themselves into the South German Federation. They were supported by France, now thoroughly alarmed by the menace of the consolidation of the German nationality under the leadership of Prussia; and thus the opposition between France and Prussia came into the open.

This opposition between France and Prussia influenced Bismarck to refrain from a policy of humiliation of Austria after her defeat at his hands. He foresaw that the day would come when an alliance between Austria and Prussia would become imperative. Moreover, he never forgot that at that time (as in 1919) the eastern territory comprised within Austria was inhabited largely by Germans. Aus-

tria was punished but little, aside from being barred from the new German Confederation and aside from the incorporation of Schleswig-Holstein within Prussia. The latter arrangement gave Prussia the important harbor of Kiel, through which a canal could be constructed to unite the Baltic and North Seas.

The Franco-Prussian War—The overwhelming success of Prussia against Austria in 1866 was as unpalatable to France as it was unexpected. The rise of another Power in Europe with claims to be recognized as one of the great Powers would not only deprive France of the position of dictation in European affairs opened to her by the defeat of Austria, but might also put an end to future acquisition of territory by France on the Continent.

In addition, Napoleon III of France had personal reasons for desiring a French triumph over Prussia. Republican feeling was growing in France, and he could foresee the day when the monarchy in France might again be disestablished, unless he could rally his people behind him in some popular and successful cause. His attempt to force a French prince upon Mexico had ended in disaster, and had seriously diminished his prestige as a diplomat. Moreover, Bismarck had thwarted Napoleon's attempt to buy the duchy of Luxemburg from Holland, and throughout Europe Prussia was being looked upon as the diplomatic conqueror of France.

On their side, Bismarck and Prussia had everything to gain from war. The defeat of a different and rival nationality would weld together the German people into a cohesion possible through no other event and thus dissipate the last barriers to the political union of the entire German nationality. Bismarck knew that the strength of the French army existed only on paper, and that actually it was in a deplorable state of unpreparedness; whereas the military preparations of Prussia were well-nigh as perfect as they could be made by mortal hands and brains. Prussian agents were secretly mapping French topography and investigating French resources, and before long French military conditions were better known to Prussia than to France itself. In both France and Prussia, therefore, popular war enthusiasm did not arise spontaneously, but was manufactured by the machinations of the leaders of the respective countries.

France opened the diplomatic struggle by attempts to acquire German territory along the Rhine, only to be thwarted by Bismarck. Napoleon III then made definite plans to invade and annex Belgium—plans which Bismarck made public at a strategic moment to direct European public opinion against France in favor of Prussia. But the direct pretext for war arose in Spain.

Queen Isabella of Spain was forced from her throne in 1868, and the Spanish national assembly, possibly through the plotting of Bismarck, offered the vacant throne to a distant relative of the king of Prussia. This offer fanned the war fever in France, and France officially protested, with the result that the king of Prussia consented to his relative's refusal to accept the Spanish offer. France declined to be satisfied, however, and went to the length of demanding that the candidacy should never be re-opened.

To this last demand, William of Prussia naturally would not yield, although he put his refusal so politely to the French ambassador that a correct account of the procedure would have caused no international complication. This was no part of Bismarck's plans, however, so the Prussian prime minister deliberately set about to edit the account of the meeting so as to suggest that the French ambassador had been directly insulted by the Prussian king. This was too much for the French people, under the leadership of militarists. Paris resounded with cries of "To Berlin!" and "Revenge for Sadowa!" and on July 19, 1870, France declared war on Prussia.

Bismarck's diplomacy had completely isolated France. Italy would use war to attack France's ally, the Pope; friendship with Russia had been sedulously cultivated; Austria had been mollified; England was concerned only with seeing that Belgian neutrality was observed. If Napoleon III had counted on the support of the South German Confederation, he soon found that by 1870 the principle of nationality had gained too strong a hold upon Europe for one group of Germans to come to the aid of the French against a group of their fellow-Germans, especially since from the first day of the war the magnificent Prussian army carried all before it. One French army was shut up in Metz. The second great French army was utterly bewildered by German strategy, was surrounded, was defeated and forced to capitu-

late completely at Sedan (September 3), and with it Napoleon himself was taken prisoner. Two months later the strongly-fortified Metz and Strassburg were also in German possession. The remaining French troops were driven into Paris, the city was surrounded and bombarded, and after 127 days of terrible suffering, Paris was starved into surrender on January 28, 1871.

But Bismarck made the fatal mistake of not being content with the formal humiliation and defeat of France. Even the deposition of Napoleon III after Sedan and the re-establishment of a republic in France was not enough for Prussia; nor was Bismarck satisfied by the indemnity of 5,000,000,000 francs exacted from France, which he hoped would cripple her for a long time but which the thrifty French peasants soon collected in order to rid French soil of the hated Prussian army. Tempted by the mineral resources of Alsace and Lorraine, by their strategic geographical position, and by the economic injury to France inherent in cutting her off from access to the Rhine, Prussia seized Alsace and Lorraine as part of the spoils of war. The principle of nationality was thus violated so as to include within Germany an alien element.

With the Franco-Prussian war, the coherence of the German nation was definitely achieved. The South German Federation had joined the North German Federation during the war, and therefore naturally formally annexed itself to the league of which Prussia was the leader when victory was assured. On January 18, 1871, while Paris was still besieged and in Versailles itself, the historic abode of the kings of France, the formal union of all the German states was announced; the name of the federation was changed from the "North German Federation" to the "German Empire," of which Prussia remained the corner-stone; and surrounded by the leaders of all the German states, the King of Prussia was proclaimed the German Emperor. Close political union with Austria meant close political union with that section of the German nationality within Austria. Complete political unity of the German nationality had been achieved; the whole world was now its arena.

Nationalities Not Achieving Self-Expression Before 1914

Alsace-Lorraine

It is impossible to forecast to what extent fair treatment would have succeeded in welding Alsace-Lorraine into unity with the new German Empire. Switzerland is but one example of a country in which different nationalities live together in concord while there is no attempt at political and economic suppression one of the other. Indeed, as has been seen, the inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine were originally of Germanic stock, and had been drawn within the circle of French culture only by the freedom which they enjoyed under French rule.

Bismarck, however, set about to Germanize Alsace and Lorraine by the policy of "blood and iron." Soon after the Treaty of Frankfort which closed the Franco-Prussian War, thousands of inhabitants of the new German territory were compelled to emigrate to France because they chose to retain French rather than German citizenship. For a long time, Alsace and Lorraine were under stringent political disabilities, and even when, in the twentieth century, a form of autonomous constitutional government was presented them, it proved to be shadowy rather than real; and for practical purposes, when the Great War broke out the 2,000,000 people of Alsace-Lorraine were subjects rather than citizens of the German Empire.

Perhaps the chief source of irritation was the suppression of the French language, its use being forbidden in official assemblies, in the schools, and even on tombstones! Radical and even liberal newspapers were also suppressed. The young men were forced to become part of the German army which had just conquered their land, by being driven under the yoke of the German system of universal military training. In the meantime, Germany endeavored to neutralize the hostility of the population by extensive colonization of Alsace and Lorraine by German settlers; and the vast mineral resources of the new colonies were developed by German industrial efficiency until the iron fields of Alsace-Lorraine became the most productive in the world, and their coal fields among the most productive.

But all in vain. Alsace-Lorraine would go to all lengths to get

freedom from German oppression, although there is evidence to show that before 1914 complete autonomy was desired above even re-annexation to France. With the actual invasion of France by German armies in 1914, however, Alsace-Lorraine regarded itself as a part of the invaded nation. France, on her side, never forgave the rape of her fair Rhine provinces, and thus from 1870 to 1914 there smouldered between France and Germany a popular and fundamental resentment on which the movement for war throve and grew fat.

"Italia Irredenta"


"Italy Unredeemed" signifies today two sections of western Hungary which are inhabited by people of Italian descent and of Italian tongue. These are (1) the Trentino and (2) Trieste with a strip of coast along the Adriatic south of Trieste.

The Trentino is the southwestern projection of Hungary into the Italian peninsula, including the city of Trent. It stretches north of Lake Garda and would comprise roughly that portion of Hungary enclosed between the frontier in 1914 and a line drawn between Mount Marmolate on the east and Mount Ortler on the west. It would cover between 2,500 and 3,000 square miles.

Trieste derives its importance from its excellent harbor, which is the only one along the east coast of the Adriatic with natural facilities of the first order. Its position has made it the chief seaport of Austria-Hungary, and its value to the two countries which claim it can accordingly hardly be overestimated. Although about three-fourths of its population is Italian, the Istrian peninsula, of which it is at the head, has a population only about one-third Italian. Indeed, only the cities and towns along the west shore of the Istrian peninsula have a predominantly Italian population, the country back of the Adriatic (the "Hinterland"), including the city of Fiume, being chiefly Slavic, both by origin and by colonization.

The struggle between Austria-Hungary and Italy for the Trentino and especially for Trieste has been a point around which turned many of the international alliances preceding and accompanying the Great War. It was undoubtedly with the hope of acquiring them that Italy finally threw in her lot with the Entente Allies, and dispatched her


Longitude West from Greenwich.
30°
25°
20°
15°
10°
5°
0°
5°
10°
15°
ARCTIC
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
Cape Rifstangi
ARCTIC CIRCLE
LOFOTEN ISLANDS
FAROE ISLANDS
SHETLAND ISLANDS
ORKNEY ISLANDS
HEBRIDES
Bergen
Trondhjem
Sundsvall
Gefle
Christiana
Upsala
Stockholm
Kinnaird Head
The Naze
BRITISH ISLES
NORTH SEA
SKAGER RAK
Gothenburg
Norrkoping
Edinburgh
Dublin
Sunderland
Liverpool
Hull
Cape Clear
Cork
St. George's Channel
Lands End
Plymouth
London
Amsterdam
The Hague
Hamburg
Berlin
Stettin
Danzig
ENGLISH CHANNEL
Isle of Wight
Brighton
Dover
Calais
Lille
Amiens
Cologne
Leipzig
Dresden
Breslau
Rennes
Nantes
Paris
Reims
Orleans
Frankfort
Nuremberg
Prague
Cape Ortegal
Cape Finisterre
BAY OF BISCAY
Bordeaux
Dijon
Munich
Vienna
Oporto
Burgos
Toulouse
Lyons
Geneva
Mt. Blanc
Milan
Venice
Trieste
Lisbon
Cape St. Vincent
Gulf of Lions
MARSEILLES
Toulon
CORSICA (to FRANCE)
Ajaccio
BARCELONA
BALEARIC ISLANDS
Valencia
Madrid
Cadiz
Strait of Gibraltar
Malaga
Gibraltar
Cartagena
SARDINIA
Cagliari
Rome
Mt. Vesuvius
NAPLES
TYRRHENIAN SEA
MEDITERRANEAN
ADRIATIC SEA
Ancona
Spalato
Ragusa
Durazzo
IONIAN SEA
Palermo
SICILY
Malta Channel
MALTA (Br.)
AFRICA
Cape Matapan
Longitude East from Greenwich.
5°
10°
15°
20°
Rand, McNally & Co.'s Grammar School Geography Map of Europe.


EUROPE.
IN 1914
Scale of Statute Miles.
0 50 100 200 300 400 500
KANSAS
81,700 Square Miles.
Copyright by Rand, McNally & Co.
KARA SEA
NOVAYA ZEMLYA
Kara Strait
WHITE SEA
Archangel
Dvina River
Lake Onega
ST. PETERSBURG
Reval
Gulf of Finland
Lake Peipus
Novgorod
Valdai Hills
Jaroslav
Kostroma
Nizhni Novgorod
Kazan
MOSCOW
Oka River
Volga River
Samara
Orenburg
Ural River
Riga
Gulf of Riga
Dvina River
Vitebsk
Tula
Tambov
Saratov
Minsk
Mohilev
Orel
Kursk
Kharkov
Kiev
Poltava
Berdichev
Donets River
Don River
Rostov
Astrakhan
Odessa
SEA OF AZOV
CRIMEA
Kuban River
Terek River
CAUCASUS
Mt. Elbrut
MOUNTAINS
CASPIAN SEA
Sebastopol
BLACK SEA
ROUMANIA
BULGARIA
CONSTANTINOPEL
ASIA MINOR
Tigris River
CYPRUS
CANDIA
ARCHIPELAGO SEA
Ob River
Perm
Petchora River
URAL MOUNTAINS
Torneo
Lake Enare
Kylouey Island
Kola Peninsula
Lake Ladoga
Lake Ilmen
Vilna
Libau
Pripet River
Dniester River
Danube River
Bug River
Dniepr River
Kherson
Tchernaya River
Sea of Marmora
Dardanelles
Lake Vyg
Lake Enare

troops against Austria through "Italia Irredenta." And it was Italian claim to and occupancy of territory along the Adriatic beyond the sea-coast strip inhabited by Italians which caused that friction between the South Slavs and Italy which determined many of the peace negotiations of the Great War of 1914-19.

Ireland

In many respects, the most flagrant example of a suppressed nationality in western Europe cannot be laid at the doors of the Congress of Vienna. For centuries, the "Irish Question" has troubled the well-being of England, and the Napoleonic Wars neither aggravated nor diminished the seriousness of the quarrel between the two countries.

The Irish are Celts—indeed, one of the significant features of the contemporaneous movement for Irish freedom has been the revival of the Celtic language, not only in literary usage, but also in popular and legislative assemblies. In addition, except for Ulster, Ireland is Catholic and agricultural, in contrast with Protestant and industrial England. The constant friction between the two nations is thus by no means fortuitous.

A vital issue in the Irish problem was long the ownership of the land of Ireland. From the invasion of Ireland by a band of Normans in 1169 down to the nineteenth century, more and more of the land was confiscated by England; until Ireland came into the nineteenth century with a population mostly of tenant farmers, living on soil owned by men of English descent, mercilessly exploited by the agents who managed the farms for the owners (many of them absentee landlords), under limitations which made the Irish practically agricultural serfs, dispossessed on the slightest pretext, and existing from day to day and from year to year in the midst of poverty which beggars description. It is estimated, for instance, that between 1845 and 1847 the failure of the potato crop caused the death of almost 100,000 people literally by starvation, while hundreds of thousands were kept alive only by some form of public or private charity; and the wretchedness of their lot drove about one-fifth of the population to emigrate to America in the five years following 1845. To the agricultural distress

of the country was added general economic prostration due to the imposition of restrictive economic measures. It is believed that Ireland came into the nineteenth century with a population of some 8,000,000; today it is less than 4,000,000.

Marked alleviation of the misery of Ireland had to wait for 1881 and Gladstone. In that year, the celebrated English statesman secured the passage of measures providing some definite improvement in conditions; and later acts of 1885, 1888, 1891 and 1903 gradually paved the way for the transfer of the soil of Ireland from wealthy owners to the hard-driven Irish peasantry. Even today, however, much Irish soil is in the hands of the English and Irish nobility and of the upper classes; and accordingly much of the difficulty of handling the "Irish Question" is still economic.

The second great issue between Ireland and England is that of religion. Again Ireland came into the nineteenth century with a population forced to submit to a state church toward which it felt little but horror and hatred, and even to pay tithes to support it; while the Catholic allegiance of the poverty-stricken Irish peasant was the source of stringent political restrictions upon him. It was not until 1829 that the English Parliament, with violent opposition from the established Anglican Church in both England and Ireland, removed from Catholics the ban on holding political office. It was not until 1867 that the working classes were definitely enfranchised, and it was not until two years later that the Anglican Church in Ireland was disendowed and disestablished. By this time, more than half of the population of Ireland had emigrated to the United States.

Today, however, the most pressing aspect of the Irish question is the political.

The Act of Union between Ireland and England dates from 1801. It abrogated the Irish Parliament which had existed before that time, although with few real powers; and so bitter was the opposition to the Act in Ireland that votes of Irish legislators necessary to ratification were secured only by wide-spread bribery.

Even before 1801, however, riots and uprisings in Ireland had occurred periodically. These manifestations of Irish feeling throughout the eighteenth century down to the American Revolution had

represented little more than despair and hatred at oppression. But the lesson taught by the success of the American colonies in escaping from a foreign rule was not lost upon Ireland, and many secret societies began to function for political independence.

The French Revolution also impregnated Ireland with consciousness of nationality and with longings for political freedom, with the result that a violent and sanguinary revolution broke out again in 1798.

After the Act of Union, the movement for political freedom was abortive until it came definitely under the leadership of Daniel O'Connell in 1829; and by 1834 the sentiment for Home Rule had become strong. By 1848, a somewhat better organization was perfected, with facilities for propaganda. Ten years later, Irish immigrants in the United States, who had lost none of their bitterness toward England, began to organize as Fenians in societies aiming at freedom by violence if necessary, and the resulting violence and even international complications were serious.

In 1870, the political party of the Irish Nationalists was formed to achieve Home Rule. It soon fell under the able and persistent leadership of Charles Stewart Parnell, who also organized five years later the powerful Land League. The murder in 1882 of Lord Cavendish, Lieutenant Governor of Ireland, in Phoenix Park, Dublin, although it served to stir up enmity toward the Home Rulers, also brought a realization of the seriousness of the Irish Question. Gladstone soon became converted to the principles of Home Rule, and in 1886, when an almost evenly-divided Parliament gave the Nationalists the balance of power, brought in a Home Rule Bill, only to see it defeated in the House of Commons by a small majority.

In 1893, Gladstone again brought in a Home Rule Bill, and steered it successfully through the House of Commons, only to see it slaughtered in the House of Lords.

In the twentieth century, the Liberal ministry of Mr. Asquith again saw the Nationalists holding the balance of power, with the result that the third Home Rule Bill was introduced in 1912. It was again thrown out by the House of Lords, but now Asquith enjoyed an advantage over Gladstone. For by 1912, the House of Lords had been

deprived of its absolute veto power, and when the Bill passed the House of Commons for the third time on May 5, 1914, it automatically became the law of the land.

As has been seen, the opposition within Ireland to Home Rule is centred around the provinces comprising Ulster, within which is included the city of Belfast, and representing the problem of a recalcitrant minority which has always plagued the development of democratic procedure. Although the religious question and Ulster's defiance of "Rome Rule" are much in the foreground, the dominant point of dispute is economic. Indeed, only about 60 per cent of Ulster is Protestant. Ulster is industrial and wealthy, and fears over-heavy taxation to remedy the ills of agricultural Ireland. Ulster claims that the Home Rule bill does not guarantee it against exploitation by the remainder of Ireland, and that the recent reforms in Ireland without Home Rule have been serviceable and cumulative. When it became apparent that Home Rule would pass the English Parliament, Protestant Ulster, under the leadership of Sir Edward Carson, openly proclaimed its intention to resist the law. Arms were brought in and Ulster armies trained in public defiance of England; and even in the English army in Ireland a powerful group of officers officially proclaimed that they would refuse to obey orders "to coerce Ulster."

So serious was the situation that the English government introduced into Parliament an amendment to the Home Rule Act to exclude automatically from its operations for six years those counties in Ulster which so expressed a desire by referendum. This attempt at compromise, however, merely added fuel to the flames. The Ulster volunteer army became more open in its threats of rebellion; and the Irish Catholics, fearing that at least a large section of the British army would side with Ulster in case the dispute came to civil war, took steps to form their own volunteer army. A section of the British army in Dublin, in attempting to prevent a consignment of arms from reaching the Nationalist volunteers, found it necessary to fire on a mob in the streets, killing several and wounding scores; and the Nationalists swore revenge.

By the summer of 1914, accordingly, civil war in Great Britain to many observers was at least a possibility, a possibility which might

render England powerless to function in any international dispute between the great Powers of Europe. And it was in the summer of 1914 that Austria, supported by Germany, dispatched to Servia the ultimatum which was the spark to set off the whole European powder-box.

Suppressed Nationalities in Central and South Central Europe

Poland

In the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Poland was one of the largest countries of the world, although much of its territory was Polish only through nominal allegiance of minor rulers. Stretching from the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Riga to the southern border of what was in 1914 Galicia (in Austria), and from the Dnieper River in Russia to and including East Prussia, in the middle of the seventeenth century it covered almost 400,000 square miles and was inhabited by some 15,000,000 people.

In the eighteenth century, however, Poland fell under the power of Russia, and by the first partition of Poland in 1772 Russia, Austria and Prussia absorbed large portions of Poland contiguous to them. In 1793 occurred the second partition of Poland, between Prussia and Russia; and in 1795 the rest of what had been Poland was divided among Russia, Austria and Prussia. As has been seen, the Congress of Vienna confirmed the dissemination of this great people among three alien peoples; and when the Great War broke out in 1914, about three-fifths of what had been Poland, containing almost four-fifths of the Polish race, was incorporated in Russia, while Austria and Prussia shared about equally in the remainder.

The Poles are a Slavic race, with a high degree of culture and a history of material and artistic achievements which has helped to preserve the feeling for Polish nationality unweakened after more than a century of partition and repression. Indeed, their history under Russian rule has been an almost unbroken record of revolt for independence and re-union. Russia treated the Poles with tolerance for

fifteen years after the Congress of Vienna, but in 1830 undertook a policy of Russification. The Polish language was banned, in school and church as well as in law-court; the Greek Catholic Church of Russia employed every possible method to starve out the Roman Catholic religion of the Poles; thousands of Polish families were deported; extensive colonization of Poland by Russian peasants was introduced; and with dull regularity the Polish leaders were executed or exiled.

Nevertheless, by 1861 Poland experienced a recrudescence of national consciousness which has continued to the present day, making inevitable as one of the settlements of the Great War the resurrection of a Polish state; but which resulted in 1863 only in a new campaign of Russification and in the complete political amalgamation of Poland in Russia with Russia in 1868. The Polish nationalistic spirit flourished especially among the nobility and the clergy, because these classes were best able to appreciate the services rendered to civilization by the Poles in the past; and Russia in retaliation punished the upper classes by distributing their lands generally among the Polish peasants. By the outbreak of the Great War the Polish peasant was accordingly in a somewhat better economic condition than his Russian brother; and hence in the twentieth century before the Great War the spirit of Polish nationalism often took the form of a longing for mere autonomy under Russia.

This longing was intensified by the repression of the Poles in Prussia, where they inhabited Posen and other parts of East Prussia. Prussian repression of the Polish nationalistic spirit became more brutal than even the Russian, as it not only was more cold-bloodedly efficient, but also because it included practically dispossession and confiscation of the land and other property owned by the Poles. This harsh treatment of the Poles in Germany was the occasion of the first vote of lack of confidence in the Imperial Government ever passed by the German Reichstag. This achievement occurred on January 30, 1913, and was effected by a combination of Polish delegates with Catholic (Centrum) and Socialists (Social Democrats).

On the other hand, Austria needed the support of the Polish political group in Austria against the opposition of other nationalities included

within the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and treated the Poles of Galicia with comparative generosity. Nevertheless, the Austrian Poles kept alive their dreams of another Polish state, and joined with their fellows in Prussia and Russia in the realization of that dream after the Great War. Indeed, among some Poles the aspirations for the new Poland included all the territory covered by Poland before the first partition in 1772, when Poland had within her confines millions of Great Russians, White Russians, Prussians, Ukrainians, and Letts, and was itself repressive of these alien nationalities under its rule.

Finland, Baltic Provinces and Lithuania

Finland comprises the large stretch of land north of the Gulf of Finland to the Arctic Ocean, and divides the peoples of the Scandinavian peninsula from the Slavs of Russia. For the Finns are not an Indo-European race, although they have achieved a culture and a religion through Sweden. Indeed, they possess a high degree of cultivation, and have no points of cultural contact with the Russians. Finland has a territory of about 150,000 square miles, but a population of only 3,000,000.

Finland was annexed from Sweden to Russia in 1809, and the annexation was confirmed by the Congress of Vienna. However, under Russian rule Finland enjoyed absolute freedom of national and even of economic and cultural life until 1899. In that year, the Tsar of Russia launched upon Finland a violent campaign of Russification, which continued until the 1905 revolution in Russia was supported by a similar revolution, together with a powerful general strike, in Finland; and the Finns once more won autonomy. In 1909, however, another period of suppression by Russian rulers began in Finland, and 1911 saw the beginning of a program of partition of the province and of amalgamation with Russia proper.

A thin strip of Norway cuts off Finland from both the Arctic and the Atlantic Oceans. However, a cornerstone in the recent foreign policy of Russia has been the acquisition of a Norwegian port on the open Atlantic, and the strategic importance of Finland's geographical

position consists in the fact that the railroad from Russia to such a port would pass through Finland. As it has been the policy of England and the Scandinavian countries to prevent Russia from realizing her dream of an Atlantic port, those countries have supported Finland as best they might against Russian aggression.

The Baltic Provinces are Courland, Livonia and Esthonia, lying along the east coast of the Baltic Sea south of the Gulf of Finland. The native inhabitants are Letts and Esths, the former a Lithuanian and the latter a Finnish nationality. The upper classes, who dominated the country until 1914, however, are Germans. There are few Russians, and the bulk of the people are Protestants.

The Baltic Provinces were originally conquered by Teutonic invaders, but finally they fell into other hands. Courland was under Polish sway well into the eighteenth century, and Esthonia and Livonia had become parts of Sweden. Toward the end of the eighteenth century, the Baltic provinces were conquered by Russia, and were incorporated within the Russian Empire. A definite campaign of suppression of nationalistic feeling and of Russification was launched upon the Baltic Provinces in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Lithuania stretches from Courland to Poland and Ukraine. The land is for the greater part covered with swamps and forests, and although the inhabitants, with the Letts, have kept alive their national feeling, they are not in a high state of culture. For several centuries before Lithuania was incorporated within Russia toward the end of the eighteenth century, it was under Polish domination; but its inhabitants possess a language and racial characteristics differentiating them from the Poles and forming them with the Letts into a distinct nationality. The Letts extend also into East Prussia and Russian Poland.

Ukraine

Ukraine (literally, "Borderland") constitutes the entire southern part of European Russia from Poland to the Don River, including most of the north coast of the Black Sea. It is thus one and one-half times as large as the Germany of 1914. Ukrainians (Little Russians)

live also in the Austrian province of Galicia, where they are known as Ruthenians; and the total number of Ukrainians is close to 25,000,000. By extent of territory, by number of inhabitants, by fertility of soil, by vastness of natural resources, and by geographical position the problem of Ukraine is accordingly one of the most important and urgent problems arising out of the question of nationality.

The Ukrainian national consciousness in Russia represents one kept alive chiefly by outside pressure rather than by inner aspirations. For the Ukrainians differ from the Great Russians, who comprise the bulk of European Russia, chiefly in language, Ukrainian being a tongue varying markedly in many respects from Russia. In religion, the Ukrainians and the Great Russians are one, the ethnological differences between them are more theoretical than real, and their economic interests are largely identical.

Centuries ago there blossomed in Ukraine a rich and extensive culture of which the memory has been kept alive among Ukrainians. As a matter of fact, in mediaeval days Ukraine and its capital, Kiev, were the centre of the political and religious forces of the territory which later became Russia. But the country was overrun and conquered by Tartars and later by Poles, from whom Russia proceeded to annex Ukraine at the partitions of Poland.

From that day to 1917, the Russian government proceeded to repress and Russify the Ukrainians. The Ukrainian language and the Ukrainian literature were proscribed; attempts were made to stamp out the native Ukrainian culture; there was colonization in Ukraine by Russian families; the Ukrainian peasants were placed under economic and political restrictions; and the Ukrainian national leaders were exiled. This policy embittered the Ukrainians all the more as the Ukrainians under Austrian rule, although hardly enjoying complete freedom, nevertheless were not subjected to so ruthless a program of denationalization. Accordingly, the feeling for Ukrainian unity began to take definite shape and organization shortly after the middle of the nineteenth century.

It was the Great War, however, which made Ukrainian nationalism a movement of definite strength and solidarity. For the tactics of the Tsars had finally rendered the Ukrainians anti-Russian and thus

they became to a great extent pro-German. Furthermore, the program of the Entente Allies contained a plank for the restoration of Poland, and the western Ukrainians were therefore afraid that they would be placed under the yoke of their hereditary Polish oppressors if the Central Powers should be defeated. However, with the first Russian Revolution of March, 1917, the exploited Ukrainian peasant was able to possess himself of the lands of the nobility, and thereby to lose much of his grievance against Russia; and the autocratic treatment of Ukraine by Germany in 1917 caused great bitterness against the Central Powers. Ukraine had constituted itself an independent state soon after the Revolution of March, 1917, but political and economic differences of Ukraine with the Russian Government under Bolshevist regime manifested themselves in 1918 and 1919.

Armenia

Although the Armenians are a suppressed race of Asia rather than of Europe, they may be considered at this point as their problem is inextricably a part of the larger European problem of nationalities. For the Armenians are a race of Indo-European (Aryan) stock; their language is one of the Indo-European group; and they are Christians, although Christians unconnected with any other organized Christian church. In fact, the Armenian Church was the earliest national Christian church to be established. These facts, together with the isolation of the Armenians among Asiatic surroundings, have served to weld the Armenians into a nationality of very strong racial, religious and social solidarity.

Armenia is in the northwestern corner of Asia Minor, between the Black and the Caspian Seas and southwest of the Caucasus Mountains. It is divided among Russia, Persia and Turkey, although the Armenian problem has been concerned chiefly with the treatment of the Armenians by the Turks. For through religious fanaticism and especially through jealousy of the economic prowess of the Armenians, the last three decades have witnessed a series of Armenian massacres at the hands of Turks which have occurred with the connivance if not at the instigation of the Turkish Government; which have been unsurpassed

and well-nigh unequaled in savagery and bestiality; and which by the end of the Great War had literally wiped out about one-half of the 2,000,000 Armenians.

Turkey was in a most advantageous position for playing off one group of Powers against the other group, nor was Russia anxious to see the establishment of a free and united Armenia; and all that could be accomplished for the Armenians was some protection by France to the few affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church and by Russia to the few under Greek Catholic protection. Because of the religious nature of the persecution, it has strongly attracted the popular sympathies of the peoples of the West, and much of the moral stigma attached to the cause of the Central Powers in the Great War was due to the inclusion within the Quadruple Alliance of the perpetrator of the Armenian massacres.

Czecho-Slovakia

The Czechs are the native Slavic inhabitants of Bohemia. Together with the Slovaks, a neighboring related race, they represent a race of about 8,000,000 living in the north of the Austria-Hungary of 1914. Besides Bohemia, where there is also a large German population, the Czecho-Slovaks are found in Moravia, Prussian and Austrian Silesia, in Lower Austria, in Volhynia (in Russia of 1914), and in other sections of northern Hungary.

Toward the end of the mediaeval period, Bohemia was an important kingdom of Europe, with notable national achievements to its credit: and the re-birth of the Bohemian nationalistic spirit in the nineteenth century was endowed with a past of significance from which to draw inspiration.

The Germans and the Czechs in Bohemia have always been at loggerheads, for the ascendance of the one inevitably signified the repression of the other. As the Austro-Hungarian government throughout the nineteenth century was under the domination of the German element and its ally, the Magyars, the recent history of the Czecho-Slovaks is an unbroken tale of persecution tempered by violent revolts. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the nationalistic feeling in Bohemia

took on definite shape, and even the upper classes began to discard the German language in favor of the native Czech. The Czechs played their part in the general European revolt of 1848, but nationalistic rivalries divided the ranks of the revolutionists, and resulted in their defeat. Of this revival of Czech culture, the native university at Prague, the capital of Bohemia, has been the centre.


Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the nationalistic impulses of the Czecho-Slovaks became involved with movements for political freedom and reform, and from 1879 to 1891 the Czechs in Bohemia were in the ascendancy over the German influence there. But in the twentieth century, repression of the Czecho-Slovaks again caused serious riots; and despite considerable political reforms in 1907, martial law had to be proclaimed throughout Bohemia in the year before the outbreak of the Great War. The settlement of the problem of a Czecho-Slovak state therefore is largely wrapped up in the treatment of the German minority in that land.

The Land of the Magyars

The Magyars (Hungarians) are the dominant race of Hungary, although they are slightly outnumbered by the Slavic, Rouman and other nationalities of Hungary. There are today in Hungary some 10,000,000 persons speaking the Magyar language, but the total number of native Magyars is probably not above 8,000,000.

The Magyar nationality is one utterly unlike other European nationalities, except the Finns, to whom by their joint non-Indo-European origins and non-Indo-European languages the Magyars are closely allied.

After many centuries under the yoke of Turkey, Hungary fell under Austrian rule in the eighteenth century; and after the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the national consciousness of the Magyars became acute. It was accompanied not only by vigorous movements for political reforms, but also by a literary output of value. Nowhere did the revolutionary spirit of 1848 find more fertile soil than in Hungary; and under the leadership of Kossuth, independence for Hungary was in sight in that year. But antagonism between the Magyars and the


RACIAL MAP
OF
EUROPE
Hammond's Racial Map of Europe
Copyright 1916, by C.S.Hammond & Co., N.Y.
NORWEGIANS
SCANDINAVIANS
ENGLISH
Welsh
Erse
White-Russians
Little Russians
Ukrainians
CAUCASIANS
KURDS
TURKS
BERBERS
SPANIARDS
Portuguese
Catalans
Provencals
North French
Low Germans
Middle Germans
High Germans
Czechs
Slovaks
Magyars
Roumanians
Bulgarians
Albanians
ITALIANS
Lithuanians
Esthonians
Little Russians
Kirgiz
Nogays
Kumiks
Tatars
Greeks
Circassians
Longitude West
Longitude
East
from
Greenwich
SHETLAND IS.
ORKNEY IS.
HEBRIDES
CHANNEL IS.
ALAND IS.
DAGOE
OSEL
GOTLAND
OLAND
CORSICA
SARDINIA
BALEARIC ISLANDS
MALTA
CORFU
RHODES
CRETE OR CANDIA
CYPRUS
Edinburgh
Dublin
London
Amsterdam
Calais
Brest
Rouen
Paris
Luxemburg
Strassburg
Bordeaux
Marseille
Bilbao
Madrid
Lisbon
Barcelona
Granada
Seville
Cadiz
Gibraltar
Algiers
Genoa
Milan
Florence
Rome
Naples
Palermo
Ajaccio
Zara
Belgrade
Budapest
Vienna
Prague
Dresden
Berlin
Hamburg
Copenhagen
Stockholm
Christiania
Helsingfors
Petrograd
Moscow
Warsaw
Sofia
Bukharest
Odessa
Czernowitz
Constantinople
Smyrna
Athens
Trebizond
Astrakhan
Baku
Danube R.
Don R.
Volga R.
Ural R.
Oka R.
Duna R.
Dnieper R.
Rhone R.

Slavs in Hungary was too intense to permit them to join forces, and this division of strength made it possible for Hungary to be re-conquered in 1849 by Austria, supported, as we have seen, by Prussia and Russia under the terms of the Holy Alliance.

The defeat of Austria at the hands of Prussia in 1866, however, paved the way for Hungarian freedom; and in 1867 Hungary was united with Austria in the Dual Monarchy, in which each half enjoyed complete independence and autonomy.

The fruition of the Magyar political desires led to an intensification of their nationalistic activities; and to preserve the Magyar ascendancy in Hungary, the other races of that country were subjected to ruthless repression. Magyar was made the only language permissible in the schools and in official assemblies. Slavic and Roumanian journals and educational institutions were suppressed. Economic and industrial success was made possible only by cooperation with Magyar nationalism. Suffrage was not granted on terms of equality to Hungarian Slavs and Roumans; and by other public and private methods of violence, the policy of repression by the Magyar minority in Hungary became more brutal than even the policy of repression by the German majority in Austria.

Naturally, the progress of Magyarization in Hungary was met by a program of Pan-Slavism, supported by Russia, the centre of the Slavic race. Accordingly, when the Great War became imminent, the Hungarian government, in Magyar hands, rallied whole-heartedly to the support of Austria, as the victory of Russia would mean the ascendancy of the Slavs in Hungary and the downfall of the Magyars.

The Land of the Roumans

Only about one-half of the Roumanian race lived in Roumania at the outbreak of the Great War. The other half lived chiefly in eastern Hungary (especially Transylvania), in Bessarabia (a strip of land along the Black Sea forming the extreme southwestern tip of Russia in Europe), in Servia and in Bulgaria. "Roumania Irredenta" accordingly lay in the hands of both Central Powers and Entente Allies in 1914.

Roumania was settled soon after the Christian era as a Roman province, and today the Roumanian language is a Latin tongue. However, long centuries of Slavic infiltration have made the Roumanians ethnologically a mixed nationality. They are members of the Greek Catholic Church. Suffrage is restricted to a very small class; the country is very backward economically; and there is general exploitation of the peasants by the land-owners.

Until the end of the eighteenth century, Roumania, then composed of Wallachia and Moldavia, and known as the "Danubian Provinces," was a part of the Turkish realm. Russia began to covet it, however; and between the upper and nether millstones of Turkey and Russia, after the Congress of Vienna Roumania began to develop a national consciousness, and after 1848 a native literature of some note. By 1860, the Danubian Provinces achieved autonomy under Turkey and in 1866 chose a German prince as their ruler. In 1877, they joined Russia in the Russo-Turkish War, and were rewarded by a grant of independence from the Congress of Berlin in the following year. They were given as part of their country the province of Dobruja, but Russia kept Bessarabia. The status of Roumania in European politics was profoundly affected by the First and Second Balkan Wars.

The Land of the Bulgars

The Bulgars are of the South Slav family, but by development, language, and political outlook they have come to constitute a separate nationality in the Balkans. About 5,000,000 in number, they have their own Orthodox Bulgarian Church, although several hundred thousand of them are Mohammedans. Only slightly more than half of the Bulgars dwell within the confines of Bulgaria as it existed in 1914, the remainder being under Roumanian, Russian, Turkish and Hungarian rule; and the consequent rivalries with her fellow-Balkan states, together with attempts of Russia to keep Bulgaria from becoming too powerful, were responsible for Bulgaria's allegiance to the Central Powers when the Great War broke.

Bulgaria was under Turkey from the fourteenth to the nineteenth century, not achieving complete independence until 1909. The vivid

consciousness of Bulgarian nationality, however, dates from the period around 1885, when Bulgaria achieved autonomy under Turkish suzerainty. Bulgaria has made remarkable economic and educational progress, and shows a far higher degree of civilization than most other regions of the Balkan peninsula, or the Near East, as it is often called.

Jugo-Slavia

The South (Jugo) Slavs may be considered as divided into two groups—Serbo-Croats and Slovenes. They number about 10,000,000.

The Serbs form the bulk of the population of Servia and Montenegro, whereas the Croats are located chiefly in the territory which before 1919 was the Hungarian provinces of Bosnia (including Herzegovina), Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia. The Croats are chiefly Roman Catholics and the Serbs are chiefly Greek Catholics, but in origin, language, culture and political aspirations their interests are largely identical. The land of the Slovenes is the northwestern tip of the old Hungary, at the head of the Adriatic; and although their language is different from that of the Serbo-Croats, they amalgamated with them as one body in the nationalistic struggles of the South Slavs down to and through the Great War.


Toward the end of the mediaeval period, Servia was a strong power, but it fell under the sway of the Turks, who kept their hold upon large numbers of the South Slavs into the twentieth century. In the sixteenth century, Austria wrested some of the western South Slavs from the Turks, but most of the Balkan peninsula was under Turkish rule until the latter half of the nineteenth century.

The South Slavs became race-conscious in the nineteenth century; and as they were Slavs like the Russians, it was natural that a strong feeling of racial unity should arise between the Slavic peoples of the Balkans and of Russia. When Russia began her campaign looking toward territorial extension taking in Constantinople, her interests conflicted with those of Turkey; and it was chiefly as a result of the Russo-Turkish War in 1877 that the South Slavs under Turkish rule in the Balkans were able to assert their autonomy. They were thus not only closely related but also deeply indebted to the Russians.

The nationalistic affiliation of the South Slavs with Russia was intensified by the process of Magyarization which, as we have seen, was inflicted upon the South Slavs in Hungary. For a time, Hungary gave fair treatment to the South Slavs in Croatia and Slavonia, largely because the important port of Fiume was located in that territory; but the economic exploitation was intense and the Croatian and Slavonian Slavs in the twentieth century felt themselves oppressed along with their brothers under Hungarian rule in other sections.

Russia's interests in the Balkans, moreover, conflicted also with the economic interests of Austria-Hungary. Austria-Hungary was bent on expanding southward along the Adriatic and eastward to the Aegean. Germany's imperialistic aims were also identified chiefly with expansion toward the East through Austria-Hungary, the Balkan peninsula and Turkey. A Pan-Slavic territory in the Balkans would bar the road to both Austria and Germany, and open the way to Russia's economic supremacy in this "cock-pit of Europe." By the twentieth century, Servia was free and was not only supported by Russia in blocking the aims of Austria-Hungary, but also was itself supporting the South Slavs in Hungary in their struggles against Austro-Hungarian rule. Expansion to the Adriatic was necessary to Servia's economic development, but that would check Austria's and Italy's hopes in that direction. The intensity of the struggle and its consequent danger to the peace of Europe was realized by the great Powers, and temporary working agreements were patched up between Russia and Austria in 1897 and in 1903. Nevertheless, the feeling for nationalism among the South Slavs was made all the stronger by the political rivalries between Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism.

Austria-Hungary made the Balkan situation more serious than ever by annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina, inhabited by South Slavs, from Turkey in 1908. Austria-Hungary's action was inspired by the successful revolution of the Young Turks in Turkey in that year, which seemed to give promise of strengthening the Turkish government and hence of weakening Austria's influence upon the Turkish provinces in the Balkans. Austria's action was taken without previous understanding with the great Powers, although in 1871 all the great Powers had pledged themselves to enter upon no new important procedure of this nature before reaching an agreement with one another.



Photos by International Film Service

LUXURY IN GERMAN TRENCHES

In the upper panel is given a striking realization of the pains to which the German officers went to enjoy their enforced stay in the trenches. The trench villa in the picture was called by the Germans *The Golden Sun of Evening,* and some German officers were in the foreground of the scene as it was photographed by a German camera.

CAPTURED GERMAN TANK

The tank shown in the central panel was captured by the French, in a sortie near Villers-Brettoneaux. It had been damaged by fire, but was repaired by its captors, and was afterwards put into service.

AN OBSERVATION POST IN THE VOSGES

In the lower panel is shown an observation post, well-manned, on the summit of one of the highest of the Vosges Mountains.

As long as Turkey retained territory on the Balkan peninsula, Russia and Austria could stand together at least in their opposition to the Turks; but with the expulsion of Turkey from all Europe except a small section around Constantinople as a result of the First Balkan War of 1912, Russia and Austria-Hungary turned their undivided attention in the Balkans to each other. Austria-Hungary used every possible method to disrupt the South Slavic national unity, such as diverting railroads, stirring up religious strife, imposing internal tariff duties and making travel difficult. In fact, in the decade before the Great War it was a commonplace among well-informed students of European affairs that the rivalry of Austria and Russia in the Balkans could finally result only in a general European conflagration; and it was with extreme difficulty that the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 were localized and remained Balkan Wars.

In formulating precepts for the guidance of the Holy Alliance, Metternich had maintained:—

"The world desires to be governed by facts and according to justice, not by phrases and theories; the first need of society is to be maintained by strong authority. . . . . The first and greatest concern for the immense majority of every nation is the stability of the laws and their uninterrupted action—never their change. . . . .

"Let the governments announce this determination to their people and demonstrate it by facts. Let them reduce the doctrinaires to silence within their states, and show their contempt for them abroad. . . . . Let them not allow it to be believed that experience has lost all its rights to make way for experiments which at the least are dangerous. Let them . . . . not seek by concessions to gain over those parties who aim at the destruction of all power but their own, whom concessions . . . . will only further embolden in their pretensions to power.

"Let them in these troublous times be more than usually cautious in attempting real ameliorations. . . . .

"Let them maintain religious principles in all their purity, and not allow the faith to be attacked and morality interpreted according to the Social Contract or the visions of foolish sectarians. . . . .

"The most profound and salutary peace which the history of any time can show will (thus) have been affected. This peace will not be without a very decided influence on the fate of those states threatened with destruction, and will even assist the restoration of those which have already passed under the scourge of revolution."

And these were the principles largely followed by the great Powers in their international affiliations in the hundred years from 1814 to 1914. The result was the Great War.

II—ECONOMIC AND TRADE RIVALRIES

The National Industrial Revolution

In this day and generation, it is well-nigh impossible to conceive of a Europe or an America without machines, without factories, without large towns; but consisting almost entirely of an agricultural population scattered throughout the country-side in little communities, and producing within the home by means of rude hand tools most of the necessities of life outside of those raised from the soil. Yet that was the situation which obtained in England 150 years ago, in other European countries and in the United States 100 years ago, and in many countries of the world less than 100 years ago;—before the latter half of the eighteenth century there were practically no steam engines, no factories, no factory towns, no capitalist class outside of land-owners and no laboring class outside of farmers and farm tenants and handcraft workers in small shops, no women in industry outside the home, no mechanical media of transportation and integration. no considerable quantity of iron or of steel in use, and even no internal trade worth mentioning beyond the confines of local markets and neighborhoods.

In 1767, Hargreaves invented the "spinning jenny," which allowed one man to operate eight spindles at once instead of one at a time. Before that invention, all spinning and weaving had to be done by hand, with the distaff, card, hand spindle, spinning wheel and hand loom, which were not much of an advance over the methods used many centuries before Christ. In 1768, Arkwright began to set up spinning machinery in factories, and in 1787 Cartwright perfected a power loom. In the United States, the cotton gin of Eli Whitney (1792) transformed the entire world of commerce by cheapening cotton; but the greatest of the inventions which were to give birth to an industrial revolution was the steam engine of James Watt. By the beginning

of the nineteenth century, not only were steam engines and power-utilizing factories common in England, but also iron had been made more generally available by improvement in methods of smelting.

The effect of all these revolutionizing changes was to establish large manufacturing centres, drawing inevitably unto themselves large populations of wage-workers. Specialization in industry was made possible, and production per laborer was thus increased many-fold. Machines in many instances turned out products by the thousands which under the domestic system could be turned out only by the tens; and the total quantity of all goods produced increased by leaps and bounds. Villages became great cities or else disappeared altogether as great masses turned from agricultural to industrial life. And, most significant of all changes for future years, there arose a capitalist class which owned the machines and employed the men who worked at them, while by their side arose a working class not owning the implements with which it toiled but selling its labor to the owning class.

Although the National Industrial Revolution thus swept first over England, by its very nature it brushed aside obstacles of space, and eventually spread to every civilized land. And not the least stupendous of its influences was its obliteration of geographical and commercial barriers within nations, thus not only binding them together as homogeneous economic units, but also, as we have seen, in some cases creating for the first time among their inhabitants the consciousness of unified nationality.

The International Industrial Revolution

Before the National Industrial Revolution around the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth, production of material goods had been far too scant to meet even the modest demands of economically undeveloped nations. The social value of the National Industrial Revolution lay thus in its increased production of goods at lower cost and hence at lower prices. Moreover, the very cheapness and prevalence of many articles increased the demand for them. So that the laws of supply and demand worked upon the National Industrial Revolution in a circle—better methods of production created

a supply of goods for the first time adequately meeting the demand for them, and in turn demand for goods was heightened by the very possibility of meeting it with a supply.

Improvement in the methods of production, however, did not cease as the supply of goods began to square with even the heightened demands for them. The epoch-making and epoch-marking discoveries in the material sciences, especially in physics and chemistry, in the latter half of the nineteenth century were carried over into the industrial world so as to make profitable the erection of industrial plants of a size and output hitherto undreamed of. Corporations were organized to perform tasks impossible for individual owners. The result was inevitable—production began to outrun the ability of the home country to absorb it.

The situation with respect to material goods was paralleled in the field of capital. The huge business successes had multiplied the amount of capital available and eager for investment until there was no longer field within its home country for its employment at as profitable rates as it had been enjoying.

There was but one recourse open to the manufacturing and banking classes. It was necessary for them to broaden their markets so as to take in other countries. For the consummation of this achievement they needed the political or even the financial support of their own governments; and hence naturally and legitimately arose that partnership between governments and business interests which made the imperialism in which were sunk the roots of the war an economic rather than a mere geographical imperialism.

Revolutionary improvements in obliterating the obstacles of space aided this trend toward the internationalization of large business undertakings and investments. Steel replaced iron in ship-building and huge ocean greyhounds crossed the Atlantic in five or six days. Cables were extended over the entire globe, and the invention and perfection of the wireless telegraph obliterated space and time. Railroad locomotives were built of tremendous power and speed, and railroad trunk lines were functioning across Asia and from top to bottom of Africa no less than across the United States and Canada; while explorers and missionaries were opening up regions of the earth about which little had

been known. As the industrial revolution at the end of the eighteenth century was national, that at the end of the nineteenth became international.

But the great nations of the world were in no mood to permit foreign manufacturers and bankers to capture their markets—native markets were needed for native manufacturers and native bankers. Furthermore, countries inadequately supplied by their own industries could readily foresee the day when they, too, could no longer absorb their own production, and would also have to search for foreign markets. Protective tariffs and subsidies were utilized to prevent native markets from being exploited by foreign sources. It is true that England by her geographical position was compelled to stick to free trade, but in practice she maintained systems of preferential tariffs and concessions in her colonies, so as to keep in British hands the markets of the vast British Empire.

Balked thus in the effort to find new markets among the civilized nations, manufacturers and bankers could turn to but one other field—the great undeveloped regions of the earth. Again, and even to a greater extent, the protection of the home governments was needed; and hence in the latter half of the nineteenth century and through the twentieth, the great Powers entered into a race for colonial expansion which surpassed in eagerness and absorption even the race for colonial expansion in the several centuries following the discovery of the New World. Indeed, through most of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries interest in colonies had been decidedly on the wane.

The great business interests needed not only new markets; they needed also new sources for raw materials. As production increased, raw materials in their home countries were becoming either exhausted or else expensive; and many of the undeveloped regions of the earth were rolling in natural wealth and resources to be had almost for the asking. And only Russia and the United States could call themselves independent of foreign raw materials.

Finally, labor was cheap in the undeveloped regions of the earth, was unorganized, and was unprotected by labor legislation; and the process of producing in those regions was hence economical as long as protection was assured by the home governments.

To achieve these results, it was not always necessary for a Power actually to annex the territory to be developed. Protectorates might be established, as in Morocco and Korea; or there might be mere "spheres of influence," as in Persia; or wide "concessions," that is, monopolies, might be sufficient. Trade routes, however, were all-important.

In the National Industrial Revolution, the leading industry had been the textile. In the International Industrial Revolution, the leading industry was the iron and steel. For the sale of textiles in backward regions, little was needed beyond trading skill; and there was no reason why one country should not permit traders of another country to conduct business to some extent in the colonies of the first. But the sale of iron and steel in backward regions must be on a large scale to be profitable. Primitive natives cannot buy railroads, nor can one country well allow so powerful a civilizing force as a railroad to be built in one of its colonies by the citizens of another country. Railroads, moreover, have a distinct military value. So that the development of undeveloped territory in recent years has been confined largely to the business interests of the particular country controlling that territory; and, conversely, the business interests of any one country would be unable satisfactorily to develop undeveloped territory unless their home government inaugurated and maintained political control over such territory.

As has been seen, the National Industrial Revolution occurred first in England; and England's position was such that the International Industrial Revolution appeared first in England. From 1882 to 1893, the foreign investments of England increased on the average of 75 per cent each year and in 1915 the interest alone on English capital invested abroad equalled almost 10 per cent of the total national income of England. England, however, was the most favored of all lands in colonial possessions, and had developed a technique of governing an empire on which the sun never set so as to hold the allegiance of those elements such as Canada, New Zealand and Australia, which were notoriously adept in governing themselves.

Germany, on the other hand, was, as we have seen, the most backward of all the great Powers in rising to a consciousness of national unity; and by the time German internal unity was perfected and Ger-

many could turn her attention to world politics, the colonial field had been largely pre-empted. Her colonial longings first became articulate at the time of the accession of William II in 1888. By this time, Africa was the one continent largely undeveloped. But England had undisputed sway over the south of it. The north of Africa was largely in the hands of Turkey and Italy, and as these countries had become partners of Germany in the Quadruple Alliance, Germany could not intrude there. Only central portions of Africa were open to her, and the central portions of Africa could hardly be considered desirable colonial territory.

Moreover, as industrial development occurred in Germany later than in any of the other great Powers, it proceeded in Germany more rapidly than in any of them. In 1870, the population of Germany was 40,000,000; in 1900, it was 65,000,000. In 1870, less than one-fourth of the German people lived in cities or towns; in 1900, almost one-half were urban dwellers, and in 1914, almost three-fourths. In those years, the German foreign trade increased 1,000 per cent. In the ten years after 1870, the capital alone of the national Deutsches Bank of Germany increased almost 500 per cent, and in the twenty years following 1870 the volume of business done by the Deutsches Bank increased more than 10,000 per cent. From 1872 to 1906, the production of coal in the German Empire increased some 400 per cent—in Prussia, 600 per cent; and the production of pig iron in those years increased 500 per cent. And in the production of steel—the true barometer of industrial development— the increase of production from 1870 to 1907 was almost 2,500 per cent.

By the twentieth century, Germany had supplanted England as the country in which movements of international scope were apt first to appear. The vast territory of the United States was not settled to the point of profitable saturation by that time, so that by economic position as well as by tradition and inclination, the United States was not a rival in the race for economic imperialism through colonial possessions. Accordingly, the hope of Germany to become the dominating power of the world resolved itself largely into a campaign for colonial territory as opposed to the colonial interests of England and France in Africa; of Russia in the Near East; of England and Russia in Per-

sia and Arabia; of Great Britain, Russia and especially of Japan in the Far East; and of all the great Powers in regions such as Mexico and South America where competition for the fruits of colonial exploitation was more or less free.

These rivalries for economic and trade advantages determined the manœuvres of the *governments* of the world for power, as nationalistic feelings and antipathies were the bases of the popular support vouchsafed those governments in international world affairs by their *peoples.*

Germany, however, not only entered the lists as a seeker for colonial territory later than the other great Powers—she pursued methods other than those which had been tacitly agreed upon in international bargaining and manœuvering as legitimate. Not that the accepted methods were ethical or straightforward or guileless or uncorrupt or public or free from sordidness and treachery. Indeed, the pretexts for occupation,—whether found to hand or manufactured by either the business interests or the governments interested—ranged from protection of citizens, insult to the flag, avenging murders, and maintaining law and order to guaranteeing loans and hastening the development of backward races (the "White Man's Burden").

But the great Powers, outside of Germany, were anxious to avert a world-war. They were in bitter competition with one another; they played off one against the other; they intrigued one against the other; but they used only the methods which all used, and when they were fairly beaten in the game of international politics, they retired and prepared for the next bout. They would even not hesitate to use their superior force against a weaker nation. But when it came deliberately and carelessly to provoking enmity to the point of danger among Powers of equal greatness, equal dignity and equal strength, they showed a willingness to withdraw before the point of an actual general European War was reached.

On the other hand, Germany in the twentieth century did not hesitate to "rattle her sabre" or "to appear as a knight in glittering armor." The force constantly threatened by Germany was physical force, and there was increasing evidence that she considered her interests worth even a world-war. And for the secret of the especially belligerent atti-

tude of the Imperial German Government in international affairs of recent years, it will be necessary to consider the type of civilization bred in Germany since the days of her consolidation into a cohesive nationality.

III—THE SUPPRESSION OF LIBERALISM AND THE GROWTH OF MILITARISM

By 1914, most of the great nations of the West had achieved an appreciable program of political democracy with two exceptions—Russia and Germany. Not that the political democracy of the other great nations was complete or even approaching the point of completion. Almost the entire female sex was still disenfranchised. In certain countries, abnormal conditions kept the right to vote from certain racial elements. In other countries, property qualifications for the franchise right existed, and multiple voting was still not altogether abolished. Minorities constantly received parliamentary representation far below their voting strength, and even in the most democratic countries it was possible for the highest officials to be selected without a majority of votes. But, except in Russia and Germany, at least the principle of political democracy—parliamentary government elected by and responsible to the people—was accepted, and, on the whole, the trend of political development was constantly toward the elaboration and fuller realization of that principle.

In Germany

It is impossible to understand the Germany of 1914 without making two vital distinctions—one between the entire German Empire and Prussia; and the other between Germany in the first seventy-five years of the nineteenth century, before the advent of the International Industrial Revolution in Germany, and Germany in the last three or four decades.

After the Franco-Prussian War, Prussia remained the cornerstone of the German Empire. Many of the twenty-four other States within the German Empire were themselves politically organized along democratic lines, but their influence was completely overshadowed by that

of Prussia, whose political structure was more autocratic than even that of the German Empire. The philosophy which of recent years came both to influence and also to mirror the German people sprang chiefly from Prussia; but again Prussia's position as dictator of the German Empire transformed that philosophy from a Prussian into a German philosophy. In fact, in Germany outside of Prussia there has been since 1871 a strong antipathy to Prussian and especially to Berlin influences, but the organization of the German Empire was such as to render that antipathy powerless.

The influential governing body in the German Empire was the Bundesrat, composed of 61 members, appointed by, responsible only to, and directed in its actions by the rulers of the various kingdoms within the Empire. As the Bundesrat had veto power over practically all legislation of importance, as 14 votes in the Bundesrat could prevent any change in the Imperial Constitution, and as Prussia had 17 representatives in the Bundesrat, it will be readily realized that the powers of the Reichstag, the popular assembly, were chiefly those of debate and criticism. The Reichstag itself in 1914 was elected according to the apportionment of 1871, before the migration from the farms to the cities had got completely under way. Accordingly, the rural districts, the stronghold of the conservative classes, enjoyed a representation in the Reichstag beyond their numerical deserts; and the urban districts, the stronghold of the liberal forces, were grievously under-represented. For instance, in 1912 a popular vote of some 2,000,000 gave the Conservative Party 74 Reichstag representatives and a popular vote of some 4,250,000 gave the Social Democratic Party only 110 representatives. The entire city of Berlin, with more than 2,000,000 inhabitants, elected 6 representatives, whereas the rural region of East Prussia, with a population of about the same number, elected 17.

The King of Prussia was ipso facto the German Emperor or Kaiser, and the monarchy of Prussia was hereditary in the House of Hohenzollern. The Kaiser was the commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy, which in Germany was so completely the hub around which the Empire turned that the commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy was inevitably the virtual dictator of Germany. The Kaiser himself could proclaim a defensive war, and needed only the assent of the

Bundesrat to proclaim an offensive war. The chancellor and the high officials of the Empire were appointed by the Kaiser and were responsible only to him. As King of Prussia, the Kaiser enjoyed within Prussia even more absolute powers than as Emperor of Germany, and the Prussian Assembly was elected by even less democratic methods than the German Reichstag; so that in foreign no less than in domestic affairs, Germany was compelled to follow where Prussia led. The Kaiser was responsible for his actions only to himself and to God,—there was no pretense of allegiance even to the principles of political democracy.

Before the middle of the nineteenth century, German thought and philosophy were diametrically the antitheses of the German thought and philosophy of the first decade of the twentieth century. The most notable contributions to modern philosophy have come from the German Kant, Hegel and their followers; and, weird as the statement may seem to the generation which passed through the horrors of the Great War, the Kantian-Hegelian philosophy was fundamentally idealistic. Wagner, Bach, Mozart, Beethoven; Goethe, Schiller, Heine, Lessing; Ranke, Mommsen, Grimm; these are names among the brightest in all the world in music, literature and philology and history, while the name of the brilliant scientists of the nineteenth century who have been Germans is literally legion. It was this Germany, gloriously adding to the achievements of mankind and yet with ambitions confined to its own borders, from which sailed the bulk of the German immigrants to the United States, and which presented itself to their minds when the name of Germany came before them in later years. Only those few who had returned later to visit the Fatherland could realize that the Germany which they had known was no more and that the Germany of 1910 was as different from the Germany of 1850 as black from white.

The transformation from an idealistic and self-sufficient Germany to a materialistic and over-ambitious Germany was due chiefly to the great industrial revolution which has been mentioned, and primarily to the fact that in Germany the industrial revolution occurred with even greater rapidity and intensity than in other countries. The outstanding feature of modern life for most men and women in industrial countries is its intensity as compared with the comparative calm of an earlier age;

but the intensity of German life was deeper than even the intensity of life in other lands. The psychology of the German people became largely a mob-psychology arising from a state of over-nervous excitement.

Perhaps the experiences of the War have made it possible for other countries to understand the German psychology. For during the war those countries were living in a high state of nervous tension which was reflected in their reactions to the problems of their every-day existence. During the war, these countries found it necessary to acquiesce in procedure which under normal conditions would have been repugnant to them—censorship of speech and press; organized propaganda from Government sources; investigation of the private activities of individual citizens; concealment of the truth; secrecy about important activities; interference with individual freedom and conscription of the individual for purposes of state; rigorous subordination of private desires to the needs of the state. And the normal German state of mind may best be explained in those terms—the rapidity of the German development and the German's brooding hallucination that Germany was pitted against the world and the world was pitted against Germany *rendered the German mind in time of peace comparable to the state of mind of other countries in time of war.*

The German in the latter half of the nineteenth century could look back upon German history, and see that Germany had been made great chiefly by its army. Prussia had emerged into prominence from a congeries of unimportant principalities in the eighteenth century because Frederick the Great and his successors had devoted their efforts primarily to the organization of an efficient army. Napoleon had trampled Prussian pride in the dust because his armies had been better trained than those of Prussia; and conversely Prussia had triumphed with almost ludicrous ease over the great armies of Austria and France because in the meantime Prussian armies had been carefully trained, because every new development of business organization and scientific research had been utilized in the Prussian war machine, and because the Prussian military methods had represented the last word in thoroughness.

The principle of conscription of the individual for the military serv-

ice of the state had been adopted by Prussia during the end of the Napoleonic Wars and had helped to raise the Prussian armies to a higher level of efficiency which had spelled misfortune for Napoleon. The principle of conscription, however, had been allowed to fall into disuse after 1815, but in 1861 William I determined to apply the principle in times of peace so as to provide for a large body of citizens with military training as a reserve army. Under Bismarck, the practise of military training in times of peace in preparation for times of war was nursed into fruition; and after its successes in 1866 and 1870, the German nation became whole-hearted advocates of that system. And Germany's success compelled other nations in Europe to enter upon the same procedure, except England, whose defence lay in her fleet.

Under the German system of military training, as it was carried forward into the twentieth century, the German youth was called at the age of twenty to two years of military training, during which he was completely isolated from the influences of civil life. During the next five years, he was still called upon for military drills, and until the age of thirty-nine was kept in the reserve, while his final release from liability for call to the colors did not cease until forty-five.

A trend toward unquestioning obedience to authority is the inevitable concomitant of military training, and the more thorough the military training, the more deeply-rooted is the habit of implicit obedience. Accordingly, the German people at the time of the Great War had developed or had had developed in them a habit of mind which obeyed the rulers of Germany and the ruling ideas of Germany with little or no doubt but with almost slavish adoration.

The effect of military training and absorption was no less marked upon the national life of Germany than upon the individual lives of Germans. As the Kaiser was the dominating force over the army, so the army became the dominating force over the national life of Germany. The army was considered to be not only outside of but even above civil law. Social life was arranged according to military standing, and a social caste system arose in Germany in which the highest stratum was the military. The people's representatives in the Reichstag possessed scant authority over the army which was supported by

heavy taxation upon the people. In a word, to follow the analogy presented above, the German people in peace took the same pride in their army that any other nation would be apt to take only in war; and similarly the pinnacle of achievement for a German was success in army life. The army was viewed, not as a necessary evil, but as the highest development of modern civilization; not as a means to an end, but as an end in itself.

Along with this practical reverence of physical force, and possibly as a result of it, came a theoretical laudation of physical force. There arose toward the end of the nineteenth century in Germany a school in history and philosophy which glorified might and power as the final source of all values. The leaders of German thought delved into history to prove that the destinies of mankind were determined well or ill as force was applied, and the worth assigned by these thinkers to other nations and to world movements was in accordance with the amount of force represented by those nations and movements.

Among the leaders of thought who idealized the use of force none was more influential in molding German "Kultur" than Treitschke. Treitschke taught that the ultimate ideal in life was the welfare of the state; and that as nothing was higher than the state, the state could recognize no limitations of any other authority upon the realization of its ends. Since the welfare of the state was the ultimate goal of existence, any methods used by the state in attaining its destiny were righteous and any hindrances upon the state's self-attainment were vicious. Ethical principles, international agreements, respects for the rights of other units in society, all must be and even should be disregarded if they stand in the way of the state; and power alone can be the final refuge of a state as it struggles upward and onward. The political sin against the Holy Ghost, declared Treitschke, is feebleness of the state. Treitschke's principles were carried into military philosophy by General von Bernhardi, who insisted that war was good in itself, as it presented necessary measures for the development of the state and of the individuals who comprise the state, and that therefore a state was negligent which did not seize the opportunity to wage successful war.

These principles were crystallized by Nietsche. Nietsche deliberately

reversed the Christian principles to which modern society pays at least theoretical homage, and maintained that charity, tolerance, mercy, the rights of the weak, all were vicious principles. Nietsche struck boldly at the entire conception of democracy, declaring that the guiding rule for existence was not the greatest happiness for the greatest number, but the development of the strongest and best-equipped of the human race at the expense of the weaker members. In other words, Nietsche aimed at the improvement of the world by the improvement of the race so as to encourage the powerful and to discourage the weak in the struggle for existence. Every feeling and every action which kept the strong from utilizing their strength and protected the weak from the elimination due to their weakness was hence holding back mankind. Nietsche's ideal was thus the Superman. And given a race which was a Super-race, that race was under every obligation to develop according to its strength, to crush every other race which stood in its way and to use every method available to it in its progress toward self-realization.

It would be easy to exaggerate the influence of these thinkers and their followers upon the great mass of the German people. Despite the comparatively high degree of education among the German people, they were probably no better informed upon the creeds of their erudite philosophers than the great mass of the people in any other country upon the creeds of their erudite philosophers. But the creeds of Treitschke, von Bernhardi, Nietsche and their followers and elaborators found fertile soil among the German upper class and especially among the German academic and intellectual classes; and the creeds which have been outlined above were the prevalent creeds among the leaders of Germany at the time of the Great War. In other lands, the leaders of thought would have found it difficult to convert the great mass of the people to such a philosophy. But, as has been suggested, the mass of the German people had developed to an unusual degree a spirit of obedience and docility toward those in authority over them, whether in political and military realms or in the realm of thought. Germany had organized a strict system of Government supervision over the doctrines taught in the schools and universities, and the creed of power and might was inculcated in the German school-children with insistent

vehemence. Accordingly, although the creed of German "Kultur" might well have been the creed of only the German social and intellectual aristocracy, for practical purposes it had the effect of a creed for the whole German people.

The comparative materialism of the German mind was demonstrated excellently by the backwardness of the woman's movement in Germany, and in the comparatively low status of the German woman, as contrasted with the vigorous movement for woman's economic and political equality in Anglo-Saxon lands, and the high social influence of the French woman. Again, when troops of all the great Powers joined in putting down the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900, the German army surpassed all its associates in the brutality of its looting, thievery and rape. Indeed, the Kaiser had instructed his army to behave like the Huns of old.

As a corollary of this creed of Power above Everything, there was developed in Germany a violent and unchallenged belief in the creed of Germany above Everything ("Deutschland über Alles"). It had been one of Hegel's teachings that the history of mankind revealed that in each era there was one race destined to rule the world as the most potent of all the races, and German thinkers by the twentieth century had applied that principle to the German race. Stress was laid upon the doctrine that the Germans were a pure race, although there is little proof that they are not as mixed as other races. Much evidence was produced to prove that other races, especially the English and the French, had already enjoyed their periods of ascendancy and were already decadent. Similar evidence was produced to prove that in well-nigh every field of human endeavor German achievements under conditions of equal competition were superior to the achievements of other lands. With unswerving faith, Germany believed that the German army was the best army; that German industry was the best industry; that the German financier was the best financier; that the German scientist was the best scientist; that the German rulers were the best rulers; that the German political and social administrators were the best social and political administrators; that German art, literature and music were the best art, literature and music; that

German scholarship was the best scholarship; in a word, that German civilization was the best, if not the only civilization.

Given these premises, the conclusion was inevitable—it was not only Germany's manifest destiny, but also its duty, to rule the world; it was to the best interests of the world itself to be ruled by Germany; and any and all methods to realize this end were legitimate and binding.

It cannot be overemphasized that the hold of this creed of blood and iron upon the German people rendered them by the time of the Great War a nation with criteria of conduct altogether opposed to the criteria of conduct of the other great nations of the world. German Kultur did not regard the atrocities performed by its armies in Belgium as morally inexcusable but authorized them nevertheless—German Kultur conceived the Belgian atrocities as morally legitimate. German Kultur did not refuse mercy to the passengers of the *Lusitania* because of sheer callousness—German Kultur regarded feelings of mercy as anti-social. German Kultur had no feeling of guilt when British towns were bombed by air-raids—to German Kultur, the ends justified the means. German Kultur did not knowingly commit treachery when it rescinded its faithful pledges concerning the neutrality of Belgium, submarine warfare against neutral vessels and the treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Russia—German Kultur recognized as binding no barrier of any kind which stood in the way of the realization of German Kultur's manifold destiny to rule the world.

Germany was as fanatically unswerving in its course as the Spain which conducted the Inquisition—the Inquisition tortured and slew unbelievers, not for the torture and the slaughter, but for the greater glory of God; German Kultur let loose and fought through the war which crucified civilization, not for the sake of the crucifixion but for the greater glory of God through the enhancement of the ends of the German nation.

The German people rallied behind their leaders in peace as well as in war all the more enthusiastically because the leaders were ever solicitous for the welfare of the people. Unlike the rulers of Germany's neighbor, Russia, the German rulers were ambitious for the well-being of no single stratum of their society, but of all the strata which comprised Germany. More frankly than in any other great

country, the Government recognized its responsibility for the happiness of its people. Indeed, with the rulers' faith in the destiny of Germany, they could not do otherwise than promote the welfare of the masses; for a Germany in which a large section of the population was ineffective would be an ineffective Germany.

Moreover, the Socialist movement was strong in Germany as early as 1880, and Bismarck was acute enough to realize that its strides could be shortened only by preventing the misery and exploitation on which Socialism thrives. In 1883, the Imperial Government provided for a national plan to insure its workers against the distresses incident upon illness and disability. In the next year, the Government enacted measures similarly protecting the working-class against dependency because of accidents. And in 1889, a comprehensive law was passed providing pensions for old age and invalidity. Protection under these measures was compulsory for all workers receiving wages below a stipulated amount; and so thorough and beneficent was this legislation that when other great nations years later began to follow in Germany's footsteps in the field of social legislation, their laws were based largely upon the German models.

In every other field, the Government prosecuted its measures of benevolent paternalism. Education was made accessible to all, and illiteracy became practically non-existent. The slums which disgrace great cities of other lands were unknown in Germany. The Government recognized also its duties in providing recreation, in controlling the distribution of the necessities of life, and in making possible all manner of activities which would accrue to the advantage of the people and hence of the German Empire.

In industry, especially, the Government of Germany maintained a position of control. The rapidity of the industrial growth of Germany let Germany escape from the principles of the *laissez-faire* creed which the other great nations took many years to abandon. The leaders of Germany recognized the existence within the state of conflicting interests between classes rather than between individuals, and the Government's endeavor was to preserve a balance of power between classes rather than between individuals, and to prevent class-exploitation rather than individual exploitation. Accordingly, the Government made itself

directly responsible for the welfare of German business conditions and enterprises, and each German industry had its place in the general scheme of business enterprise as conceived by the German Government. Where certain commodities were needed, the Government saw that they were produced. When shipping was needed for German trade, the German Government developed an extensive German merchant marine. Where certain firms could not compete satisfactorily with foreign firms, they were subsidized by the Government. Where farm land was poor, the Government made possible the application of scientific intensive farming. Where over-production threatened to glut the market, it was checked by the Government; and where under-production threatened depression, it was stimulated by the Government. Especially did the Government encourage research in all fields where such research could be utilized in the discovery of new methods which would enrich the German Empire as a whole.

The characteristic German utilization of new methods was again due to the newness of the German nationalistic consummation. Germany was the youngest of the nations, and she displayed the salient characteristics of youth—contempt for tradition and attraction toward novel procedure. Much of the success of the German merchant and trader in competition with foreign merchants in undeveloped territory was due to the conservatism bred by custom in the countries which were Germany's rivals. And the very lateness and rapidity of Germany's industrial development allowed her to predict its successive stages and to plan them scientifically, instead of proceeding according to the necessarily less scientific individualism of other lands.

These conditions, then, help to explain the tolerance of the German people for the essentially autocratic, outworn and even ridiculous political system of Germany. In the first place, the rulers would brook no decrease of or check upon their power. In the second place, the vast German army was always available to repress the slightest tendency toward revolt; and the German army was untinctured with any feeling for democracy. In the third place, material conditions were satisfactory for the masses, and especially were they freed from the gnawing fear of the future which dominates the lives of most insecure wage-earners. And finally, the political creed of the masses

was Socialism; and as the middle class was uncompromisingly opposed to the Socialist program, there did not arise in Germany that combination between the middle and lower classes by which political democracy had been secured in other lands.

The paternalism of the Government had inspired even the Socialists with strong patriotic consciousness, as the Great War showed. Most Socialists are internationalists, but the German Socialists were predominantly nationalistic. Even though the German Socialists had opposed Germany's prosecution of the Franco-Prussian War, even though they had violently agitated for peace during both Moroccan "affairs" and even in the days immediately preceding August 1, 1914, yet they would not join their fellow-Socialists in other lands in agreeing to oppose all wars by an international general strike. Only the opposition of the German Socialists prevented the International Socialist Congress of 1907 from binding Socialists everywhere to refuse participation in world war; and if the German Socialists had been pledged to a general industrial and military strike after war had been declared by the Imperial German Government, and had been faithful to that pledge, Germany's plans in August, 1914 would have been completely demolished. Accordingly, the German people in the years preceding the Great War were laboring under a psychology which supported with utmost seriousness and enthusiasm programs and statements which other peoples would have received with indignation or amusement. Germans were seldom unconscious of the relation of each of their actions, even of their thoughts, to the furtherance of their nation, the chosen of God. They were in a partnership with their rulers, and both parties must under all conditions fulfill their share of the agreement. The people were to carry forward the program of the German Empire; the rulers of the Empire were to safeguard the people's welfare. In a word, the difference between the German and the Anglo-Saxon political philosophy which was the fundamental issue of the Great War might be thus summarized—the Anglo-Saxon creed was that the state existed to subserve the interests of the individual, the German creed was that the individual existed to subserve the interests of the state; and the Anglo-Saxon creed was that the nation existed

to subserve the interests of mankind, whereas the German creed was that mankind existed to subserve the interests of the dominant nation.

In Russia

The Congress of Vienna placed Russia in closer touch with the main currents of European life than in the eighteenth century, and gave her a position of increased prestige and power. In extent of territory, Imperial Russia was the greatest of the world's nations. In the land of the Tsar, however, the hands of the clock had been violently turned backward and Imperial Russia of the twentieth century was less democratic politically, although perhaps more democratic economically, than Imperial Russia of the first decade of the nineteenth century.

In the early days of his reign, Alexander I had been distinctly a liberal ruler and had even sympathized to an extent with the ideals of the French Revolution. However, immediately after the Congress of Vienna he fell under the influence of Metternich and the Holy Alliance; and from 1815 the Government in Russia prevented not only the organization of new liberalizing bodies but even the mere dissemination of new ideas, whether in the field of politics or in the field of religion and science. The reformers were hence driven to function through secret societies. These secret societies stimulated in 1825 and 1830 revolutions which were put down ruthlessly and which served only to increase the rigor of autocratic administration in Russia.

Up to 1861, the peasants of Russia existed as mere serfs upon the land; but in that year the Tsar, fearful of further disturbances, freed them from serfdom, although with so many burdensome details and restrictions that the position of the peasant was hardly improved by his theoretical emancipation. The brutal methods of the government against all forces of light in that land of darkness thereafter became intensified. The reformers finally responded with a policy of terrorism, including political assassinations, which, however, was similarly ineffective; and by the last decades of the nineteenth century most of the revolutionary spirits of Russia had been either executed or exiled or had removed to foreign lands as the centres for their revolutionary propaganda.

During the last years of the nineteenth century, however, the Industrial Revolution spread to Russia, and its results were soon apparent in the political life of the Russian people. The reaction against deprivation of education, against censorship of the press and of public assemblies, against government guidance of the teaching in the schools and universities, against restrictions upon travel, against espionage on even private personages, against exile for political activities, against over-burdensome taxation, against secret trials without juries, against the virtual encouragement of illiteracy, the reaction against the entire Tsarist regime was heightened when the new industrial demands brought together into industrial centres large bodies of workers who had formerly lived in scattered rural communities. The feeling for revolution grew apace; it was met by a tightening of the fetters upon the Russian people.

Early in 1904 war was declared between Russia and Japan, and Russian defeats at the hands of Japan brought the crisis to a head in the following year. A violent revolution broke out which was finally quelled only with great difficulty and after the Government had promised to call a parliament (Duma) and to institute other reforms. But with the support of her fellow-autocracy in Germany and even of imperialist forces in Russia's political ally, France, the Tsar succeeded in averting the day of fundamental reforms. Russia accordingly came into the Great War a nation as backward as the great nations of the earth in the Dark Ages a thousand years previously; and even the most superficial observer of Russian conditions could predict the speedy arrival of an upheaval in Russia which in violence, power, thoroughness, intensity, scope and appeal would eclipse even the French Revolution.

GERMAN DIPLOMATIC DOMINATION, 1870-1911

The Isolation of France

After the Congress of Vienna, the mightiest power in international affairs had been Austria under Metternich. Great Britain had kept aloof from European diplomatic manoeuvres except when her own welfare was directly concerned, as her interests were chiefly colonial. France, it is true, had rallied splendidly in the years after Waterloo, had challenged Austrian domination after 1848, and after the humiliating defeat of Austria in 1866 could lay claims to the diplomatic dictatorship of Europe. But after 1870, the diplomatic dictatorship of Europe was no longer a matter for dispute—supremacy in international affairs belonged to Germany under Bismarck, and none there was to say him nay. Eight years later, the great Powers of Europe, assembled in conclave at the Congress of Berlin, accepted the law as it was laid down to them by Germany; and even in the personal relations between the distinguished emissaries, Bismarck gave orders as a master gives orders to subordinates.

The Congress of Vienna had formulated the principle of the Balance of Power among the nations, and even after the Treaty of Frankfort between France and Germany in 1871 the conception of the Balance of Power was retained by the great Powers. The rise of two new nations, Germany and Italy, the former now the most powerful of all the great Powers, merely made necessary a new application of the theory of the Balance of Power. There was no attempt at union or cooperation among the nations—each jockied constantly for position in the international competition.

The military importance and mineral wealth of Alsace and Lorraine had proved irresistible to Bismarck, but he was under no illusions as to the effect which their annexation to Germany would have upon France and hence upon the entire future international situation. France

would neither forget nor forgive, and Bismarck's task was clear—he must isolate France and protect Germany against any possible alliance which France might endeavor to form against her. In view of the universal fear which Germany's successes had inspired against her, Bismarck's road was inevitably a rocky one, but he was the adroitest statesman of modern times, and he knew no scruples.

By the terms of the Treaty of Frankfort, German troops were to occupy French soil until France paid the enormous indemnity of 5,000,000,000 francs which Bismarck had levied upon her. It was a bitter disappointment to the German Chancellor that France paid the indemnity within several years, the French peasants making pathetic sacrifices to rid their soil of the hated Prussians; and Germany could not hold France in material subjection as Bismarck had wished. Moreover, Bismarck was in no mood for immediate future wars—Germany needed peace to consolidate her newly-won national unity. The industrial revolution was in the height of its activity in Germany, and peace was needed also for German industrial development.

The League of the Three Emperors

The fruits of Bismarck's generosity toward Austria after the latter's defeat in 1866 were now ripe. The Austrian prime minister was hostile to Bismarck, but Bismarck, by skilful manipulation of Austria's internal political situation, unseated his enemy. Austria was fearsome of further revolutions, and the establishment of the international Socialist organization in 1864 had not served to allay her fears; so that Germany's agreement to assist in putting down revolutionary movements in Austria in case of an Austro-German treaty was very welcome to the Hapsburg monarchy. Austria was anxious also for support against Russia in the Balkans.

The rivalry between Austria and Russia might have proved to any one except Bismarck an insuperable barrier to an alliance with both of them. But Russia and Germany were traditional friends: the Russian Tsar was the nephew of the German Emperor, and a warm personal devotion existed between them; in 1863 Germany had been benevolently neutral when the Poles had risen in revolt against Russian

rule; both Germany and Russia were political autocracies, with a common foe in all democratic ideas; Bismarck himself had been ambassador to Russia, and had inspired friendly regard in the court of the Tsar; and in 1870 Germany had sanctioned a change in the Treaty of Paris which enabled Russia to send her warships into the Black Sea. Bismarck compromised the conflicting ambitions of the two countries in the Balkans by inducing Austria to withdraw her support from the Poles agitating against Russia, and Russia to withdraw her support from the Slavs agitating against Austria. Accordingly, in 1872 there was consummated the so-called "League of the Three Emperors," between Germany, Austria and Russia.

If Bismarck, however, had visions of a new Holy Alliance arising from the League of the Three Emperors, with himself playing the part of a second Metternich, he was doomed to disappointment. Neither Russia nor Austria had thrown herself whole-heartedly into the League, but had joined chiefly to assure a period of external repose in order to settle internal troubles.

The inefficacy of Bismarck's arrangement was proved in 1875. He had determined to take further steps to crush an attempt of France to rise above a position of subjection to Germany, but Germany's own ally, Russia, supported by England, forbade Germany to go ahead with another attack upon France; and by that time Austria and Russia were again quarreling openly in the Balkans. It was evident that the League could not be used offensively against France. Bismarck realized that he would be compelled to enter into direct alliances for the protection of Germany and the isolation of France; and as between Austria and Russia, he determined to hold on to Austria. However, he used every resource of his fertile mind to maintain relations of friendliness with Russia, and to prevent a Franco-Russian alliance.

The Triple Alliance

In 1876, Turkey was responsible for a particularly nauseating series of atrocities against the Bulgarians, owing to a revolt in the Balkans against Turkish rule and to the massacre of some Turkish officials. The Christians in the Balkans appealed frantically to the great Powers

of western Europe for help and protection against "the unspeakable Turk," but among the great Powers only Russia was anxious to act In 1877, Russia determined to waste no more time in negotiating with Turkey concerning the situation of Russia's fellow-Slavs in the Balkans, and the Tsar declared war on the Sultan.

In those days, the Turkish army was held in high repute, and the great Powers ardently hoped that Russia would be defeated. But, aided by the Roumanians, Russia managed to upset the forecasts and to vanquish the Turkish forces. The expulsion of Turkey from Europe and the formation of independent nations in the Balkans then seemed to be impending; but such a settlement of the Balkan Question was no part of the plan of England, and the other great Powers supported England when she demanded that the results of the Russo-Turkish war be settled by a great international conference. Russia was in no position to oppose the remainder of Europe, and in 1878 the great Powers met at the Congress of Berlin to deprive Russia of the fruits of her victory and to maintain the Balance of Power unaltered.

England especially, under the premiership of Lord Beaconsfield (Disraeli), was determined to permit no great increase in the power of her great rival, Russia. England feared that if the Balkan states were to be entirely freed from Turkish rule, they would fall under Russian influence. Russia would thus obtain her long-coveted outlet upon the Mediterranean. The Suez Canal had just been completed, and England desired to see no Russian influence in eastern waters. England, moreover, had obtained from Turkey control over the island of Cyprus in return for support of Turkey at the Congress of Berlin; so that Russia was not only shorn of the fruits of her victory, but much territory in the Balkans was retained under Turkish control.

At the Congress of Berlin, Germany's support of Austria as against Russia came definitely into the open. Turkey was given back most of the territory in the Balkans won from her by Russia, and Austria was given the government of the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. And it was therefore no surprise to Europe when in 1879 an alliance between Germany and Austria was consummated. France would get no assistance from the Dual Monarchy.

Foiled in the attempt to make the League of the Three Emperors

effective and to get active Russian support against France, Bismarck turned to Italy. Here again the consummation of an alliance would have seemed impossible to any but a Bismarck. Italy's ancient oppressor and hereditary foe was the very ally of Germany, Austria; and it had been Austria from whom Italian independence and unified nationality had been achieved. The problem of Italia Irredenta was a burning one. France had come to Italy's assistance against Austria and French help had been largely responsible for the defeats of Austria at the hands of Italy. Austria was the stronghold of the political power of the Pope, and Papal interests and Italian national interests were in opposition. Finally, it had been only an Austrian defeat in 1866 which gave Italy the opportunity to wring Venetia from Austria.

On the other hand, although Napoleon III had helped Italy against Austria, he had withdrawn his support at the very moment when Italy was prepared to conquer Venetia from the Hapsburgs, lest Italy become too powerful. France likewise was a Catholic state, and the Pope had received active support from France, so that it had not been until the Franco-Prussian War that Italy felt able to annex all the Papal lands and to fix the Italian capital at Rome. Italy was friendly to England, and during the Franco-Prussian War English feeling had been pro-German and anti-French.

But another element in the situation was still necessary to throw Italy into Germany's arms, and it was found in Africa. After 1870, Bismarck had left no stone unturned to turn France's ambitions into colonial channels. As far as it was humanly possible, he hoped to see France forget Alsace-Lorraine in pride at the acquisition of new territory outside of Europe. Italy, however, had ambitions in the very locality in northern Africa where France's ambitions were centered. Bismarck was too shrewd to inveigle Italy into an open alliance against France by direct assistance to Italy in Africa; he preferred indirect methods, and he was anxious to conciliate France to the utmost. Indeed, it was with Bismarck's promise of support and with Bismarck's advice that in 1881 France dispatched from Algeria, which for some decades had belonged to France, a force of French troops to occupy Tunis.

As Bismarck well knew, it was Tunis which Italy likewise coveted.

Indeed, there were many Italian colonists in Tunis, and Italy felt that Italian expansion in Tunis was fore-ordained. France's action therefore enfuriated Italy against France, and removed the last barriers in the way of an Italian-German understanding. In 1882, Italy formally allied herself with Germany and Austria, and the Triple Alliance was thus formed. France would get no help from Italy.

The Machinations of Bismarck

Bismarck, however, was not yet satisfied. He appeased Spain and kept on the friendliest terms with her, while he deliberately encouraged France to compete with England in the colonial field, and France once more played Germany's game as she had done in Tunis. Neither from England nor from Spain would France derive assistance.

A retaliatory alliance between France and Russia would then have seemed inevitable by the logic of the international situation. Germany had pledged herself to support Austria against Russia in the Balkans, and to assist Austria to quell the Slavs, whose ethnological mother was Russia. Geographically, Germany lay between Russia and France, and could be attacked in the rear by either did she try to make war upon the other; so that a Franco-Russian alliance would compel Germany to divide her military strength, as it compelled her in 1914.

Nevertheless, Bismarck staved off an alliance between the two great continental countries outside the sphere of German control. Even today the methods he used in this almost unbelievable achievement remain largely unknown, and in his entire career he accomplished no success under conditions more difficult than those which accompanied his prevention of a formal alliance between France and Russia. Russia was planning expansion in Asia toward India, expansion which brought on strained feelings between England and Russia; and Bismarck was adroit enough to encourage Russia in her plans without arousing English enmity against Germany. Russian fear of English interference with these plans was fertile soil for Bismarck's seductions; France was actively sympathetic toward Polish independence; doubtless Bismarck played on the fear in autocratic Russia of the "radical" ideas of republican France; William I of Germany was popular and influential at

the Russian court; and in 1884 and again in 1887 Germany and Russia actually signed in good faith treaties which bound them to remain neutral in case either should be attacked by a third power. And all this time Austria and Germany were in an alliance to protect each other against Russia! Bismarck's policy of protection for Germany and isolation of France was complete; France would get no help from Russia.

During the Great War it was customary to charge that Germany was trying to gain a position of world-dominance; it would have been more exact to charge that she was trying to re-gain her position of world-dominance.

Accession of William II

In 1888, the aged Emperor William I died and in the same year William II, the Kaiser under whom the German Empire was to wage the Great War, ascended the throne of his ancestors. He was then but twenty-nine years of age, but of a highly energetic character, with tremendous powers of leadership and organization. As a matter of fact, it has been the tragedy of Germany—indeed, the tragedy of the entire world—that the later Hohenzollern rulers have been capable men—one Hohenzollern king of recent generations like George III of England would have done much to shear the power of the rulers of Prussia and Germany.

On one point, the new Emperor was firm—he intended to govern his empire himself. The old William I had been content to give Bismarck a free hand, as well he might; but William II was no man to play the subordinate to his own chancellor. On March 8, 1890, the Emperor "dropped the pilot" altogether from the ship of state, and Bismarck retired to private life.

The diplomatic heritage which William II thus assumed was no bed of roses. As we have seen, Germany's alliances were forced rather than natural in at least two cases, the treaties with Italy and Russia. Italian animosity at her formal ally, Austria, concerning their joint aspirations along the Adriatic was by no means vanishing; and France moreover was soon to disestablish Church and State and to renounce her support of the Papacy. Again, the Triple Alliance in-

volved extensive and hence expensive military preparations on the part of its members, and Italy was poor and already groaning under taxation. And finally, Germany and Turkey were soon to become allies, and Italian colonial aspirations in Africa were now centered upon Tripoli, the territory of Turkey.

The understanding with Russia was even harder to maintain. The Russian statesmen could not remain blind forever to the wiles practiced upon them by Bismarck—probably French statesmen helped to enlighten the Russian. The official terms of the Dual Alliance between Austria and Germany were published in 1888, and if Russia had not known them already, she now saw how unreservedly Germany was supporting Austria in the rivalry between Russia and Austria. And a financial factor of vital importance entered into the situation.

Despite the huge indemnity paid Prussia as a result of the Franco-Prussian War, France was a rich country. Not only were her people frugal and addicted to saving; but also her program for paying off the indemnity to Germany had occasioned a partnership between French bankers and the French government which, however illegitimate it might seem to twentieth century eyes, left the French financial interests in a powerful position. Now, for many years Russia, always in need of money, had been financed by Berlin bankers. But in 1888, Paris banking houses succeeded in obtaining the subscriptions to new Russian loans, made especially necessary by the inauguration of work on the Trans-Siberian Railroad. These loans were liberally subscribed to by the French people, and in the years following the ascension of William II Russia saw herself indebted to the French people instead of only to German bankers. In passing, it might be noted that France continued to finance Russia as late as 1917, and that the attitude of France toward Russia during and after the Great War may thus to a great extent be explained.

The Alliance Between France and Russia

It is doubtful if even Bismarck could have succeeded in holding France and Russia apart much longer. That is, it is doubtful if he could have succeeded without war. Indeed, so clearly had he antici-



© International Film Service

© Underwood & Underwood

© Underwood & Underwood

DESCRIPTION OF PICTURES ON REVERSE SIDE

Upper Left Hand Corner—Marshal Joseph Jacques Césaire Joffre, Chief of the French General Staff, and Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies, 1911-December 12, 1916; Military Adviser to the French Government, December 12, 1916—.

Upper Right Hand Corner—Marshal Henri Philippe Petain, French General Commanding Sixth Division, 1914; Commander, Thirty-Third Army Corps, 1915; Commander-in-Chief, Armies of Verdun, 1916; Commander-in-Chief, French Armies, May 15, 1917—.

Center—Marshal Ferdinand Foch, Commander, Seventh French Army, Battle of the Marne, 1914; Chief of Staff, May 15, 1917; Member, Supreme War Council of Versailles, 1917; Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Armies of the Entente Allies, March 29, 1918—.

Lower Left Hand Corner—General Armando Diaz, Commander, Twenty-Third Italian Army Corps, 1917; and Commander-in-Chief, Italian Armies, November 9, 1917—.

Lower Right Hand Corner—General H. J. E. Gouraud, French Commander, Moroccan Expeditionary Force in France, 1915; Commander-in-Chief, French Armies at Gallipoli, 1915; Commander, French Armies around Rheims, 1918.

pated a Franco-Russian "rapprochement" that in 1888 he had in unmistakable language warned France and Russia that an alliance between them would be regarded by Germany as an unfriendly procedure and that Germany would act accordingly. Possibly Bismarck would merely have threatened war, if he had remained in control of the German Empire; possibly he would actually have precipitated another European conflict.

At all events, when it was definitely announced in 1891 that a treaty had been signed between France and Russia, William II kept the peace. His fanatical obsession that he had been entrusted with the destinies of Germany directly by God doubtless persuaded his mystical mind at that time that his mission on earth was to maintain peace. Certainly, Germany had everything to hope and nothing to fear from war, everything to gain and nothing to lose, and the German jingoes clamored for war; but the sword was not drawn and Bismarck's system had lost one brick in its foundation. France no longer was completely isolated—she could now assert herself more confidently in European affairs with the consciousness of at least a nominal ally. Even though the treaty was defensive only (its text had not been published up to 1919), France could look to Russia for help.

From his retirement, Prince Otto von Bismarck launched biting comments upon the diplomatic abilities of the new German Emperor. But William II had his own program for the retention of German dominance in Europe, and he proceeded to put it into successful effect. Great Britain was still friendly to Germany, and the Kaiser sedulously cultivated that friendship by encouraging France and Russia to continue their colonial programs so as to come into conflict with British colonial interests. And France and Russia played the Kaiser's game no less satisfactorily than they had played Bismarck's. In Indo-China, in Egypt, in Madagascar, in Zanzibar, French expansion proved a constant irritation to the British Empire. And Russia not only still planned and plotted with an eye on the road to India, but also began to "stake out pegs" in Manchuria, where again she competed with British interests and where later a conflict with the rising nation of the Far East was to give birth to the Russo-Japanese War.

The Dreyfus Affair

France's power in international bargaining at this time was sadly weakened also by a domestic dispute which finally split the entire country into factions and for more than seven years shattered the unity of the French people. Nothing could have been more pleasing to the German Empire than the effect upon France of the trial of Captain Alfred Dreyfus.

Alfred Dreyfus, before 1894 an insignificant officer of the French Army, was of a Jewish family which had immigrated to France from Alsace after 1871. In 1894, at a secret court-martial, he was convicted of having sold military secrets to the enemies of France, and was publicly disgraced and sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor for life. In 1896, however, another French officer, Colonel Picquart, chief of the Intelligence Bureau, became convinced that Dreyfus had been innocent, that a Major Esterhazy was the true culprit and that Dreyfus had been the victim of an Army conspiracy. Colonel Picquart was transferred, public interest in "l'affaire Dreyfus" became intense, and all France soon became partisans either as Dreyfusards or anti-Dreyfusards.

The issue at stake soon passed beyond the confines of a personal dispute, and shook France to her very foundations. In the first place, the rape of Alsace-Lorraine and the consequent spirit of revenge had rendered the Army very popular in France after 1870, and public feeling therefore ran abnormally high against any French officer convicted of treason. In the second place, there was flourishing at this time a vigorous anti-Semitic campaign in France, owing chiefly to the fact that international finance was controlled largely by Jewish bankers and to the French belief that international finance was supporting the interests of Germany against the interests of France. In the third place, there was in France a large Royalist faction opposed to the Republic which had been re-established in France in 1870 and this faction took advantage of the current prejudices against Dreyfus to develop a new political party around their creed. In the fourth place, the religious nature of the affiliations for or against Dreyfus involved the status of the state (Catholic) Church of France, and anti-Catholics rallied to the defense of the convicted captain. This last factor of the

quarrel also lined up the conservative elements in France against Dreyfus, and the more radical elements, including the "intellectuals" and the Socialists, in support of him.

The constant and efficient agitation of the Dreyfusards resulted finally in the trial of Esterhazy, but Esterhazy was unanimously and joyously acquitted. Picquart was then himself tried; and although he was also acquitted, the French Chamber of Deputies formally condemned the Dreyfusards. Early in 1898, however, Emile Zola published his famous "J'accuse" letter on the Dreyfus case, which made new accusations and submitted new evidence in defense of Dreyfus. Zola was also haled before a law-court and was sentenced to imprisonment for one year; but his charges finally did much to turn the tide in favor of Dreyfus. An evidence of the transcendent importance of the dispute by this time is found in the fact that the elections to the French Chamber of Deputies in 1898 turned largely on the Dreyfus case; and evidence of the state of the French mind, in the fact that not one professed supporter of Dreyfus was elected.

Picquart, however, had a burning and fighting zeal for justice. He came forward with new charges which caused the suicide of his successor in the Intelligence Bureau, after a confession of having forged certain documents in the interests of Dreyfus's accusers. Esterhazy soon afterwards fled the country after having also confessed forgery against Dreyfus. In 1899, Dreyfus was again brought before a jury and again found guilty, but his sentence was reduced and soon afterward he was pardoned. He was determined to get complete exoneration, however, and in 1906 he was declared innocent by an unbiased investigation and was restored to the army and promoted in rank.

The deep-lying result of the entire twelve years' struggle, accordingly, was the subordination of the military power in the Republic to the civil; the triumph of the liberal over the reactionary forces in the leadership of France; and, in 1905, the complete separation of Church and State in France. But during most of this period of internal readjustment France was in no position to present an unbroken front to the other Powers. Other countries were hardly disposed to look favorably upon an alliance with France; even Russia must have doubted the strength of the Franco-Russian alliance; and Germany still ruled with unvitiated

power in European affairs. Indeed, so successful did William's policy of conciliating France appear in contrast with Bismarck's policy of intimidating her that in 1895 a French fleet as well as a Russian was present at the opening of the Kiel Canal.

The Fashoda Incident

In 1876, the inability of the Egyptian government to pay its debts led to the assumption of joint control by France and England over Egypt. The natives, however, asserted their right to independence and self-determination and revolted against foreign rule. The revolt demanded armed intervention by both the nations which had assumed control of Egypt, but France was still afraid of attack from Germany, and allowed England to pacify Egypt alone. The result was that, although England officially disclaimed any intention of making Egypt an English protectorate, yet for practical purposes Egypt became a part of the British Empire and was so regarded by the great Powers.

France, however, still considered northern Africa the legitimate field for the colonial expansion which, as we have seen, she entered upon a few years after the Franco-Prussian War; and toward the end of the nineteenth century, the bitterness between France and England with respect to colonial ambitions became acute in Egypt. In 1898, a French expeditionary force set out from France's possessions in Central Africa to occupy the Sudan, the vast region to the south of what was then considered Egypt proper. England promptly dispatched a force from Egypt to bar the French advance and the two armies met at Fashoda, where the French had encamped and had planted the French flag. The seriousness of the situation was enhanced by the fact that shortly before England had declared that intervention in the Sudan by any other nation would be considered by England a hostile act on the part of that nation.

War appeared on the horizon. The French commanding officer declared that he had occupied the Sudan first, and that his rights were unquestioned. The British commander, on the other hand, was under strict orders from his home government, had the superior force, and was not to be deterred and before his doggedness and inflexibility, the

French were finally compelled to withdraw from the Sudan, barely averting an armed clash. The name of the British commander was Kitchener.

The Beginning of Anglo-German Rivalry

At the beginning of the twentieth century, however, the period of German internal industrial development was nearing an end; her industries were preparing to expand over the entire world. Germany was no longer content to dominate Europe; she was seeking the larger arena, and saw the way open to dominate the world. And although Germany could disregard England in European politics, she could not disregard England in the politics of the world outside of Europe.

England's position had long been one of "splendid isolation." She was surrounded by water and had no fear of a land invasion as long as she could keep the control of the sea. She was not economically self-supporting, drawing upon the entire world for the supplies necessary to her great factories; but as long as her fleet was greater than that of any other two countries combined, and as long as she adhered to her policy of free trade, neither British subjects nor British industry could be starved. Her vast empire spread over the entire world, but it was vulnerable to attack by the great Powers of Europe chiefly from the sea; and we have seen how jealously England protected her colonies when Russia endeavored to approach them in Asia and France in Africa.

England therefore naturally looked askance when the merchants of a nation with whom she was on most friendly terms began to appear in the great trading ports outside of Europe and to compete with English merchants. The thoroughness and the attention to details of German industry soon proved formidable, and bit by bit the Germans began to overcome the handicap of England's earlier start and occupancy of the field. Moreover, the great German business enterprises were virtually a part of the German government, and could rely upon their government for advantages and subsidies which English firms did not enjoy. It is difficult for individuals to engage in economic rivalry without developing a feeling of antagonism in other fields; and

the spirit of at least the influential group of English capitalists and financiers became appreciably less friendly to Germany.

Coolness between the leaders of the business world, however, did not necessarily imply coolness between the great masses of the people of the German and British empires. But there was already existent a cause of deep resentment against Germany on the part of the British people. In 1896, the Kaiser revealed the true attitude of his government toward England by an act as unexpected and startling as it was provocative and impolitic. In that year, the Boers in South Africa repulsed a raid of English under Jameson upon the Transvaal; whereupon the Emperor of Germany proceeded gratuitously to dispatch a telegram of congratulation to the Boers. England at that time was smarting under the defeat of English citizens at the hands of the South African farmers, and the Kaiser's attitude caused an outbreak of anti-German feeling within the British Isles.

In 1899, war was declared between the Boers and the British Empire. It could hardly be said that the English people supported the war without division. Indeed, no less a personage than David Lloyd-George attacked it during actual hostilities with an uncompromising intensity which in the Great War fifteen years later would have earned him the epithets of "pacifist" and "conscientious objector" in England, and in America would have subjected him to the penalties of the Espionage Act; and a large and influential section of British public opinion was with Mr. Lloyd-George. However, the stubbornness of the Boers' resistance enraged the bulk of the English people, and inspired them with a determination to "see the war through" until victory should perch upon British arms.

The Kaiser's telegram at the time of the Jameson raid and other indisputable evidence convinced England that Germany was pro-Boer. This feeling was heightened by information that Germany was selling munitions to the Boers; and Germany's action in supplying England's enemies with fire-arms caused indignation in England at that time, as America's action in supplying England with fire-arms fifteen years later caused anger in Germany. And the attitude of Germany could be explained only by her determination definitely to attack England's hold upon Africa.

The Kaiser had been too practical to imagine that Germany, despite her more efficient business methods, could continue for any length of time to capture trade away from British merchants in colonial territory controlled by the British. Before the end of the nineteenth century, as we have seen, Germany also entered the race for colonies; and England no longer experienced that attachment to Germany due to Germany's aloofness from the colonial competition in which England was trying to hold her own against France and Russia.

And the Kaiser had been too practical also to imagine that he could either acquire or maintain colonies against England's interests while England held undisputed sway of the seas. For some time, Germany had been quietly paying careful attention to her navy. The German merchant marine had been nursed until it was in fair shape to compete with show of success against the English. The Kiel Canal had been completed, so that German warships were available for service in either the Baltic Sea or the North Sea; and the island of Helgoland had been made a great naval base. And in 1900 Germany capped the climax by adopting the first of her "Great Navy Bills," which definitely challenged England's control of the sea, and threw down the gauge of battle to English shipbuilding.

No further action was needed to reveal Germany's intentions to England. With Germany in control of the sea, Germany would control the world, and England would be relegated to a secondary position. Nay, more, a blockaded England could oppose Germany even with less chance of success than France or Russia; and with Germany in control of the sea, England would become practically a German vassal. The cornerstone of English naval policy had been to maintain a fleet so large that even a combination of the second and the third naval powers of the world would still find the English Navy unrivalled. With the thrill of battle, England therefore accepted Germany's challenge; and from that time until 1918, the two nations engaged in a heartbreaking naval rivalry. The resources of each were taxed to the utmost as Germany rose to the position of the world's second naval power and England kept undiminished the ratio of her naval strength to Germany's naval strength. In 1906, England launched the *Dreadnaught,* and thereafter the major battleships constructed by

the great Powers were of the great size, power and expense of the *Dreadnaught* type. So burdensome in fact was the taxation made necessary by these huge naval armaments that England on several occasions proposed to Germany "a naval holiday," but Germany was obdurate and the naval competition continued unassuaged.

England was now beginning to realize that German ambitions compelled her to revise her policy of isolation in European politics. England had no illusion as to the strength of the German army; and if war should actually break out, why should Germany's enemies be divided, so that they might be crushed one by one? Why should not England call in the assistance of Germany's other diplomatic competitors, France and Russia; and in return offer them assistance against Germany's aggression?

After the defeat of French diplomacy in the Fashoda affair, the French Foreign Office had been filled by Théophile Delcassé. Delcassé was an implacable foe of Germany, and refused to allow France to be duped by Germany any longer into rivalry with England. He left no stone unturned to end the enmity between France and England, and to create an Anglo-French understanding. He yielded to British claims in Egypt and the Sudan. He conciliated Spain and England in Morocco. In England, Queen Victoria, friendly to the Germans and unfriendly to the French, died in 1901, and was succeeded by the astute Edward VII. A dispute concerning customs with England's diplomatic friend, Italy, was amicably settled, and despite Italy's membership in the Triple Alliance, a Franco-Italian understanding with regard to points of difference was consummated in 1902. And the Berlin-to-Bagdad Railroad project of Germany removed the last valid reason for England's policy of isolation.

The Berlin-to-Bagdad Railroad

With most of the great foreign fields for economic exploitation preempted by the time of the International Industrial Revolution in Germany, it seemed to German business interests that at least one rich section of undeveloped territory might be legitimately claimed as field for German foreign development. This was Asia Minor. It was

Turkish soil, but Turkey was totally unable to develop it industrially, nor was she unwilling to grant concessions looking toward that end to a foreign Power. None of the other great Powers of Europe had laid claim to exclusive economic interests in either Turkey in Europe or in Turkey in Asia; and Germany could well claim that she was but following in the footsteps of the other great Powers without treading on the toes of any of them if she arrogated to herself the right to economic exploitation of Turkey and Asia Minor. There were vast economic possibilities not only in Turkey, but also in Mesopotamia, Persia and Arabia; and Germany laid her plans with high expectations of rich reward.

Germany's program was concerned chiefly with a railroad from Constantinople through Bagdad to the Persian Gulf, with branch lines through Damascus stretching along both sides of the Red Sea. A tunnel would be constructed under the Bosphorus, so that the traffic might be uninterrupted from the Baltic Sea to the Persian Gulf. From Austria-Hungary, the European sections of the railroad would pass through the Balkan states, so that Germany's interest in maintaining Austrian supremacy in the Balkans against Russian interests became more vital than ever. The railroad would open to German business lands which had hitherto been largely inaccessible for extensive trade, investment and raw materials; and Germany took deep interest and pride in her new project. Of course, the German government was by no means blind to the political and military possibilities also in a railroad over which troops could be transported as readily as freight. And the railroad would cut off Russia from the Mediterranean in the Balkans and at Constantinople.

Turkey had not forgotten that Germany had been among the Powers to protect Turkish interests at the Congress of Berlin; and from that time Germany had sedulously cultivated the friendship of the Sultan's government. Soon after his accession, William II had formally paid a visit of friendship to the Sultan. Germany dispatched as ambassador to Turkey the ablest German diplomat of that and even of a later time, von Bieberstein; and she had no trouble in getting the concessions she desired from the Sultan for the "Bagdadbahn."

In 1896, a section of the proposed road, from the Bosphorus to

Konia, in Anatolia, had been completed with the support of both German and British capitalists; and in 1899 and again in 1902 the Kaiser obtained from Turkey the concessions he needed to extend that road to the Persian Gulf. Indeed, it was not until 1899 that the full scope of the German plan was made plain to other countries, including England.

England became at once thoroughly alarmed by and antagonistic to the Berlin-to-Bagdad Railroad. German exploitation of Turkey in Europe was of little concern to England, but nothing could have affected English interests more profoundly than a great German port on the Persian Gulf pointed directly at India, with a similar port pointing at Egypt and the Suez Canal; and both ports with direct rail connection with Berlin. Egypt was by no means tranquil under English rule; and then, as earlier in the Sepoy rebellion in 1857 and even as later during the Great War, nationalistic feeling was strong in India. England saw in the proposed railroad another carefully prepared German plan to undermine the British Empire, and by 1900 England had learned not to trust Germany. She determined to thwart Germany's intentions at all costs.

The only section of coast along the Persian Gulf where Germany could find a harbor adequate to be the terminus of the "Bagdadbahn" was in the province called Koweit. England proceeded to resurrect a shadowy claim over Koweit, and established a protectorate over it. The German threat at India now seemed more serious to England than the Russian, and England came to an understanding with Russia, now occupied chiefly with Manchurian troubles, concerning their long dispute about Asia; with the result that the land of Persia was divided between them—the northern part of Persia becoming a Russian sphere of influence, the southern part (contiguous to India) becoming an English sphere of influence, and the two countries guaranteeing to keep the central part of Persia a neutral zone to be free of all foreign aggrandisement. The Berlin-to-Bagdad Railroad would have to locate its eastern terminus somewhere in the sands of the Arabian desert.

German rage at the frustration of the Kaiser's cherished scheme knew no bounds. Germany indulged unrestrainedly in accusations that England not only wanted to keep her own position of vantage in the

world, but also was straining every nerve to prevent Germany from obtaining a similar position, to which Germany's great achievements entitled her. To German eyes, England was trying to keep Germany from "a place in the sun." New weight was given the utterances of those German thinkers who insisted that England was the inevitable enemy of the "Deutschtum" and that war between them was inevitable. The people of the two countries conceived a deep and bitter hatred of each other which did not lessen as the years rolled on.

German popular animosity against England was now even more intense than English popular animosity against Germany. England's next step in international affairs was now inevitable. She must abandon her position of splendid isolation, and join the alliance against Germany.

The Entente Cordiale

On April 8, 1904, England and France signed an agreement establishing an "Entente Cordiale," a cordial understanding, between them. The issue on which the agreement turned was Morocco. France considered Morocco pre-destined to join French colonial territory in north Africa, but England had certain colonial claims in Morocco, so that an agreement between the two countries was necessary. By the terms of the understanding, England agreed to give France free rein in Morocco and in return France agreed not to thwart England's aspirations in Egypt.

But more was contained in the understanding between England and France than this compromise regarding Egypt and Morocco. There were secret clauses in the treaty which were not published until some years afterwards. All Europe was intensely interested in knowing the content of those secret clauses; Germany was especially interested.

So that neither France nor England was isolated any longer. France had two powerful supporters in England and Russia; she had regained much of the position she had lost in 1870; no longer would it be necessary for her to submit to German domination without struggle.

Nor did England come unsupported into the Entente Cordiale. Some years previously, England had determined to oppose Russian advance

in the Far East, and being at that time occupied with the difficult problem of defeating the Boers, she had turned for help to Japan. Japan had not swung into the orbit of Western ideas until Commodore Perry's visit in 1853; but she had proved an apt pupil of Western civilization and England knew how ably prepared for conflict were the Japanese army and navy. Japan also was anxious to dominate the Far East, and Russia's Far Eastern activities were opposing Japan's; so that an alliance between Japan and England had been consummated in 1902.

Moreover, Italy was but a lukewarm member of the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria. Delcassé had soothed Italy's wrath at the French occupation of Tunis by promising Italy a free hand in Tripoli, and Tripoli belonged to Germany's friend, Turkey. A bitter tariff war between France and Italy, begun in 1885, had well-nigh disrupted Italian industries, but Delcassé had been astute enough to put an end to the Franco-Italian commercial warfare in 1898; and had thereby earned the deep gratitude of Italy. Again, Italy's claims for the Irredenta and for land along the Adriatic were still conflicting with those of Austria; and in case of a general European war, Italy's interests would best be served by the defeat of Austria. Italy's membership in the Triple Alliance involved also extensive military preparations on an extremely expensive scale, and Italy was notoriously a poor country. Moreover, it was by this time evident that the later developments of the Dreyfus scandal in France had turned the tide in France against the Catholic party there and accordingly against the French support of the Papal interests. It was therefore natural that when in 1902 the Triple Alliance was renewed, the Italian foreign minister should publicly announce that its terms contained no clause providing for Italian aggression against France.

In fact, the neutrality of Italy in the first months of the Great War later proved how insecure was the hold of the Triple Alliance upon Italy. Germany must have known that Italy was using her position largely for purposes of international bargaining and that in the event of war German armies would get little help from Italy; and therefore German anger at Italy's final decision to join the Entente during the

Great War was not so violent as would have been the case if Germany had definitely counted upon Italian support.

Accordingly, the great Powers of Europe were organized by 1904 into two armed camps—Germany actively supported by Austria and nominally supported by Italy in the Triple Alliance, with a friend in Turkey; France actively supported by Russia and England in the Entente Cordiale, with Japan friendly and Spain not unfriendly.

The First Moroccan Crisis

It was now Germany's turn to fear. Manifestly, something had happened not in accord with her destiny to dominate Europe. Bismarck had ordered and Europe had obeyed—now the enemy whom Germany had thought humiliated for all time was again in condition to offer battle. Bismarck had arranged Europe as German interests dictated—now Germany was not even consulted, much less listened to, in the disposition of Morocco. Where were German prestige, German leadership, German diplomacy, even German assurance against defeat? Especially, where was the Germany army? The Junkers and the capitalist interests of Germany echoed the cry—Where was the German army? Bismarck would have used it rather than suffer humiliation such as this combination of Franco-Russian, Franco-Italian and now Franco-English ententes, the German Kaiser was told. And when the Kaiser still remained obdurate, he was promptly and roundly denounced by the Junkers and by the capitalist interests throughout Germany as a traitor to the Fatherland.

But the Kaiser had no intention of submitting without a contest. He was merely biding a more opportune occasion.

In the meantime, France thrilled at the contemplation of her achievement. Morocco was a flaming feather in her bonnet. Morocco was rich in mineral wealth, especially iron. It had good harbors on both the ocean and the Mediterranean. It was across from Gibraltar, and thus enjoyed no mean strategic position. It was easily accessible to France and its pleasant climate might later induce extensive French colonization. It was contiguous to the other French colonial territory in Africa. And, most important of all considerations, Morocco enor-

mously enhanced French prestige and by the same token seriously diminished German prestige throughout the world; and for the first time patriotic Frenchmen could feel that the degradation of 1870 was on the fair road to being avenged. Only the French Socialists, under the leadership of the far-seeing Jean Jaurès, objected to French colonial expansion, and discerned war in the future as the result of Delcassé's strategy.

For many months, the Kaiser dodged the issue. Publicly, he pretended to disregard the Moroccan situation as unimportant and as not affecting any vital interests of Germany. Officially, he was as cordial as ever to France and England, even to M. Delcassé. And then the situation for which he had been patiently waiting presented itself.

The Russo-Japanese War—In 1894, Japan had asserted her intention to dominate the Far East, and at the same time had revealed the efficiency of her army, by vanquishing China with dispatch, ease and thoroughness. According to the terms of peace, Japan was to receive Formosa and the Liao-Tung peninsula (adjoining Korea), rich commercial concessions were to be granted Japan by China, China was to pay a considerable indemnity and Korea was to recognize the suzerainty of Japan.

But, as we have seen, by this time the Russian plans for expansion in the Far East were fully under way, and Japan's success threatened to thwart Russia's program. Russia was especially anxious to capture a port on the Pacific far enough to the south to be free from ice-blockades, and in the territory demanded by Japan from China was situated Port Arthur, the logical port for Russia's plans and for the southern terminus of the Trans-Siberian Railroad. Russia accordingly proceeded to arrange an alliance between herself, France and Germany, ostensibly to maintain the territorial integrity of China, and then the coalition of the western Powers demanded that Japan surrender most of her territorial acquisitions resulting from the war with China; and although Japan consented, she consented only with an ill-grace, only because she was unable to resist the demands inspired by Russia, and only with determination to be avenged on Russia.

In passing, it might be noted that the European powers then

themselves proceeded to dismember China, Germany seizing the important harbor of Kiao-Chau, France and England also acquiring additions to their territory at the expense of China, and Russia seizing Manchuria and the Liao-Tung peninsula. Russia then took steps to colonize her Far Eastern territory on a large scale with Russian citizens.

Japan immediately realized that sooner or later she would come into armed conflict with Russia in the Far East, and from 1896 carefully prepared her army and navy for war. In 1903, Japan asserted herself, after having made all the arrangements necessary to guard against support to Russia from any great Power. Russia was occupying Manchuria only under promise made years previously to withdraw as soon as possible from Manchurian soil, and Japan insisted in 1903 that the time had arrived for that promise to be redeemed. Moreover, again contrary to treaties, Russia had begun to penetrate Korea to develop valuable lumber concessions which she had wrung from the Korean Government; and Japan insisted that Russia make clear also her intentions regarding Korea. But even members of the royal family of Russia were financially interested in the Korean lumber concessions, and Russia temporized. On February 5, 1904, Japan declared war against Russia.

The Entente Cordiale between England and France was not signed until April 8, 1904. This, then, was the cause of the Kaiser's inaction in the face of the "rapprochement" between France and England—he was waiting to see what Japan would do to France's ally. There hasn't been a period in the last fifty years when Germany has not been fully informed by her secret agents of the military condition of the other great Powers, and it is certain that the Kaiser realized how strong was the little nation of the Pacific and how weak was the largest nation of Europe. No other nation watched the developments of the Russo-Japanese War with greater interest than Germany.

Both on land and on sea, Japan began to win a series of smashing and devastating victories. A victory off Port Arthur in February, 1904, and another off Vladivostock in May assured Japan complete control of the sea in the Far East. Port Arthur was surrounded, besieged and captured on the first day of 1905. The Russian land forces were divided and their only line of communication with the base of supplies

thousands of miles away was the single-track and over-crowded Trans-Siberian Railroad. In a word, the Russians were employing military methods of the nineteenth century while the Japanese were employing military methods of the twentieth century; and the war was an almost unbroken series of Japanese victories. But the Kaiser was still waiting for a final and decisive Russian defeat, which occurred in the long and terrific battle of Mukden.

The battle of Mukden was concluded on the ninth day of March, 1905. And on the last day of that month, the Kaiser's yacht dropped anchor in the harbor of Tangier, in Morocco. The Kaiser went ashore, visited the Sultan of Morocco officially, and with the whole world for an audience delivered a speech to the Moorish leader which every well-informed student of foreign affairs in Europe was reading within two hours with the fear of war in his breast.

In his speech, the Kaiser addressed the Sultan as an independent ruler. Morocco should always be independent and free of foreign domination; and Germany was prepared to come to Morocco's assistance, if need be, to achieve that end. All nations must share on terms of equality in the trade of independent Morocco. The Moors were Mohammedans, and the Kaiser was well-known as the defender of the Mohammedans.

It must be admitted that Germany was not without just cause for complaint at the Anglo-French disposition of Morocco. A treaty of the great Powers in 1880 had guaranteed all nations equal rights in the development of Morocco; and although there was tacit agreement among the great Powers that treaties which were not renewed were hardly to be regarded as effective after several decades, yet Germany could well insist that she should have been at least consulted before the treaty was annulled. Accordingly, it was rather the defiant manner of the German protest which caused alarm and anger in Europe. Indeed, Germany has always revealed an irritating disregard of international etiquette, delighting in asserting her point with unnecessary rudeness; and to a considerable extent the deep antagonisms among the countries of Europe in the twentieth century may be laid at the door of the crude and insulting methods of German diplomacy.



Photos Supplied by International Film Service

THE DEVASTATION OF WAR

The upper panel shows the appearance of Ypres today. In 1914, Ypres was one of the most prosperous towns in Belgium, with a population of some 20,000.

The upper central panel to the left shows the result of five minutes' bombardment by American aviators at Ostend, during the German occupation of that town.

The upper central panel to the right shows the top of the ruined tower of the Cloth Hall at Ypres. The Cloth Hall, one of the famous sights of interest in Europe, was begun in 1201 and finished in 1342.

The lower central panel to the left shows all that was left of the Cloth Hall at Nieuport, France, after the bombardment of the town.

The lower central panel to the right shows the ruins of a spinning room in a weaving factory along the Oise.

The lower panel shows the appearance of an individual dwelling after shell-fire. This particular house was once the abode of a well-to-do French family near the Aisne.

At all events, the decision now lay in the hands of France—was it to be peace or war? When France surveyed the situation, she sadly confessed that it would have to be peace. The scars of the Dreyfus case, with the accompanying religious and political quarrels, were still by no means healed. Both France and Germany knew that the French army was ill-prepared and that the German war machine, as always, represented the last word in military preparedness. England, it is true, could be counted upon for support, but the Entente was still new, there was an old tradition in England of enmity between France and England, and it was extremely doubtful if the English people would be over-enthusiastic about another war so soon after the Boer War. Russia not only had been prostrated abroad but was convulsed at home. So France consented to modify the Moroccan agreement, and the Kaiser's popularity increased in Germany.

But Germany was not yet satisfied. The Moroccan arrangement had touched not only her material interests—it had threatened German prestige. The diplomatic attack had been public and arrogant, the diplomatic victory must be public and humiliating. Furthermore, it had been due chiefly to one man's abilities that France had been able of late to assert herself, and Germany discerned the opportunity to kill two birds with one stone—she demanded that Théophile Delcassé resign as minister for foreign affairs of France.

It was a demand no less humiliating than that which nine years later Austria was to make of Servia, and which Servia declared was too humiliating to be accepted. But France was powerless. Delcassé resigned.

Still Germany was not content. She demanded that a great international conference be held to settle the Moroccan dispute. The circumstances surrounding that demand, its reception by the other great Powers, the reasons behind it, the results which attended it, all are still shrouded in mystery so far as general public knowledge is concerned. But one fact about the conference, which was held in Algeciras, Spain, in 1906, is clear—Germany suffered a decisive diplomatic defeat. Of the thirteen great Powers represented at Algeciras, including the United States, only Austria and Morocco voted with Germany on the important issues. Especially implicit was England's support of

France—England had not entered lightly into the Entente Cordiale. Belgium also threw in her lot with the Entente against Germany. The Conference decided against the German claim of absolute independence for Morocco, and, although theoretically safeguarding German commercial interests there and refusing to recognize France's right to a protectorate over the country, nevertheless assigned to France and Spain significant police powers in the turbulent Moorish state.

United States at the Algeciras Conference. The true reasons why the United States departed from her traditional policy of non-interference in European politics in order to participate in the Algeciras Conference are not clear. The pretext evidently lay in the capture in 1904 of a naturalized American citizen, Perdicaris, by a Moroccan bandit, Raisuli, who used his capture for his own political ends under the guise of holding Perdicaris for a ransom. It is hardly probable that this country entered the diplomatic lists against Germany as a result of attempted German interference with the Monroe Doctrine in Venezuela in 1903, when strong and even threatening representations by President Roosevelt had been necessary to bring Germany to terms. (Germany had yielded to arbitration only after President Roosevelt had assured the German ambassador that Admiral Dewey would proceed with a fleet to Venezuela within four days, but had promised to allow the Kaiser to arrogate to himself the credit for arbitrating the difficulty in case Germany yielded.) The United States could claim other interests also in the Algeciras Conference, for it had participated in the European conference in 1880 regarding Morocco and again in 1885 in another conference regarding territorial adjudications in Africa. If participation in the Algeciras Conference was intended by President Roosevelt as an entering wedge for a more influential position for the United States in world politics, he did not see his way clear to taking the country into his confidence.

At all events, this country signed the Algeciras pact only with the reservation of committing itself to no guarantee to take measures to enforce it; and later when Germany called to our attention the fact that the Algeciras pact was being violated, President Taft insisted

that the obligations of the Monroe Doctrine restrained us from participation in European political affairs.

Nevertheless, our participation in the international conference in 1906 was a striking forerunner of our participation in the great international conference at Paris in 1919. For in both conferences the United States was associated with the great Powers of the world in maintaining world order. In both conferences the United States played a leading part. In both conferences, the United States supported the interests of France and England against those of Germany. And our representative at the Algeciras Conference was Henry White, one of our five representatives to the Paris Conference thirteen years later.

The Triple Entente

In the combination of Powers against the Triple Alliance (Germany, Italy, Austria), a striking anomaly existed. Russia was allied with France, England was allied with France, but there was not even friendship, much less an alliance, between Russia and England. For decades England had been opposing the Russian advance toward the Mediterranean and toward the East. In 1827, England had helped Greece to independence against Turkey in order to prevent Russia from reaping the benefits of the Ottoman defeat. In 1854 the two countries had actually waged war in the Crimean and in 1878 England had been a large factor in depriving Russia of the fruits of the Russian victory over Turkey in the previous year. In Afghanistan, in Tibet, in Persia, the two nations were at loggerheads; and before the twentieth century, nine of every ten Englishmen would have called Russia rather than Germany the hereditary foe of England. In the Far East, also, Russia was endeavoring to advance from her territory to the north upon the British territory to the south; and it has already been seen how England allied herself with Japan against Russia's Far Eastern projects. In 1904, England and Russia had again come almost to war when a Russian battle-fleet fired by mistake upon English fishing vessels in the North Sea. England had been sincerely anti-Russian during the Russo-

Japanese War; and the liberty-loving English detested the autocracy which controlled Russia.

So that France had no easy task in persuading her two chief allies to reach an "entente." But we have already seen how England was now discerning her real enemy in Germany, and how she had already come to an agreement with Russia in Persia in order to thwart the full development of the Berlin-to-Bagdad Railroad. In addition, Russian and English business interests had become greatly dependent upon each other. Russia's defeat at the hands of Japan in 1905 had removed much of the threat of Russian domination in the Pacific; and England was not anxious to see Russia too weak in the Far East lest Japan be able to assume domination there to the detriment of English interests. England's Far Eastern policy had been one of supporting Japan against Russia; it was now one of supporting Russia against Japan. Moreover, in the First Moroccan Dispute much of the German victory had been due to Russia's weakness, and a weak Russia would still further aid Germany in the future Anglo-German rivalry. On her side, Russia was coming around to place the chief emphasis in her policy upon the Balkan situation, and for some years England had realized that German domination in the Balkans and in Asia Minor was less desirable than even Russian domination in these disputed regions.

Accordingly, in 1907, France's efforts to make the Entente a Triple instead of a Double Entente were successful. On August 31 of that year, a definite understanding was signed between Russia and England. They came to an agreement concerning their colonial aspirations—if there were also secret clauses in the agreement they probably assured Russia support in the Balkan peninsula and in her campaign for the acquisition of Constantinople.

In the same year, Japan, also, reached an understanding with Russia and France. Russia's allies immediately planned a comprehensive reconstruction and enlargement of the Russian army, and British and French officers began to assist the Russian military command. Germany was being encircled—the balance of power was becoming susceptible to very slight weights, so closely were the lines in Europe being drawn.

The Revolution in Turkey

In the year after his accession in 1888, the Kaiser had paid a formal visit of friendship to the Sultan of Turkey, and since that time the relations between the two countries had been very cordial. Germany needed Turkish control of the Dardanelles and Asia Minor to keep open Germany's connections with the East, just as Germany needed Austrian control of the Balkans. A weak and unsupported Turkey would mean Russian control of Constantinople, just as a weak and unsupported Austria would mean Russian control of the Balkans; and in either contingency, the "Pan-German" hope of a German "Middle Europe" (Mitteleuropa), stretching from the Baltic to the Persian Gulf, would be shattered. So the Kaiser had proclaimed himself the defender of Islam, and for years the Turkish army had been trained and officered by Germans; while von Bieberstein had been kept at Constantinople to outgeneral the other ambassadors there.

But in 1908 a successful revolt broke out against the venal and shiftless Turkish government, and resulted in its overthrow at the hands of the "Young Turks." The very venality and shiftlessness of the old regime of "The Sick Man of Europe" had aided Germany to develop her plans in Turkish territory almost at will, so that the revolt was another blow at the strength of Germany's position.

The Young Turks were a secret organization which had been planning a "coup d'état" for a long time, but it is doubtful if the revolution could have been successful without secret support from the members of the Triple Entente. But Germany was still mistress of Europe. She knew that her domination was sharply challenged by the revolution of the Young Turks; she accepted the challenge; von Bieberstein summoned to his aid all his finesse; Russia was still the natural foe to Turkish interests; and Germany regained the upper hand in Turkish affairs.

Turkey by this time had also developed a consciousness of nationality, and the Young Turks were the embodiment of the new Turkish nationalistic ambitions. They were ostensibly reformers and liberals, but their political and social creed was overshadowed by their nationalism. Like the Magyars, they soon developed into an oppressing

nationalistic group, persecuting the alien nationalities within the Turkish Empire with no less zeal than had the Sultan whom they had deposed; the alien nationalities fought their oppressors; and once more reaction reigned in Turkey.

Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria

After the Algeciras Conference, both the Triple Entente and the Quadruple Alliance (for Turkey was now completely under German control) sought every available opportunity to strengthen themselves and to weaken their opponents. In theory, and for public consumption, they insisted that they were anxious merely to preserve the world's peace by maintaining the Balance of Power unaltered from its previous state (the *status quo ante*); but in reality each group was anxious to disturb the Balance of Power if it could but weight down the Balance of Power on its own side. The Entente strengthened its hold upon Persia, and France succeeded in seducing Italy even farther from the Quadruple Alliance, while the reconstruction of the Russian army proceeded apace. On her side, Germany was busy in intrigues with Russia and in the Balkans; and the secret manoeuvres of this period can not yet be fully understood. In so delicate a situation, little was required to give birth to another international crisis; and it came in 1908, immediately after, and as a result of, the Young Turks' Revolution.

It will be remembered that at the Congress of Berlin in 1878 Austria-Hungary had been assigned the government of two Turkish provinces in the Balkans, Bosnia and Herzegovina. The two provinces were of considerable extent, being almost as large as Servia itself; and their geographical position was important in that they lay between Austria and Servia and between Servia and the Adriatic. They were peopled by South Slavs, of the same race as the inhabitants of Servia; and all Servia's aspirations toward the Adriatic lay in the direction of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Since 1878, Austria had treated the two provinces, nominally part of Turkey, as though they were in fact part of the Hapsburg dominions. The Turkish Government was too weak to resist the Austrian "peace-

ful penetration" of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and as long as they were parts of Austria *de facto,* the Dual Monarchy cared little to whom they belonged *de jure.*

But the Young Turks seemed to be of different calibre from the Sultan whom they had deposed. They at least threatened to reform and even to liberalize the Turkish government, and Austria knew that they were intensely patriotic and zealous to assert the claims of Turkish nationalism. It was inconceivable that the Young Turks would acquiesce in the hold Austria had taken upon two important provinces which belonged to Turkey, and Austria therefore determined to forestall any move of the new Turkish government in that direction. On October 3, 1908, Austria announced the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Austria's action was a direct repudiation of the Treaty of Berlin; and naturally was not taken without the advice, if it was taken without the instigation, of Germany. But Austria's action was much more than a mere repudiation of a solemn obligation—it was a defiant taunt at the Triple Entente. It was more insulting than the Anglo-French agreement concerning Morocco had been to Germany, for German interests in Morocco were hardly to be considered vital, whereas the interests of the Entente, and especially of Russia, in the Balkans went deep down to the very national existence of great nations. Again, the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was an annexation of new bodies of Slavs to be placed under Magyar repression; and Magyar repression of Slavs was already causing profound disturbance to the peace of Europe. Austria's action gave almost a death-blow to the dream of a greater Servia, or, to use contemporaneous nomenclature, of a united Jugo-Slavia; and it dragged Russian pride down into the dust. Finally, the action of Austria was taken without warning or hint—she repudiated a treaty without disclosing her intention in advance to all the other signatories; it was another attempt to assert the leadership of the Quadruple Alliance and the subjection of the Triple Entente.

Russia immediately protested, using restrained language and arguments, setting forth plainly the issues involved, and requesting an international conference. England and France supported the protest of

their ally. But Austria refused to consider the question of a conference—or rather, she would consent to the calling of a conference if it were agreed *a priori* that the conference would not be empowered to object to Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Entente renewed its protests, in firmer language; and all eyes turned to Berlin. Berlin's answer was to the point—she would support Austria to the uttermost. Germany announced also that unless Servia ceased her preparations for war, and unless Russia consented to Austria's action, an Austrian army would invade Servia. Austria even began mobilization. Again the decision lay in the hands of the Entente—was it to be peace or war?

Again the Entente hesitated. Russia was in no shape to endure a severe military struggle—she had not yet recovered from either the Russo-Japanese War or the Revolution of 1905; nor had the reconstruction of her army advanced far. Moreover, the great mass of the English and French people were not interested in the Balkan Question, nor could they be made to see that a great moral issue had been raised—such an issue, for instance, as the invasion of Belgium in 1914. The English and the French people would understand only that they were fighting for Russia; and about this time new revelations of the utter brutality of the Tsar's regime had made Russia more repugnant than ever to the democratic sensibilities of the Western democracies. In both England and France, the pacifists and the anti-Russians would be many; and the Socialists in France had become powerful and would take an anti-war stand, under the magnificent leadership of Jaurès. Why not wait before joining issue with Germany until Russia was in better shape to give material assistance? Again the Entente yielded and chose peace. Again Germany had imposed her will upon Europe. Again Germany gloried in her triumph and repeated the set phrases about the super-race, the people of destiny, and the degeneracy of other nations. Again the Kaiser was fêted, and Bismarck was no longer mourned.

The triumph seemed to be conclusive. Turkey did not dare to hold aloof, and remained within the fold of the Quadruple Alliance. And in 1910, the Kaiser actually induced Russia to reach an accord with Germany which withdrew Russian opposition from, and even promised

Russian support to, the Berlin-to-Bagdad Railroad. Germany continued the development of the "Bagdadbahn;" and England's attempt to render it futile had largely failed. It was the high-water mark of German success; never again was the German star to set so high in the ascendant.

THE DECLINE OF GERMAN DIPLOMATIC DOMINATION, 1911-1914

The Second Moroccan Crisis

The Act of Algeciras had been of little value in solving the problem concerning Morocco itself. Revolts broke out constantly against the authority of the Sultan of Morocco. Violence became more and more common. Foreigners and foreign property were attacked and a virtual condition of anarchy threatened to reign in the land of the Moors. As France used the various developments of this chaotic situation to exercise more and more the police authority granted her under the Act of Algeciras, and to place the Moroccan Government under deeper financial obligations to France, it was generally believed that France was bent on extending her control over Morocco beyond the limits set by the agreement of 1906.

In 1908, a conflict between the German consul at Casablanca, Morocco, and some French seamen, concerning fugitives from the French army who had taken refuge in Morocco, again threatened an international crisis. For a period, international feeling ran high and there were many negotiations between the foreign offices of the great Powers, with the result that Germany finally agreed to submit her demand for an apology to the Hague Tribunal. The Hague award was made in terms which conciliated both parties to the dispute, although sustaining the French position; and again the war cloud passed over.

But the power of Morocco to cause trouble between France and Germany had thus again been recognized; and in 1909, the two countries came to a formal agreement concerning their interests in Morocco. The diplomatic negotiations of this period have been religiously kept from public knowledge, so that it is difficult to appreciate their true significance. The French government agreed to safeguard German

economic interests in Morocco, and the German government agreed to recognize the potency of the political claims of France there. France also agreed to make the first terminus of a railroad she was constructing in Morocco at an "open" seaport, where German trade would have equal rights, instead of at an interior town where German trade would be discriminated against.

The whole world, accordingly, was dismayed when in July, 1911, the German Government informed the great Powers that a German gunboat had been dispatched to the "open" Moroccan port of Agadir. The reason assigned by Germany was the protection of German interests and trade in Agadir; but when the great Powers investigated Agadir, they discovered that it was a town of only several hundred inhabitants, with no important economic interests of any kind. Germany then came into the open with a project which amounted virtually to a partition of Morocco between France, Spain, and Germany. Three months before, Delcassé had been recalled to the French Cabinet, and Germany scented another revolt against her will. The Kaiser, emboldened by his domination of Europe in 1908 and determined to solidify the German diplomatic domination, was but rattling his sword once more.

Again it was the manner of rather than the reason for the action of Germany which caused alarm and indignation. Germany might well claim a right to protest about Morocco itself. France had not lived up to the agreement of 1909 regarding the railroad in Morocco, and was building sections of the line through the interior before she completed the sections which would terminate at an open port. It was an illuminating example of the economic causes of war. In April, 1911, a serious revolt had broken out in Fez, which may or may not have been instigated by France; and France had dispatched an army of considerable size to put it down. Throughout Europe, France's action had been regarded as the final step in establishing a French protectorate over Morocco; and Germany had officially warned France that France must respect the Act of Algeciras and the 1909 agreement by withdrawing the French troops after the troubles in Fez had been quieted, without seizing the political control of the country. But the French army definitely located itself in Morocco with Fez as head-

quarters; and began to extend in all directions from Fez into Moroccan territory.

The moment was well-chosen for another assertion of the international power of Germany. In France, a huge railroad strike had just been put down only by the use of the army, and French politics were chaotic, with a change of ministry a few days previously in a fashion which made improbable the formulation of a definite French foreign policy. The new premier was Caillaux, believed to favor a Franco-German "rapprochement." In England, the Asquith ministry was engaged in its bitter struggle, under the leadership of Lloyd-George, to curtail the power of the House of Lords, and England also was rent with political dissensions. Moreover, Ireland was again seething with discontent, and strikes in England as well as in France had been serious. And probably Germany wanted definite and exact information as to the amount of support which England would give France in case hostilities leading to the first great European war in forty years should actually begin.

But on this occasion Germany overstepped the mark. The degradation experienced by the Entente in 1908 had left a deep scar; and both England and France had resolved that submission to Germany a second time was impossible. In the face of German aggression, French patriotism brought unity into France. The British government allowed Mr. Lloyd-George, chancellor of the exchequer, and the notorious pacifist of the Boer War, to state the position of the Asquith ministry in a speech at the Mansion House on July 21. Mr. Lloyd-George's statements were guarded but definite—England would support France unreservedly, even to the point of war. And Mr. Balfour, leader of the Opposition, gave public announcement that in case of danger abroad, there would be unity at home, and the Opposition would cease functioning as an Opposition. France stood firm—she would consult, she would reason, she would confer, she would arbitrate, but to any check upon her political domination of Morocco she would not consent. The Entente had made its choice—as between war and further degradation, it chose war. The burden of the ultimate decision was in the hands of the Imperial German Government.

While the Imperial German Government was deciding whether to

provoke the general European conflagration in 1911, or to wait for another occasion, France struck swiftly and surely at one of the most vital sources of the strength of the German Government. Ever since 1875, French finance had been supremely powerful. In all quarters of the globe French banks had sunk their roots deep, and German banking institutions of all kinds were supported largely by money from France or by funds under the control of French interests. And immediately after the Moroccan crisis became acute, pressure was brought to bear upon German banks from many different sources. Suddenly, the Berlin Bourse became weak and a panic threatened Germany.

After some weeks, Germany decided to submit, to swallow her humiliation and to cover the blow at her prestige as best she might. France proved not unwilling to make concessions which might save Germany's honor in the eyes of all except the most discerning; and on November 4, 1911, a final pact was signed regarding Morocco. France was to establish a protectorate over Morocco and in return ceded Germany sections of the French Congo. The new German acquisition looked large on the maps; only those familiar with the territory knew that it consisted for the greater part of swamps and marshes.

Until years later, when all the circumstances regarding these negotiations are made public, only one answer will be available to the question as to why Germany did not choose war in 1911 rather than in 1914—she must have hoped that in later years she would be able to retrieve her diplomatic defeat as she had more than retrieved in 1908 her defeat in 1906. The Balkans were becoming more and more troublesome, and they were ever fertile soil for diplomatic machinations. But instead of strengthening German prestige, later international developments were to weaken it even further.

The Turco-Italian War

Before the second Moroccan crisis had been definitely adjudicated, the weakness of the Quadruple Alliance was revealed in a new quarter—one of its members opened war upon another. Despite Germany's pleas and threats, Italy determined to wait no longer to annex Tripoli, and to that end declared war on Turkey on September 27, 1911.

As has been seen, Italy had been forestalled by France in the annexation of Tunis in 1881. In the race among the great Powers for colonies in Africa, Italy then resorted to the extreme east of the Dark Continent, and annexed Eritrea, along the Red Sea, and Italian Somaliland, along the Indian Ocean. Between them lay Abyssinia, to which Italy next turned; but the Abyssinians proved such formidable antagonists that in 1896 Italy was compelled to recognize Abyssinia as independent. Italy then looked once more toward northern Africa, and set her heart upon Tripoli, under Turkish rule. In 1901, France recognized Italian claims in Tripoli in return for Italian recognition of France's rights in Morocco; and by the time of the Conference of Algeciras Italy's claims to Tripoli were generally recognized.

Italy proceeded to colonize Tripoli, maintaining some semblance of law and order, settling many Italian families there and developing the economic resources of the country. Plans for railroads were carefully and extensively drawn. But the Young Turks' Revolution in 1908 rudely shattered Italian hopes for Tripoli, just as it menaced Austrian hopes for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Turks proceeded to assert themselves in Tripoli, and even to suppress and repress the Italians there. Italy accordingly made plans to assert her sovereignty over Tripoli by force as soon as the occasion presented itself, in the meantime organizing a campaign of propaganda along that line in the Italian press. The diplomatic defeat of Germany in 1911 gave Italy the opportunity which she had been awaiting, and when she declared war on Turkey and occupied Tripoli with an Italian army, the Socialists were the only influential section of the Italian nation not to support the war.

The Tripolitan sea-coast was soon captured by Italy, but Turkey nevertheless would not cede her province. Early in 1912, therefore, Italy proceeded to move her troops inland. But in this campaign she met with bitter and effective guerilla warfare from the Arab natives, who were Mohammedans and desired to remain under Mohammedan rather than submit to Christian rule. Turkey made little military effort to resist the Italian military penetration, but it soon became evident that the resistance of the natives might continue for years. So in April, 1912, Italy launched a direct attack against the

Dardanelles. But the Dardanelles proved to be well-nigh impregnable, as they proved several years later; and Italy would have been baffled again had not Turkey met with attack in another quarter. At this time the Albanians began a revolt which was suspiciously timely for Italy and which occupied Turkey's resources to the utmost, and the signs were multiplying that the Balkan nations were preparing a campaign to drive Turkey completely out of Europe. In October, Montenegro, Servia, Bulgaria and Greece were at war with the Sultan, and Italy threatened to join them in case Turkey did not formally surrender Tripoli. Turkey accordingly yielded, although in terms which concealed her cession; and Italy incorporated Tripoli as a part of the kingdom of Victor Emmanuel.

The Balkan Question Again

The Balkan Peninsula has long been the battleground of all three fundamental causes of the Great War—the conflict of nationalities, the conflict of economic interests and the conflict of political ambitions. In the twentieth century these conflicts raged with renewed fury in the "cock-pit of Europe." Repression of the Slavs continued with accelerated intensity. The Berlin-to-Bagdad Railroad; the quest of Russia for a port free from ice-blockades; the insistence of Austria upon control of the Danube; the hope of Servia for access to the sea; tariff and trade discriminations, all used the Balkan states as pawns on their chess-board of the Western world. And in the Balkans the Quadruple Alliance sought its field for repairing its political power and diplomatic reputation.

So conflicting were the interests of the Balkan states and so variant their stages of culture that it was believed until 1912 that unified political action through a Balkan League was chimerical. But on one issue, at least, the Balkan states could agree; and by 1912 that issue stood out so transcendant that for the first time it stimulated an effective alliance between them. Servia, Montenegro, Roumania, Greece and Bulgaria could agree together that the "unspeakable Turk" must be pried from his hold upon the Balkan peoples.

We have seen that the Congress of Berlin in 1878 had protected

the Turkish hold upon the Christian peoples of the Balkans, so that as late as 1912 a broad belt of Balkan territory, including Albania, Macedonia and Thrace, was still part of the Turkish Empire. In those days, the Turkish army was rated high—it was a product of German military training and tactics—and the Balkan states had found it necessary to await a favorable opportunity before breaking a lance against the Sultan. Indeed, in 1897, Greece had gone to war with Turkey in the attempt to free Crete from Turkish rule, and Greece had been decisively defeated. (The great Powers, however, had declared Crete autonomous under Turkey as a result of the war, and had guaranteed her neutrality.)

The First Balkan War

The revolution of the Young Turks, however, had greatly stimulated feeling for joint action of the Balkan states against Turkey; for the Revolution not only weakened the political power of the Porte, but also re-awakened the ever-restless Turkish nationalistic program of attacking the alien races under Turkish rule. Evidence was piling up that Turkey was preparing to re-conquer Crete; and from 1908 to 1912 the Slavs in Macedonia—a large section of the Bulgarian nationality—were subjected to a series of merciless massacres and outrages. Indeed, the whole Bulgarian nation was maddened by the plight of its brothers in Macedonia; and for once the demand for war in the Balkans arose from the people over the opposition of the government. And the Italian attack on Turkey in 1911-12 brought the situation to a head. Largely through the diplomatic sagacity of Venizelos, the Greek premier, the Balkan states, except Roumania, united in a declaration of war against Turkey in October, 1912. War in the Balkans was no part of the program of the great Powers, as it threatened to upset the Balance of Power; but the great Powers were divided into two camps, and the Balkan states were one in purpose, so that the very division in the Concert of Europe rendered the great Powers helpless to restrain the Balkans from their plan.

A long and wearing war had been foreseen—especially since Turkey and Italy patched up peace at that time—and the Balkan states laid



© Underwood & Underwood

© Clinedinst

© Underwood & Underwood

© International Film Service

© Underwood & Underwood

DESCRIPTION OF PICTURES ON REVERSE SIDE

Upper Left Hand Corner—Lieutenant General Robert Lee Bullard, Commander, First Division, American Expeditionary Force, January, 1918, and Commander, Second American Army, A. E. F., October 9, 1918—.

Upper Right Hand Corner—General Tasker H. Bliss, Assistant Chief of Staff, United States Army, February 15, 1915, and Chief of Staff, September 22, 1917-March 1, 1918; Member, Supreme War Council in France, 1918, and United States Delegate, Paris Peace Conference, 1919.

Center—General John Joseph Pershing, Commander-in-Chief, American Military Expedition into Mexico, March, 1916, and Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Force in Europe, May, 1917—.

Lower Left Hand Corner—Lieutenant General Hunter Liggett, Commander, Western Department, United States Army, 1917, and Commander, First American Army, A. E. F., October 9, 1918—.

Lower Right Hand Corner—Major General Joseph T. Dickman, Commander, Camp Custer, Michigan, 1917, and Commander, Third American Army, A. E. F. (Army of Occupation), November 18, 1918—.

their military plans very carefully. Greece was the only one of the combination with a strong navy, and Greece had been admitted into the league largely in order that she might retain control of the sea and prevent Turkey from dispatching troops and supplies by water to Turkish forces in Albania and Macedonia. The Bulgars were to attack through Thrace and to direct their army toward Constantinople itself. Greece was to send her army northward into southern Macedonia. Servia was to dispatch one army southward into northern Macedonia and another, in co-operation with the Montenegrins, was to invade Albania. The great Powers, helpless to interfere, bent every effort (under the leadership of Sir Edward Grey) to prevent the conflagration from spreading to Europe outside the Balkans and secretly hoped that Turkey would be able to resist sufficiently to create a deadlock that might preserve the *status quo ante bellum.*

But to the accompaniment of universal amazement, the Balkan states required only a few months to bring Turkey to her knees. In Thrace, Adrianople was surrounded; and after tremendous Bulgarian victories at Kirk Kilisse and Lule Burgas, the Turks fled to the defences of Constantinople itself. The Grecian forces carried all before them, and by November 9 captured Saloniki. Monastir also soon fell before the Serbian attack; and on December 3, 1912, Turkey signed an armistice. In the next month, however, another revolution in Turkey brought in a new Turkish government, which repudiated the armistice, with the result that hostilities re-commenced. Adrianople and other fortresses then fell before the Balkan attack; and on April 20, 1913, the war officially ended with the signing of the Treaty of London.

The agreements entered into by the Balkan allies before the war had provided for a definite disposition of the land wrung from Turkey. Servia was to realize her dreams for access to the sea through Albania, and Montenegro was also to acquire a section of the strip of Turkish soil (Novi Bazar) which had separated her from Servia. Bulgaria was to obtain territory in Macedonia inhabited by Bulgars, and Greece was also to be recompensed in Crete and probably in Macedonia. Greece (probably) and Bulgaria were to gain in Thrace.

A portion of Macedonia claimed by both Bulgaria and Servia was to be awarded according to the arbitrament of the Tsar of Russia.

But such an arrangement was no part of the plans of the Quadruple Alliance. It would injure the interests of every member. Turkey, obviously, lost everything and gained nothing. Serbian possession of Albania would end Italy's ambitions to expand along the Adriatic. Serbian possession of Albania would end also Austria's Adriatic ambitions, and in addition would create a Servia strong both in economic and military positions and hence would still further cause disaffection among the Slavs in the Dual Monarchy. And finally, a strong Balkan Federation would oppose a barrier to Germany's urge toward the East ("Drang nach Osten"), would endanger the fullest development of the Berlin-to-Bagdad Railroad, and would cut off Germany from her ally in the East who had been so overwhelmingly defeated.

Accordingly, Austria-Hungary, the prime oppressor of nationalities, suddenly developed a passion for protecting the natives of Albania from the oppression of Servia. Albania is a wild, barren and thinly-populated section of the Adriatic sea-coast between Greece and Montenegro. Its inhabitants are still in a nomadic state of culture, with tribal government, and united by no recognition of national unity. The Albanians are chiefly Mohammedans, although there are also many Albanian Greek and Roman Catholics. They are unconnected with the other Balkan states by either origin or language. Many of them represent a high type of cultivation, but for the greater part their state is one approaching the semi-barbarous. There was little evidence that Albania was ready for self-government.

Austria's claim, however, was supported by Italy, and for the same reason which had in reality actuated Austria—the necessity for keeping Servia from the sea. Austria mobilized her army against Servia and Montenegro; Italy supported Austria; Germany again rattled her sword. The Entente Allies, on the other hand, still worked for peace, and were loth to precipitate a general European conflict because of squabbles in the Balkans. Servia and Montenegro were enfuriated by Austria's action, and, it is rumored, went even so far as to obtain a promise from Bulgaria to support them against Austria;

but finally yielded, and reluctantly withdrew their troops from Albania. The true reasons which dictated this action are still not matters of public information—only the fact can be recorded. The great Powers then constituted Albania an autonomous state under William of Wied, a German prince.

The Second Balkan War

Servia was thus balked of all the fruits which were to fall to her as a result of the victory over Turkey. It was accordingly inevitable that she should demand a modification in the agreements concerning the territory wrested from Turkey so as to afford her some recompense for having been driven out of Albania. Servia laid claim to certain sections of Macedonia which had been assigned to Bulgaria, but which had been captured by a Serbian and Grecian army during the hostilities against Turkey and which were still occupied by the Serbian-Grecian forces.

The various intricate developments which then arose are again not matters of general knowledge. Some facts, however, seem to be indisputable. Bulgaria refused to yield to the demand of Servia. Macedonia was inhabited by Bulgars; Bulgaria had the better ethnological claim to it. Servia and Greece then refused to withdraw their armies; they proposed that the question be left to Russia for arbitration.

Bulgaria and Russia, however, were diplomatic foes, and their interests conflicted sharply. Bulgaria was the most civilized nation in the Balkans, with a high degree of education, with general well-being of the masses, with little dire poverty, and with a democratic political organization which represented a far higher state of culture than that of Russia itself. Russia had long feared that Bulgaria might become so strong as to block Russia's expansion to the Mediterranean and to the Dardanelles, and had used every opportunity to check the progress of the Bulgarian nation. For the same reason, Austria had supported Bulgaria against Russia. So that naturally Bulgaria refused to submit her dispute with Servia and Greece to Russia.

In this question, Austria supported Bulgaria. The Bulgarian army had proved to be magnificent in the war against Turkey, and Austria was confident that it would defeat Servia and Greece in case of war. It is probable that Austria secretly urged Bulgaria to war; at all events, Bulgaria suddenly opened hostilities against Servia on June 29, 1913.

But again the Quadruple Alliance had blundered. Servia and Greece, with the diplomatic support of Russia, launched successful counter-attacks; and the Bulgar armies were forced to retreat. At the end of July, however, the Bulgarians prepared to make a stand against the Greek army, when they were unexpectedly attacked in the rear by a new opponent.

Roumania had always been considered friendly to the Quadruple Alliance; but the Triple Entente had not been inactive while the Quadruple Alliance had been pursuing its machinations in the Balkans, and the Entente had utilized the new turn of affairs to detach Roumania from her previous affiliation. Roumania suspected that the victory of Bulgaria would entail the pre-eminence of Bulgaria in the Balkans and her own subordination. By remaining aloof from the First Balkan War, Roumania had acquired none of the territory lost by Turkey. Furthermore, Roumania had asked for the cession of a strip of land from Bulgaria to strengthen the southern Roumanian frontier; but Bulgaria had refused the request. On July 10, then, Roumania suddenly declared war on Bulgaria, and immediately advanced upon the Bulgarian capital. At this time, Turkey discerned the opportunity to profit by the dissensions among her opponents, and also opened an attack upon Bulgaria, in Thrace.

Against such a coalition, Bulgaria was helpless. She surrendered on July 30; and the terms of peace were embodied in the Treaty of Bucharest, signed on August 10, 1913.

The treaty of Bucharest naturally despoiled Bulgaria of most of her acquisitions from the First Balkan War. Greece extended her territory far up into what had been Macedonia and Thrace, including both Saloniki and Kavala, the latter a port on the Aegean of vital importance to the economic development of Bulgaria. Crete also was given to Greece. The new Greece thus became about half as large again as the old.

Servia extended her land down into what had been Macedonia, extending through Monastir, thus increasing her territory almost one hundred per cent. Montenegro also made extensions to her boundaries.

Roumania acquired that section of Bulgaria proper which had been the direct *casus belli* between them, although it was ethnologically an integral part of Bulgaria. And Turkey held the land she had occupied toward the end of the Second Balkan War, including Adrianople.

Bulgaria itself was left with only a strip of land from what had been Thrace and a small section of territory along the Black Sea as her gains from the dismemberment of Turkey.

The Treaty of Bucharest accordingly added to the nationalistic quarrels of the Balkans by retaining a large section of the Bulgar nationality under non-Bulgar rule. It must be confessed that Greece, Roumania and Servia began to oppress the Bulgars in their dominions with hardly less severity than the Turks had employed, and all hopes of a strong Balkan Federation, with a consequent lessening of the diplomatic tension throughout Europe, vanished into thin air. Servia nourished bitter resentment against Austria and Italy for the establishment of an autonomous Albania which still cut off Servia from the sea; and she organized her campaign for the liberation and support of the Slavs within Hungary with renewed zeal and bitterness. A Serbian secret society, the *Narodna Odbrana,* was most successful in nationalistic agitation among the Hungarian Slavs; and revolution on a large scale in Hungary became more and more threatening.

Effect of the Balkan Wars on the Diplomatic Situation in Europe

Once more, the power and prestige of the Quadruple Alliance had suffered a terrible blow. Not since 1866 had Germany sunk so low in the scale of international power. Indeed, as the rulers of Germany surveyed the situation among the great Powers of Europe, well might they conclude that the ways of peace had failed and that Germany must declare war in order to implant German rule upon the world. Their only gain from the Balkan Wars was the creation of an independent Albania between Servia and the sea; but with both Austria and Italy coveting Albania, that settlement could hardly be considered a promising or a lasting one.

On the other hand, even German military prestige, never before questioned since the days when Bismarck had held the helm of the German Empire, had been sadly weakened. The Turkish army had been trained for years by Germany, only to be routed by the armies of the Balkan states.

The Alliance had supported Bulgaria, and Bulgaria had been weakened and defeated. As a result, the Alliance had lost its hold upon Roumania, which might now be expected, if left unchecked, to turn to the Entente.

Servia, although barred from the Adriatic, had increased her territory to twice its previous size, and was all the better prepared for her competition with Austria. And the stronger Servia became, the stronger became the aspirations of the Serbs under Austro-Hungarian rule to break from their oppressors and to join their own kinsmen.

Turkey itself had found disaster in her affiliation with Germany and Austria, and even a von Bieberstein might not be able much longer to restrain the Turkish government from going over to the Entente.

The Berlin-to-Bagdad Railroad and German economic interests in the East were definitely weakened.

And as the hold of Germany and Austria upon the Balkans grew weaker, the hold of Russia automatically became stronger.

GERMANY PREPARES FOR WAR

The Prelude

Germany's intentions in this crisis were openly proclaimed to the world on June 30, 1913. On that day, the German Government succeeded in forcing through the Reichstag a bill providing for gigantic increases in the Germany army. The peace footing of the German forces was strengthened by almost twenty per cent. The increases provided by the bill covered a period of several years; but the money to cover the cost was to be collected at once. The purpose was obvious—Germany was planning to lay up huge stores and supplies to be available at the very moment when the first shot should be fired. Moreover, Germany hastened and amplified the construction of her elaborate net-work of railroads leading up to the Belgian border, with intent no less obvious than in the case of the huge army bill.

The response of the Entente was an immediate acceptance of the challenge. Russia feverishly accelerated the re-organization of her army. The period of service in the Russian army was increased from three to three and one-quarter years. General Joffre, the French commander-in-chief, was called into lengthy consultation on the Russian military preparations. Increased military credits were voted. And Russia likewise prepared to lay down a great network of railroads leading to the border of her enemy, Germany, so that Russian mobilization against Germany might be hardly less rapid than German mobilization against Russia.

Great Britain increased her naval preparations, and placed her navy in immediate readiness for conflict.

Belgium met the construction of German railroads up to the Belgian frontier by adopting for the first time the plan of universal military

training, and by preparing to increase her army to twice its previous size.

But the most striking answer came from France. Five weeks after the Reichstag passed the new German army bill, the French Chamber of Deputies passed a bill providing for an increase of the period of French military training from two to three years. It would not be long before the peace footing of the French army would be almost equal to the peace footing of the German army.

Germany's allies also met the challenge. Italy planned new and important reforms in her army. Austria-Hungary prepared to increase her peace footing by one-quarter and her artillery by more than one-half. Even the Balkan states and the neutal countries increased their military preparations—it was evident to the most superficial observer that the rivalry between the Entente and the Alliance had been strained to the breaking point; it could not survive another crisis.

As the world moved into the year 1914, the national recriminations inevitably bred by these military preparations came into the open. In both Germany and France, speakers in public and private assemblies pointed to the militarism of their enemy across the Vosges; ridiculed their civilization; scorned their pretensions; feared, threatened and warned. Never had the German people been so roused to anger at the autocracy of Russia; never had the English been so roused to anger at the autocracy of Germany. The German press, pulpit and platform denounced English commercialism and imperialism; the British press, pulpit and platform denounced German militarism and materialism. In the spring, the German and Austrian newspapers, always subservient to the German and Austrian Governments, published a series of articles revealing the overwhelming proportions which the Russian army would reach in a few years, and German leaders openly urged action before it was too late. And on June 28, 1914, the pan-Slav agitation in Servia came to fruition with the murder in Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia, of a distinguished visitor from Austria, with the murder by pistol-shot in the streets of Sarajevo of Franz Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria-Hungary, nephew of the Emperor Franz Josef, and heir apparent to the Austrian imperial crown.

The Pretext

During all the time from the outbreak of the Great War to the signing of the final terms of peace, no evidence was brought forward to prove that the murder of the Austrian Crown Prince was actually and directly inspired by German militarists. Archduke Franz Ferdinand was known both as an able administrator and as a sympathizer with the plight of the oppressed Slavs within the empire over which he was expected soon to rule. In both capacities, his accession to the throne was feared by the pan-Serbian nationalists, for a slackening of the oppression of the Slavs in Hungary and a vigorous and liberal administration of Austria-Hungary would conceivably lessen the longings of the Hungarian Slavs for annexation to Servia. Austria produced much incriminating evidence to prove that the murderers of the Archduke had received assistance in their act from officials of the Serbian government, although Servia countered with charges that the Magyars within Hungary instigated the murder of Sarajevo because they feared a diminution in their special privileges when he should be called to the throne.

At all events, the murder of the Archduke came at a most propitious time for Germany. From the German Reichstag itself and during the war, arose a voice, that of the Socialist leader, Karl Liebknecht, proclaiming to the world that the crime of Sarajevo had been hailed with the deepest satisfaction in high official circles in Germany.

In Russia, the program of reconstructing the Russian army had not yet reached a stage where the Tsar's troops could be said to have been welded together into an efficient military body. On the other hand, Russia was making great progress toward that end, and within a few years at the utmost Russia might well be the most dangerous antagonist in Europe. If Germany was to strike, she must strike now—a few years later, and it would be too late. Moreover, Russian mobilization depended upon the inadequate railroad facilities of that vast land, and strikes by Russian workers on the railroads had increased even the normal inadequacy of the Russian railroad service. At that very moment, Petrograd itself was in the throes of a serious labor struggle.

and Russia's effectiveness abroad would be sadly hindered by her troubles at home.

In France, the new law providing for three years of military service in place of two had not yet had an opportunity to function for any considerable period of time. But after it should have functioned for several years longer, the French army and reserves would be hardly inferior in numbers to the German army and reserves. Moreover, France was convulsed by the scandal concerning the murder of M. Calmette by Madame Caillaux, and the political prominence of the principals threatened to turn the Caillaux-Calmette case into another Dreyfus scandal, with the consequent damage to French unity. When the period for the actual decision respecting war arrived, the French premier and president were on the high seas, returning from a visit to Russia; and France could determine upon no decisive course of action until they landed. Finally, France also had just come through a period of stringent labor troubles, which had almost convulsed the country. At least until actual hostilities should commence, the French Socialists could be counted upon to oppose war; and their leader was Jean Jaurès, in many respects the ablest political leader in all Europe.

In England, as has been seen, the Irish Question had reached the point where actual civil war was threatened. Even if the Irish situation did not deter England from a course which would lead to war, at least it could be expected to hinder her effectiveness on land and on sea.

Among the members of the Quadruple Alliance, the hold of Germany and Austria upon Italy had already been loosened. A few more years might actually find Italy not merely neutral, but a member of the Entente.

In Austria, there would be unflinching support of Germany because the quarrel was in essence an Austrian quarrel. There was evidence that nationalistic feeling in Austria was beginning to resent the complete subordination of Austria to Germany; and Austrian support might not be whole-hearted in case Germany should wait until the quarrel leading to war was in essence a German quarrel. Moreover, the aged Franz Josef was rapidly nearing his end, and a platitude in European political discussions for the past few years had been the

statement that the death of Franz Josef would see the dissolution of the Hapsburg dominions. A few more years, then, and little help might be expected from Austria.

And within Germany itself the political situation was such that the German Government might find itself a few years later literally helpless to force a war. In the elections of 1912, the Socialists had polled a larger vote than any other one political party. They had twenty-eight per cent of the members of the Reichstag and a strictly proportional system of representation would have given them thirty-five per cent. And from 1912 the Socialists had been growing in strength from even those figures. In the spring of that very year, 1914, they had conducted throughout the Empire a campaign for membership which had increased their ranks by about fifteen per cent. If the next elections should give the Socialists the balance of power in the Reichstag, the political structure of the Empire would be reformed, and with a politically democratic Germany, the power of the German militarists would be sadly curtailed.

Moreover, the demand for political reform within Germany was growing. Among thinking people, there might be scepticism about the desirability of the Socialist program, but there could be little defence of a political system such as that by which Prussia was ruled. And the burdens of taxation for war purposes and the arrogance of the personnel of the German army were beginning to cause restlessness among even the docile German masses.

The Kiel Canal had just been broadened and deepened.

Finally, the threat of an invasion of Servia by Austria would cause Russia to mobilize, and the German leaders could rally Germany against Russia as against no other country. The autocracy of Russia under the Tsar was less defensible than even the autocracy of Germany under the Kaiser; and the most vehement internationalist among all the German Socialists would support a war which could be officially colored so as to represent a war of German defence against Russian invasion.

If hope of German domination of the world was not to be abandoned for all time, Germany must strike now or never.

THE FOURTEEN DAYS

WHO'S WHO IN THE CORRESPONDENCE

M. ALLIZE, *French Minister to Bavaria at Munich (Germany).*
Mr. ASQUITH, *British Premier.*
M. BARRERE, *French Ambassador to Italy.*
M. DE BASSOMPIERRE, *of the Belgian Diplomatic Service.*
HERR VON BELOW SALESKE, *German Minister at Brussels.*
COUNT BENCKENDORFF, *Russian Ambassador at London.*
COUNT BERCHTOLD, *Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*
M. BERTHELOT, *of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.*
SIR F. BERTIE, *British Ambassador at Paris.*
DR. VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG, *German Chancellor.*
BARON BEYENS, *Belgian Minister at Berlin.*
M. BOPPE, *French Minister to Servia.*
M. BOSCHKOVITCH, *Servian Minister at London.*
M. BRONEWSKY, *Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.*
HERR VON BUCH, *German Minister to Luxemburg.*
SIR G. BUCHANAN, *British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.*
SIR M. DE BUNSEN, *British Ambassador at Vienna.*
M. PAUL CAMBON, *French Ambassador at London.*
M. JULES CAMBON, *French Ambassador at Berlin.*
M. DAVIGNON, *Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*
M. DELCASSE, *French Minister for Foreign Affairs.*
M. DUMAINE, *French Ambassador to Austria-Hungary.*
M. EYSCHEN, *President of Luxemburg Government.*
M. DE FLEURIAU, *French Chargé d'Affaires at London.*
HERR VON FLOTOW, *German Ambassador to Italy.*
BARON GEISL VON GEISLINGEN, *Austrian Minister at Belgrade.*
MARQUIS DI SAN GIULIANO, *Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*
SIR E. GOSCHEN, *British Ambassador at Berlin.*
SIR EDWARD GREY, *British Foreign Secretary.*
BARON GUILLAUME, *Belgian Minister at Paris.*
M. ISVOLSKY, *Russian Ambassador at Paris.*
HERR VON JAGOW, *German Secretary for Foreign Affairs.*
SIR A. JOHNSTONE, *British Minister to Luxemburg.*

M. KAZANSKY, *Gérant of Russian Consulate at Prague, Austria.*
M. KLOBUKOWSKI, *French Minister at Brussels.*
COUNT DE LALAING, *Belgian Minister at London.*
PRINCE LICHNOWSKY, *German Ambassador at London.*
M. DE MANNEVILLE, *French Chargé d'Affaires, Berlin.*
M. BIENVENU MARTIN, *French Minister of Justice and Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs.*
COUNT MENSDORFF, *Austrian Ambassador at London.*
M. MOLLARD, *French Minister to Luxemburg.*
COUNT VON MOLTKE, *Chief of German General Staff.*
SIR ARTHUR NICHOLSON, *British Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs.*
M. PACHITCH, *Servian Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs.*
M. PALEOLOGUE, *French Ambassador to Russia.*
M. POINCARE, *President of the French Republic.*
COUNT POURTALES, *German Ambassador at St. Petersburg.*
SIR R. RODD, *British Ambassador at Rome.*
SIR H. RUMBOLD, *British Councilor of Embassy at Berlin.*
M. SAZONOF, *Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*
M. SCHEBEKO, *Russian Ambassador at Vienna.*
BARON VON SCHOEN, *German Ambassador at Paris.*
M. SEVASTOPOULO, *Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris.*
M. STRANDTMAN, *Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade.*
GEN. SUCHOMLINOF, *Russian Minister of War.*
M. DE SWERBEEW, *Russian Ambassador at Berlin.*
COUNT SZAPARY, *Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg.*
COUNT SZECSEN, *Austrian Ambassador to France.*
COUNT SZOGYENY, *Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to Germany.*
HERR VON TSCHIRSCHKY UND BOGENDORFF, *German Ambassador at Vienna.*
COUNT DE VILLERS, *Luxemburg Minister at Berlin.*
SIR F. VILLIERS, *British Minister to Belgium.*
M. VIVIANI, *Premier of France.*
HERR VON ZIMMERMANN, *German Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.*

There was naturally wide-spread horror in Europe and even in America at the murder of the heir apparent to the Austrian throne, but only the few persons initiated into the innermost significance of European diplomacy realized the extent of the complications which might arise from the murder of Sarajevo. For the rest, the world went ahead in its usual course of daily routine, blissfully oblivious to the threat of another war-cloud on the horizon. But every student of international relations turned his gaze toward Vienna, and awaited with ill-concealed anxiety the attitude of Austria.

Austria moved slowly. She put on foot an investigation before acting.

On July 2, the French ambassador at Vienna reports a general and deep anti-Serbian feeling in Austria and preparations to force the issue with Servia and to assert without further delay Austrian mastery in the Balkans.

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador in Vienna, to M. Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs

Vienna, July 2, 1914.

The crime of Serajevo is inflaming the liveliest resentment in Austrian military circles and among all those who are not resigned to allowing Servia to keep the place she has won in the Balkans.

The inquiry into the origin of the outrage, which is to be demanded on conditions intolerable to the dignity of the Belgrade Government, would, in case of a refusal, provide the excuse for proceeding to military execution.

DUMAINE.

The interest which Germany is taking in the attitude of her ally is revealed on July 2, as follows:

M. de Manneville, French Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, to M. Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs

Berlin, July 4, 1914.

The Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs told me yesterday, and repeated to the Russian Ambassador today, that he hoped that Servia would give satisfaction to the demands which Austria might address to her, with a view to the search for and prosecution of those concerned in the Serajevo

crime. He added that he was confident that this would be the case, because, if Servia acted otherwise, she would have the opinion of the whole civilized world against her. And the German Government does not, therefore, appear to share the apprehensions displayed in a portion of the German press as to possible tension, or at least does not wish to appear to do so.

On July 5, Austria publishes an official *communiqué* reproving Servia for lack of consideration toward Austria and warning Servia to be "reasonable" in the forthcoming diplomatic negotiations.

On July 6, the Austrian chargé d'affaires at Petrograd (Count Czernin) informs the Russian government that Austria may be forced to search on Serbian soil for the perpetrators of the murder of the Archduke, only to be met by a warning from Russia against such a course:

M. Paléologue, French Ambassador in St. Petersburg, to M. Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs

St. Petersburg, July 6, 1914.

. . . . . Count Czernin, having let it be understood that the Austro-Hungarian Government might perhaps be forced to search, on Servian territory, for the instigators of the Serajévo outrage, M. Sazonof interrupted him to say: "No country has suffered more than Russia from outrages planned upon foreign territory. Have we ever claimed to adopt against any country whatever the measures with which your newspapers threaten Servia? Do not enter upon that path."

May this warning not be lost. PALEOLOGUE.

On July 9, Count Tisza, the President of the Austro-Hungarian Ministry for Hungary, announces in the Hungarian Chamber that Austria is determined to settle her accounts with Servia and to fight the Pan-Serbian propaganda.

On July 11, the French consul at Budapest, the capital of Hungary, informs his government that Austria seems to be preparing a *coup* and calls attention to the fall in the Hungarian 4 per cents:

M. d'Apchier le Maugin, French Consul General at Budapest, to M. Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs

Budapest, July 11, 1914.

Questioned in the Chamber as to the state of the Austro-Servian question, Count Tisza declared that first of all the result of the judicial inquiry, of which he refused to reveal the slightest detail, must be awaited. . . . .

Everything is for peace in the newspapers, but the mass of the public believes in war and fears it. Moreover, persons in whom I have every reason to have confidence have told me that they know that every day guns and ammunition have been sent in large quantities to the frontier. . . . .

The tone of the Government newspapers has been lowered first, by one note and then by two, until now it has become almost optimistic. But the Government newspapers themselves have carefully spread the alarm. Their optimism to order is really without an echo. The nervousness of the Bourse, a barometer one cannot neglect, is a sure proof of that. Stocks, without exception, have fallen to improbably low prices. The Hungarian 4 per cent. was yesterday quoted at 79.95, a price which has never been quoted since the first issue.

D'APCHIER LE MAUGIN.

On July 15, Count Tisza again warns in the Hungarian Chamber that Austria intends to assert herself strongly against Servia.

On July 20, a report from a French consul in Austria to the French government gives a forecast of the terms of the Austrian ultimatum, and warns that the terms will be such that Servia will not be able to meet them, with the result that war will ensue. There is no doubt that Germany is kept informed in a general way of the steps Austria is preparing to take, although there is no evidence that the German government assists directly in the drafting of the ultimatum Austria is to send to Servia. In the preface to the official German White Book, it is stated:

In view of these circumstances Austria had to admit that it would not be consistent either with the dignity or self-preservation of the monarchy to look on longer at the operations on the other side of the border without taking action. The Austro-Hungarian Government advised us of this view of the situation and asked our opinion in the matter. We were able to assure our ally most heartily of our agreement with her view of the situation and to assure her that any action that she might consider it necessary to take in order to put an end to the movement in Servia directed against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy would receive our approval.

On July 30, the British ambassador at Vienna was to wire the British government:

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

Vienna, July 30, 1914.

. . . . . Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information that the German Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia before it was dispatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor.



© Western Newspaper Union

AIRSHIP STATION FROM ABOVE

This illustration shows one of the British air-stations along the coast as seen from a dirigible balloon flying above it.

I know from the German Ambassador himself that he indorses every line of it. . . . .

On July 21, the day upon which the trial of Madame Caillaux is opened in Paris, the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (von Jagow) informs the British chargé d'affaires at Berlin that there ought to be no outside interference in the quarrel between Austria and Servia:

Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey

Berlin, July 22, 1914.

. . . . . He (von Jagow) insisted that question at issue was one for settlement between Servia and Austria alone, and that there should be no interference from outside in the discussions between those two countries. He had, therefore, considered it inadvisable that the Austro-Hungarian Government should be approached by the German Government on the matter. . . . .

On July 22, the French ambassador at Vienna informs his government that he has been told by the Russian ambassador at Vienna:

. . . . . that his Government will have no objection to steps being taken for the punishment of the guilty, and for the dissolution of the notoriously revolutionary associations, but could not admit exactions which would have been humiliating for Servian national feeling.

DUMAINE.

Note—The double dates in some of the following correspondence represent the difference between the calendar of western Europe and that of Russia, Servia, etc.

JULY 23

The Austrian ambassador at London explains unofficially to Sir Edward Grey the steps upon which Austria has determined and the nature of the ultimatum to be presented to Servia. Sir Edward Grey objects to the ultimatum feature of the Austrian note, and to the proposed time-limit for the Serbian answer.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen

London, Foreign Office, July 23, 1914.

Sir:

Count Mensdorff . . . . . explained privately what the nature of the demand (on Servia) would be.

. . . . . When Count Mensdorff told me that he supposed there would be something in the nature of a time limit, which was in effect akin to an ultimatum, I said that I regretted this very much. To begin with, a time limit might inflame opinion in Russia, and it would make it difficult, if not impossible, to give more time, even if after a few days it appeared that by giving more time there would be a prospect of securing a peaceful settlement and getting a satisfactory reply from Servia. . . . . I urged that a time limit could always be introduced afterward; that, if the demands were made without a time limit in the first instance, Russian public opinion might be less excited, after a week it might have cooled down, and if the Austrian case was very strong it might be apparent that the Russian Government would be in a position to use their influence in favor of a satisfactory reply from Servia. A time limit was generally a thing to be used only in the last resort, after other means had been tried and failed.

Count Mensdorff said that if Servia, in the interval that had elapsed since the murder of the Archduke, had voluntarily instituted an inquiry on her own territory, all this might have been avoided. In 1909 Servia had said in a note that she intended to live on terms of good neighborliness with Austria; but she had never kept her promise, she had stirred up agitation the object of which was to disintegrate Austria, and it was absolutely necessary for Austria to protect herself. . . . .

I could not help dwelling upon the awful consequences involved in the situation. . . . .

Count Mensdorff did not demur to this statement of the possible consequences of the present situation, but he said that all would depend upon Russia.

At 6 P. M., the long-awaited and greatly-feared Austrian ultimatum is delivered to Servia. After rehearsing the relations between Austria and Servia on the question of the annexation of Bosnia and Herze-

govina, Austria proceeds to charge Servia with having tolerated anti-Austrian propaganda within Servia and of having fostered it within Hungary. The note then proceeds to give the result of the investigation conducted by Austria respecting the murder of Sarajevo, and then states the Austrian demands:

It results from the depositions and confessions of the criminal perpetrators of the outrage of the 28th June that the Serajevo assassinations were planned in Belgrade, that the arms and explosives with which the murderers were provided had been given to them by Servian officers and functionaries belonging to the Narodna Odbrana, and finally, that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and their arms was organized and effected by the chiefs of the Servian frontier service.

The above-mentioned results of the Magisterial investigation do not permit the Austro-Hungarian Government to pursue any longer the attitude of expectant forbearance which it has maintained for years in face of the machinations hatched in Belgrade, and thence propagated in the territories of the monarchy. The results, on the contrary, impose on it the duty of putting an end to the intrigues which form a perpetual menace to the tranquillity of the monarchy.

To achieve this end the Imperial and Royal Government sees itself compelled to demand from the Royal Servian Government a formal assurance that it condemns this dangerous propaganda against the monarchy; in other words, the whole series of tendencies, the ultimate aim of which is to detach from the monarchy territories belonging to it, and that it undertakes to suppress by every means this criminal and terrorist propaganda.

In order to give a formal character to this undertaking the Royal Servian Government shall publish on the front page of its Official Journal of the 26th July (13th July) the following declaration:

"The Royal Government of Servia condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary—i. e., the general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and it sincerely deplores the fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings.

"The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers and functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus compromised the good neighborly relations to which the Royal Government was solemnly pledged by its declaration of the 31st March, 1909.

"The Royal Government, which disapproves and repudiates all idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the kingdom, that henceforward it will proceed with the utmost rigor against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which it will use all its efforts to anticipate and suppress."

This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to the royal army as an order of the day by his Majesty the King and shall be published in the Official Bulletin of the army.

The Royal Servian Government further undertakes:

1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial integrity;

2. To dissolve immediately the society styled Narodna Odbrana, to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other societies and their branches in Servia which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal Government shall take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under another name and form;

3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia, both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary;

4. To remove from the military service, and from the administration in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserves to itself the right of communicating to the Royal Government:

5. To accept the collaboration in Servia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government in the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy;

6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 28th June who are on Servian territory. Delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Governmént will take part in the investigation relating thereto;

7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voija Tankositch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a Servian State employee, who have been compromised by the results of the magisterial inquiry at Serajevo;

8. To prevent by effective measures the co-operation of the Servian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the frontier service at Schabatz and Loznica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the frontier;

9. To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government with explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high Servian officials, both in Servia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their official position, did not hesitate after the crime of the 28th June to express themselves in interviews in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government; and, finally,

10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads.

The Austro-Hungarian Government expects the reply of the Royal Government at the latest by 6 o'clock on Saturday evening, the 25th July.

Of the terms, Servia could readily yield to those demanding a condemnation of the anti-Austrian propaganda, the punishment and dismissal of all Serbian officials and teachers who should participate in it, the dissolution of the *Narodna Odbrana*, the suppression of all anti-Austrian publications in Servia, the arrest of Serbians named as being implicated in the murder of the Archduke, the prevention of illegal traffic in fire-arms across the Austro-Serbian frontier and the punish-

ment of all Serbian officials participating in or permitting such traffic.

But to the demands concerning the collaboration of Austrian officials on Serbian soil in suppressing the anti-Austrian propaganda and in investigating the plot which resulted in the murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, Servia could not yield without virtually surrendering her sovereignty. And the demand for an answer within forty-eight hours was in itself a threat which struck vitally at Serbian pride and at Serbian nationalistic freedom from subordination to Austria.

JULY 24

The text of the Austrian note is communicated by Austria to all the great Powers.

Germany supports Austria. A note communicated by the German ambassadors at London, Paris and Petrograd echoes the Austrian complaints against Servia and ends with a direct warning to the Entente, and especially to Russia, to withhold support from Servia and to leave her to her fate at the hands of Austria. In part, the note reads as follows:

Note Communicated by German Ambassador to the British Government

London, July 24, 1914.

The publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government concerning the circumstances under which the assassination of the Austrian heir presumptive and his consort has taken place disclose unmistakably the aims which the Great Servian propaganda has set itself, and the means it employs to realize them. The facts now made known must also do away with the last doubts that the center of activity of all those tendencies which are directed toward the detachment of the southern Slav provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their incorporation into the Servian Kingdom is to be found in Belgrade, and is at work there with at least the connivance of members of Government and army. . . . .

It has become clearly evident that it would not be consistent either with the dignity or with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy still longer to remain inactive in face of this movement on the other side of the frontier, by which the security and the integrity of her territories are constantly menaced. Under these circumstances, the course of procedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as equitable and moderate. In spite of that, the attitude which public opinion as well as the Government in Servia have recently adopted does not exclude the apprehension that the Servian Government might refuse to comply with those demands, and might allow themselves to be carried away into a provocative attitude against Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian Government, if it does not wish definitely to abandon Austria's position as a great power, would then have no choice but to obtain the fulfillment of their demands from the Servian Government by strong pressure and, if necessary, by using military measures, the choice of the means having to be left to them.

The Imperial (German) Government want to emphasize their opinion that in the present case there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that the great powers ought seriously to endeavor to reserve it to those two immediately concerned. The Imperial

Government desire urgently the localization of the conflict, because every interference of another power would, owing to the different treaty obligations, be followed by incalculable consequences.

Servia appeals to Russia for assistance, the Crown Prince of Servia in a telegram to the Tsar complaining that Servia, although willing to comply with most of Austria's demands, would not, indeed, could not, comply with all of them. The telegram of the Servian Crown Prince is in part as follows:

Telegram from the Prince Regent of Servia to the Tsar of Russia

Belgrade, 11 (24) July, 1914.

. . . . . We are ready to accept the Austro-Hungarian conditions which are compatible with the situation of an independent State, as well as those whose acceptance shall be advised us by your Majesty. . . . . Certain among these demands cannot be carried out without changes in our legislation, which requires time. We have been given too short a delay. We can be attacked after the expiration of the delay by the Austro-Hungarian Army, which is concentrating on our frontier. It is impossible for us to defend ourselves, and we supplicate your Majesty to give us your aid as soon as possible. . . . .

In these difficult moments I interpret the sentiment of the Servian people, which supplicates your Majesty to interest himself in the lot of the Kingdom of Servia.

ALEXANDER.

Russia calls a meeting of the British and French ambassadors at Petrograd with M. Sazonof, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs. *The French ambassador assures M. Sazonof that France will consider herself bound by the Franco-Russian alliance. The British ambassador, Sir George Buchanan, on the other hand, is more noncommittal. He will not promise Russia the military support of England in case of actual hostilities.* The salient points of the British ambassador's stand (which was approved in a telegram to him the following day from his chief, Sir Edward Grey) as reported by him to Sir Edward Grey, are as follows:

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey

St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.

. . . . . Personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from his Majesty's Government that would entail an unconditional engagement on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms. Direct British interests in Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion. . . . .

I said that it seemed to me that the important point was to induce Austria to extend the time limit, and that the first thing to do was to bring an influence to bear on Austria with that end in view. . . . .

French Ambassador and M. Sazonof both continued to press me for a declaration of complete solidarity of his Majesty's Government with French and Russian Governments, and I therefore said that it seemed to me possible that you might perhaps be willing to make strong representations to both German and Austrian Governments, urging upon them that an attack upon Servia by Austria would endanger the whole peace of Europe. Perhaps you might see your way to saying to them that such action on the part of Austria would probably mean Russian intervention, which would involve France and Germany, and that it would be difficult for Great Britain to keep out if war were to become general. . . . .

It seems to me, from the language held by French Ambassador, that, even if we decline to join them, France and Russia are determined to make a strong stand.

England, therefore, is trying to keep Russia from war by refusing to make a definite promise of English support in case of war.

Later in the day Russia asks Vienna for an extension of time for Servia in which to answer the ultimatum. The Russian request is as follows:

The communication made by Austria-Hungary to the Powers the day after the presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade leaves a period to the Powers which is quite insufficient to enable them to take any steps which might help to smooth away the difficulties that have arisen.

In order to prevent the consequences, equally incalculable and fatal to all the Powers, which may result from the course of action followed by the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems to us to be above all essential that the period allowed for the Servian reply should be extended. Austria-Hungary, having declared her readiness to inform the Powers of the results of the inquiry upon which the Imperial and Royal Government base their accusations, should equally allow them sufficient time to study them.

In this case, if the Powers were convinced that certain of the Austrian demands were well founded they would be in a position to offer advice to the Servian Government.

A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers, and would be in contradiction to the very bases of international relations.

M. Sazonof also informs the German ambassador at Petrograd that Russia is agitated by Austria's action:

Telegram of the Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg to the Imperial German Chancellor

July 24, 1914.

I have just availed myself of the contents of Decree 592 in a long talk with Sazonof. The Minister made wild complaints against Austria-Hungary, and was much excited. What he said most definitely was this: that Russia

could not possibly permit the Servian-Austrian dispute to be confined to the parties concerned.

In England, Sir Edward Grey suggests to the German ambassador that France, Italy, Germany and Great Britain shall work together for moderation in both Petrograd and Vienna. The German ambassador, however, has evidently received no information concerning any change in the opinion of the German government that the quarrel in the Balkans is one which concerns solely Austria and Servia and that no other nation should interfere.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold

London, Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.

. . . . . German Ambassador has communicated to me the view of the German Government about the Austrian demand in Servia. I understand the Germany Government is making the same communication to the powers.

I said that if the Austrian ultimatum to Servia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia I had no concern with it; I had heard nothing yet from St. Petersburg, but I was very apprehensive of the view Russia would take of the situation. . . . . I said that, in view of the extraordinarily stiff character of the Austrian note, the shortness of the time allowed, and the wide scope of the demands upon Servia, I felt quite helpless as far as Russia was concerned, and I did not believe any power could exercise influence alone.

The only chance I could see of mediating or moderating influence being effective was that the four powers, Germany, Italy, France, and ourselves, should work together simultaneously at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favor of moderation in the event of the relations between Austria and Russia becoming threatening.

The immediate danger was that in a few hours Austria might march into Servia and Russian Slav opinion demand that Russia should march to help Servia; it would be very desirable to get Austria not to precipitate military action and so to gain more time. But none of us could influence Austria in this direction unless Germany would propose and participate in such action at Vienna.

England advises Servia to adopt a conciliatory attitude:

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe

London, Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.

Servia ought to promise that, if it is proved that Servian officials, however subordinate they may be, were accomplices in the murder of the Archduke at Serajevo, she will give Austria the fullest satisfaction. She certainly ought to express concern and regret. For the rest, Servian Government must reply to Austrian demands as they consider best in Servian interests.

It is impossible to say whether military action by Austria when time limit expires can be averted by anything but unconditional acceptance of her demands, but only chance appears to lie in avoiding an absolute refusal and replying favorably to as many points as the time limit allows.

JULY 25

Austria refuses to extend the time limit for the Serbian answer to her ultimatum, in spite of the fact that Great Britain supports Russia in the latter's request in behalf of Servia.

Servia then presents her official reply to the Austrian ultimatum. Servia opens by declaring unfounded the Austrian charges of bad faith in her relations with Austria. On the other hand, Servia cannot hold herself liable for the activities of private bodies or for newspaper articles. Nevertheless, she stands ready to hand over for trial any Serbian official or citizen against whom evidence may be brought and to publish a strong official disapproval and repudiation of all anti-Austrian propaganda within Servia, and at the first legal opportunity will take steps to make such propaganda punishable. The *Narodna Odbrana* will be dissolved. Servia will similarly proceed against the illicit trade in arms across the frontier. Finally, Servia agrees to remove all officials and to end all activities against whom and which Austria will submit proof showing that such persons and activities are anti-Austrian, and agrees also to keep the Austro-Hungarian government fully informed of the steps which Servia is taking in accordance with the wishes of Austria-Hungary.

But Servia cannot completely yield to the demands that Austrian officials enter Servia in order to collaborate in putting down the anti-Austrian propaganda and in investigating the plot leading to the murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand.

Reply of Servian Government to Austro-Hungarian Note
(Communicated by the Servian Minister, July 27.)

Belgrade, July 12, (25) 1914.

5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Servia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighborly relations.

6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider it their

duty to open an inquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15th June, and who happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this inquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents.

If even these concessions do not satisfy Austria, Servia is willing to leave the dispute to the arbitrament of neutrals:

If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this reply the Servian Government . . . . . are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal of The Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 18th (31st) March, 1909.

Nevertheless, within several hours *the Austrian minister at Belgrade pronounces the Serbian answer unsatisfactory,* and gives notice of his withdrawal from Servia, together with his entire diplomatic staff. The Serbian government prepares to remove its capital to Nish.

Germany admits that Austria is intending to proceed to military measures in order to teach Servia a lesson; but at the same time the German Foreign Secretary agrees to join the Conference of the Four Powers proposed by Sir Edward Grey in case of an Austro-Russian dispute, *but still insists that there be no outside interference in the Austro-Serbian dispute.*

Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey

Berlin, July 25, 1914.

. . . . . Secretary of State said that he did not know what Austria-Hungary had ready on the spot, but he admitted quite freely that Austro-Hungarian Government wished to give the Servians a lesson, and that they meant to take military action. He also admitted that Servian Government could not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands. . . . .

He remained of opinion that crisis could be localized. . . . . He said that he had given the Russian Government to understand that last thing Germany wanted was a general war, and he would do all in his power to prevent such a calamity. If the relations between Austria and Russia became threatening, he was quite ready to fall in with your suggestion as to the four powers working in favor of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburg. . . . .

Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the Imperial German Ambassador in London

July 25, 1914.

The distinction made by Sir Edward Grey between the Austro-Servian and Austro-Russian conflict is quite correct. We wish as little as England to mix in the first, and, first and last, we take the ground that this question must be localized by the abstention of all the Powers from intervention in it. It is therefore our earnest hope that Russia will refrain from any active intervention, conscious of her responsibility and of the seriousness of the situation. If an Austro-Russian dispute should arise, we are ready, with the reservation of our known duties as allies, to co-operate with the other great powers in mediation between Russia and Austria.

Germany also informs the French Foreign Office that the Austrian note to Servia was presented without Germany's knowledge; that *Germany, however, strongly sympathizes with her ally and will stand by her in case of war.*

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs

Paris, 12 (25) July, 1914.

. . . . . The Ambassador of Germany . . . . . today visited the *Gerant* of the Political Department to declare that Austria had presented its note to Servia without a precise understanding with Berlin, but that nevertheless Germany approved the point of view of Austria, and that certainly "the arrow once sent," (these are his own words,) Germany could not allow herself to be guided except by her duties as ally.

SEVASTOPOULO.

Servia orders general mobilization at 3 P. M.

Russia also is willing to leave the Austro-Serbian dispute to the disinterested great Powers, but feels that Austria is in reality striking at Russia through Servia, and that the triumph of Austria over Servia would result in upsetting the Balance of Power. In event of the great Powers being involved in the quarrel, Russia hopes for English support to maintain the diplomatic equilibrium of Europe.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey

St. Petersburg, July 25, 1914.

. . . . . If Servia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy. It was possible in his opinion, that Servia might propose to submit the question to arbitration. . . . .

Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present status quo in the Balkans and establishing her own

hegemony there. He (the Russian Foreign Minister) did not believe that Germany really wanted war, but her attitude was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no war. If we failed them now rivers of blood would flow, and we would in the end be dragged into war. . . . .

I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and warned him that if Russia mobilized Germany would not be content with mere mobilization or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once. His Excellency replied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush Servia and become the predominant power in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war. He assured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflict, but that unless Germany could restrain Austria I could regard the situation as desperate.

The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Russian Ambassador at London

St. Petersburg, 12 (25) July, 1914.

In case of a new aggravation of the situation, possibly provoking on the part of the Great Powers united action, we count that England will not delay in placing herself clearly on the side of Russia and France with a view to maintaining the equilibrium of Europe in favor of which she has constantly intervened in the past, and which would without doubt be compromised in the case of the triumph of Austria.

SAZONOF.

Russia secretly begins mobilization, according to a telegram from the Tsar to the Kaiser on July 30, in which the Russian ruler reports that Russia mobilization was decided upon five days previously, that is, today.

The Tsar to the Kaiser

Peterhof, July 30, 1914.

. . . . . The military measures now being taken were decided upon five days ago for defensive purposes against Austria's preparations. . . . .

At the trial of General Soukhomlinoff, months after the outbreak of the Great War, it was revealed that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs kept the news of the order for general Russian mobilization, not only from the Quadruple Alliance, but also from the Entente, and even from the heads of the Russian Government.

England informs the German ambassador that England will not intervene in an Austro-Serbian quarrel but will feel constrained to play a part if the war cannot remain localized.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold

London, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

. . . . . I . . . . . said that I felt I had no title to intervene between Austria and Servia, but as soon as the question became one as between Austria and Russia, the peace of Europe was affected, in which we must all take a hand. . . . . .

Italy is in general agreement with the attitude of England.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd

London, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

Sir:

The Italian Ambassador came to see me today. I told him in general terms what I had said to the German Ambassador this morning.

The Italian Ambassador cordially approved of this. He made no secret of the fact that Italy was most desirous to see war avoided. I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

JULY 26

Germany expresses a belief that Austria is contemplating no annexation of Serbian territory, and, holding that the peace of Europe lies in the hands of Russia, requests the Government of the Tsar to adopt an attitude of moderation.

Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the Imperial German Ambassador in London

Important!

July 26, 1914.

Austria-Hungary has declared officially and solemnly in St. Petersburg that she contemplates no acquisition of territory in Servia, and that she will not endanger the continuance of the kingdom, but wishes only to secure quiet. According to reports reaching here, Russia is about to summon several bodies of reservists immediately, which would be equivalent to mobilization against us. If this news is corroborated, we shall be forced against our will to take measures to meet it. Today our efforts are still directed toward localizing the trouble and maintaining the peace of Europe. For this reason we ask that the strongest possible pressure be brought to bear in St. Petersburg for achieving this end.

From England comes a modification of Sir Edward Grey's proposal that the four disinterested great Powers mediate in the Serbian-Austro-Russian dispute. His new suggestion is that he and the ambassadors to England of Germany, France and Italy confer to prevent complications, no military steps to be taken pending conference

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Sir H. Rumbold, and Sir R. Rodd

London, Foreign Office, July 26, 1914.

Would Minister for Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct Ambassador here to join with representatives of France, Italy, and Germany, and myself to meet here in conference immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications? . . . . . If so . . . . . representatives at Belgrade, Vienna and St. Petersburg could be authorized to request that all active military operations should be suspended pending results of conference.

Italy agrees immediately to Sir Edward Grey's proposal.

In the meantime, Russia completes plans immediately precedent to mobilization and sends mobilization warnings to all the frontier districts.

JULY 27

Germany informs the British ambassador that she does not look with favor upon Sir Edward Grey's proposal, as his plan virtually constitutes a court of arbitration, which should be called only at the request of the disputants, Russia and Austria. Germany prefers direct negotiations between Austria and Russia. *Germany also warns England that Russian mobilization against Germany would of necessity be followed by German mobilization.*

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey

Berlin, July 27, 1914.

(German) Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion, be called together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He could not, therefore, fall in with your suggestion, desirous though he was to co-operate for the maintenance of peace. . . . . He added that news he had just received from St. Petersburg showed that there was no intention on the part of M. de Sazonof to exchange views with Count Berchtold. He thought that this method of procedure might lead to a satisfactory result, and that it would be best, before doing anything else, to await outcome of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian Governments.

In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State said that as yet Austria was only partially mobilizing, but that if Russia mobilized against Germany latter would have to follow suit. I asked what he meant by "mobilizing against Germany." He said that if Russia only mobilized in south, Germany would not mobilize, but if she mobilized in north, Germany would have to do so too, and Russian system of mobilization was so complicated that it might be difficult exactly to locate her mobilization. Germany would therefore have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise.

Germany formally informs France that German mobilization will be ordered if Russia mobilizes on the German frontier, and that Germany will attack Russia if Russia attacks Austria.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting French Minister for Foreign Affairs

Berlin, July 27, 1914.

. . . . . I pointed out that we had Sir Edward Grey's proposal, which opened the way to a peaceful issue. Herr von Jagow repeated again that he was willing to adhere to it, but he pointed out that if Russia mobilized Germany would be obliged to mobilize as well, that we also would be forced to do so, and



© Underwood & Underwood

© Underwood & Underwood

© Underwood & Underwood

© Underwood & Underwood

© International Film Service

DESCRIPTION OF PICTURES ON REVERSE SIDE

Upper Left Hand Corner—Robert Lansing, Counselor, Department of State, March 20, 1914-June 23, 1915, and Secretary of State of the United States, June 23, 1915—.

Upper Right Hand Corner—Georges Clemenceau, Premier of France and Minister of War, November 17, 1917—.

Center—David Lloyd George, British Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1908-1915; Minister of Munitions, May, 1915-July, 1916; Secretary of State for War, July, 1916-December 6, 1916; and Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury, December 6, 1916—.

Lower Left Hand Corner—Vittorio Orlando, Premier of Italy, October 31, 1917—.

Lower Right Hand Corner—Eleutherios Venizelos, Prime Minister of Greece. and Minister of War, June 27, 1917—.

that the struggle would be almost inevitable. I asked him if Germany would believe herself bound to mobilize in the event of Russia mobilizing only on her Austrian frontier. He replied "No," and formally authorized me to acquaint you with this restriction. He would also attach the greatest importance to intervention in Russia by the powers allied or friendly with that State.

Finally, he remarked that if Russia attacked Austria, Germany would have to attack at once on her side. . . . .

Nevertheless, the Berlin representatives of the *London Times,* the *Manchester Guardian* and the *London Daily Chronicle* agree that Germany is trying to turn Austria into paths where peace may be found.

Russia once more asks England for definite guarantees of support, but England sticks to her previous attitude. *England asks that Russia postpone mobilization, but Russia is non-committal because of the danger of Austrian mobilization.*

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey

St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.

. . . . . On the (Russian) Minister for Foreign Affairs questioning me, I told him that I had correctly defined the attitude of his Majesty's Government in my conversation with him, which I reported in my telegram of the 24th instant. I added that you could not promise to do anything more, and that his Excellency was mistaken if he believed that the cause of peace could be promoted by our telling the German Government that they would have to deal with us as well as with Russia and France if she supported Austria by force of arms. Their attitude would merely be stiffened by such a menace, and we could only induce her to use her influence at Vienna to avert war by approaching her in the capacity of a friend who was anxious to preserve peace. His Excellency must not, if our efforts were to be successful, do anything to precipitate a conflict. In these circumstances I trusted that the Russian Government would defer the mobilization ukase for as long as possible and that troops would not be allowed to cross the frontier even when it was issued.

In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that until the issue of the Imperial ukase no effective steps toward mobilization could be taken, and the Austro-Hungarian Government would profit by delay in order to complete her military preparations if it was deferred too long.

Russia is willing to arbitrate the dispute before a conference of the four disinterested great Powers, but has not yet heard from Austria regarding the Russian suggestion of a modification in the terms to Servia.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey
(Received July 28.)

St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.

His Excellency (the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs) said he was perfectly ready to stand aside if the Powers accepted the proposal for a conference, but he trusted that you would keep in touch with the Russian Ambassador in the event of its taking place.

M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff
(Communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 28.)

St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.

I replied . . . . . that I have begun conversations with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador under conditions which I hope may be favorable. I have not, however, received as yet any reply to the proposal made by me for revising the note between the two Cabinets.

If direct explanations with the Vienna Cabinet were to prove impossible, I am ready to accept the British proposal, or any other proposal of a kind that would bring about a favorable solution of the conflict.

On the other hand, Russia disagrees completely with Germany's contention that no other Power should interest itself in the Austro-Serbian dispute. In reply to the Serbian cry for assistance, *Russia assures Servia that the Tsar will not allow his ally in the Balkans to be crushed by the Dual Monarchy.*

Telegram from the Tsar to Prince Alexander of Servia under Date of 14 (27) July, 1914

Your Royal Highness in addressing Me in a moment of particular difficulty was not deceived in regard to the sentiments which animate me in his regard and in regard to my cordial sympathy for the Servian people.

My most serious attention is drawn by the present situation and my Government is devoting itself with all its force to smoothing out the present difficulties. I have no doubt that your Highness and the Royal Government wish to facilitate this task by neglecting nothing to arrive at a solution which would prevent the horrors of a new war while at the same time safeguarding the dignity of Servia.

So long as there is the least hope of avoiding bloodshed all our efforts must tend toward this object. If, despite Our most sincere desire, We do not succeed, your Highness may be assured that in no case will Russia disinterest herself in regard to the fate of Servia.

NICHOLAS.

England issues orders not to disperse the English fleet at Portsmouth.

France accepts Sir Edward Grey's proposal for arbitration.

Russian mobilization gets definitely under way.

England informs Germany that Russia has gone to the limit of concession in seeing that the Serbian reply to the Austrian ultimatum was highly conciliatory and that, if peace is to be preserved, there is more need of German pressure upon Vienna than of English pressure upon Petrograd.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

London, Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.

I have replied (to Germany) that the Servian reply went further than could have been expected to meet the Austrian demands. German Secretary of State has himself said that there were some things in the Austrian note that Servia could hardly be expected to accept. I assumed that Servian reply could not have gone as far as it did unless Russia had exerted conciliatory influence at Belgrade, and it was really at Vienna that moderating influence was now required. If Austria put the Servian reply aside as being worth nothing and marched into Servia, it meant that she was determined to crush Servia at all costs, being reckless of the consequences that might be involved. Servian reply should at least be treated as a basis for discussion and pause. I said German Government should urge this at Vienna.

. . . . . Other issues might be raised that would supersede the dispute between Austria and Servia, and would bring other Powers in, and the war would be the biggest ever known; but as long as Germany would work to keep the peace I would keep closely in touch. I repeated that after the Servian reply it was at Vienna that some moderation must be urged.

England also points to her orders against the dispersion of the English fleet to allay any impression that in case of a general European outbreak England will not support the Entente.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen

London, Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.

I said (to the Austrian ambassador to England) that it seemed to me as if the Austrian Government believed that, even after the Servian reply, they could make war upon Servia anyhow, without risk of bringing Russia into the dispute. If they could make war on Servia and at the same time satisfy Russia, well and good; but, if not, the consequences would be incalculable. I pointed out that our fleet was to have dispersed today, but we had felt unable to let it disperse. We should not think of calling up reserves at this moment, and there was no menace in what we had done about our fleet, but, owing to the possibility of a European conflagration, it was impossible for us to disperse our forces at this moment. I gave this an as illustration of the anxiety that was felt. It seemed to me that the Servian reply already involved the greatest humiliation to Servia that I had ever seen a country undergo, and it was very disappointing to me that the reply was treated by the Austrian Government as if it were as unsatisfactory as a blank negative.

I am, &c., E. GREY.

JULY 28

AUSTRIA DECLARES WAR ON SERVIA, AND PROCEEDS WITH GENERAL MOBILIZATION.

In Germany, the Kaiser, who returned only two days ago from a trip, telegraphs the Tsar that he is trying to bring about an understanding between Russia and Austria.

The Kaiser to the Tsar

July 28, 10:45 P. M.

. . . . . Remembering the heartfelt friendship which has bound us closely for a long time, I am . . . . . exerting all my influence to endeavor to make Austria-Hungary come to an open and satisfying understanding with Russia. I earnestly hope that you will help me in my efforts to set aside all obstacles that may yet arise.

Your very sincere and devoted friend and cousin.

WILHELM.

The German chancellor, von Bethman-Hollweg, reports to England that the news of the Russian mobilization, if true, will hamper his moves for peace.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey
(Received July 29.)

Berlin, July 28, 1914.

. . . . . If the news were true which he (the German chancellor) had just read in the papers that Russia had mobilized fourteen army corps in the south, he thought situation was very serious, and he himself would be in a very difficult position, as in these circumstances it would be out of his power to continue to preach moderation at Vienna. He added that Austria, who as yet was only partially mobilizing, would have to take similar measures, and if war were to result, Russia would be entirely responsible. I ventured to say that if Austria refused to take any notice of Servian note, which, to my mind, gave way in nearly every point demanded by Austria, and which in any case offered a basis for discussion, surely a certain portion of responsibility would rest with her. His Excellency said that he did not wish to discuss Servian note, but that Austria's standpoint, and in this he agreed, was that her quarrel with Servia was a purely Austrian concern with which Russia had nothing to do. . . . .

The German ambassador at Paris reports to the French Government that *Austria will annex no territory from Servia but gives no guarantees respecting Serbian independence.*

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey

Paris, July 28, 1914.

. . . . . German Ambassador (at Paris) has stated that Austria would respect the integrity of Servia, but when asked whether her independence also would be respected, he gave no assurance.

In a confidential communication to the various Governments of Germany, the Imperial German chancellor rehearses the danger and insult to Austria in the pan-Serb agitation, and then explains why Germany will support Austria.

The Imperial (German) Chancellor to the Confederated Governments of Germany

Confidential!

Berlin, July 28, 1914.

. . . . . If Russia feels constrained to take sides with Servia in this conflict she certainly has a right to do it. But she must bear clearly in mind that in so doing she makes Servia's aspirations to undermine the conditions necessary for the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy identical with her own, and that she alone must bear the responsibility if a European war arises from the Austro-Servian question, which all the rest of the great European powers wish to localize. This responsibility of Russia is perfectly apparent and is all the heavier since Count Berchtold has officially declared to Russia that there is no intention of acquiring Servian territory, nor of threatening the continued existence of the Servian Kingdom, but that all that is desired is to obtain permanent relief from Servian machinations that threaten Austria's existence.

The attitude of the Imperial German Government in this matter is clearly outlined. The agitation conducted by the Pan-Slavs against Austria-Hungary has as its principal aim the dissolution of weakening of the Triple Alliance by means of the destruction of the Danube Empire and, as a result, the complete isolation of the German Empire. Our closest interests, therefore, summon us to the side of Austria-Hungary.

. . . . . If, contrary to hope, the trouble should spread, owing to the intervention of Russia, then, true to our duty as an ally, we should have to support the neighboring monarchy with the entire might of the German Empire. . . . .

Despite the declaration of war upon Servia by Austria, the Russian ambassador to Vienna is not yet recalled; but *Russia warns that she will mobilize on the same day that Austria crosses the Serbian frontier.*

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey
(Received July 29.)

St. Petersburg, July 28, 1914.

. . . . . His Excellency (Sazonof) stated . . . . . that order for (Russian) mobilization against Austria would be issued on the day that Austria crossed Servian frontier.

I told the German Ambassador, who appealed to me to give moderating counsels to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that from the beginning I had not ceased to do so, and that the German Ambassador at Vienna should now in his turn use his restraining influence. I made it clear to his Excellency that, Russia being thoroughly in earnest, a general war could not be averted if Servia were attacked by Austria.

Russia informs Germany that she will mobilize tomorrow in the military districts of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow and Kazan (to the south of Russia), but disclaims any intention to mobilize against Germany.

M. Sazonof to Russian Ambassador at Berlin, July 28, 1914

In consequence of the declaration of war by Austria against Servia, the Imperial (Russian) Government will announce tomorrow (29th) the mobilization in the military circonscriptions of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow, and Kazan. Please inform German Government, confirming the absence in Russia of any aggressive intention against Germany.

The Russian Ambassador at Vienna has not been recalled from his post.

JULY 29

Hostilities between Austria and Servia begin along the Danube.

Belgium places its army on an advanced peace footing.

Bulgaria declares its neutrality.

The British, French and Italian ambassadors in Vienna agree that nothing can now stop the direct hostilities between Austria and Servia.

Russia informs the Powers of the partial Russian mobilization.

In Germany, a war council is held at Potsdam. After the meeting, the German chancellor asks the British ambassador if England will remain neutral, in case Germany does not aim at crushing France. If Great Britain will remain neutral, Germany will give assurance not to annex any French territory in Europe. However, *Germany will not agree to refrain from annexing French colonial territory, nor will she guarantee to respect Belgian territory, as her attitude toward Belgium will depend upon the attitude of France.* Germany will respect Dutch neutrality.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

. . . . . He (the German Chancellor) then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.

I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that, so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give his Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany. . . . .

The Kaiser telegraphs the Tsar supporting Austria's action and once more asking Russia not to interfere.

The Kaiser to the Tsar

July 29, 1914.

. . . . . As I said to you in my first—I cannot consider Austria-Hungary's action "disgraceful war." Austria-Hungary knows by experience that Servia's promises, when they are merely on paper, are quite unreliable. According to my opinion, Austria-Hungary's action is to be looked upon as an attempt to secure full guarantees that Servia's promises shall also be turned into deeds. I am confirmed in this view by the statement of the Austrian Cabinet that Austria-Hungary contemplates no acquisition of territory at the expense of Servia. I think, therefore, that it is quite possible for Russia to remain in the rôle of a spectator toward the Austrian-Servian war, without dragging Europe into the most terrible war that it has ever seen. . . . .

Germany warns Russia that Germany will mobilize unless Russia ceases her military preparations.

The (Russian) Minister of Foreign Affairs to the (Russian) Ambassador in France

St. Petersburg, 16 (29th) July, 1914.

Today the Ambassador of Germany communicated to me the resolution taken by his Government to mobilize if Russia did not stop her military preparations. . . . .

Germany warns France of the dangers inherent in the French military preparations which by this time seem to have been begun.

Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the Imperial German Ambassador in Paris

July 29, 1914.

Reports to us of French preparations for war increase from hour to hour. I request that you talk on this matter with the French Government and make it clear to them that such measures would lead to precautionary measures on our part. We should be obliged to proclaim "Kriegsgefahr," (danger of war,) and even if this should not mean calling in reserves and mobilization, it would, nevertheless, increase the tension. We still hope uninterruptedly for the maintenance of peace.

France informs Russia that France will be bound by the Franco-Russian treaty and will support her ally.

The (Russian) Ambassador in France to the (Russian) Minister of Foreign Affairs

Paris, 16 (29th) July, 1914.

Viviani has just confirmed to me the full determination of the French Government to act in accordance with us. This resolution is supported by the most extended circles and by all parties, including the Radical Socialists, who have presented to him a declaration, expressing the absolute confidence and the patriotic disposition of the group. . . . .

Russia declines to cease her military preparations, but is willing to continue direct negotiations with Austria or to leave the dispute to the four disinterested great Powers. Russia is happy that she can count upon the support of France.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey

St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.

. . . . . The (Russian) Minister for Foreign Affairs . . . . . proposed, when informing German Ambassador of this refusal of Austria's, (for direct conversation between Vienna and Petrograd on the question of Servia) to urge that a return should be made to your proposal for a conference of four Ambassadors, or, at all events, for an exchange of views between the three Ambassadors less directly interested. yourself, and also the Austrian Ambassador if you thought it advisable. Any arrangement approved by France and England would be acceptable to him, and he did not care what form such conversations took. . . . .

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Paris

St. Petersburg, July 16 (29), 1914.

. . . . . Since we cannot accede to the desire of Germany it only remains for us to accelerate our own armament, and to take measures for the probable inevitability of war. Be so good as to notify the French Government and express to it at the same time our sincere gratitude for the declaration which the Ambassador of France made me in its name to the effect that we can count entirely upon the assistance of our ally, France. In the present circumstances this declaration is particularly precious to us. . . . .

England still refuses to encourage Russia and France by promising them support in case of war, but still refuses to encourage Germany by promising neutrality in case of a general European war.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie

London, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

Sir: After telling M. Cambon today how grave the situation seemed to be, I told him that I meant to tell the German Ambassador today that he must not be misled by the friendly tone of our conversations into any sense of false security that we should stand aside if all the efforts to preserve the peace, which we were now making in common with Germany, failed. But I went on to say to M. Cambon that I thought it necessary to tell him also that the public opinion here approached the present difficulty from a quite different point of view from that taken during the difficulty as to Morocco a few years ago. In the case of Morocco the dispute was one in which France was primarily interested, and in which it appeared that Germany, in an attempt to crush France, was fastening a quarrel on France on a question that was the subject of a special agreement between France and us. In the present case the dispute between Austria and Servia was not one in which we felt called to take a hand. Even if the question became one between Austria and Russia we

should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav—a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question. If Germany became involved and France became involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a case that we should have to consider. France would then have been drawn into a quarrel which was not hers, but in which, owing to her alliance, her honor and interest obliged her to engage. We were free from engagements, and we should have to decide what British interests required us to do. I thought it necessary to say that, because as he knew, we were taking all precautions with regard to our fleet, and I was about to warn Prince Lichnowsky not to count on our standing aside, but it would not be fair that I should let M. Cambon be misled into supposing that this meant that we had decided what to do in a contingency that I still hoped might not arise.

M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very clearly. He understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel and in a struggle for supremacy between Teuton and Slav we should not feel called to intervene; should other issues be raised, and Germany and France become involved, so that the question became one of the hegemony of Europe, we should then decide what it was necessary for us to do. He seemed quite prepared for this announcement, and made no criticism upon it.

He said French opinion was calm, but decided. He anticipated a demand from Germany that France would be neutral while Germany attacked Russia. This assurance, France, of course, could not give; she was bound to help Russia if Russia was attacked.

I am, &c., E. GREY.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

London, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

Sir: After speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the European situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite private and friendly way, something that was on my mind. The situation was very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at present actually involved we had no thought of interfering in it. But if Germany became involved in it, and then France, the issue might be so great that it would involve all European interests: and I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our conversation —which I hoped would continue—into thinking that we should stand aside.

He said that he quite understood this, but he asked whether I meant that we should under certain circumstances intervene.

I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything that was like a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying that, if things became worse, we should intervene. There would be no question of our intervening if Germany was not involved, or even if France was not involved. But we knew very well that if the issue did become such that we thought British interests required us to intervene, we must intervene at once, and the decision would have to be very rapid, just as the decisions of other powers had to be. I hoped that the friendly tone of our conversations would continue as at present, and that I should be able to keep as closely in touch with the German Government in working for peace. But if we failed in our efforts to keep the peace, and if the issue spread so that it involved practically every European interest, I

did not wish to be open to any reproach from him that the friendly tone of all our conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing that we should not take action, and to the reproach that, if they had not been so misled, the course of things might have been different.

The German Ambassador took no exception to what I had said; indeed, he told me that it accorded with what he had already given in Berlin as his view of the situation.

I am, &c., E. GREY.

JULY 30

Austria begins the bombardment of Belgrade, Servia.

Nevertheless, Austria begins to feel seriously alarmed about the consequences which are now threatening all mankind as a result of her attack upon Servia. The news of the Russian mobilization and of the preparations for war of the other great Powers has a sobering effect upon Austrian opinion. Germany also is putting strong pressure upon her ally in the direction of peace, and in the following dispatch *warns her that Germany will refuse to be drawn into a world war because Austria will not listen to German advice.*

From the German Imperial Chancellor to the German Ambassador in Vienna

Berlin, July 30, 1914.

. . . . . We cannot expect Austria-Hungary to negotiate with Servia, with whom she is in a state of war. The refusal to exchange views with St. Petersburg, however, would be a grave mistake. We are indeed ready to fulfil our duty. As an ally, we must refuse, however, to be drawn into a world conflagration through Austria-Hungary not respecting our advice. Your Excellency will express this to Count Berchtold with all emphasis and great seriousness.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

The authenticity of the above document has been questioned, although it was given to a British newspaper by the German Foreign Office on this day and was printed in that newspaper on August 2. But it is supported by a conversation between the French and the British ambassadors in Vienna.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey

Vienna, July 30, 1914.

. . . . . The French Ambassador hears from Berlin that the German Ambassador at Vienna is instructed to speak seriously to the Austro-Hungarian Government against acting in a manner calculated to provoke a European war. . . . .

But the German ambassador to Austria-Hungary is known as an ardent Pan-German and as an uncompromising Slavophobist, and may not have delivered the message to Austria as desired by his home government.

Germany, as mentioned above, is still pressing Austria for a more moderate stand in the interests of peace. The Kaiser again wires the Tsar of the danger in Russian mobilization.

The Kaiser to the Tsar

July 30, 1914.

My Ambassador has been instructed to call your Government's attention to the dangers and serious consequences of mobilization; I said the same thing to you in my last telegram. Austria-Hungary mobilized only against Servia, and at that she mobilized only a part of her army. If Russia, as appears from what you and your Government say, is mobilizing against Austria-Hungary, the position of mediator, which you intrusted to me in a friendly manner and which I accepted at your urgent request, is jeopardized if not rendered untenable. The whole weight of the decision now rests on your shoulders; they must bear the responsibility for war or peace.

WILHELM.

Germany withdraws her assurance to Russia of German mobilization only in case of Russian mobilization along the German frontier.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. René Viviani, (French) Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs

Berlin, July 30, 1914.

. . . . . I pointed out to the Secretary of State that he himself had said to me that Germany would not consider herself forced to mobilize unless Russia mobilized upon the German frontier, and that such was not the case. He replied that that was true, but that the heads of the army insisted that all delay was a loss of strength to the German Army, and that "the words I recalled did not constitute a firm engagement on his side." . . . .

The more conciliatory attitude adopted by Austria-Hungary today is revealed in the following documents:

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

Vienna, July 30, 1914.

The Russian Ambassador gave the French Ambassador and myself this afternoon at the French Embassy . . . . . an account of his interview with the (Austrian) Minister for Foreign Affairs, which he said was quite friendly. The Minister for Foreign Affairs had told him that as Russia had mobilized, Austria must, of course, do the same. This, however, should not be regarded as a threat, but merely as the adoption of military precautions similar to those which had been taken across the frontier. He said he had no objection to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg continuing their conversation, although he did not say that they could be resumed on the basis of the Servian reply.

On the whole, the Russian Ambassador is not dissatisfied. He had begun to make his preparations for his departure on the strength of a rumor that

Austria would declare war in reply to mobilization. He now hopes that something may yet be done to prevent war with Austria.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

I asked him (the German Chancellor) whether he could not still put pressure on the authorities at Vienna to do something in general interests to reassure Russia and to show themselves disposed to continue discussions on a friendly basis. He replied that last night he had begged Austria to reply to your last proposal, and that he had received a reply to the effect that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs would take wishes of the Emperor this morning in the matter.

France again asks England for assurance of unconditional support of France and Russia.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey

Paris, July 30, 1914.

. . . . . He (President Poincaré) is convinced that peace between the Powers is in the hands of Great Britain. If his Majesty's Government announced that England would come to the aid of France in the event of a conflict between France and Germany as a result of the present differences between Austria and Servia, there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude.

I explained to him how difficult it would be for his Majesty's Government to make such an announcement, but he said that he must maintain that it would be in the interests of peace. . . . . A declaration now of her intention to support France, whose desire it is that peace should be maintained, would almost certainly prevent Germany from going to war (President Poincaré believed).

England still refuses to give France unqualified assurance of support.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie

London, Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

He (the French Ambassador at London) did not wish to ask me to say directly that we would intervene, but he would like me to say what we should do if certain circumstances arose. The particular hypothesis he had in mind was an aggression by Germany on France. . . . . He anticipated that the aggression would take the form of either a demand that France should cease her preparations, or a demand that she should engage to remain neutral if there was war between Germany and Russia. Neither of these things could France admit.

I said that the Cabinet was to meet tomorrow morning, and I would see him again tomorrow afternoon.

I am, &c., E. GREY.

England also in definite terms rejects Germany's bid for England's neutrality in case France's colonial possessions or Belgian neutrality will be involved by Germany's actions, but at the same time proposes a better understanding for the future between the two countries and mitigation of the international rivalries.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

London, Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms.

What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies.

From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed, as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy.

Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover.

The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligations or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain, either. . . . . We must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem to us to require in any such unfavorable and regrettable development of the present crisis as the Chancellor contemplates. . . . .

One way of maintaining good relations between England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe; if we succeeded in this object, the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I believe, be ipso facto improved and strengthened. . . . .

And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavor will be to promote some arrangement, to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

London, Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

I have warned Prince Lichnowsky that Germany must not count upon our standing aside in all circumstances. . . . .

France withdraws all her troops ten kilometers from the Franco-German frontier, in the hope that mobilization will not result in open conflict between the opposing forces before war is actually declared.

From M. René Viviani, French Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador in London

Paris, July 30, 1914.

. . . . . Although Germany has taken her covering precautions up to within a few hundred meters of the frontier along the whole front from Luxemburg to the Vosges, and has advanced her covering troops to their fighting positions, we have kept our troops at a distance of ten kilometers of the frontier, and have forbidden them to advance further. . . . . In thus leaving a strip of territory without defense against the sudden aggression of the enemy, the Government of the Republic is anxious to show that France, no more than Russia, is responsible for the attack.

Russia makes one more effort to modify the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, but *threatens general mobilization* if it is not successful.

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey

St. Petersburg, July 30, 1914.

. . . . . German Ambassador (at Petrograd) had a second interview with (Russian) Minister for Foreign Affairs at 2 A. M., when former completely broke down on seeing that war was inevitable. He appealed to M. Sazonof to make some suggestion which he could telegraph to German Government as a last hope. M. Sazonof accordingly drew up and handed to German Ambassador a formula in French, of which following is translation:

"If Austria, recognizing that her conflict with Servia has assumed character of question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate principle of sovereignty of Servia, Russia engages to stop all military preparations."

Preparations for general mobilization will be proceeded with if this proposal is rejected by Austria, and the inevitable result will be a European war. . . . .

On this night Russia orders a general mobilization, without waiting further for answer to her proffer of the morning to Austria. Russia maintains that Germany is making military and naval preparations against her.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey

St. Petersburg, July 30, 1914.

. . . . . M. Sazonof told us that absolute proof was in possession of Russian Government that Germany was making military and naval preparations against Russia—more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland. Excitement here has reached such a pitch that if Austria refuses to make a concession Russia cannot hold back, and, now that she knows that Germany is arming, she can hardly postpone, for strategical reasons, converting partial into general mobilization.



Photos by International Film Service

THE END OF A GERMAN GOTHA

The upper panel shows the remains of a huge German bombing "Gotha," brought down by a British flyer.

ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUN AT THE FRONT

The central panel shows a battery of field artillery manning a light anti-aircraft gun in the trenches in France.

A FOKKER IN RANGE

The lower panel shows the crew of a British anti-aircraft brigade hurrying to man their guns as a German "Fokker," or light scouting plane, comes into range.

JULY 31

In Austria, the outlook for peace is constantly more hopeful. The Austrian ambassador at Petrograd and the Russian minister for foreign affairs are still in direct consultation about the Austro-Russian crisis. Austria again asserts her willingness not to infringe upon Serbian sovereignty nor to annex Serbian territory. *Austria is mobilizing on the Russian frontier in answer to Russia's general mobilization, but the greatest danger lies in a possible German mobilization.*

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

Vienna, July 31, 1914.

I am informed by Count Forgach, (Austrian) Under Secretary of State, that although Austria was compelled to respond to Russian mobilization, which he deplored, the Austrian Ambassador in London has received instructions to inform you that mobilization was not to be regarded as a necessarily hostile act on either side. Telegrams were being exchanged between the Emperor of Russia and the German Emperor, and conversations were proceeding between Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg and Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. A general war might, he seriously hoped, be staved off by these efforts. . . . .

Russia announces to the great Powers that she is mobilizing as a result of Austrian mobilization against Russia and Austria's refusal to accept the mediation of the great Powers. *Russia gives no reason for the Russian mobilization on the German frontier as well as on the Austrian frontier, except a general belief that Germany is arming against Russia.*

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey

St. Petersburg, July 31. 1914.

It has been decided to issue orders for general (Russian) mobilization.

This decision was taken in consequence of report received from Russian Ambassador in Vienna to the effect that Austria is determined not to yield to intervention of Powers, and that she is moving troops against Russia as well as against Servia.

Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active military preparations, and she cannot afford to let her get a start.

Germany replies to the Russian general mobilization with an ultimatum to Russia announcing general German mobilization unless with-

in twelve hours Russia agrees to demobilize at once against both Germany and Austria.

Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg

July 31, 1914.

In spite of still pending mediatory negotiations, and although we ourselves have up to the present moment taken no measures for mobilization, Russia has mobilized her entire army and navy; in other words, mobilized against us also. By these Russian measures we have been obliged, for the safeguarding of the empire, to announce that danger of war threatens us, which does not yet mean mobilization. Mobilization, however, must follow unless Russia ceases within twelve hours all warlike measures against us and Austria-Hungary and gives us definite assurance thereof. Kindly communicate this at once to M. Sazonof and wire hour of its communication to him.

Germany informs Russia that the German ultimatum is not in itself a declaration of war, but is near it.

Secret Telegram to the (Russian) Representatives in Other Countries

19th July (1st Aug.), 1914.

At midnight the Ambassador of Germany declared to me, by order of his Government, that if within twelve hours, that is at midnight of Saturday, we did not commence demobilization, not only in regard to Germany but also in regard to Austria, the German Government would be forced to give the order of mobilization. To my question if this was war the Ambassador replied in the negative, but added that we were very near it.

SAZONOF.

Germany informs England that the general Russian mobilization ends all hopes for a peaceful solution.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

According to information just received by German Government from their Ambassador at St. Petersburg, whole Russian Army and Fleet are being mobilized. Chancellor tells me that "Kriegsgefahr" will be proclaimed at once by German Government, as it can only be against Germany that Russian general mobilization is directed. Mobilization would follow almost immediately. His Excellency added in explanation that "Kriegsgefahr" signified the taking of certain precautionary measures consequent upon strained relations with a foreign country.

This news from St. Petersburg, added his Excellency, seemed to him to put an end to all hope of a peaceful solution of the crisis. Germany must certainly prepare for all emergencies.

At two P. M. Germany proclaims "Kriegzustand," the condition immediately preceding mobilization.

The Kaiser informs the Tsar and the King of England of the ultimatum to Russia.

Germany closes the bridges across the Luxemburg-German frontier; Luxemburg asks both France and Germany if they will respect her neutrality.

Germany asks France what steps France will take as a result of the German ultimatum to Russia, and demands a reply within eighteen hours. If the general German mobilization is carried out as a result of an unsatisfactory answer from Russia, it will be along the French frontier as well as along the Russian.

Telegram of the German Chancellor to the German Ambassador in Paris
Important!

July 31, 1914.

In spite of our still pending mediatory action, and although we ourselves have adopted no steps toward mobilization, Russia has mobilized her entire army and navy, which means mobilization against us also. Thereupon we declared the existence of a threatening danger of war, which must be followed by mobilization, unless Russia within twelve hours ceases all warlike steps against us and Austria. Mobilization inevitably means war. Kindly ask the French Government whether it will remain neutral in a Russian-German war. Answer must come within eighteen hours. Wire at once hour that inquiry is made. Act with the greatest possible dispatch.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey

Paris, July 31, 1914.

. . . . . The German Government will consider it necessary to order the total mobilization of the German army on the Russian and French frontiers if within twelve hours the Russian Government do not give an undertaking to comply with German demand. . . . .

He (the German Ambassador to France) is going to call at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs tomorrow (Saturday) at 1 P. M. in order to receive the French Government's answer as to the attitude they will adopt in the circumstances.

He intimated the possibility of his requiring his passports. . . . .

England asks France and Germany if they will respect Belgian neutrality, and informs Belgium that England expects Belgium to resist any encroachments upon Belgian soil.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie and Sir E. Goschen

London, Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

I still trust situation is not irretrievable, but in view of prospect of mobilization in Germany it becomes essential to his Majesty's Government, in view of existing treaties, to ask whether French (German) Government is prepared.

to engage to respect neutrality of Belgium so long as no other Power violates it.

A similar reques is being addressed to German (French) Government. It is important to have an early answer.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers

London, Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

. . . . . You should say (to the Belgian Foreign Minister) that I assume that the Belgian Government will maintain to the utmost of her power her neutrality, which I desire and expect other Powers to uphold and observe.

You should inform the Belgian Government that an early reply is desired.

Germany again refuses to commit herself to respect Belgian neutrality, saying that the German attitude will depend upon the attitude of France.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey
(Received Aug. 1.)

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

I have seen (German) Secretary of State, who informs me that he must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer (about the neutrality of Belgium). I gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether they would return any answer at all. . . . .

It appears from what he said that German Government consider that certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo already.

. . . . . The prospect of obtaining a definite answer seems to me remote.

In speaking to me today the Chancellor made it clear that Germany would in any case desire to know the reply returned to you by the French Government (concerning the neutrality of Belgium).

In response to inquiries from Belgium and England, *France agrees to respect Belgian neutrality in case it is not violated by another Power.*

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey
(Received August 1.)

Paris, July 31, 1914.

. . . . . (France officially informs England and Belgium that) French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure defense of her own security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been given several times. President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs today.

M. Davignon, (Belgian) Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers in Berlin, Paris, and London

Brussels, 31st July, 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre:

The French Minister (to Belgium) . . . . . said to me: I take advantage of this opportunity to declare to you that no incursion of French troops will take place in Belgium, even if large forces were massed upon the frontiers of your country. France does not wish to have the responsibility of carrying out the first act of hostility toward Belgium. Instructions to this effect will be given to the French authorities.

Jean Jaurès, the noted French Socialist leader, is assassinated in a Paris café by a Frenchman who fears Jaurès will exert upon the diplomatic situation an influence not to the best interests of France.

England refuses to ask Russia to demobilize unless Austria will limit her advance into Servia.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan

London, Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

. . . . . I informed the German Ambassador that, as regards military preparations, I did not see how Russia could be urged to suspend them unless some limit were put by Austria to the advance of her troops into Servia.

France asks England what the English attitude will be as a result of the German ultimatum to Russia.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey
(Received July 31.)

Paris, July 31, 1914.

. . . . . The (French) Minister for Foreign Affairs . . . . . inquires what, in these circumstances, will be the attitude of England. . . . .

England is still maintaining her position of refusing unqualified support to France and Russia and yet of warning Germany not to expect English neutrality in case of a general European War; the question of Belgian neutrality is an important one in English eyes.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie

London, Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

. . . . . I said (to the French Ambassador in London) that it was quite wrong to suppose that we had left Germany under the impression that we would not intervene. I had refused overtures to promise that we should remain neutral. I had not only definitely declined to say we would remain neutral, I had even gone so far this morning as to say to the German Ambassador that if France and Germany became involved in war we should be drawn into it. . . . .

. . . . . Though we should have to put our policy before Parliament we could not pledge Parliament in advance. Up to the present moment we did not feel, and public opinion did not feel, that any treaties or obligations of this country were involved. Further developments might alter this situation and cause the Government and Parliament to take the view that intervention was justified. The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, but an important factor, in determining our attitude. Whether we proposed to Parliament to intervene or not to intervene in a war, Parliament would wish to know how we stood with regard to the neutrality of Belgium. . . . .

M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help France if Germany made an attack on her.

I said I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had gone at present, we could not make any engagement.

England will not support France and Russia if they do not listen to any Austro-German proposals of a reasonable nature; but otherwise England will be drawn into war.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

London, Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

I said to German Ambassador (in London) this morning that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburg and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it his Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences; that, otherwise, I told German Ambassador that if France became involved we should be drawn in.

The Bank of England doubles its discount rate.

Belgium orders the mobilization of the Belgian army.

Italy informs Germany that Austria's attitude has been aggressive, not defensive; and that as Italy considers the Triple Alliance only a defensive union, *Italy will remain neutral in case of war.*

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 3, 1914.

. . . . . To the question as to what were the intentions of Italy, the Marquis di San Giuliano (Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs) replied (to Germany):

"The war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences which might result, had, in the words of the German Ambassador himself, an aggressive object. Both were therefore in conflict with the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, and in such circumstances Italy would remain neutral."

AUGUST 1

Germany orders the release of English ships illegally detained at Hamburg.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 1, 1914.

We are informed that authorities at Hamburg have forcibly detained steamers belonging to the Great Central Company and other British merchant ships.

I cannot ascertain on what grounds the detention of British ships has been ordered.

You should request German Government to send immediate orders that they should be allowed to proceed without delay. The effect on public opinion here will be deplorable unless this is done. His Majesty's Government, on their side, are most anxious to avoid any incident of an aggressive nature, and the German Government will, I hope, be equally careful not to take any step which would make the situation between us impossible.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey
(Received August 2.)

Berlin, Aug. 1, 1914.

. . . . . (German) Secretary of State, who expressed the greatest surprise and annoyance (at the detention of British shipping), has promised to send orders at once to allow steamers to proceed without delay.

In the afternoon Germany orders general mobilization of the German army and navy, the first day of mobilization to be tomorrow.

Germany informs England that she cannot accept England's view that Germany is being drawn into war solely because of her alliance with Austria. Germany insists that her strategic position compels her to strike while the iron is hot, because Germany has the speed while Russia has the numbers. *Russia has not answered the German ultimatum within the time specified, and has been informed that further silence will create a state of war.*

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey
(Received August 2.)

Berlin, Aug. 1, 1914.

. . . . . I spent a long time arguing with him (the German Foreign Secretary) that the chief dispute was between Austria and Russia, and that Germany was only drawn in as Austria's ally. . . . . Secretary of State

for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's readiness to discuss was the result of German influence at Vienna, and, had not Russia mobilized against Germany, all would have been well. But Russia, by abstaining from answering Germany's demand that she should demobilize, had caused Germany to mobilize also. Russia had said that her mobilization did not necessarily imply war, and that she could perfectly well remain mobilized for months without making war. This was not the case with Germany. She had the speed and Russia had the numbers, and the safety of the German Empire forbade that Germany should allow Russia time to bring up masses of troops from all parts of her wide dominions. The situation now was that, though the Imperial Government had allowed her several hours beyond the specified time, Russia had sent no answer. Germany had, therefore, ordered mobilization, and the German representative at St. Petersburg had been instructed within a certain time to inform the Russian Government that the Imperial Government must regard their refusal to answer as creating a state of war.

Russia, through the Tsar, asks Germany, through the Kaiser, but two hours after the expiration of the time-limit, to see that the German mobilization does not involve war between Russia and Germany. Germany, however, insists upon an unequivocal answer to her ultimatum.

The Tsar to the Kaiser

St. Petersburg, Aug. 1, 1914.

I have received Your telegram. I understand that You are forced to mobilize, but I should like to have from You the same guarantee which I have given You, viz., that these measures do not mean war, and that we shall continue to negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the universal peace which is so dear to our hearts. With the aid of God it must be possible to our long-tried friendship to prevent the shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence Your urgent reply.

NICOLAS.

The Kaiser to the Tsar

Berlin, Aug. 1, 1914.

I thank You for Your telegram. I showed yesterday to Your Government the way through which war may alone be averted. Although I asked for a reply by today noon, no telegram from my Ambassador has reached me with the reply of Your Government. I therefore have been forced to mobilize my army. An immediate, clear and unmistakable reply of Your Government is the sole way to avoid endless misery. Until I receive this reply, I am unable, to my great grief, to enter upon the subject of Your telegram. I must ask most earnestly that You, without delay, order Your troops to commit, under no circumstances, the slightest violation of our frontiers.

WILHELM.

Germany undertakes not to attack France in case France will remain neutral.

Telegram of the German Ambassador in London to the German Chancellor, August 1st, 1914

Sir E. Grey just asked me by telephone whether I believed I was in a position to declare that we would not attack France in a war between Germany and Russia in case France should remain neutral. I declared I believed I was able to give such a pledge.

LICHNOWSKY.

Telegram of the Kaiser to the King of England, August 1st, 1914

I just received the communication from Your Government offering French neutrality under guarantee of Great Britain. Added to this offer was the inquiry whether under these conditions Germany would refrain from attacking France. On technical grounds My mobilization, which had already been proclaimed this afternoon, must proceed against the two fronts, east and west, as prepared; this cannot be countermanded because, I am sorry, Your telegram came so late. But if France offers Me neutrality, which must be guaranteed by the British fleet and army, I shall of course refrain from attacking France and employ My troops elsewhere. I hope that France will not become nervous. The troops on My frontier are about to be stopped by telegraph and telephone from crossing into France.

Telegram of the German Chancellor to the German Ambassador in London, August 1st, 1914

Germany is ready to accept British proposal in case England guarantees with all her forces absolute neutrality of France in Russo-German conflict. German mobilization has been ordered today on account of Russian challenge, before English proposal was known here. It is therefore now impossible to make any change in strategical distribution of troops ordered to the French frontier. But we guarantee that our troops will not cross the French frontier before 7 P. M. on Monday the 3rd inst. in case England will pledge herself meanwhile.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

France professes not to understand the threatening nature of the communication received yesterday from Germany. The German ambassador has made preparations to leave Paris.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey

Paris, Aug. 1, 1914.

. . . . . The German Ambassador was informed, on calling at the (French) Ministry for Foreign Affairs this morning, that the French Government failed to comprehend the reason which prompted his communication of yesterday evening. It was pointed out to his Excellency that general mobilization in Russia had not been ordered until after Austria had decreed a general mobilization, and that the Russian Government were ready to

demobilize if all Powers did likewise. . . . . There were no differences at issue between France and Germany, but the German Ambassador had made a menacing communication to the French Government and had requested an answer the next day, intimating that he would have to break off relations and leave Paris if the reply were not satisfactory. The Ambassador was informed that the French Government considered that this was an extraordinary proceeding.

The German Ambassador, who is to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs again this evening, said nothing about demanding his passports, but he stated that he had packed up.

France then informs Germany that, in the event of a Russo-German war, France will act according to her own interests.

M. René Viviani, French Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paléologue, French Ambassador in St. Petersburg

Paris, July 31, 1914.

. . . . . In conclusion, Baron von Schoen asked me on behalf of his Government, what would be the attitude of France in the event of a conflict between Germany and Russia. He told me that he would call to receive my answer at 1 o'clock tomorrow.

I do not intend to make any statement to him on this subject, and I shall confine myself to telling him that France will be inspired by her interests. The Government of the Republic, indeed, owes only to her ally a statement as to her intentions.

Telegram of the German Ambassador in Paris to the German Chancellor

Aug. 1, 1:05 P. M.

To my repeated inquiry as to whether France, in case of a German-Russian war, would remain neutral the Premier declared that France would do that which might be required of her by her interests.

France orders general mobilization of the French army at 3:40 P. M.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey

Paris, August 1, 1914.

(French) Minister of War informed (British) Military Attaché this afternoon that orders had been given at 3:40 for a general mobilization of the French Army. This became necessary because the Minister of War knows that, under the system of "Kriegszustand," the Germans have called up six classes. Three classes are sufficient to bring their covering troops up to war strength, the remaining three being the reserve. This, he says, being tantamount to mobilization, is mobilization under another name.

The French forces on the frontier have opposed to them eight army corps on a war footing, and an attack is expected at any moment. It is therefore of the utmost importance to guard against this. A zone of ten kilometers has been left between the French troops and the German frontier. The French troops will not attack, and the Minister of War is anxious that it should be explained that this act of mobilization is one for purely defensive purposes.

France agrees to respect the neutrality of Luxemburg if it is not violated by Germany.

M. Viviani, French Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Mollard, French Minister in Luxemburg

Paris, Aug. 1, 1914.

Please state to the Prime Minister (of Luxemburg) that in conformity with the Treaty of London of 1867 the Government of the (French) Republic intends to respect the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, as it has shown by its attitude. A German violation of this neutrality, however, would be of a nature to force France to act thereafter in accordance with the requirements of her defense and her interests.

RENE VIVIANI.

Belgium informs England that the Belgian Government intends to protect the soil of Belgium from invasion.

Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey

Brussels, Aug. 1, 1914.

Belgium expects and desires that other Powers will observe and uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power. In so informing me (the Belgian) Minister for Foreign Affairs said that, in the event of the violation of the neutrality of their territory, they believed that they were in a position to defend themselves against intrusion. The relations between Belgium and her neighbors were excellent, and there was no reason to suspect their intentions; but he thought it well, nevertheless, to be prepared against emergencies.

England corrects the mistaken impression of Germany that England thought it possible for France to remain neutral in case of a Russian-German war.

The King of England to the Emperor of Germany, August 1, 1914

In answer to your telegram just received, I think there must be some misunderstanding as to a suggestion that passed in friendly conversation between Prince Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey this afternoon when they were discussing how actual fighting between German and French armies might be avoided while there is still a chance of some agreement between Austria and Russia. Sir Edward Grey will arrange to see Prince Lichnowsky early tomorrow morning to ascertain whether there is a misunderstanding on his part.

GEORGE.

The German Ambassador in London to the German Chancellor, August 2, 1914

Sir E. Grey's suggestions were prompted by a desire to make it possible for England to keep permanent neutrality, but as they were not based on a previous understanding with France and made without knowledge of our mobilization, they have been abandoned as absolutely hopeless.

LICHNOWSKY.

England informs Germany that German violation of Belgian neutrality will greatly inflame British popular opinion, but refuses to go on record as stating that it will *ipso facto* cause a declaration of war from England. Nevertheless, German respect for Belgian neutrality will greatly lessen tension in England, but again England refuses to say that she will remain neutral in case Belgium is not attacked. England finally refuses to state terms on which she will remain neutral, desiring to keep her hands free.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 1, 1914.

Sir: I told the German Ambassador today that the reply of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that which had been given by France it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. I said . . . . . I was authorized to tell him this . . . . .

He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgium neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral.

I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.

The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.

I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free. I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

Austria is thoroughly alarmed at her inability to localize her quarrel with Servia and is now willing to accept mediation and to cease her mobilization against Russia if Russia will countermand the Russian mobilization against Austria.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 1, 1914.

Information reaches me from a most reliable source that Austrian Government have informed German Government that, though the situation has been changed by the mobilization of Russia, they would in full appreciation of the efforts of England for the preservation of peace be ready to consider favorably

my proposal for mediation between Austria and Servia. The understanding of this acceptance would naturally be that the Austrian military action against Servia would continue for the present, and that the British Government would urge upon Russian Government to stop the mobilization of troops directed against Austria, in which case Austria would naturally cancel those defensive military counter-measures in Galicia, which have been forced upon Austria by Russian mobilization. . . . .

The Russian Ambassador in France to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs

Paris, 19 July, (1 Aug.,) 1914.

The Ambassador of Austria yesterday called upon Viviani and declared to him that Austria not only had no intention of infringing the territorial integrity of Servia, but was ready to discuss with the other Powers the basis of its conflict with Servia. . . . .

The Austrian ambassador to Russia remains in Petrograd and continues to discuss the Russian-Austrian *impasse* with the Russian Foreign Office.

HAVING RECEIVED NO REPLY FROM RUSSIA TO HIS ULTIMATUM, AT 7:10 P. M. THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN PETROGRAD HANDS THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT A FORMAL DECLARATION OF WAR ON RUSSIA BY GERMANY.

Note Handed in by the Ambassador of Germany at St. Petersburg the 19th July, (Aug. 1,) 1914, at 10 Minutes Past 7 in the Evening

St. Petersburg, 19th July, (1st Aug.,) 1914.

The Imperial Government has endeavored from the opening of the crisis to lead it to a pacific solution. In accordance with a desire which had been expressed to him by his Majesty the Emperor of Russia, his Majesty the Emperor of Germany in accord with England had applied himself to filling a mediator rôle with the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg, when Russia, without awaiting the result of this, proceeded to the complete mobilization of her forces on land and sea. As a consequence of this threatening measure, motived by no military *"presage"* on the part of Germany, the German Empire found itself in face of a grave and imminent danger. If the Imperial Government had failed to safeguard herself against this peril it would have compromised the safety and the very existence of Germany. Consequently the German Government saw itself forced to address to the Government of his Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias an insistence on the cessation of the said military acts. Russia not having thought it should reply to this demand, and having manifested by this attitude that its action was directed against Germany, I have the honor to make known to your Excellency the following:

His Majesty the Emperor, My August Sovereign, in the name of the Empire, taking up the challenge, considers himself in a state of war with Russia.

F. POURTALES.

AUGUST 2

Germany presents an ultimatum to Belgium, demanding that Belgium grant passage to German troops.

Note handed in on August 2d at 7 o'clock P. M. by the German Minister to Belgium to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

Highly Confidential.

Brussels, 2 August, 1914.

The German Government has received reliable information according to which the French forces intend to march on the Meuse, by way of Givet and Namur. This information leaves no doubt as to the intention of France of marching on Germany through Belgian territory. The Imperial German Government cannot avoid the fear that Belgium, in spite of its best will, will be in no position to repulse such a largely developed French march without aid. In this fact there is sufficient certainty of a threat directed against Germany.

It is an imperative duty for the preservation of Germany to forestall this attack of the enemy.

The German Government would feel keen regret if Belgium should regard as an act of hostility against herself the fact that the measures of the enemies of Germany oblige her on her part to violate Belgian territory.

In order to dissipate any misunderstanding the German Government declares as follows:

1. Germany does not contemplate any act of hostility against Belgium. If Belgium consents in the war about to commence to take up an attitude of friendly neutrality toward Germany, the German Government on its part undertakes, on the declaration of peace, to guarantee the kingdom and its possessions in their whole extent.

2. Germany undertakes under the conditions laid down to evacuate Belgian territory as soon as peace is concluded.

3. If Belgium preserves a friendly attitude, Germany is prepared, in agreement with the authorities of the Belgian Government, to buy against cash all that is required by her troops, and to give indemnity for the damages caused in Belgium.

4. If Belgium behaves in a hostile manner toward the German troops, and in particular raises difficulties against their advance by the opposition of the fortifications of the Meuse, or by destroying roads, railways, tunnels, or other engineering works, Germany will be compelled to consider Belgium as an enemy.

In this case Germany will take no engagements toward Belgium, but she will leave the later settlement of relations of the two States toward one another to the decision of arms. The German Government has a justified hope that this contingency will not arise and that the Belgian Government will know how to take suitable measures to hinder its taking place. In this case the friendly relations which unite the two neighboring States will become closer and more lasting.

Germany's forces enter Luxemburg, Germany asserting that her intentions are not hostile and that compensation will be made.

Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey

Luxemburg, Aug. 2, 1914.

The Luxemburg Minister of State has just received through the German Minister in Luxemburg, M. de Buch, a telegram from the Chancellor of the German Empire, Bethmann-Hollweg, to the effect that the military measures taken in Luxemburg do not constitute a hostile act against Luxemburg, but are only intended to insure against a possible attack of a French army. Full compensation will be paid to Luxemburg for any damage caused by using the railways, which are leased to the Empire.

Germany informs France that the measures taken in Luxemburg are not hostile, but preventive.

Note Presented by the German Ambassador at Paris to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs

Paris, Aug. 2, 1914.

The German Ambassador has just been ordered and hastens to inform the Minister of Foreign Affairs that the military steps taken by Germany in the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg do not constitute an act of hostility. They must be considered as being purely preventive measures taken for the protection of the railways which under existing treaties between Germany and the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg are under German administration.

Luxemburg protests against the violation of her neutrality.

Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey

Luxemburg, Aug. 2, 1914.

. . . . . The Luxemburg Government have not failed to address an energetic protest against this aggression (of Germany) to the representatives of his Majesty the German Emperor at Luxemburg. An identical protest will be sent by telegraph to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Berlin.

England informs France that the British fleet will not permit the German fleet to proceed through the English Channel or the North Sea to attack French coasts or French shipping, this action being in accord with a secret naval agreement of 1912 between France and England whereby England undertook to protect northern France so that France might concentrate her fleet in the Mediterranean. England does not feel called upon to defend the neutrality of Luxemburg but feels that the violation of Belgian neutrality is a much more important matter. England, therefore, has not yet definitely committed herself.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 2, 1914.

After the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon the following memorandum:

"I am authorized to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.

"This assurance is, of course, subject to the policy of his Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding his Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place."

I pointed out that we had very large questions and most difficult issues to consider, and that Government felt that they could not bind themselves to declare war upon Germany necessarily if war broke out between France and Germany tomorrow, but it was essential to the French Government, whose fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know how to make their dispositions with their north coast entirely undefended. We therefore thought it necessary to give them this assurance. It did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless the German fleet took the action indicated, but it did give a security to France that would enable her to settle the disposition of her own Mediterranean fleet.

M. Cambon asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. I told him the doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in 1867. He asked me what we should say about the violation of the neutrality of Belgium. I said that was a much more important matter; we were considering what statement we should make in Parliament tomorrow—in effect, whether we should declare violation of Belgian neutrality to be a casus belli. I told him what had been said to the German Ambassador on this point.

The English Opposition Party (Unionist) pledges its support to the Government in any policy of coming to the rescue of France and Russia.

Russia proclaims the state of war with Germany, declaring that she has been attacked by Germany.



© Underwood & Underwood

© Pach

© International Film Service

© Western Newspaper Union

DESCRIPTION OF PICTURES ON REVERSE SIDE

Upper Left Hand Corner—Henry Morgenthau, United States Ambassador to Turkey, 1913-1916.

Upper Right Hand Corner—Brand Whitlock, United States Minister to Belgium, December 2, 1913—.

Center—James W. Gerard, United States Ambassador to Germany, July, 1913-February 3, 1917.

Lower Left Hand Corner—Thomas Nelson Page, United States Ambassador to Italy, June 21, 1913—.

Lower Right Hand Corner—William Graves Sharp, United States Ambassador to France, 1914-1919.

AUGUST 3

At 7 A. M., Belgium replies to the German ultimatum, warning Germany that Belgium will resist any attempt to violate her neutrality and asserting no fear that France will violate it.

Note Handed in by Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to German Minister to Belgium

Brussels, 3 August, 1914.
(7 o'clock in the morning.)

. . . . . The intentions attributed to France (by Germany) are in contradiction with the express declarations which were made to us on the 1st August, in the name of the Government of the Republic.

Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, a violation of Belgian neutrality were to be committed by France, Belgium would fulfill all her international duties and her army would offer the most vigorous opposition to the invader.

The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870, establish the independence and the neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee of the Powers, and particularly of the Government of his Majesty the King of Prussia. . . . .

The attempt against her (Belgium's) independence with which the German Government threatens her would constitute a flagrant violation of international law. No strategic interest justifies the violation of that law.

The Belgian Government would, by accepting the propositions which are offered to her, sacrifice the honor of the nation while at the same time betraying her duties toward Europe.

Conscious of the part Belgium has played for more than eighty years in the civilization of the world, she refuses to believe that the independence of Belgium can be preserved only at the expense of the violation of her neutrality.

If this hope is disappointed the Belgian Government has firmly resolved to repulse by every means in her power any attack upon her rights.

Germany promises that if England remains neutral Germany will forego all naval operations and the use of the Belgian coast as a supporting base.

M. Paul Cambon, French Minister in London, to M. Viviani, French Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs

London, Aug. 3, 1914.

. . . . . The German Ambassador has sent a communiqué to the press stating that if England remains neutral Germany will forego all naval operations and will not use the Belgian coasts as supporting base. I am making the reply that respect for coasts is not respect for the neutrality of territory, and that the German ultimatum is already a violation of neutrality.

PAUL CAMBON.

Belgium appeals to England for diplomatic protection but informs France that she does not yet require French assistance and will not yet appeal to the guaranty of the Powers.

Letter addressed by Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Belgian Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg

Brussels, 3d August, (Midday,) 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre:

As you are aware, Germany has delivered to Belgium an ultimatum expiring this morning, Aug. 3, at 7 o'clock. No act of war having taken place up to the present time, the Council of Ministers has decided that there was not for the moment reason to appeal to the guaranteeing powers.

. . . . . I thanked M. Klobukowski for the support which the French Government would presumably be good enough to offer, and I told him that the Belgian Government were not at the moment making an appeal for the guarantee of the Powers and reserve to themselves the right to decide later on what it would be best to do.

DAVIGNON.

Telegram addressed by the King of Belgium to the King of England

Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium.

In England, Sir Edward Grey addresses the House of Commons in the afternoon, tracing the history of the entente with France and asserting that it implies a moral obligation to support France today. He rejects the German offer to respect the north coast of France. He explains the importance of the issue of the neutrality of Belgium, and reveals for the first time the naval understanding with France entered into in 1912.

England informs Belgium that German violation of Belgian neutrality will result in war between England and Germany.

Telegram addressed by the Belgian Minister in London to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

London, 3d August, 1914.

I showed your telegram to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who communicated same to the Cabinet Council. The Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that if your neutrality were violated it would mean war with Germany.

COMTE DE LALAING.

CITING ALLEGED HOSTILE ACTS OF FRANCE, GERMANY ISSUES A DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST FRANCE.

Letter Handed by German Ambassador (to France) to M. René Viviani During His Farewell Audience, Aug. 3, 1914, at 6:45 P. M.

Paris, Aug. 3, 1914.

M. le Président:

The German administrative and military authorities have remarked a certain number of definitely hostile acts committed on German territory by French military airmen. Several of these latter have manifestly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the territory of that country. One has endeavored to destroy buildings near Wesel; others have been seen in the Eifel region; another has thrown bombs on the railway line near Carisruhe and Nuremberg. I am ordered, and I have the honor, to inform your Excellency that in view of these aggressions the German Empire considers itself to be in a state of war with France by the act of this latter power. . . . .

France charges (in a speech of Premier Viviani to the Chamber of Deputies) that Germany has been guilty of aggression against France before the declaration of war between the two countries.

France offers Belgium military assistance.

Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey

Brussels, Aug. 3, 1914.

French Government have offered through their Military Attaché the support of five French Army corps to the Belgian Government. . . . .

AUGUST 4

EARLY IN THE MORNING GERMANY INFORMS BELGIUM THAT IT IS NECESSARY FOR GERMANY TO INVADE BELGIUM. LATER IN THE DAY GERMAN TROOPS ENTER BELGIUM.

Letter addressed by the German Minister to Belgium to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

Brussels, 4th August, 1914.
(6 A. M.)

Monsieur le Ministre:

I have been instructed, and have the honor to inform your Excellency, that in consequence of the Government of his Majesty the King having declined the well-intentioned proposals submitted to them by the Imperial Government, the latter will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry out—if necessary by force of arms—the measures of security which have been set forth as indispensable in view of the French menaces. I am, &c.,

VON BELOW.

Telegram addressed by the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Belgian Ministers in London and Paris

Brussels, 4th August, 1914.

The General Staff notify that the national territory has been violated at Gemmenich.

DAVIGNON.

Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey

Brussels, Aug. 4, 1914.

Military Attaché has been informed at War Office that German troops have entered Belgian territory, and that Liége has been summoned to surrender by small party of Germans, who, however, were repulsed.

M. Pellet, French Minister at The Hague, to M. Viviani, French Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs

The Hague, Aug. 3, 1914.

The German Minister called upon the Minister of Foreign Affairs yesterday in order, he said, to explain the necessity of the violation of Luxemburg neutrality by Germany. He added that today he would have a further communication to make to him. This morning, indeed, he announced the entry of German troops into Belgium in order, he declared, to avoid an occupation of that country by France.

PELLET.

Belgium hands the German ambassador his passports.

Letter addressed by the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the German Minister to Belgium

Brussels, 4th August, 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre:

I have the honor of acquainting your Excellency that from today the King's Government can no longer acknowledge your diplomatic character, and must cease to have official relations with you. Your Excellency will find inclosed the passports which are necessary for your departure and that of the staff of the legation. I am, &c.,

DAVIGNON.

France notifies the Powers of a state of war between France and Germany.

The German Chancellor explains the reasons for Germany's actions in the Reichstag, laying the blame for the war at the door of Russia. He admits that Germany's invasion of Belgium is in violation of treaty and international law, but defends it on the grounds of strategical necessity. The German Socialists declare that the war is not a people's war, but support it in order to repel Russia.

Germany informs England that there will be no annexation of Belgian territory and that Germany's invasion of Belgium is rendered necessary by an intended French invasion of Belgium.

German Foreign Secretary to Prince Lichnowsky

Berlin, August 4, 1914.

Please dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intentions by repeating most positively formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretense whatever, annex Belgian territory. . . . . Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance.

England informs Belgium that England will join with Russia and France in protecting Belgium against Germany and that England expects Belgium to defend herself.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 4, 1914.

You should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, His Majesty's Government expect that they will resist by any means in their power, and that His Majesty's Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that His Majesty's Government in this event are prepared to join Russia and

France, if desired, in offering to the Belgian Government at once common action for the purpose of resisting use of force by Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain their independence and integrity in future years.

England notifies Norway and Holland that England will protect them as well as Belgium against Germany.

Telegram addressed by the Belgian Minister in London to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

London, 4th August, 1914.

The (English) Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed the British Ministers in Norway, Holland and Belgium, that Great Britain expects that these three kingdoms will resist the pressure of Germany and maintain neutrality. They will be supported in their resistance by England, who in such a case is ready to co-operate with France and Russia if such is the desire of these three Governments in offering an alliance to the said Governments to repel the employment of force against them by Germany, and a guarantee for the future maintenance of the independence and the integrity of the three kingdoms. I pointed out that Belgium is neutral in perpetuity. The Minister for Foreign Affairs replied: "It is for the event of neutrality being violated."

COMTE DE LALAING.

In the afternoon, England delivers an ultimatum to Germany, demanding that Belgian neutrality be respected and that German troops be withdrawn from Belgian soil. England demands a satisfactory answer by midnight.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 4, 1914.

. . . . . His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German Government has delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours.

We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations.

His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded with, and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 4, 1914.

We hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government will be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable.

We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich.

In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply

to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this morning (see above), be received here by 12 o'clock tonight. If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and to say that his Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves.

Germany refuses to comply with the British ultimatum. Germany protests against the action of England, calling the treaty guaranteeing Belgian neutrality a "scrap of paper," and "neutrality" a "mere word." The British ambassador to Germany demands his passports at 9:30 P. M.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey

London, Aug. 8, 1914.

Sir—In accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the 4th instant, I called upon the (German) Secretary of State that afternoon and enquired, in the name of His Majesty's Government, whether the Imperial (German) Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be "No," as, in consequence of the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavor to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. . . . .

I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed the Secretary of State that unless the Imperial Government could give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night that they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial Government that His Majesty's Government would have to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a party as themselves.

Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give me no other answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely, that the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency a written summary of your telegram and, pointing out that you had mentioned 12 o'clock as the time when His Majesty's Government would expect an answer, asked him whether, in view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible even at the last moment that their answer should be reconsidered. He replied that if the time given were even twenty-four hours or more, his answer must be the same. I said that in that case I should have to demand my passports. This interview took place at about 7 o'clock. . . . .

His Excellency (the German Chancellor) at once began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by his Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word—"neutrality," a word which in war time had so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper

Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. . . . .

. . . . . I said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of "life and death" for the honor of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could any one have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? . . . .

. . . . . At about 9:30 P. M. Herr von Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary of State, came to see me. After expressing his deep regret that the very friendly official and personal relations between us were about to cease, he asked me casually whether a demand for passports was equivalent to a declaration of war. I said that such an authority on international law as he was known to be must know as well or better than I what was usual in such cases. I added that there were many cases where diplomatic relations had been broken off and, nevertheless, war had not ensued; but that in this case he would have seen from my instructions, of which I have given Herr von Jagow a written summary, that his Majesty's Government expected an answer to a definite question by 12 o'clock that night and that in default of a satisfactory answer they would be forced to take such steps as their engagements required. Herr Zimmermann said that that was, in fact, a declaration of war, as the Imperial Government could not possibly give the assurance required either that night or any other night. . . . .

. . . . . I should also like to mention the great assistance rendered to us all by my American colleague, Mr. Gerard, and his staff. Undeterred by the hooting and hisses with which he was often greeted by the mob on entering and leaving the embassy, his Excellency came repeatedly to see me to ask how he could help us and to make arrangements for the safety of stranded British subjects. He extricated many of these from extremely difficult situations at some personal risk to himself, and his calmness and *savoir-faire* and his firmness in dealing with the Imperial authorities gave full assurance that the protection of British subjects and interests could not have been left in more efficient and able hands. I have, &c.,

W. E. GOSCHEN.

AT MIDNIGHT, HAVING RECEIVED NO ANSWER TO THE BRITISH ULTIMATUM TO GERMANY DEMANDING THAT GERMANY RESPECT THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM, ENGLAND DECLARES WAR ON GERMANY.

AUGUST 5

AUSTRIA DECLARES WAR ON RUSSIA BECAUSE OF THE STATE OF WAR EXISTING BETWEEN GERMANY AND RUSSIA.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE WAR, AUGUST 1, 1914—APRIL 6, 1917

Neutrality in Thought and Action

A feeling of horror completely overshadowed all other feelings in the United States when the great nations of Europe plunged into war. At that time, there was practically no general popular understanding in this country of the tremendous issues which had given birth to the holocaust and which would be involved in its results. The United States was thousands of miles from the seat of the war. It possessed no territory adjacent to the main battle arena. It had no alliances or even "understandings" with any of the great Powers involved. It had followed in its own diplomacy a tradition of isolated publicity which rendered it all the more disinterested in or even intolerant of the secret and public alliances which for many years had aligned Europe into two hostile camps. It contained no royal families, no aristocracy of birth, no large standing army and no policy of universal military training. Small wonder then that the war should have presented itself to our minds as a mere product of political and economic ambitions, and that we should have echoed fervently the old adage that wars were fought by the people, not by the rulers, but for the benefit of the rulers, not of the people.

A policy of neutrality was thus acclaimed with unanimous consent. On August 4, 1914, the President issued a Neutrality Proclamation, of which the salient passages are as follows and which is a sample of our neutrality proclamations issued later as other nations became drawn into the general conflict.

> Whereas a state of war unhappily exists between Austria-Hungary and Servia and between Germany and Russia and between Germany and France; And Whereas the United States is on terms of friendship and amity with the contending powers, and with the persons inhabiting their several dominions;

And Whereas there are citizens of the United States residing within the territories or dominions of each of the said belligerents and carrying on commerce, trade, or other business or pursuits therein;

And Whereas there are subjects of each of the said belligerents residing within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, and carrying on commerce, trade, or other business or pursuits therein;

And Whereas the laws and treaties of the United States, without interfering with the free expression of opinion and sympathy, or with the commercial manufacture or sale of arms or munitions of war, nevertheless impose upon all persons who may be within their territory and jurisdiction the duty of an impartial neutrality during the existence of the contest;

And Whereas it is the duty of a neutral government not to permit or suffer the making of its waters subservient to the purposes of war;

Now, Therefore, I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of America, in order to preserve the neutrality of the United States and of its citizens and of persons within its territory and jurisdiction, and to enforce its laws and treaties, and in order that all persons, being warned of the general tenor of the laws and treaties of the United States in this behalf, and of the law of nations, may thus be prevented from any violation of the same, do hereby declare and proclaim that by . . . . . provisions of the act approved on the 4th day of March, A. D. 1909, commonly known as the "Penal Code of the United States" . . . . . (certain) acts are forbidden to be done, under severe penalties, within the territory and jurisdiction of the United States. . . . .

And I do hereby further declare and proclaim that any frequenting and use of the waters within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States by the armed vessels of a belligerent, whether public ships or privateers, for the purpose of preparing for hostile operations, or as posts of observation upon the ships of war or privateers or merchant vessels of a belligerent lying within or being about to enter the jurisdiction of the United States, must be regarded as unfriendly and offensive, and in violation of that neutrality which it is the determination of this government to observe. . . . .

And I do further declare and proclaim that the statutes and the treaties of the United States and the law of nations alike re-

quire that no person, within the territory and jurisdiction of the United States, shall take part, directly or indirectly, in the said wars, but shall remain at peace with all of the said belligerents, and shall maintain a strict and impartial neutrality.

And I do hereby enjoin all citizens of the United States, and all persons residing or being within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, to observe the laws thereof, and to commit no act contrary to the provisions of the said statutes or treaties or in violation of the law of nations in that behalf.

And I do hereby warn all citizens of the United States, and all persons residing or being within its territory or jurisdiction that, while the free and full expression of sympathies in public and private is not restricted by the laws of the United States, military forces in aid of a belligerent cannot lawfully be originated or organized within its jurisdiction; and that, while all persons may lawfully and without restriction by reason of the aforesaid state of war manufacture and sell within the United States, arms and munitions of war, and other articles ordinarily known as "contraband of war," yet they cannot carry such articles upon the high seas for the use or service of a belligerent, nor can they transport soldiers and officers of a belligerent, or attempt to break any blockade which may be lawfully established and maintained during the said wars without incurring the risk of hostile capture and the penalties denounced by the law of nations in that behalf.

And I do hereby give notice that all citizens of the United States and others who may claim the protection of this government, who may misconduct themselves in the premises, will do so at their peril, and that they can in no wise obtain any protection from the government of the United States against the consequences of their misconduct. . . . .

Coupled with this determination to remain neutral toward the European conflict was a realization that by its position the United States was the one great Power which could act with complete impartiality as mediator when the time for mediation should arrive, and as peacemaker when the time for peace should arrive. This feeling was well expressed by President Wilson in an address to the members of the Associated Press at a luncheon in New York on April 20, 1915.

. . . . . Do you realize, that, roughly speaking, we are the only great nation at present disengaged? I am not speaking, of

course, with disparagement of the greatness of those nations in Europe which are not parties to the present war, but I am thinking of their close neighborhood to it. I am thinking how their lives much more than ours touch the very heart and stuff of the business, whereas we have rolling between us and those bitter days across the water 3,000 miles of cool and silent ocean. Our atmosphere is not yet charged with those disturbing elements which must permeate every nation of Europe. Therefore, is it not likely that the nations of the world will some day turn to us for the cooler assessment of the elements engaged? I am not now thinking so preposterous a thought as that we should sit in judgment upon them—no nation is fit to sit in judgment upon any other nation—but that we shall some day have to assist in reconstructing the processes of peace. Our resources are untouched; we are more and more becoming by the force of circumstances the mediating nation of the world in respect of its finance. We must make up our minds what are the best things to do and what are the best ways to do them. We must put our money, our energy, our enthusiasm, our sympathy into these things, and we must have our judgments prepared and our spirits chastened against the coming of that day. . . . .

Possible Dangers to America

The historically-minded among us were not slow to recall that slightly more than one hundred years before, the ramifications of the last previous general war in Europe had finally involved the United States in armed conflict with a great European power. The issue at stake in the War of 1812 was the issue of the freedom of the seas, and was thus stated by the President who guided the destinies of the nation during that war:

[*From President Madison's Message to Congress, June 1, 1812*]

. . . . . British cruisers have been in the continued practice of violating the American flag on the great highway of nations, and of seizing and carrying off persons sailing under it, not in the exercise of a belligerent right founded on the law of nations against an enemy, but of a municipal prerogative over British subjects. . . . .

Thousands of American citizens, under the safeguard of public

law and of their national flag, have been torn from their country and from everything dear to them; have been dragged on board ships of war of a foreign nation and exposed, under the severities of their discipline, to be exiled to the most distant and deadly climes, to risk their lives in the battles of their oppressors, and to be the melancholy instruments of taking away those of their own brethren. . . . .

British cruisers have been in the practice also of violating the rights and the peace of our coasts. They hover over and harass our entering and departing commerce. . . . .

Under pretended blockades, without the presence of an adequate force and sometimes without the practicability of applying one, our commerce has been plundered in every sea, the great staples of our country have been cut off from their legitimate markets, and a destructive blow aimed at our agricultural and maritime interests. . . . .

Not content with these occasional expedients for laying waste our neutral trade, the cabinet of Great Britain resorted at length to the sweeping system of blockades, under the name of orders in council, which has been molded and managed as might best suit its political views, its commercial jealousies, or the avidity of British cruisers.

To our remonstrances against the complicated and transcendent injustice of this innovation the first reply was that the orders were reluctantly adopted by Great Britain as a necessary retaliation on decrees of her enemy proclaiming a general blockade of the British Isles at a time when the naval force of that enemy dared not issue from his own ports. . . . .

We behold, in fine, on the side of Great Britain a state of war against the United States, and on the side of the United States a state of peace toward Great Britain.

Whether the United States shall continue passive under these progressive usurpations and these accumulating wrongs, or, opposing force to force in defense of their national rights, shall commit a just cause into the hands of the Almighty Disposer of Events, avoiding all connections which might entangle it in the contest or views of other powers, and preserving a constant readiness to concur in an honorable reestablishment of peace and friendship, is a solemn question which the Constitution wisely confides to the legislative department of the Government. In recommending it to their early deliberations I am happy in the assurance that the decision will be worthy the enlightened and

> patriotic councils of a virtuous, a free, and a powerful nation. . . . .

But in one hundred years the United States had grown from a few states in an under-developed economic condition, and devoted chiefly to agricultural pursuits, into a great industrial and commercial Power. She had interests which far transcended the territorial boundaries of the land and in turn her home interests were vitally affected by foreign conditions.

Moreover, in those one hundred years, new developments in science and industry had broken down the barriers of time and space. With cables and wireless systems between Europe and America, with vessels crossing the Atlantic in six days, America could not consider herself unrelated to the world which was seething in struggle. All the more reason, then, why the United States should be over-scrupulous in preserving an attitude of stern and strict neutrality, not only in deed, but even in thought.

On August 20, 1914, President Woodrow Wilson signified the gravity of the situation by openly addressing his fellow-countrymen in the interests of neutrality:

> My Fellow-Countrymen: I suppose that every thoughtful man in America has asked himself, during these last troubled weeks, what influence the European war may exert upon the United States, and I take the liberty of addressing a few words to you in order to point out that it is entirely within our own choice what its effects upon us will be and to urge very earnestly upon you the sort of speech and conduct which will best safeguard the Nation against distress and disaster.
>
> The effect of the war upon the United States will depend upon what American citizens say and do. Every man who really loves America will act and speak in the true spirit of neutrality, which is the spirit of impartiality and fairness and friendliness to all concerned. The spirit of the Nation in this critical matter will be determined largely by what individuals and society and those gathered in public meetings do and say, upon what newspapers and magazines contain, upon what ministers utter in their pulpits and men proclaim as their opinions on the street.
>
> The people of the United States are drawn from many nations, and chiefly from the nations now at war. It is natural and inevit-

able that there should be the utmost variety of sympathy and desire among them with regard to the issues and circumstances of the conflict. Some will wish one nation, others another, to succeed in the momentous struggle. It will be easy to excite passion and difficult to allay it. Those responsible for exciting it will assume a heavy responsibility, responsibility for no less a thing than that the people of the United States, whose love of their country and whose loyalty to its Government should unite them as Americans all, bound in honor and affection to think first of her and her interests, may be divided in camps of hostile opinion, hot against each other, involved in the war itself in impulse and opinion if not in action.

Such divisions among us would be fatal to our peace of mind and might seriously stand in the way of the proper performance of our duty as the one great nation at peace, the one people holding itself ready to play a part of impartial mediation and speak the counsels of peace and accommodation, not as a partisan, but as a friend.

I venture, therefore, my fellow-countrymen, to speak a solemn word of warning to you against that deepest, most subtle, most essential breach of neutrality which may spring out of partisanship, out of passionately taking sides. The United States must be neutral in fact as well as in name during these days that are to try men's souls. We must be impartial in thought as well as in action, must put a curb upon our sentiments as well as upon every transaction that might be construed as a preference of one party to the struggle before another. . . . .

Leaders in private as well as in public life enjoined strict impartiality upon America. Ex-President Theodore Roosevelt was only one of the prominent Americans to advocate unadulterated neutrality toward the quarrel across the seas.

Our hope for the speedy ending of the War was well reflected in President Wilson's proclamation on September 8, 1914, setting aside a day for prayers for peace.

Whereas great nations of the world have taken up arms against one another and war now draws millions of men into battle whom the counsel of statesmen has not been able to save from the terrible sacrifice;

And Whereas in this as in all things it is our privilege and duty

to seek counsel and succor of Almighty God, humbling ourselves before Him, confessing our weakness and our lack of any wisdom equal to these things;

And Whereas it is the especial wish and longing of the people of the United States, in prayer and counsel and all friendliness, to serve the cause of peace;

Therefore, I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of America, do designate Sunday, the fourth day of October next, a day of prayer and supplication and do request all God-fearing persons to repair on that day to their places of worship there to unite their petitions to Almighty God that, overruling the counsel of men, setting straight the things they can not govern or alter, taking pity on the nations now in the throes of conflict, in His mercy and goodness showing a way where men can see none, He vouchsafe His children healing peace again and restore once more that concord among men and nations without which there can be neither happiness nor true friendship nor any wholesome fruit of toil or thought in the world; praying also to this end that He forgive us our sins, our ignorance of His holy will, our wilfulness and many errors, and lead us in the paths of obedience to places of vision and to thoughts and counsels that purge and make wise. . . . .

The American Policy of Isolation

The foreign policy of the United States from the first days of the Republic through an uninterrupted cycle of years had been definitely a policy of isolation from European political quarrels and affiliations. Our first President had successfully resisted, during his stewardship of the nation's affairs, the tremendous pressure brought to bear upon him to show gratitude for France's help in the War of the American Revolution by intervening on the side of France in the struggle between France and England. And when George Washington finally was ready to lay down the burdens of office and to retire to Mount Vernon, in his Farewell Address to his country he solemnly advised it against all foreign entangling alliances and all over-strong foreign affections:

. . . . . Nothing is more essential than that permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular nations and passionate

attachments for others should be excluded, and that in place of them just and amicable feelings toward all should be cultivated. The nation which indulges toward another an habitual hatred or an habitual fondness is in some degree a slave. It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest. Antipathy in one nation against another disposes each more readily to offer insult and injury, to lay hold of slight causes of umbrage, and to be haughty and intractable when accidental or trifling occasions of dispute occur. . . . .

So, likewise, a passionate attachment of one nation for another produces a variety of evils. Sympathy for the favorite nation, facilitating the illusion of an imaginary common interest in cases where no real common interest exists, and infusing into one the enmities of the other, betrays the former into a participation in the quarrels and wars of the latter without adequate inducement or justification. It leads also to concessions to the favorite nation of privileges denied to others, which is apt doubly to injure the nation making the concessions by unnecessarily parting with what ought to have been retained, and by exciting jealousy, ill will, and a disposition to retaliate in the parties from whom equal privileges are withheld. . . . .

Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence (I conjure you to believe me, fellow-citizens) the jealousy of a free people ought to be *constantly* awake, since history and experience prove that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of republican government. But that jealousy, to be useful, must be impartial, else it becomes the instrument of the very influence to be avoided, instead of a defense against it. Excessive partiality for one foreign nation and excessive dislike of another cause those whom they actuate to see danger only on one side, and serve to veil and even second the arts of influence on the other. Real patriots who may resist the intrigues of the favorite are liable to become suspected and odious, while its tools and dupes usurp the applause and confidence of the people to surrender their interests.

The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations to have with them as little *political* connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop.

Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent

controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities. . . . .

Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign grounds? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice?

It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world, so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it; for let me not be understood as capable of patronizing infidelity to existing engagements. I hold the maxim no less applicable to public than to private affairs that honesty is always the best policy. I repeat, therefore, let those engagements be observed in their genuine sense. But in my opinion it is unnecessary and would be unwise to extend them.

Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable establishments on a respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies. . . . .

In relation to the still subsisting war in Europe my proclamation of the 22d of April, 1793, is the index to my plan. Sanctioned by your approving voice and by that of your representatives in both Houses of Congress, the spirit of that measure has continually governed me, uninfluenced by any attempts to deter or divert me from it.

After deliberate examination, with the aid of the best lights I could obtain, I was well satisfied that our country, under all the circumstances of the case, had a right to take, and was bound in duty and interest to take, a neutral position. Having taken it, I determined as far as should depend upon me to maintain it with moderation, perseverance, and firmness. . . . .

Washington's advice was repeated with eloquent firmness by Thomas Jefferson, in his Inaugural on March 4, 1801:

About to enter, fellow-citizens, on the exercise of duties which comprehend everything dear and valuable to you, it is proper you should understand what I deem the essential principles of our Government, and consequently those which ought to shape its Administration. I will compress them within the narrowest

compass they will bear, stating the general principle, but not all its limitations. Equal and exact justice to all men, of whatever state or persuasion, religious or political; peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none. . . . .

The Monroe Doctrine

Another reason for the aloofness of America from European political interests lay in the implications of the Monroe Doctrine.

During the Napoleonic Wars the Spanish-American colonies in America revolted and proceeded to govern themselves. This denial of the governing rights of royal monarchs was, as we have seen, in violation of the principles of the Holy Alliance; and in 1823, when the monarchy was restored in Spain, Spain undertook preparations to place the former Spanish colonies in America once more under Spanish rule. Both France and Russia evinced intentions of supporting Spain.

But the United States was committed to the principle of political democracy, and had come to regard the former American colonies of Spain as morally and legally independent. Indeed, in 1822, the United States had recognized the separate existence of several of them, and had dispatched diplomatic representatives to them.

Great Britain also was opposed by 1823 to interference by European Powers in the political affairs of America and offered to cooperate with the United States in issuing a warning to that effect. But President Monroe decided that even such a joint declaration would be in contradiction to the United States's tradition of no entangling alliances, and finally determined that the policy of preventing European nations from further acquiring territorial possessions in America must be a purely American policy.

In President Monroe's message to Congress in December, 1823, the following doctrine was laid down, and was soon to become famous under the name of the man who formulated it:

> . . . . . At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Government, made through the minister of the Emperor residing here, a full power and instructions have been transmitted to the minister of the United States at St. Petersburg to arrange by amicable

negotiation the respective rights and interests of the two nations on the northwest coast of this continent. A similar proposal had been made by His Imperial Majesty to the Government of Great Britain, which has likewise been acceded to. The Government of the United States has been desirous by this friendly proceeding of manifesting the great value which they have invariably attached to the friendship of the Emperor and their solicitude to cultivate the best understanding with his Government. In the discussions to which this interest has given rise and in the arrangements by which they may terminate the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers. . . . .

It was stated at the commencement of the last session that a great effort was then making in Spain and Portugal to improve the condition of the people of those countries, and that it appeared to be conducted with extraordinary moderation. It need scarcely be remarked that the result has been so far very different from what was then anticipated. Of events in that quarter of the globe, with which we have so much intercourse and from which we derive our origin, we have always been anxious and interested spectators. The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellowmen on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective Governments; and to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their

system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In the war between those new Governments and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered, and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of this Government shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security.

The late events in Spain and Portugal shew that Europe is still unsettled. Of this important fact no stronger proof can be adduced than that the allied powers should have thought it proper, on any principle satisfactory to themselves, to have interposed by force in the internal concerns of Spain. To what extent such interposition may be carried, on the same principle, is a question in which all independent powers whose governments differ from theirs are interested, even those most remote, and surely none more so than the United States. Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government *de facto* as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to those continents circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition in any form with indifference. If we look to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and those new Governments, and their distance from each other, it must be obvious that

she can never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in the hope that other powers will pursue the same course. . . . .

As a matter of fact, in promulgating his doctrine, President Monroe was but following in the footsteps of his predecessors. For instance, in a communication to Congress on January 3, 1811, President Madison uttered words prophetic of the Monroe Doctrine:

I communicate to Congress, in confidence, a letter of the 2d of December from Governor Folch, of West Florida, to the Secretary of State, and another of the same date from the same to John McKee.

I communicate in like manner a letter from the British chargé d'affaires to the Secretary of State, with the answer of the latter. Although the letter can not have been written in consequence of any instruction from the British Government founded on the late order for taking possession of the portion of West Florida well known to be claimed by the United States; although no communication has ever been made by that Government to this of any stipulation with Spain contemplating an interposition which might so materially affect the United States, and although no call can have been made by Spain in the present instance for the fulfillment of any such subsisting engagement, yet the spirit and scope of the document, with the accredited source from which it proceeds, required that it should not be withheld from the consideration of Congress.

Taking into view the tenor of these several communications, the posture of things with which they are connected, the intimate relation of the country adjoining the United States eastward of the river Perdido to their security and tranquillity, and the peculiar interest they otherwise have in its destiny, I recommend to the consideration of Congress the seasonableness of a declaration that the United States could not see without serious inquietude any part of a neighboring territory in which they have in different respects so deep and so just a concern pass from the hands of Spain into those of any other foreign power.

I recommend to their consideration also the expediency of authorizing the Executive to take temporary possession of any part or parts of the said Territory, in pursuance of arrangements which may be desired by the Spanish authorities, and for making provision for the government of the same during such possession.

> The wisdom of Congress will at the same time determine how far it may be expedient to provide for the event of a subversion of the Spanish authorities within the Territory in question, and an apprehended occupancy thereof by any other foreign power.

In his Eighth Annual Message to Congress on December 7, 1824, President Monroe repeated the implications of his previous utterances on the relations between America and Europe, as affected by the independence of the former Spanish colonies in America, in the following words:

> . . . . . With respect to the contest to which our neighbors are a party, it is evident that Spain as a power is scarcely felt in it. These new States had completely achieved their independence before it was acknowledged by the United States, and they have since maintained it with little foreign pressure. The disturbances which have appeared in certain portions of that vast territory have proceeded from internal causes, which had their origin in their former Governments and have not yet been thoroughly removed. It is manifest that these causes are daily losing their effect, and that these new States are settling down under Governments elective and representative in every branch, similar to our own. In this course we ardently wish them to persevere, under a firm conviction that it will promote their happiness. In this, their career, however, we have not interfered, believing that every people have a right to institute for themselves the government which, in their judgment, may suit them best. Our example is before them, of the good effect of which, being our neighbors, they are competent judges, and to their judgment we leave it, in the expectation that other powers will pursue the same policy. The deep interest which we take in their independence, which we have acknowledged, and in their enjoyment of all the rights incident thereto, especially in the very important one of instituting their own Governments, has been declared, and is known to the world. Separated as we are from Europe by the great Atlantic Ocean, we can have no concern in the wars of the European Governments nor in the causes which produce them. The balance of power between them, into whichever scale it may turn in its various vibrations, can not affect us. It is the interest of the United States to preserve the most friendly relations with every power and on conditions fair, equal, and applicable to all. But in regard to our neighbors our situation is dif-

ferent. It is impossible for the European Governments to interfere in their concerns, especially in those alluded to, which are vital, without affecting us; indeed, the motive which might induce such interference in the present state of the war between the parties, if a war it may be called, would appear to be equally applicable to us. It is gratifying to know that some of the powers with whom we enjoy a very friendly intercourse, and to whom these views have been communicated, have appeared to acquiesce in them.

As an evidence of the importance felt by Monroe's successors of reiterating the Monroe Doctrine, the following passage from the Third Annual Message of President Fillmore, December 6, 1852, is significant.

. . . . . It has been the uniform policy of this Government, from its foundation to the present day, to abstain from all interference in the domestic affairs of other nations. The consequence has been that while the nations of Europe have been engaged in desolating wars our country has pursued its peaceful course to unexampled prosperity and happiness. The wars in which we have been compelled to engage in defense of the rights and honor of the country have been, fortunately, of short duration. During the terrific contest of nation against nation which succeeded the French Revolution we were enabled by the wisdom and firmness of President Washington to maintain our neutrality. While other nations were drawn into this wide-sweeping whirlpool, we sat quiet and unmoved upon our own shores. While the flower of their numerous armies was wasted by disease or perished by hundreds of thousands upon the battlefield, the youth of this favored land were permitted to enjoy the blessings of peace beneath the paternal roof. While the States of Europe incurred enormous debts, under the burden of which their subjects still groan, and which must absorb no small part of the product of the honest industry of those countries for generations to come, the United States have once been enabled to exhibit the proud spectacle of a nation free from public debt, and if permitted to pursue our prosperous way for a few years longer in peace we may do the same again.

But it is now said by some that this policy must be changed. Europe is no longer separated from us by a voyage of months, but steam navigation has brought her within a few days' sail of

our shores. We see more of her movements and take a deeper interest in her controversies. Although no one proposes that we should join the fraternity of potentates who have for ages lavished the blood and treasure of their subjects in maintaining "the balance of power," yet it is said that we ought to interfere between contending sovereigns and their subjects for the purpose of overthrowing the monarchies of Europe and establishing in their place republican institutions. It is alleged that we have heretofore pursued a different course from a sense of our weakness, but that now our conscious strength dictates a change of policy, and that it is consequently our duty to mingle in these contests and aid those who are struggling for liberty.

This is a most seductive but dangerous appeal to the generous sympathies of freemen. Enjoying, as we do, the blessings of a free Government, there is no man who has an American heart that would not rejoice to see these blessings extended to all other nations. We can not witness the struggle between the oppressed and his oppressor anywhere without the deepest sympathy for the former and the most anxious desire for his triumph. Nevertheless, is it prudent or is it wise to involve ourselves in these foreign wars? Is it indeed true that we have heretofore refrained from doing so merely from the degrading motive of a conscious weakness? For the honor of the patriots who have gone before us, I can not admit it. Men of the Revolution, who drew the sword against the oppressions of the mother country and pledged to Heaven "their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor" to maintain their freedom, could never have been actuated by so unworthy a motive. They knew no weakness or fear where right or duty pointed the way, and it is a libel upon their fair fame for us, while we enjoy the blessings for which they so nobly fought and bled, to insinuate it. The truth is that the course which they pursued was dictated by a stern sense of international justice, by a statesmanlike prudence and a far-seeing wisdom, looking not merely to the present necessities but to the permanent safety and interest of the country. They knew that the world is governed less by sympathy than by reason and force; that it was not possible for this nation to become a "propagandist" of free principles without arraying against it the combined powers of Europe, and that the result was more likely to be the overthrow of republican liberty here than its establishment there. History has been written in vain for those who can doubt this. France had no sooner established a republican form of govern-

ment than she manifested a desire to force its blessings on all the world. Her own historian informs us that, hearing of some petty acts of tyranny in a neighboring principality, "the National Convention declared that she would afford succor and fraternity to all nations who wished to recover their liberty, and she gave it in charge to the executive power to give orders to the generals of the French armies to aid all citizens who might have been or should be oppressed in the cause of liberty." Here was the false step which led to her subsequent misfortunes. She soon found herself involved in war with all the rest of Europe. In less than ten years her Government was changed from a republic to an empire, and finally, after shedding rivers of blood, foreign powers restored her exiled dynasty and exhausted Europe sought peace and repose in the unquestioned ascendency of monarchical principles. Let us learn wisdom from her example. Let us remember that revolutions do not always establish freedom. Our own free institutions were not the offspring of our Revolution. They existed before. They were planted in the free charters of self-government under which the English colonies grew up, and our Revolution only freed us from the dominion of a foreign power whose government was at variance with those institutions. But European nations have had no such training for self-government, and every effort to establish it by bloody revolutions has been, and must without that preparation continue to be, a failure. Liberty unregulated by law degenerates into anarchy, which soon becomes the most horrid of all despotisms. Our policy is wisely to govern ourselves, and thereby to set such an example of national justice, prosperity, and true glory as shall teach to all nations the blessings of self-government and the unparalleled enterprise and success of a free people. . . . .

None of our Presidents has taken a deeper interest in expounding the Monroe Doctrine than Theodore Roosevelt. In the following passages from his official utterances, he insists upon the necessity for the United States to maintain sufficient military and naval forces to support the Monroe Doctrine, and touches also upon the misunderstanding in South America regarding the Monroe Doctrine:

. . . . . The Monroe Doctrine should be the cardinal feature of the foreign policy of all the nations of the two Americas, as it is of the United States. Just seventy-eight years have passed since President Monroe in his Annual Message announced that

"The American continents are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power." In other words, the Monroe Doctrine is a declaration that there must be no territorial aggrandizement by any non-American power at the expense of any American power on American soil. It is in no wise intended as hostile to any nation in the Old World. Still less is it intended to give cover to any aggression by one New World power at the expense of any other. It is simply a step, and a long step, toward assuring the universal peace of the world by securing the possibility of permanent peace on this hemisphere.

During the past century other influences have established the permanence and independence of the smaller states of Europe. Through the Monroe Doctrine we hope to be able to safeguard like independence and secure like permanence for the lesser among the New World nations.

This doctrine has nothing to do with the commercial relations of any American power, save that it in truth allows each of them to form such as it desires. In other words, it is really a guaranty of the commercial independence of the Americas. We do not ask under this doctrine for any exclusive commercial dealings with any other American state. We do not guarantee any state against punishment if it misconducts itself, provided that punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non-American power.

Our attitude in Cuba is a sufficient guaranty of our own good faith. We have not the slightest desire to secure any territory at the expense of any of our neighbors. We wish to work with them hand in hand, so that all of us may be uplifted together, and we rejoice over the good fortune of any of them, we gladly hail their material prosperity and political stability, and are concerned and alarmed if any of them fall into industrial or political chaos. We do not wish to see any Old World military power grow up on this continent, or to be compelled to become a military power ourselves. The peoples of the Americas can prosper best if left to work out their own salvation in their own way. . . . .

. . . . . Our people intend to abide by the Monroe Doctrine and to insist upon it as the one sure means of securing the peace of the Western Hemisphere. The Navy offers us the only means of making our insistence upon the Monroe Doctrine anything but a subject of derision to whatever nation chooses to disregard it. We desire the peace which comes as of right to the

just man armed; not the peace granted on terms of ignominy to the craven and the weakling.

It is not possible to improvise a navy after war breaks out. The ships must be built and the men trained long in advance. Some auxiliary vessels can be turned into makeshifts which will do in default of any better for the minor work, and a proportion of raw men can be mixed with the highly trained, their shortcomings being made good by the skill of their fellows; but the efficient fighting force of the Navy when pitted against an equal opponent will be found almost exclusively in the war ships that have been regularly built and in the officers and men who through years of faithful performance of sea duty have been trained to handle their formidable but complex and delicate weapons with the highest efficiency. In the late war with Spain the ships that dealt the decisive blows at Manila and Santiago had been launched from two to fourteen years, and they were able to do as they did because the men in the conning towers, the gun turrets, and the engine-rooms had through long years of practice at sea learned how to do their duty. . . . .

[*First Annual Message, December 3, 1901*]

. . . . . One of the most effective instruments for peace is the Monroe Doctrine as it has been and is being gradually developed by this Nation and accepted by other nations. No other policy could have been as efficient in promoting peace in the Western Hemisphere and in giving to each nation thereon the chance to develop along its own lines. If we had refused to apply the doctrine to changing conditions it would now be completely outworn, would not meet any of the needs of the present day, and, indeed, would probably by this time have sunk into complete oblivion. It is useful at home, and is meeting with recognition abroad because we have adapted our application of it to meet the growing and changing needs of the hemisphere. When we announce a policy such as the Monroe Doctrine we thereby commit ourselves to the consequences of the policy, and those consequences from time to time alter. It is out of the question to claim a right and yet shirk the responsibility for its exercise. Not only we, but all American republics who are benefited by the existence of the doctrine, must recognize the obligations each nation is under as regards foreign peoples no less than its duty to insist upon its own rights.

That our rights and interests are deeply concerned in the main-

tenance of the doctrine is so clear as hardly to need argument. This is especially true in view of the construction of the Panama Canal. As a mere matter of self-defense we must exercise a close watch over the approaches to this canal; and this means that we must be thoroughly alive to our interests in the Caribbean Sea.

There are certain essential points which must never be forgotten as regards the Monroe Doctrine. In the first place we must as a Nation make it evident that we do not intend to treat it in any shape or way as an excuse for aggrandizement on our part at the expense of the republics to the south. We must recognize the fact that in some South American countries there has been much suspicion lest we should interpret the Monroe Doctrine as in some way inimical to their interests, and we must try to convince all the other nations of this continent once and for all that no just and orderly Government has anything to fear from us. There are certain republics to the south of us which have already reached such a point of stability, order, and prosperity that they themselves, though as yet hardly consciously, are among the guarantors of this doctrine. These republics we now meet not only on a basis of entire equality, but in a spirit of frank and respectful friendship, which we hope is mutual. If all of the republics to the south of us will only grow as those to which I allude have already grown, all need for us to be the especial champions of the doctrine will disappear, for no stable and growing American Republic wishes to see some great non-American military power acquire territory in its neighborhood. All that this country desires is that the other republics on this continent shall be happy and prosperous; and they cannot be happy and prosperous unless they maintain order within their boundaries and behave with a just regard for their obligations toward outsiders. It must be understood that under no circumstances will the United States use the Monroe Doctrine as a cloak for territorial aggression. We desire peace with all the world, but perhaps most of all with the other peoples of the American Continent. There are, of course, limits to the wrongs which any self-respecting nation can endure. It is always possible that wrong actions toward this Nation, or toward citizens of this Nation, in some State unable to keep order among its own people, unable to secure justice from outsiders, and unwilling to do justice to those outsiders who treat it well, may result in our having to take action to protect our rights; but such action will not be taken with a view to territorial aggression, and it will

be taken at all only with extreme reluctance and when it has become evident that every other resource has been exhausted.

Moreover, we must make it evident that we do not intend to permit the Monroe Doctrine to be used by any nation on this Continent as a shield to protect it from the consequences of its own misdeeds against foreign nations. If a republic to the south of us commits a tort against a foreign nation, such as an outrage against a citizen of that nation, then the Monroe Doctrine does not force us to interfere to prevent punishment of the tort, save to see that the punishment does not assume the form of territorial occupation in any shape. The case is more difficult when it refers to a contractual obligation. Our own Government has always refused to enforce such contractual obligations on behalf of its citizens by an appeal to arms. It is much to be wished that all foreign governments would take the same view. But they do not; and in consequence we are liable at any time to be brought face to face with disagreeable alternatives. On the one hand, this country would certainly decline to go to war to prevent a foreign government from collecting a just debt; on the other hand, it is very inadvisable to permit any foreign power to take possession, even temporarily, of the custom houses of an American Republic in order to enforce the payment of its obligations; for such temporary occupation might turn into a permanent occupation. The only escape from these alternatives may at any time be that we must ourselves undertake to bring about some arrangement by which so much as possible of a just obligation shall be paid. It is far better that this country should put through such an arrangement, rather than allow any foreign country to undertake it. To do so insures the defaulting republic from having to pay debt of an improper character under duress, while it also insures honest creditors of the republic from being passed by in the interest of dishonest or grasping creditors. Moreover, for the United States to take such a position offers the only possible way of insuring us against a clash with some foreign power. The position is, therefore, in the interest of peace as well as in the interest of justice. It is of benefit to our people; it is of benefit to foreign peoples; and most of all it is really of benefit to the people of the country concerned.

This brings me to what should be one of the fundamental objects of the Monroe Doctrine. We must ourselves in good faith try to help upward toward peace and order those of our sister republics which need such help. Just as there has been a gradual

growth of the ethical element in the relations of one individual to another, so we are, even though slowly, more and more coming to recognize the duty of bearing one another's burdens, not only as among individuals, but also as among nations. . . . .

[*Fifth Annual Message, December 5, 1905.*]

. . . . . In many parts of South America there has been much misunderstanding of the attitude and purposes of the United States towards the other American Republics. An idea had become prevalent that our assertion of the Monroe Doctrine implied, or carried with it, an assumption of superiority, and of a right to exercise some kind of protectorate over the countries to whose territory that doctrine applies. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Yet that impression continued to be a serious barrier to good understanding, to friendly intercourse, to the introduction of American capital and the extension of American trade. The impression was so widespread that apparently it could not be reached by any ordinary means.

It was part of Secretary Root's mission (to South America in 1906) to dispel this unfounded impression, and there is just cause to believe that he has succeeded. In an address to the Third Conference at Rio on the 31st of July—an address of such note that I send it in, together with this message—he said:

> "We wish for no victories but those of peace; for no territory except our own; for no sovereignty except the sovereignty over ourselves. We deem the independence and equal rights of the smallest and weakest member of the family of nations entitled to as much respect as those of the greatest empire, and we deem the observance of that respect the chief guaranty of the weak against the oppression of the strong. We neither claim nor desire any rights or privileges or powers that we do not freely concede to every American Republic. We wish to increase our prosperity, to extend our trade, to grow in wealth, in wisdom, and in spirit, but our conception of the true way to accomplish this is not to pull down others and profit by their ruin, but to help all friends to a common prosperity and a common growth, that we may all become greater and stronger together. Within a few months for the first time the recognized possessors of every foot of soil upon the American continents can be and I hope will be represented with the acknowledged rights of equal sovereign states in the great World Congress at The Hague. This will be the world's formal and final acceptance of the declaration that no part of the American continents is to be

> deemed subject to colonization. Let us pledge ourselves to aid each other in the full performance of the duty to humanity which that accepted declaration implies, so that in time the weakest and most unfortunate of our Republics may come to march with equal step by the side of the stronger and more fortunate. Let us help each other to show that for all the races of men the liberty for which we have fought and labored is the twin sister of justice and peace. Let us unite in creating and maintaining and making effective an all-American public opinion, whose power shall influence international conduct and prevent international wrong, and narrow the causes of war, and forever preserve our free lands from the burden of such armaments as are massed behind the frontiers of Europe, and bring us ever nearer to the perfection of ordered liberty. So shall come security and prosperity, production and trade, wealth, learning, the arts, and happiness for us all."

These words appear to have been received with acclaim in every part of South America. They have my hearty approval, as I am sure they will have yours, and I can not be wrong in the conviction that they correctly represent the sentiments of the whole American people. I can not better characterize the true attitude of the United States in its assertion of the Monroe Doctrine than in the words of the distinguished former minister of foreign affairs of Argentina, Doctor Drago, in his speech welcoming Mr. Root at Buenos Ayres. He spoke of—

> "The traditional policy of the United States (which) without accentuating superiority or seeking preponderance, condemned the oppression of the nations of this part of the world and the control of their destinies by the great Powers of Europe. . . . ."
>
> [*Sixth Annual Message, December 3, 1906.*]

On the other hand, President Taft felt that the apprehensions which originally gave rise to the Monroe Doctrine had largely disappeared by the twentieth century. In his First Annual Message, December 7, 1909, he stated:

> . . . . . The Pan-American policy of this Government has long been fixed in its principles and remains unchanged. With the changed circumstances of the United States and of the Republics to the south of us, most of which have great natural resources, stable government and progressive ideals, the apprehension which gave rise to the Monroe Doctrine may be said to have nearly disappeared, and neither the doctrine as it exists nor any other doctrine of American policy should be permitted



Photos by International Film Service

GERMAN DEAD ON THE BATTLE-FIELD

The upper panel shows German soldiers lying dead on a sunken road near Moislains, which has just been taken by storm by British troops.

ABANDONED TANK

The center panel shows a tank abandoned in the trench where it has been made "hors de combat."

THE EFFECT OF FIRE

The lower panel gives an excellent idea of the devastation wrought in northern France by heavy bombardments. The charred trunks in the background are all that remain of what a few days previously had been a luxuriant forest.

> to operate for the perpetuation of irresponsible government, the escape of just obligations, or the insidious allegation of dominating ambitions on the part of the United States. . . . .

But however ardently America in 1914 desired the end of the conflict abroad, it is psychologically impossible for a great mass of people to witness a life-and-death struggle without taking sides. America was a unit in hoping for a speedy peace among the belligerents and in insisting that our country be not drawn into the vortex of battle; but as far as the issue of the war itself was concerned, America soon fell into two camps—those desiring to see the Entente victorious, and those desiring to see the Central Powers victorious.

Immigrant Stocks in America

These partisanships were not only inevitable psychologically—they were inevitable because of the fact that America had welcomed to its shores millions upon millions of men and women who had emigrated from the countries which were now at war. Our immigration policy had been one which made the United States the home of hordes fleeing from both political and economic oppression.

The traditional American attitude toward immigration to our shores was outlined with eloquent succinctness by President Wilson in his message to Congress on January 28, 1915, vetoing the bill providing for the restriction of immigration by the imposition of a literacy test.

> In two particulars of vital consequence this bill embodies a radical departure from the traditional and long-established policy of this country, a policy in which our people have conceived the very character of their Government to be expressed, the very mission and spirit of the Nation in respect of its relations to the peoples of the world outside their borders. It seeks to all but close entirely the gates of asylum which have always been open to those who could find nowhere else the right and opportunity of constitutional agitation for what they conceived to be the natural and inalienable rights of men; and it excludes those to whom the opportunities of elementary education have been denied, without regard to their character, their purposes, or their natural capacity.
>
> Restrictions like these, adopted earlier in our history as a Na-

> tion, would very materially have altered the course and cooled the humane ardors of our politics. The right of political asylum has brought to this country many a man of noble character and elevated purpose who was marked as an outlaw in his own less fortunate land, and who has yet become an ornament to our citizenship and to our public councils. . . . .
>
> Hitherto we have generously kept our doors open to all who were not unfitted by reason of disease or incapacity for self-support or such personal records and antecedents as were likely to make them a menace to our peace and order or to the wholesome and essential relationships of life. . . . .

In vetoing a similar bill years previously, President Grover Cleveland had also defined our immigration policy in eloquent terms. In his message to Congress on March 2, 1897, he said:

> . . . . . Heretofore we have welcomed all who came to us from other lands except those whose moral or physical condition or history threatened danger to our national welfare and safety. Relying upon the zealous watchfulness of our people to prevent injury to our political and social fabric, we have encouraged those coming from foreign countries to cast their lot with us and join in the development of our vast domain, securing in return a share in the blessings of American citizenship.
>
> A century's stupendous growth, largely due to the assimilation and thrift of millions of sturdy and patriotic adopted citizens, attests the success of this generous and free-handed policy which, while guarding the people's interests, exacts from our immigrants only physical and moral soundness and a willingness and ability to work.
>
> A contemplation of the grand results of this policy can not fail to arouse a sentiment in its defense, for however it might have been regarded as an original proposition and viewed as an experiment its accomplishments are such that if it is to be uprooted at this late day its disadvantages should be plainly apparent and the substitute adopted should be just and adequate, free from uncertainties, and guarded against difficult or oppressive administration. . . . .

The first settlers in America were, of course, chiefly of English descent, so that the earlier foundations of America were English. In political organization, in language, in literature, in social customs, in

religion, no less than in root-stock, America and England were practically two branches of the same civilization.

In addition, America remembered with gratitude the help given by France in achieving American independence.

But the immigrants first to arrive in this country in great numbers during the nineteenth century were ethnologically of groups to counteract in great measure our basic bias in favor of the Entente Allies. It has already been seen how hundreds of thousands of Irish came to America in the middle of the nineteenth century as a result of the famine and oppression prevalent in Ireland. In 1910, there were in the United States 4,656,170 persons who had either been born in Ireland or who had parents of whom one or both had been born in Ireland. This number amounted to about 5% of the total population of the United States exclusive of territorial possessions. And although it would manifestly not be exact to state that all this group or even a majority of it could be classified as anti-English, certainly a large percentage of it cherished bitter feelings against England.

After the period of the great Irish immigration came the great period of German immigration. The German immigrant stock in the United States in 1910 was almost 100% larger than the second largest immigrant stock (the Irish), and composed approximately 25% of the total immigrant stock. In 1910 there were in the United States 2,501,181 persons who had been born in Germany, 3,911,847 persons both of whose parents had been born in Germany, 1,869,590 persons one of whose parents had been born in Germany (the other being native-born), and 212,524 persons whose fathers had been born in Germany and whose mothers had been born in some other foreign country. The total of the German immigrant stock in the United States in 1910 was accordingly 8,495,142 persons, or more than 9% of the total population of the United States exclusive of territorial possessions.

It would not be exact to assert that the majority of these persons were pro-German. Many of them had left Germany or their parents had left Germany just because of the autocratic political system of Germany. The war was to prove before it was ended that the overwhelming majority of these persons placed the welfare of their country

of adoption above the welfare of their country of origin. But much of the German immigration to this country had definitely exerted itself not to allow all traces of German culture to disappear in the new land. The Germans, like most immigrants, tended to locate in definite regions or in definite sections of cities; and in those places the German language was often taught, German newspapers and books were often read, and social ties were often determined by the joint German origin. It was hence inevitable that a large and influential section of the American people should sympathize with the cause of Germany as against the cause of her declared enemies of 1914.

Again, in 1910, 5,383,552 persons, or almost 6% of the total population of the United States exclusive of territorial possessions, had either been born in Russia or Austria-Hungary or had parents of whom one or both had been born in Russia or Austria-Hungary. A large proportion of these persons were Jews, the story of whose race in Russia was one of heartless and ruthless mistreatment. To these, the Russian government was an unmitigated evil, a mediaeval anachronism in the twentieth century. A Russian victory would imply a prolongation of the autocratic government in Russia and a Russian defeat would imply the long-desired democratization of Russia. Accordingly, this group for the greater part ardently desired the defeat of the Tsar and his forces.

Similarly, a large proportion of the non-Jewish section of the Austrian and Hungarian stock in America was also of oppressed nationalities. Many were Czechs, some were Slovaks, many were South Slavs, and the recent story of their races under Austria-Hungary had also been one of mistreatment. To large numbers of this group, the defeat of Austria-Hungary would mean a relaxation of the oppression of the minor nationalities in Austria-Hungary and possibly the re-arrangement of the Dual Monarchy along ethnological lines.

These, then, were the chief internal factors influencing American partizanship in the first days of the War. But external developments soon began to play upon the situation and to prove a far stronger factor in making up the minds of these and most other Americans as to which of the two warring groups in Europe was the better entitled to the unofficial sympathy and support of the American people.

The Effect Upon America of the German Treatment of Belgium

Chief among these external developments were the German violation of Belgian neutrality and the atrocities committed by German troops against the Belgian people. In September, 1914, the Royal Belgian Commission came to this country to lay the wrongs of Belgium before the bar of American opinion, and the Commission was received with the deepest sympathy. But Belgium needed from the United States much more than sympathy. She needed food, clothing and all the other necessities of life. Belgian industry was paralyzed or destroyed; Belgian supplies had been seized by the invaders; the able-bodied Belgian men were or had been in the Belgian army; soon large sections of the Belgian civilian population were deported to Germany for industrial purposes—Belgium was helpless. Germany was treating Belgium as an enemy, and would not supply her with materials needed by Germany itself. Moreover, immediately after the outbreak of the War, the Entente took measures to prevent supplies from reaching Germany from other lands; and Germany claimed that what she called the "starvation blockade" of the Allies was resulting in a shortage of food for the German civilian population too serious to permit her to share any food with Belgium. The Entente, on the other hand, obviously could not send supplies of prime value to the enemy to a land occupied by the enemy. Accordingly, it was only from neutrals that Belgium could expect relief; and of all the neutrals the richest and most powerful was the United States.

The deliberate violation of the neutrality of Belgium by a stronger nation, which seventy-five years previously had deliberately agreed to respect it, struck at the security of other lands and of all international law, nebulous as international law was. Of course, most of the great Powers had violated the neutrality of other lands in recent years; but the latter had been mostly backward countries like Egypt, Morocco, Persia and China, not countries recognized as European Powers, if not great Powers; whereas the very smallness of Belgium as contrasted with the greatness of Germany and the plucky resistance made by King Albert's forces to the powerful invading German forces could

not but arouse general admiration for Belgium in the United States. Ex-President Roosevelt soon departed from his earlier recommendation of strict neutrality for the United States, and used his great influence with his fellow-citizens to urge them to resent the violation of Belgian neutrality as a crime and an attack against all civilized mankind, including America.

Money and supplies were soon collected throughout the United States and forwarded to Belgium. But the need of Belgium was so great—augmented as it was by the need of the portions of northern France in the hands of the Germans—that it became necessary to organize the campaign for Belgian relief on a large scale. The Commission for Belgian Relief, under the able management of Mr. Herbert C. Hoover, took steps to tap all available resources of the United States for the sake of Belgium; the strongest appeals necessarily were made to the classes of greatest wealth and highest social standing in the United States; these classes are all-important in moulding public opinion; it was impossible for these or for any other classes to sympathize with and to assist Belgium without experiencing deep indignation at the actions which were responsible for Belgium's plight; and as a result, the attitude of the mass of the American people who had possessed no inherent bias in favor of either group of belligerents in Europe was turned by the story of Belgium into repugnance at the cause of the Central Powers.

But Belgium had suffered more than invasion—she had suffered unspeakable atrocities. Bit by bit the revolting stories of the conduct of German officers and privates toward Belgian women and children filtered through to the United States. It was generally recognized, of course, that war evokes the basest impulses in men's breasts, and that in every war atrocities have been committed by troops; but the disquieting feature of the atrocities in Belgium lay in the fact that they seemed to have been ordered in cold blood as a definite policy of terrorization ("Shrecklichkeit"); and that Germany was callous concerning them rather than ashamed. When the German sympathizers in Europe and America then raised the cry that these stories of German bestiality were part of a campaign of British propaganda, Great Britain took pains to verify them. She appointed a commission of investiga-

tion under the chairmanship of Lord Bryce, for many years England's ambassador to the United States. The United States had learned to repose implicit faith in the word of Lord Bryce, and when the Bryce report on the Belgian atrocities was published, few there were who dared to question its authenticity. As appeal after appeal was spread throughout the United States for help to Belgium, the Bryce report became better and better known; and Germany's course inspired generally a hatred of German Kultur among even those who had been ignorant of the type of civilization nourished in Germany in the past quarter of a century.

But the issue presented to American minds was soon to undergo even more radical change. It was no longer to be The Entente Allies versus The Central Powers; it was to become the United States versus the Central Powers.

As a corollary to the diplomatic disputes between the United States and Germany, however, there eventuated also a serious diplomatic issue between the United States and Great Britain. This issue was maintained by both disputants with gravity and persistence, and it often covered principles as vital to the well-being of both countries as the freedom of the seas; but it never reached a point of acerbity where neither party would yield rather than see a serious crisis develop. The points at issue concerned property and neutral rights rather than loss of lives. In all the Anglo-American diplomatic discussions between August 1, 1914, and April 6, 1917, the possibility of war never hovered in the background; and the results of these negotiations had little effect upon the final decision of the United States to enter the War or upon its conduct of hostilities after it had entered the War. It will therefore be well to consider these negotiations at this point before passing on to the diplomatic negotiations between the United States and Germany.

Diplomatic Negotiations Between the United States and Great Britain

The salient point about the Anglo-American diplomatic discussions from the outbreak of the European War to the entrance of the United States into the War was the existence of an arbitration treaty between the two countries which had resulted from the efforts of Secretary of State Bryan and which made well-nigh impossible a resort to war.

There was a similar treaty between America and France; but all efforts to arrange a similar treaty with Germany had failed. These arbitration treaties provided for the reference of all disputes between the countries concerned, irrespective of the nature of the disputes, to a permanent International Commission, provided that such disputes could not be settled by diplomatic methods of adjustment. The countries involved agreed not to declare or to wage war upon each other until the Commission had investigated and reported, and the Commission had a year in which to investigate and report.

From the very first days of the struggle, the Government of the United States foresaw that complications on the high seas might involve the question of American rights, and on August 6, 1914, we dispatched an identic note to the Powers then at war, calling attention to the uncertainty regarding the maritime rights of neutrals and suggesting that all the belligerents adopt the *Declaration of London.* The Declaration of London was the result of the Second Hague Conference in 1907. It represented the code adopted and announced on February 26, 1909, by the International Naval Conference, called to organize the International Prize Court established by the Hague Conference. The Declaration of London comprised an exhaustive set of rules governing naval operations of both belligerents and neutrals in time of war. It represented not only a codification of existing rules sanctioned by the usage of international law, but also a distinct advance in clarifying the rights and the duties of belligerents and neutrals on the seas

in war-times. Unfortunately, however, the Declaration of London had not been ratified by all the Powers signatory to the Second Hague Conference by August 1, 1914; so that it was non-effective during the Great War.

England, it is true, announced as she entered the lists against Germany that she intended to abide by the obligations of the Declaration of London; but soon altered her intention in that respect, and to the note of Secretary of State Bryan of August 6, 1914, replied that the developments of the War compelled Great Britain to use her control of the seas to the limit of power sanctioned by existing international law.

Unfortunately, international law was very vague concerning the status of contraband. The question of contraband was further complicated in the early days of the war by the fact that Germany was contiguous to neutral territory through which supplies might be obtained. England's argument was, roughly, that goods sent from the United States to such neutral countries to be re-exported to Germany could enjoy no status different from the status of goods dispatched directly to Germany. Accordingly, throughout 1914, American ships were stopped and searched, and their cargoes seized, by British warships; while the new element brought into the question of maritime rights by the submarine activities of Germany also served to create dissatisfaction in this country with the existing state of affairs regarding American cargoes and shipping on the high seas.

Finally, on December 26, 1914, a formal note of protest was sent to England concerning the English violation of American maritime rights.

England's reply to this protest was published on January 7, 1915. England declared that she was not interfering in the legitimate trade of the United States with neutrals, but adduced statistics of unusual increases in United States exports to countries contiguous to Germany of materials vitally necessary to Germany. England maintained that these figures proved that the maritime traffic with which she was interfering was in reality traffic intended for German use. However, England was willing to make reparation for illegal damages to neutral shipping.

On February 4, 1915, Germany charged that England was using neutral flags over her ships to protect them from German submarines and that, as an example, the *Lusitania* had sailed under the American flag on a recent trip when it was approaching the British coast. Six days later, the United States officially informed England of Germany's charges, calling England's attention to the danger to American shipping involved in such practices:

> . . . . . The Government of the United States, reserving for future consideration the legality and propriety of the deceptive use of the flag of a neutral power in any case for the purpose of avoiding capture, desires very respectfully to point out to his Britannic Majesty's Government the serious consequences which may result to American vessels and American citizens if this practice is continued.
>
> The occasional use of the flag of a neutral or an enemy under the stress of immediate pursuit and to deceive an approaching enemy, which appears by the press reports to be represented as the precedent and justification used to support this action, seems to this Government a very different thing from an explicit sanction by a belligerent Government for its merchant ships generally to fly the flag of a neutral power within certain portions of the high seas, which are presumed to be frequented with hostile warships. The formal declaration of such a policy of general misuse of a neutral's flag jeopardizes the vessels of a neutral visiting those wars in a peculiar degree by raising the presumption that they are of belligerent nationality regardless of the flag which they may carry. . . . .
>
> A policy such as the one which his Majesty's Government is said to intend to adopt, would . . . . . afford no protection to British vessels, while it would be a serious and constant menace to the lives and vessels of American citizens.
>
> The Government of the United States, therefore, trusts that his Majesty's Government will do all in their power to restrain vessels of British nationality in the deceptive use of the United States flag in the sea area defined by the German declaration, since such practice would greatly endanger the vessel of a friendly power navigating those waters and would even seem to impose upon the Government of Great Britain a measure of responsibility for the loss of American lives and vessels in case of an attack by a German naval force.

> You will impress upon his Majesty's Government the grave concern which this Government feels in the circumstances in regard to the safety of American vessels and lives in the war zone declared by the German Admiralty.

England replied, on February 19, 1915, that such action was not in violation of the principles of international law, and that Union vessels had utilized the British flag to escape capture during the Civil War; but England agreed not to resort to the display of neutral flags over her ships as a general practice.

On March 1, 1915, England further complicated the situation by an announcement of her intention to confiscate all goods "presumably" destined to or originating in enemy countries, but without declaring a lawful blockade of German ports. On March 30, 1915, therefore, the United States addressed another note of protest to England:

> . . . . . The (British) Order in Council of the 15th of March would constitute, were its provisions to be actually carried into effect as they stand, a practical assertion of unlimited belligerent rights over neutral commerce within the whole European area, and an almost unqualified denial of the sovereign rights of the nations now at peace. . . . .
>
> But the novel and quite unprecedented feature of (the proposed English) blockade, ... is that it embraces many neutral ports and coasts, bars access to them, and subjects all neutral ships seeking to approach them to the same suspicion that would attach to them were they bound for the ports of the enemies of Great Britain, and to unusual risks and penalties.
>
> It is manifest that such limitations, risks, and liabilities placed upon the ships of a neutral power on the seas, beyond the right of visit and search and the right to prevent the shipment of contraband already referred to, are a distinct invasion of the sovereign rights of the nation whose ships, trade, or commerce is interfered with.
>
> The Government of the United States is, of course, not oblivious to the great changes which have occurred in the conditions and means of naval warfare since the rules hitherto governing legal blockade were formulated. It might be ready to admit that the old form of "close" blockade, with its cordon of ships in the immediate offing of the blockaded ports is no longer practicable in the face of an enemy possessing the means and opportunity to

make an effective defense by the use of submarines, mines and air craft; but it can hardly be maintained that, whatever form of effective blockade may be made use of, it is impossible to conform at least to the spirit and principles of the established rules of war. . . . .

The Government of the United States notes that in the Order in Council his Majesty's Government gives as their reason for entering upon a course of action, which they are aware is without precedent in modern warfare, the necessity they conceive themselves to have been placed under to retaliate upon their enemies for measures of a similar nature, which the latter have announced it their intention to adopt and which they have to some extent adopted, but the Government of the United States, recalling the principles upon which his Majesty's Government have hitherto been scrupulous to act, interprets this as merely a reason for certain extraordinary activities on the part of his Majesty's naval forces and not as an excuse for or prelude to any unlawful action.

If the course pursued by the present enemies of Great Britain should prove to be in fact tainted by illegality and disregard of the principles of war sanctioned by enlightened nations, it cannot be supposed, and this Government does not for a moment suppose, that his Majesty's Government would wish the same taint to attach to their own actions or would cite such illegal acts as in any sense or degree a justification for similar practices on their part in so far as they affect neutral rights. . . . .

The possibilities of serious interruption of American trade under the Order in Council are so many, and the methods proposed are so unusual, and seem liable to constitute so great an impediment and embarrassment to neutral commerce, that the Government of the United States, if the Order in Council is strictly enforced, apprehends many interferences with its legitimate trade which will impose upon his Majesty's Government heavy responsibilities for acts of the British authorities clearly subversive of the rights of neutral nations on the high seas. It is, therefore, expected that his Majesty's Government, having considered these possibilities, will take the steps necessary to avoid them, and, in the event that they should unhappily occur, will be prepared to make full reparation for every act which under the rules of international law constitutes a violation of neutral rights. . . . .

In conclusion, you will reiterate to his Majesty's Government that this statement of the view of the Government of the United States is made in the most friendly spirit, and in accordance with

> the uniform candor which has characterized the relations of the two Governments in the past, and which has been in large measure the foundation of the peace and amity existing between the two nations without interruption for a century.
>
> BRYAN.

But by this time, diplomatic controversies with Germany had become more acute than those with England, and despite the growing irritation in America at the English interference with American trade, no further action was taken for some time by the United States with respect to England's interpretation of international law.

Nevertheless, the United States was still endeavoring to reach a workable understanding with England on the points at issue between them, and on August 3, 1915, the State Department at Washington made public five notes which had been addressed to England since March 30, 1915, on the subject of the rights of American shipping and cargoes. To none of these notes was the English reply considered satisfactory, and in a note to His Majesty's Government on October 21, 1915, the United States took a far stronger stand than she had previously taken:

> . . . . . While the United States Government was at first inclined to view with leniency the British measures which were termed in the correspondence . . . . . a "blockade," because of the assurances of the British Government that inconvenience to neutral trade would be minimized by the discretion left to the courts in the application of the Order in Council and by the instructions which it was said would be issued to the administrative and other authorities having to do with the execution of the so-called "blockade" measures, this Government is now forced to the realization that its expectations, which were fully set forth in its note of March 30, were based on a misconception of the intentions of the British Government. Desiring to avoid controversy and in the expectation that the administration of the Order in Council would conform to the established rules of international law, this Government has until now reserved the question of the actual validity of the Order in Council of March 11, in so far as it is considered by the Government of Great Britain to establish a blockade within the meaning of that term as understood in the law and the practice of nations; but in the circumstances

now developed it feels that it can no longer permit the validity of the alleged blockade to remain unchallenged. . . . .

It is incumbent upon the United States Government, therefore, to give the British Government notice that the blockade, which they claim to have instituted under the Order in Council of March 11, cannot be recognized as a legal blockade by the United States. . . . .

I believe it has been conclusively shown that the methods sought to be employed by Great Britain to obtain and use evidence of enemy destination of cargoes bound for neutral ports and to impose a contraband character upon such cargoes are without justification; that the blockade upon which such methods are partly founded, is ineffective, illegal, and indefensible; that the judicial procedure offered as a means of reparation for an international injury is inherently defective for the purpose; and that in many cases jurisdiction is asserted in violation of the law of nations. The United States, therefore, can not submit to the curtailment of its neutral rights by these measures, which are admittedly retaliatory, and therefore illegal, in conception and in nature, and intended to punish the enemies of Great Britain for alleged illegalities on their part. The United States might not be in a position to object to them if its interests and the interests of all neutrals were unaffected by them, but, being affected, it can not with complacence suffer further subordination of its rights and interests to the plea that the exceptional geographic position of the enemies of Great Britain require or justify oppressive and illegal practices.

The Government of the United States desires, therefore, to impress most earnestly upon His Majesty's Government that it must insist that the relations between it and His Majesty's Government be governed, not by a policy of expediency, but by those established rules of international conduct upon which Great Britain in the past has held the United States to account when the latter nation was a belligerent engaged in a struggle for national existence. It is of the highest importance to neutrals not only of the present day but of the future that the principles of international right be maintained unimpaired.

This task of championing the integrity of neutral rights, which have received the sanction of the civilized world against the lawless conduct of belligerents arising out of the bitterness of the great conflict which is now wasting the countries of Europe, the United States unhesitatingly assumes, and to the accomplishment

> of that task it will devote its energies, exercising always that impartiality which from the outbreak of the war it has sought to exercise in its relations with the warring nations. . . . .

Early in 1916, the United States again felt itself forced to protest to England, this time on account of provisions in England's Trading with the Enemy Act. The United States objected to the clauses which forbade English merchants to trade with firms in neutral countries which had German trade connections.

By this time, feeling had become strong in this country also against the rigid censorship upon neutral mails imposed by Great Britain. American feeling finally culminated in another note of protest to England on May 24, 1916. The United States maintained that its merchants were being subjected to serious losses, inconveniences and lack of opportunities through England's examination of letters in the trade branch of the Postal Service.

> . . . . . Though giving assurances that they consider "genuine correspondence" to be "inviolable," and that they will, "true to their engagements," refrain "on the high seas" from seizing and confiscating such correspondence, the Allied Governments proceed to deprive neutral Governments of the benefits of these assurances by seizing and confiscating mail from vessels in port instead of at sea. They compel neutral ships without just cause to enter their own ports, or they induce shipping lines, through some form of duress, to send their mail ships via British ports, or they detain all vessels merely calling at British ports, thus acquiring by force or unjustifiable means an illegal jurisdiction. Acting upon this enforced jurisdiction, the authorities remove all mail, genuine correspondence as well as post parcels, take them to London, where every piece, even though of neutral origin and destination, is opened and critically examined to determine the "sincerity of their character," in accordance with the interpretation given that undefined phrase by the British and French censors. Finally the expurgated remainder is forwarded, frequently after irreparable delay, to its destination. Ships are detained en route to or from the United States or to and from other neutral countries, and mails are held and delayed for several days, and, in some cases, for weeks and even months, even though not routed to ports of North Europe via British ports. This has been the procedure which has been practiced since the announce-

ment of February 15, 1916. To some extent the same practice was followed before that date, calling forth the protest of this Government on January 4, 1916. But to that protest the memorandum under acknowledgment makes no reference and is entirely unresponsive.

The Government of the United States must again insist with emphasis that the British and French Governments do not obtain rightful jurisdiction of ships by forcing or inducing them to visit their ports for the purpose of seizing their mails, or thereby obtain greater belligerent rights as to such ship than they could exercise on the high seas, for there is, in the opinion of the Government of the United States, no legal distinction between the seizure of mails at sea, which is announced as abandoned, and their seizure from vessels voluntarily or involuntarily in port.

The British and French practice amounts to an unwarranted limitation on the use by neutrals of the world's highway for the transmission of correspondence. The practice actually followed by the Allied Powers must be said to justify the conclusion, therefore, that the announcement of February 15 was merely notice that one illegal practice had been abandoned to make place for the development of another more onerous and vexatious in character. . . . .

The Government of the United States, in view of the improper methods employed by the British and French authorities in interrupting mails passing between the United States and other neutral countries and between the United States and the enemies of Great Britain, can no longer tolerate the wrongs which citizens of the United States have suffered and continue to suffer through these methods. To submit to a lawless practice of this character would open the door to repeated violations of international law by the belligerent powers on the ground of military necessity of which the violator would be the sole judge. Manifestly a neutral nation cannot permit its rights on the high seas to be determined by belligerents or the exercise of those rights to be permitted or denied arbitrarily by the Government of a warring nation. The rights of neutrals are as sacred as the rights of belligerents and must be as strictly observed.

The Government of the United States, confident in the regard for international law and the rights of neutrals which the British and French Governments have so often proclaimed and the disregard of which they have urged so vigorously against their enemies in the present war, expects the present practice of the



© Ira A. Hill

© Underwood & Underwood

DESCRIPTION OF PICTURES ON REVERSE SIDE

Upper Left Hand Corner—Evangeline C. Booth, Commander of Salvation Army in United States and its Possessions, 1904—.

Upper Right Hand Corner—John R. Mott, General Secretary, International Committee and National War Work Council, Young Men's Christian Associations.

Center—Henry P. Davison, Chairman, War Council, American Red Cross, May 11, 1917—.

Lower Left Hand Corner—William J. Mulligan, Chairman, Overseas Committee, Knights of Columbus.

Lower Right Hand Corner—Colonel Harry Cutler, Chairman, War Activities, Jewish Welfare Board.

British and French authorities in the treatment of mails from or to the United States to cease, and belligerent rights, as exercised, to conform to the principle governing the passage of mail matter and to the recognized practice of nations. Only a radical charge in the present British and French policy, restoring to the United States its full rights as a neutral power, will satisfy this Government.

I have, &c.,

ROBERT LANSING.

Great Britain promised, in reply to the American protest, to take all possible measures to minimize the extent of inspection of mails and likewise to minimize the delay thereby caused.

Several other protests to England were caused by the action of English cruisers in taking sailors from American ships, and resulted in disavowal by England of such actions where they were manifestly illegal.

On January 27, 1916, Great Britain had published a "blacklist" of almost one hundred firms and business establishments located in this country, and forbade, under the English Trading with the Enemy Act, all subjects of England to indulge in trade relations with them. Against this action, the United States protested on July 26, 1916:

. . . . . The announcement that his Britannic Majesty's Government has placed the names of certain persons, firms, and corporations in the United States upon a proscriptive "blacklist" and has forbidden all financial or commercial dealings between them and citizens of Great Britain has been received with the most painful surprise by the people and Government of the United States, and seems to the Government of the United States to embody a policy of arbitrary interference with neutral trade against which it is its duty to protest in the most decided terms. . . . .

There are well-known remedies and penalties for breaches of blockade, where the blockade is real and in fact effective, for trade in contraband, for every unneutral act by whomsoever attempted. The Government of the United States cannot consent to see those remedies and penalties altered or extended at the will of a single power or group of powers to the injury of its own citizens or in derogation of its own rights. Conspicuous among the principles which the civilized nations of the world have accepted

for the safeguarding of the rights of neutrals is the just and honorable principle that neutrals may not be condemned nor their goods confiscated, except upon fair adjudication and after an opportunity to be heard in prize courts or elsewhere. Such safeguards the blacklist brushes aside. It condemns without hearing, without notice, and in advance. It is manifestly out of the question that the Government of the United States should acquiesce in such methods or applications of punishment to its citizens. . . . .

There is no purpose or inclination on the part of the Government of the United States to shield American citizens or business houses in any way from the legitimate consequences of unneutral acts or practices; it is quite willing that they should suffer the appropriate penalties which international law and the usage of nations have sanctioned; but his Britannic Majesty's Government cannot expect the Government of the United States to consent to see its citizens put upon an ex parte blacklist without calling the attention of his Majesty's Government, in the gravest terms, to the many serious consequences to neutral right and neutral relations which such an act must necessarily involve. It hopes and believes that his Majesty's Government, in its natural absorption in a single pressing object of policy, has acted without a full realization of the many undesired and undesirable results that might ensue.

POLK, Acting Secretary of State.

On October 10, 1916, and again on October 12, 1916, England replied to the American protests against England's blacklisting procedure and interference with American mails. England went into great detail to prove that her actions were well within the sanction of international law and that the American protests were not well taken. The more serious nature of the relations between the United States and Germany was throwing these disputes between the United States and England into the background, and the replies to the various protests and answers to protests were greatly delayed.

Diplomatic Negotiations of the United States with Germany and Austria

The Great War was primarily a struggle of material resources and business efficiency. After the first rush of the invading German armies had been halted, and the German forces had entrenched themselves in northern France and Belgium, the personal conflicts between the various armies were of far less significance in determining the results of engagements than the artillery combats. Only in the air did the personal prowess of individuals make itself effective. The very presence of airplanes served in most cases to inform the belligerents of the intentions of the enemy—skilful manoeuvres and secret manipulation of large armies to gain the victory were impossible. The number of guns; the supply of shells and of small-arms, with small-arms ammunition; the strength of the air squadrons; the number of gas bombs and hand grenades; the extent of the submarine fleets; and especially the quantity and quality of the food, these were the decisive factors in the final result of the most devastating war known to modern times.

Shipments of Munitions

Each belligerent, therefore, was compelled to give as much attention to the organization of industry at home as to the organization of the armies on the land and of the navies on the seas. Soon each belligerent was developing its industrial resources to their utmost. The next step was then inevitable—the belligerents turned to the few remaining neutral countries for additional supplies and equipment. And the United States was soon to be the only neutral with material resources vast enough to be of great assistance.

The rules of war and the regulations of international law permitted neutrals to furnish munitions of war to belligerents without affecting their status as neutrals. According to all accepted interpretation, the

United States had a legal right to supply all belligerent nations who came to buy of the United States. Indeed, as President Wilson was later to point out to the Central Powers, if international law had forbidden neutrals to furnish munitions to belligerents, each country would have relied entirely upon its own preparations of armament for war; and the burdens of armament in times of peace would have sat even more heavily upon the people of Europe than they sat in the decade preceding the murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand at Sarajevo.

But the Central Powers, unfortunately for them, were so situated as to be almost completely unable to utilize the resources of neutrals. While England held undisputed sway of the sea, the Central Powers were unable to avail themselves of the resources of the United States. They were separated by the territory of Entente Powers from Spain. For a period, supplies might be obtained from Italy, but before the war was a year old, Italy threw in her lot with the Entente. The neutral countries contiguous to Germany were Holland, Switzerland and Denmark, but few supplies could be obtained directly from these small and poor countries. This neutral trio was largely dependent upon supplies from Entente Powers for necessities such as fats, and the Entente Powers soon evinced determination not to supply neutrals which were rendering supplies to their enemies. In addition, Switzerland had been financially hard hit by the absence of the tourist trade, and the incursion of refugees from Belgium helped to absorb the resources of Holland. Greece was also not prolific of supplies helpful for war purposes, and the resources of the enemy countries occupied by the Central Powers—Belgium, Servia, Montenegro and Roumania—were eclipsed practically to the point of disappearance by the resources of the United States.

Naturally, the first effect of the war had been destructive of American prosperity. Trade with abroad almost ceased; supplies from abroad were not forthcoming; the revenue from customs dwindled and had to be replaced by higher internal revenue taxes. But after some months, America began to pour forth her riches and to ship the products of her factories to the Entente Allies, and an unprecedented era of industrial activity and of prosperity was ushered in.

But Germany was in no mood to recognize America's legal right to sell supplies to the only group of belligerents able to procure them, the Entente Allies. The inexorable food blockade around Germany soon impressed itself more and more firmly upon living conditions in Germany. As long as Germany persisted in prosecuting war, that long was she compelled to divert food to her soldiers and sailors first and to her civilian population secondly. Shortage of food was taking heavy toll of disease and death in Germany, and before the signing of the armistice in November, 1918, was to inflict awful punishment upon the civil population of Germany. Indeed, it is estimated that during the war between 300,000 and 700,000 persons in Germany died directly or indirectly as a result of malnutrition and weakness; and naturally the deaths were chiefly among the very young, the very old and the infirm.

To this condition, Germany reacted with an unreasoning and blatant hatred of the United States which became apparent before the first year of war had elapsed. Germany persisted in conceiving America as unneutral, and threats of revenge against America were published openly in the German press. So that in addition to the inevitable bias against the cause of Germany in most American minds as a result of the violation of Belgian neutrality and of the atrocities committed in Belgium, American feeling was aroused against Germany by the very fact that German feeling was aroused against America. It was impossible not to regard with hostile eyes a nation which was regarding us with hostile eyes.

On April 4, 1915, Ambassador von Bernstorff officially protested to the Government of the United States against the shipment of munitions of war to the enemies of Germany. As in most of the diplomatic notes from Germany to the United States in the period from August 1, 1914, to April 6, 1917, Germany defended her attitude largely by attacking the attitude of England. The present protest complained bitterly of the violation of international law by England, and of the fact that the United States was not taking what seemed to the German point of view a sufficiently strong position against such violations. Germany maintained that the conditions in the present war were

unique, in that it was manifestly impossible for Germany to obtain munitions in the United States; so that the willingness of the United States to sell to all buyers was a willingness existing in theory rather than in reality. The German conclusion was that the shipment of munitions to the Entente was therefore in essence, if not in law, an unneutral act, and should be ended by the United States.

In the reply of the United States to this protest, published on April 22, 1915, the position was taken which the United States was likewise to take in all the diplomatic correspondence with Germany from August 1, 1914, to April 6, 1917—namely, that Germany had no authority to discuss the relations of the United States with England, but that the relationship of Germany and the United States must be discussed on its own merits. President Wilson pointed out that it would be unfair, indeed, essentially unneutral, arbitrarily to change the rulings of international law while a war was actually being fought.

> . . . . . Your Excellency's (i. e. Ambassador von Bernsdorff's) long experience in international affairs will have suggested to you that the relations of the two Governments (i. e. England and the United States) with one another cannot wisely be made a subject of discussion with a third Government, which cannot be fully informed as to the facts, and which cannot be fully cognizant of the reasons for the course pursued.
>
> This Government holds, as I believe your Excellency is aware and as it is constrained to hold in view of the present indisputable doctrines of accepted international law, that any change in its own laws of neutrality during the progress of a war, which would affect unequally the relations of the United States with the nations at war, would be an unjustifiable departure from the principle of strict neutrality, by which it has consistently sought to direct its actions, and I respectfully submit that none of the circumstances, urged in your Excellency's memorandum, alters the principle involved.
>
> The placing of an embargo on the trade in arms at the present time would constitute such a change and be a direct violation of the neutrality of the United States. It will, I feel assured, be clear to your Excellency that holding this view and considering itself in honor bound by it, it is out of the question for this Government to consider such a course.

The Central Powers sent their second protest against the shipment of munitions through Austria-Hungary. On August 1, 1915, the Austro-Hungarian Government lodged a formal protest with the United States, taking much the same ground on the shipment of munitions to the Entente Allies that had been taken in the German note.

The reply of the United States was published on August 15, 1915. It went into greater detail than the reply to the protest of Germany had gone, and elaborated upon the increase of militarism which would result if all countries were compelled to provide themselves with all the supplies required in time of war. Furthermore, President Wilson pointed out to Austria the fact that the military establishment of the United States had always been a small one in comparison with the huge military establishments of Europe, and that such action as that asked by Austria-Hungary would be a direct blow at the safety of America itself. The United States reminded Austria that throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries both Austria and Germany, while neutral, had sold munitions of war to belligerents. In the Boer War, where conditions were much the same regarding belligerents as in 1914, in the Crimean War, in the Turco-Italian War in 1911-12, and in the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913, belligerents had been able to replenish their military supplies from Austrian and German sources:

> . . . . . The Government of the United States has given careful consideration to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government in regard to the exportation of armies and ammunition from the United States to the countries at war with Austria-Hungary and Germany. The Government of the United States . . . . . is surprised to find the Imperial and Royal Government implying that the observance of the strict principles of the law under the conditions which have developed in the present war is insufficient, and asserting that this Government should go beyond the long-recognized rules governing such traffic by neutrals and adopt measures to "maintain an attitude of strict parity with respect to both belligerent parties."
>
> To this assertion of an obligation to change or modify the rules of international usage on account of special conditions, the Government of the United States cannot accede. The recognition of an obligation of this sort, unknown to the international practice of the past, would impose upon every neutral nation a duty

to sit in judgment on the progress of a war and to restrict its commercial intercourse with a belligerent whose naval successes prevented the neutral from trade with the enemy. . . . . On the novel principle that equalization is a neutral duty, neutral nations would be obligated to place an embargo on such articles because one of the belligerents could not obtain them through commercial intercourse.

But if this principle, so strongly urged by the Imperial and Royal Government, should be admitted to obtain by reason of the superiority of a belligerent at sea, ought it not to operate equally as to a belligerent superior on land? Applying this theory of equalization, a belligerent who lacks the necessary munitions to contend successfully on land ought to be permitted to purchase them from neutrals, while a belligerent with an abundance of war stores or with the power to produce them should be debarred from such traffic.

Manifestly the idea of strict neutrality now advanced by the Imperial and Royal Government, would involve a neutral nation in a mass of perplexities which would obscure the whole field of international obligation, produce economic confusion and deprive all commerce and industry of legitimate fields of enterprise, already heavily burdened by the unavoidable restriction of war. . . . .

But, in addition to the question of principle, there is a practical and substantial reason why the Government of the United States has from the foundation of the Republic to the present time advocated and practiced unrestricted trade in arms and military supplies. It has never been the policy of this country to maintain in in time of peace a large military establishment or stores of arms and ammunition sufficient to repel invasion by a well equipped and powerful enemy. It has desired to remain at peace with all nations and to avoid any appearance of menacing such peace by the threat of its armies and navies. In consequence of this standing policy the United States would, in the event of attack by a foreign power, be at the outset of the war seriously, if not fatally, embarrassed by the lack of arms and ammunition and by the means to produce them in sufficient quantities to supply the requirements of national defense. The United States has always depended upon the right and power to purchase arms and ammunition from neutral nations in case of foreign attack. This right, which it claims for itself, it cannot deny to others.

A nation whose principle and policy it is to rely upon inter-

national obligations and international justice to preserve its political and territorial integrity might become the prey of an aggressive nation whose policy and practice it is to increase its military strength during times of peace with the design of conquest, unless the nation attacked can, after war had been declared, go into the markets of the world and purchase the means to defend itself against the aggressor.

The general adoption by the nations of the world of the theory that neutral powers ought to prohibit the sale of arms and ammunition to belligerents would compel every nation to have in readiness at all times sufficient munitions of war to meet any emergency which might arise, and to erect and maintain establishments for the manufacture of arms and ammunition sufficient to supply the needs of its military and naval forces throughout the progress of a war. Manifestly the application of this theory would result in every nation becoming an armed camp, ready to resist aggression and tempted to employ force in asserting its rights rather than appeal to reason and justice for the settlement of international disputes.

Perceiving, as it does, that the adoption of the principle that it is the duty of a neutral to prohibit the sale of arms and ammunition to a belligerent during the progress of a war would inevitably give the advantage to the belligerent which had encouraged the manufacture of munitions in time of peace, and which had laid in vast stores of arms and ammunition in anticipation of war, the Government of the United States is convinced that the adoption of the theory would force militarism on the world and work against the universal peace which is the desire and purpose of all nations with one another. . . . .

The Government of the United States deems it unnecessary to extend further at the present time a consideration of the statement of the Austro-Hungarian Government. The principles of international law, the practice of nations, the national safety of the United States and other nations without great military and naval establishments, the prevention of increased armies and navies, the adoption of peaceful methods for the adjustment of international differences, and, finally, neutrality itself are opposed to the prohibition by a neutral nation of the exportation of arms, ammunition or other munitions of war to belligerent powers during the progress of the war. LANSING.

German Plots in the United States

Thwarted thus in open attempts to stop the shipment of munitions of war from the United States to the Entente, the Central Powers resorted to more indirect but also more underhanded methods. German agents in the United States encouraged strikes in factories producing munitions and planned delays in the transportation on land and sea of supplies to the Entente. German sympathizers were found to have attempted to procure fraudulent clearance papers, manifests and passports. Attempts were made to destroy the Welland Canal and bridges across the St. Lawrence. It must be admitted that direct evidence of the hand of the German government in planning these activities was usually lacking, but the indirect evidence was usually present, and was overwhelming. Indeed, on this account in 1915 the United States requested the recall of the German naval and military attachés to the German embassy in the United States, Captains Boy-Ed and von Papen, and with this request Germany was compelled to comply.

These and similar actions were not only in violation of the criminal laws of the United States—they were in violation of international law. In other words, they constituted unneutral actions on the part of Germany in so far as the German Government was responsible for them; and by the end of 1915, whatever popularity of Germany had existed in the United States was sadly on the wane.

In February, 1916, the German consul-general at San Francisco, Bopp, and some of his subordinates were indicted under the Anti-trust Law on charges of having planned to blow up tunnels and munition plants and to perform other criminal acts. The defendants were later found guilty and imprisoned.

Throughout 1916, other German subjects and sympathizers were arrested on similar serious charges. It was only natural, therefore, that much of the loss of life and property due to explosions and fires in munition plants should be charged to the account of Germany. Indeed, so strong was the feeling aroused in the United States by this program that, although the United States never felt that it had sufficient direct evidence to warrant definite complaint to the German Government, on May 18, 1916, Germany officially informed the United

States that it had issued orders to all German subjects in the United States to obey to the letter all the laws of the United States; and the criminal activities of German agents and propagandists in this country thereafter declined.

Nevertheless, legal efforts at German propaganda in this country continued uninterrupted. Like so much of German diplomacy, these efforts—such as attempts to buy pro-German editorials in newspapers and to deliver in political campaigns an alleged solid German-American vote—were palpably clumsy, and served only to react against their originators.

The highest official to be implicated in criminal and unneutral activities in the United States was the ambassador from Austria-Hungary, Dr. Theodore Dumba. A letter from him was intercepted by England and called to the attention of the United States, in which the Austrian ambassador suggested fomenting strikes among Austro-Hungarian workers in American munition plants. The United States immediately demanded the recall of Ambassador Dumba and on September 27, 1915, his Government agreed to the request.

The German Submarine Warfare

Had these remained the only issues in dispute between the United States and the Central Powers, however, the United States in all human probability would never had entered the Great War. The direct *casus belli* which was to result first in strained relations between the United States and Germany, secondly in the termination of diplomatic relations, and finally in an open declaration of war was the submarine warfare waged by the Imperial German Government.

The war which opened in the summer of 1914 was the first in which submarines were used on a scale large enough to affect the final result. There was accordingly no well-defined code of international law respecting the use of submarines, and it was therefore for the greater part necessary to define the legitimate activities of the undersea craft according to general principles of previous international understanding. The delicate and vulnerable nature of the submarine compelled it to act quickly and unexpectedly in the presence of armed craft. Its small

size restricted its personnel, so that it was seldom feasible for it to place a prize crew on captured merchantmen. It obviously could not conduct its captives to port over seas patrolled by submarine hunters and by other enemy warships. If vessels could not be sunk, there was no gain in submarine warfare; and unless a submarine could attack armed vessels without warning, there was every probability that armed vessels could not be sunk. But the rules of international law demanded that merchant vessels be not sunk until every precaution had been taken for the safety of the passengers and crew. International law sanctioned exceptions to this rule only if merchant vessels should attempt to escape.

Under these circumstances, there was grave fear in the United States at the outbreak of the War that Germany's submarine campaign would conflict with the rights of neutrals upon the high seas; and that fear seemed destined to justification early in 1915. On February 4, 1915, the Imperial German Government, in revenge for the British blockade of Germany, declared that after two weeks every merchant vessel belonging to the enemy would be sunk irrespective of measures for the safety of the passengers and crew, and that even neutral vessels entering what Germany declared to be a "war zone" around the British Isles would be in danger because of England's use of neutral flags.

The United States was alert to the perils inherent in the intention of the German Government, and on February 10, 1915, dispatched a friendly but firm note to Germany calling attention to the violation of international law implied in Germany's intentions, to the danger that American lives might thereby be placed in jeopardy and American rights transgressed, and to the purpose of the United States to hold Germany to "strict accountability" for its actions.

> . . . . . The Government of the United States, having had its attention directed to the proclamation of the German Admiralty, issued on the 4th of February, ... feels it to be its duty to call the attention of the Imperial German Government, with sincere respect and the most friendly sentiments, but very candidly and earnestly, to the very serious possibilities

of the course of action apparently contemplated under that proclamation.

The Government of the United States views those possibilities with such grave concern that it feels it to be its privilege, and, indeed, its duty, in the circumstances to request the Imperial German Government to consider before action is taken, the critical situation in respect of the relation between this country and Germany which might arise were the German naval forces, in carrying out the policy foreshadowed in the Admiralty's proclamation, to destroy any merchant vessel of the United States or cause the death of American citizens. . . . .

This Government . . . . . takes this occasion to remind the Imperial German Government very respectfully that the Government of the United States is open to none of the criticisms for unneutral action to which the German Government believes the Governments of certain other neutral nations have laid themselves open; that the Government of the United States has not consented to or acquiesced in any measures which may have been taken by the other belligerent nations in the present war which operate to restrain neutral trade, but has, on the contrary, taken, in all such matters, a position which warrants it in holding those Governments responsible in the proper way for any untoward effects on American shipping which the accepted principles of international law do not justify; and that it, therefore, regards itself as free in the present instance to take with a clear conscience and upon accepted principles the position indicated in this note.

If the commanders of German vessels of war should act upon the presumption that the flag of the United States was not being used in good faith and should destroy on the high seas an American vessel or the lives of American citizens, it would be difficult for the Government of the United States to view the act in any other light than as an indefensible violation of neutral rights, which it would be very hard, indeed, to reconcile with the friendly relations now happily subsisting between the two Governments.

If such a deplorable situation should arise, the Imperial German Government can readily appreciate that the Government of the United States would be constrained to hold the Imperial Government of Germany to a strict accountability for such acts of their naval authorities, and to take any steps it might be necessary to take to safeguard American lives and property and to secure to American citizens the full enjoyment of their acknowledged rights on the high seas. . . . .

Germany replied with a note published on February 18, 1915, which attempted to justify Germany's position by the illegal actions of England in preventing the transportation from neutrals to Germany of materials not comprised in the category of contraband of war. Germany also called attention to the "necessity" on her part of preventing in any way possible to Germany great stores of ammunition from reaching England. Germany suggested that if vessels of the United States should be placed in danger because of England's use of neutral flags over English vessels, United States vessels should proceed under the guard of a convoy.

With this disagreement between the United States and Germany, and with similar, but less serious disputes between the United States and England, President Wilson proceeded to dispatch an identic note to Germany and England suggesting a *modus vivendi* on the conduct of naval warfare. Mr. Wilson endeavored to formulate certain rules for the guidance of both Germany and England, which would accordingly lay the United States open to no charge of favoritism from either country. The proposals of the United States in this identic note might be summarized as follows:

1—Both Germany and England to use no floating mines.

2—Both Germany and England to use anchored mines only around harbors, and so constructed as to become harmless if loosed from anchorage.

3—Both Germany and England to refrain from attacking neutral vessels by submarines, unless the neutral vessels tried to escape search.

4—Both Germany and England to refrain from using over their vessels the flags of neutrals.

5—England not to place foodstuffs in the list of absolute contraband, and not to interfere with foodstuffs sent by the United States to certain designated agencies in Germany, Germany to guarantee that such foodstuffs would be used only by non-combatants.

But the proposals of this identic note met with little favor in either Germany or England. Neither would agree to all its provisions, so that it could be regarded only as failing to reconcile the positions of England and Germany with the position of the United States.

Accordingly, no further step could be taken by the United States

until a definite act of Germany in accord with its pronouncement of February 4, 1915 should give an opportunity for the United States to clarify the meaning of the phrase "strict accountability."

On March 28, 1915, the British steamship *Falaba* was sunk, with the loss of one American life. Germany claimed that the vessel had tried to escape after being halted, and that the passengers and crew had had ten minutes in which to lower life-boats before the vessel was torpedoed.

On April 29, 1915, the United States vessel *Cushing* was attacked in the English Channel by an airplane.

On May 1, 1915, the United States vessel *Gulflight* was attacked by a submarine off the Scilly Islands, with the loss of two American lives.

The "Lusitania" Case

But before the United States had formally stated its attitude toward these actions of Germany, the entire civilized world was stirred to the foundations of its consciousness by the sinking of the *Lusitania*. The *Lusitania* was one of the very largest ocean liners and probably the fastest in existence. With a length of almost 800 feet and a displacement of almost 40,000 tons, she was famous as the highest development of the art of shipbuilding. She sailed from New York on May 3, with 1,917 passengers. Several days before, advertisements, signed "Imperial German Embassy," had appeared in newspapers of New York and other cities, giving public warning that the vessel was in danger because of the existing state of war and that passengers on the boat were risking their lives. Moreover, some of the prominent persons on board seem to have received anonymous advice to cancel their bookings; but, as far as is known, neither the advertisements nor the anonymous warnings were taken seriously by any one whose attention had been drawn to them. And at about half after two on the afternoon of May 7, 1915, while approaching the Irish coast, the *Lusitania* was struck by a torpedo and sank less than fifteen minutes afterward. Of the passenger and crew list of almost 2,000, the loss of life was 1,152. Of the dead, 114 were American citizens.

The loss of the *Lusitania* brought the United States for the first

time face to face with possible entrance into the struggle in Europe. It was inconceivable that this country should respond with mere formal protest to the loss of more than one hundred of its citizens traveling on a merchant vessel. It was even more inconceivable that this country should permit similar occurrences in the future. The continued threat of German lawlessness brought very near to the practical vision of America a day when only by force of sheer might would Germany be brought to terms. With breathless interest, not only the United States but the whole world awaited the action of Woodrow Wilson on the dead of the *Lusitania*.

Only a minority, if a noisy minority, of the Americans of German descent disapproved of America's sober resentment at the sinking of the *Lusitania*. That the majority of German-Americans were loyal to the country of their adoption was in harmony with the utterances of President Wilson condemning the supporters of Germany as against the United States but asserting confidently that such persons were not representative of the entire German-American group.

> . . . . . I look forward to the necessity in every political agitation in the years which are immediately at hand of calling upon every man to declare himself, where he stands. Is it "America First" or is it not? We ought to be very careful about some of the impressions that we are forming just now. There is too general an impression, I fear, that very large numbers of our fellow-citizens born in other lands have not entertained with sufficient intensity and affection the American ideal, but their numbers are not large. Those who would seek to represent them are very vocal, but they are not very influential. Some of the best stuff of America has come out of foreign lands, and some of the best stuff in America is in the men who are naturalized citizens of the United States.
>
> I would not be afraid upon the test of America First to take a census of all the foreign-born citizens of the United States, for I know the vast majority of them came here because they believed in America, and their belief in America has made them better citizens than some people who were born in America. They can say that they have bought this privilege with a great price. They have left their homes, they have left their kindred, they have broken all the nearest and dearest ties of human life in order



FOOD FOR THE GUNS

The upper panel shows cases of ammunition being stacked at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

CARRIER PIGEONS

The central panel gives an excellent idea of the combination of modern and ancient ideas utilized during the war. American officers are watching the flight of homing pigeons, just released with messages of great importance, as in the days before the advent of the telephone and telegraph.

THE BEGINNINGS OF A CAMP

In the lower panel, American engineers are shown beginning the construction of a camp "somewhere in France."

to come to a new land, take a new rootage, begin a new life, and so by self-sacrifice express their confidence in a new principle, whereas, it costs us nothing of these things. We were born into this privilege; we were rocked and cradled in it; we did nothing to create it, and it is, therefore, the greater duty on our part to do a great deal to enhance it and preserve it. I am not deceived as to the balance of opinion among the foreign-born citizens of the United States, but I am in a hurry to have an opportunity to have a line-up and let the men who are thinking first of other countries stand on one side—Biblically, it should be the left—and all those that are for America, first, last and all the time on the other side. . . . .

[*Address to Daughters of the American Revolution, Washington, D. C., October 11, 1915.*]

. . . . . I am sorry to say that the gravest threats against our national peace and safety have been uttered within our own borders. There are citizens of the United States, I blush to admit, born under other flags but welcomed under our generous naturalization laws to the full freedom and opportunity of America, who have poured the poison of disloyalty into the very arteries of our national life; who have sought to bring the authority and good name of our Government into contempt, to destroy our industries wherever they thought it effective for their vindictive purposes to strike at them, and to debase our politics to the uses of foreign intrigue. Their number is not great as compared with the whole number of those sturdy hosts by which our nation has been enriched in recent generations out of virile foreign stock; but it is great enough to have brought deep disgrace upon us and to have made it necessary that we should promptly make use of processes of law by which we may be purged of their corrupt distempers. America never witnessed anything like this before. It never dreamed it possible that men sworn into its own citizenship, men drawn out of great free stocks such as supplied some of the best and strongest elements of that little, but how heroic, nation that in a high day of old staked its very life to free itself from every entanglement that had darkened the fortunes of the older nations and set up a new standard here,—that men of such origins and such free choices of allegiance would ever turn in malign reaction against the Government and people who had welcomed and nurtured them and seek to make this proud country once more a hotbed of European passion. A little while ago

such a thing would have seemed incredible. Because it was incredible we made no preparation for it. We would have been almost ashamed to prepare for it, as if we were suspicious of ourselves, our own comrades and neighbors! But the ugly and incredible thing has actually come about and we are without adequate federal laws to deal with it. I urge you to enact such laws at the earliest possible moment and feel that in doing so I am urging you to do nothing less than save the honor and self-respect of the nation. Such creatures of passion, disloyalty, and anarchy must be crushed out. They are not many, but they are infinitely malignant, and the hand of our power should close over them at once. They have formed plots to destroy property, they have entered into conspiracies against the neutrality of the Government, they have sought to pry into every confidential transaction of the Government in order to serve interests alien to our own. It is possible to deal with these things very effectually. I need not suggest the terms in which they may be dealt with.

I wish that it could be said that only a few men, misled by mistaken sentiments of allegiance to the governments under which they were born, had been guilty of disturbing the self-possession and mispresenting the temper and principles of the country during these days of terrible war, when it would seem that every man who was truly an American would instinctively make it his duty and his pride to keep the scales of judgment even and prove himself a partisan of no nation but his own. But it cannot. There are some men among us, and many resident abroad who, though born and bred in the United States and calling themselves Americans, have so forgotten themselves and their honor as citizens as to put their passionate sympathy with one or the other side in the great European conflict above their regard for the peace and dignity of the United States. They also preach and practise disloyalty. No laws, I suppose, can reach corruptions of the mind and heart; but I should not speak of others without also speaking of these and expressing the even deeper humiliation and scorn which every self-possessed and thoughtfully patriotic American must feel when he thinks of them and of the discredit they are daily bringing upon us. . . . .

[*Third Annual Address, December 7, 1915.*]

The tension in America was felt even by the Imperial German Government, and it hastened to take the first diplomatic action on the *Lusitania* case. On May 10, 1915, Germany officially expressed its

regrets at the loss of American lives, but still persisted in excusing its performance by the example of England. Calling attention to the alleged cruelty of the English food blockade, Germany asserted that English merchant vessels were often armed, so that they could be safely attacked by submarines only without warning. Germany closed her exhibit by a flat assertion that the *Lusitania* had been transporting ammunition, which Germany had declared to be warrant for sinking any merchant vessel.

And on the following day, also, Germany seemed anxious to allay some of the bitterness caused in the United States by the attack on the *Lusitania*. On May 11, 1915, Germany published a notice explaining in more definite terms than theretofore the German attitude toward neutral ships in the waters around the British Isles, which Germany had proclaimed a war zone. Germany agreed not to attack unarmed neutral ships if they committed no hostile act against German submarines; and to accept full responsibility for any neutral ships sunk by mistake or otherwise sunk in violation of this agreement. Germany's attitude was thus made not only more definite—it was thus rendered more conciliatory, and it retracted some of Germany's former statements of her intentions toward neutral craft.

On May 13, 1915, the official American response to the sinking of the *Lusitania* was given to the world. Mr. Wilson was now no longer oblivious to the nearness of the war-cloud to America. He still realized the gravity and the horror of war, and his note was replete with a spirit of gravity at the crisis Germany had forced upon America and with a spirit of horror at Germany's deed. Never abandoning his tone of calm friendliness toward Germany, refusing to admit that Germany's spirit was other than friendly toward America, but again insisting that Germany's attitude was placing her outside the pale of international relations, the United States frankly asserted that the actions of Germany had rendered necessary without further delay a definite understanding between the two countries. The United States demanded a disavowal of the sinking of the *Lusitania*. It demanded assurance that another such act would not be perpetrated. It demanded a recognition by Germany of the determination of the United States

not "to omit any word or any act necessary to the performance of the sacred duty of the United States of maintaining its rights."

> . . . . . In view of recent acts of the German authorities in violation of American rights on the high seas, which culminated in the torpedoing and sinking of the British steamship *Lusitania* on May 7, 1915, by which over 100 American citizens lost their lives, it is clearly wise and desirable that the Government of the United States and the Imperial German Government should come to a clear and full understanding as to the grave situation which has resulted. . . . .
>
> The Government of the United States has been apprised that the Imperial German Government considered themselves to be obliged by the extraordinary circumstances of the present war and the measures adopted by their adversaries in seeking to cut Germany off from all commerce, to adopt methods of retaliation which go much beyond the ordinary methods of warfare at sea, in the proclamation of a war zone from which they have warned neutral ships to keep away. This Government has already taken occasion to inform the Imperial German Government that it cannot admit the adoption of such measures or such a warning of danger to operate as in any degree an abbreviation of the rights of American shipmasters or of American citizens bound on lawful errands as passengers on merchant ships of belligerent nationality, and that it must hold the Imperial German Government to a strict accountability for any infringement of those rights, intentional or incidental. . . . .
>
> American citizens act within their indisputable rights in taking their ships and in traveling wherever their legitimate business calls them upon the high seas, and exercise those rights in what should be the well-justified confidence that their lives will not be endangered by acts done in clear violation of universally acknowledged international obligations, and certainly in the confidence that their own Government will sustain them in the exercise of their rights.
>
> There was recently published in the newspapers of the United States, I regret to inform the Imperial German Government, a formal warning, purporting to come from the Imperial German Embassy at Washington, addressed to the people of the United States, and stating, in effect, that any citizen of the United States who exercised his right of free travel upon the seas would do so at his peril if his journey should take him within the zone of

waters within which the Imperial German Navy was using submarines against the commerce of Great Britain and France, notwithstanding the respectful but very earnest protest of this Government, the Government of the United States. I do not refer to this for the purpose of calling the attention of the Imperial German Government at this time to the surprising irregularity of a communication from the Imperial German Embassy at Washington addressed to the people of the United States through the newspapers, but only for the purpose of pointing out that no warning that an unlawful and inhumane act will be committed can possibly be accepted as an excuse or palliation for that act or as an abatement of the responsibility for its commission. . . . .

(The United States) confidently expects, therefore, that the Imperial German Government will disavow the acts of which the Government of the United States complains; that they will make reparation so far as reparation is possible for injuries which are without measure, and that they will take immediate steps to prevent the recurrence of anything so obviously subversive of the principles of warfare for which the Imperial German Government have in the past so wisely and so firmly contended. . . . .

Expressions of regret and offers of reparation in case of the destruction of neutral ships sunk by mistake, while they may satisfy international obligations, if no loss of life results, cannot justify or excuse a practice the natural and necessary effect of which is to subject neutral nations and neutral persons to new and immeasurable risks.

The Imperial German Government will not expect the Government of the United States to omit any word or any act necessary to the performance of its sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the United States and its citizens and of safeguarding their free exercise and enjoyment.

BRYAN.

The President's note seemed to echo the feelings of most of his fellow-countrymen, and this country awaited with grim patience the disavowal demanded from Germany. In the meantime, England denied the German charge that the *Lusitania* had been armed.

The response of Germany was published on May 28, 1915. With respect to the *Cushing* and the *Gulflight,* Germany promised to investi-

gate. With respect to the *Falaba,* Germany asserted that the vessel had tried to escape capture.

With respect to the *Lusitania,* Germany was far from repentant. She repeated her denunciation of England, asserting again that England's illegal actions compelled Germany to resort to illegal actions. She repeated her charges that the *Lusitania* had been armed, had been carrying great stores of ammunition, had sunk so rapidly with so large a loss of life because of the explosion of ammunition, had been in fact a transport because it was carrying Canadian troops. Germany therefore begged to be excused from taking a definite position in regard to the American note until the Government of the United States had passed upon these charges of Germany.

The German note was manifestly an attempt to evade the issue presented by the sinking of the *Lusitania* and did not serve to relax the tension in the United States. It was known that the President immediately prepared to draft another note to Germany on the subject, and speculation was rife as to whether the second note would be more threatening than the first had been, when Mr. Bryan unexpectedly announced his resignation as Secretary of State because of irreconcilable difference of opinion with his chief over the negotiations with Germany.

The Resignation of Mr. Bryan—Without the support of William Jennings Bryan, Woodrow Wilson could hardly have received the Democratic nomination for the Presidency at the Baltimore convention in 1912. Although discredited in many quarters by his former advocacy of "free silver;" by his three defeats in the Presidential contests of 1896, 1900 and 1908; by his championing of such radical measures as government ownership of the railroads and as the initiative, referendum and recall; by his early support of prohibition and of woman suffrage; and by his uncompromising personality, Mr. Bryan still enjoyed a strong hold upon much of the population of the Middle West and the South. His political strength had made inevitable his appointment as Secretary of State in Mr. Wilson's Cabinet and his presence in the Cabinet had made possible many of his chief's legislative accomplishments.

Mr. Bryan had been known throughout his life as an unusually

trenchant opponent of war between nations. His term of office at the head of the State Department had been characterized by the signing of a number of treaties of arbitration with other countries, and by success in creating stronger international understandings and ties. And in this crisis, again, he felt he could conscientiously support no other course than that of arbitration. He maintained that the points at issue between the United States and Germany should be settled by an impartial tribunal, and that the United States should refuse to hold itself responsible for the lives of any of its citizens who traveled on belligerent vessels or on vessels carrying ammunition. Disagreeing fundamentally, therefore, with the President's stand in defence of American rights at all hazard, there was no course left for Mr. Bryan but resignation. He was succeeded by the man who had served under him as Counselor to the State Department, Robert Lansing.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *June 8, 1915.*

My dear Mr. President:

It is with sincere regret that I have reached the conclusion that I should return to you the commission of Secretary of State, with which you honored me at the beginning of your Administration.

Obedient to your sense of duty and actuated by the highest motives, you have prepared for transmission to the German Government a note in which I cannot join without violating what I deem to be an obligation to my country, and the issue involved is of such moment that to remain a member of the Cabinet would be as unfair to you as it would be to the cause which is nearest my heart, namely, the prevention of war.

I, therefore, respectfully tender my resignation, to take effect when the note is sent, unless you prefer an earlier hour.

Alike desirous of reaching a peaceful solution of the problems, arising out of the use of submarines against merchantmen, we find ourselves differing irreconcilably as to the methods which should be employed.

It falls to your lot to speak officially for the nation; I consider it to be none the less my duty to endeavor as a private citizen to promote the end which you have in view by means which you do not feel at liberty to use.

In severing the intimate and pleasant relations, which have existed between us during the past two years, permit me to acknowledge the profound satisfaction which it has given me to

be associated with you in the important work which has come before the State Department, and to thank you for the courtesies extended.

With the heartiest good wishes for your personal welfare and for the success of your Administration, I am, my dear Mr. President,

Very truly yours,

W. J. BRYAN.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *June 8, 1915.*

My dear Mr. Bryan:

I accept your resignation only because you insist upon its acceptance; and I accept it with much more than deep regret, with a feeling of personal sorrow.

Our two years of close association have been very delightful to me. Our judgments have accorded in practically every matter of official duty and of public policy until now; your support of the work and purposes of the Administration has been generous and loyal beyond praise, your devotion to the duties of your great office and your eagerness to take advantage of every great opportunity for service it offered have been an example to the rest of us; you have earned our affectionate admiration and friendship. Even now we are not separated in the object we seek, but only in the method by which we seek it.

It is for these reasons my feeling about your retirement from the Secretaryship of State goes so much deeper than regret. I sincerely deplore it.

Our objects are the same and we ought to pursue them together. I yield to your desire only because I must and wish to bid you Godspeed in the parting. We shall continue to work for the same causes even when we do not work in the same way.

With affectionate regard,

Sincerely yours,

WOODROW WILSON.

Mr. Bryan's resignation in a crisis stirred up much feeling of an unfavorable nature throughout a country aroused by the sinking of the *Lusitania,* as did a reported conversation between Mr. Bryan, while still Secretary of State, and Ambassador Dumba, in which the former was said to have informed the representative of Austria that the firmness of the stand of the United States should not be overestimated. In

that connection, the following letter from the President to Mr. Bryan months later will be of interest:

> THE WHITE HOUSE, *December 17, 1917.*
>
> MY DEAR MR. BRYAN: My attention has been called to a book in which the author states, by very clear implication, that I demanded your resignation as Secretary of State because of language used by you in an interview with Ambassador Dumba soon after the first Lusitania note. You may quote me as saying that I did not ask for your resignation or desire it, as anyone can learn from my note accepting your resignation. And this statement ought also to be a sufficient answer to the criticism of you based upon the Dumba interview, for I could not make it if I thought you responsible for the misinterpretation placed upon that interview in Berlin. But knowing at the time all the facts, I did not give the matter serious thought and, I may add, in justice to you, that as you promptly corrected the misinterpretation when, within a few days, it was brought to your attention, it could not have affected the diplomatic situation.
>
> Cordially and sincerely yours,
>
> WOODROW WILSON.

On June 4, 1915, while waiting for another American note in regard to the *Lusitania,* Germany disavowed the sinking of the *Gulflight* and asked for further information concerning the *Cushing.*

On June 9, 1915, the United States dispatched the second note to Germany on the *Lusitania* case. The United States dismissed the German contentions in the answer to the first note as irrelevant, and firmly repeated its serious representations. With respect to the *Falaba,* the United States refused to admit that disregard for the safety of its crew and passengers could be justified by its attempt to escape capture.

> . . . . . It is stated (by Germany) that the *Lusitania* was undoubtedly equipped with masked guns, supplied with trained gunners and special ammunition, transporting troops from Canada, carrying a cargo not permitted under the laws of the United States to a vessel also carrying passengers, and serving, in virtual effect, as an auxiliary to the naval forces of Great Britain. . . . .
>
> (The Government of the United States) is able . . . . . to assure the Imperial German Government that it has been misinformed. . . . .

Whatever may be the contentions of the Imperial German Government regarding the carriage of contraband of war on board the *Lusitania*, or regarding the explosion of that material by the torpedo, it need only be said that in the view of this Government these contentions are irrelevant to the question of the legality of the methods used by the German naval authorities in sinking the vessel.

But the sinking of passenger ships involves principles of humanity which throw into the background any special circumstances of detail that may be thought to affect the cases; principles which lift it, as the Imperial German Government will no doubt be quick to recognize and acknowledge, out of the class of ordinary subjects of diplomatic discussion or of international controversy. Whatever be the other facts regarding the *Lusitania*, the principal fact is that a great steamer, primarily and chiefly a conveyance for passengers, and carrying more than a thousand souls who had no part or lot in the conduct of the war, was torpedoed and sunk without so much as a challenge or a warning, and that men, women, and children were sent to their death in circumstances unparalleled in modern warfare. The fact that more than 100 American citizens were among those who perished made it the duty of the Government of the United States to speak of these things, and once more, with solemn emphasis, to call the attention of the Imperial German Government to the grave responsibility which the Government of the United States conceives that it has incurred in this tragic occurrence, and to the indisputable principle upon which that responsibility rests.

The Government of the United States is contending for something much greater than mere rights of property or privileges of commerce. It is contending for nothing less high and sacred than the rights of humanity, which every Government honors itself in respecting, and which no Government is justified in resigning on behalf of those under its care and authority. . . . .

The Government of the United States, therefore, very earnestly and very solemnly renews the representations of its note transmitted to the Imperial German Government on the 15th of May, and relies in these representations upon the principles of humanity, the universally recognized understandings of international law, and the ancient friendship of the German nation.

The Government of the United States cannot admit that the proclamation of a war zone from which neutral ships have been

warned to keep away may be made to operate as in any degree an abbreviation of the rights either of American shipmasters or of American citizens bound on lawful errands as passengers on merchant ships of belligerent nationality. It does not understand the Imperial German Government to question those rights. It understands it also to accept as established beyond question the principle that the lives of non-combatants cannot lawfully or rightfully be put in jeopardy by the capture or destruction of an unresisting merchantman, and to recognize the obligation to take sufficient precaution to ascertain whether a suspected merchantman is in fact of belligerent nationality or is in fact carrying contraband of war under a neutral flag. The Government of the United States deems it reasonable to expect that the Imperial German Government will adopt the measures necessary to put these principles into practice in respect of the safeguarding of American lives and American ships, and asks for assurances that this will be done.

ROBERT LANSING,
Secretary of State ad Interim.

To the American note of June 9, Germany replied on July 8, 1915, still shielding herself behind the actions of England and still withholding disavowal.

In the third note on the *Lusitania* on July 23, 1915, the United States again stated that Germany was attempting to evade an issue upon which the United States demanded a clear understanding. The argument of the United States was reiterated, and Germany was plainly informed that the United States would not be appeased until its case had been settled by deeds instead of by words.

The note of the Imperial German Government dated the 8th of July, 1915, has received the careful consideration of the Government of the United States, and it regrets to be obliged to say that it has found it very unsatisfactory, because it fails to meet the real differences between the two Governments, and indicates no way in which the accepted principles of law and humanity may be applied in the grave matter in controversy, but proposes, on the contrary, arrangements for a partial suspension of those principles which virtually set them aside. . . . .

The Government of the United States is . . . . . keenly disappointed to find that the Imperial German Government re-

gards itself as in large degree exempt from the obligation to observe these principles, even where neutral vessels are concerned, by what it believes the policy and practice of the Government of Great Britain to be in the present war with regard to neutral commerce. The Imperial German Government will readily understand that the Government of the United States cannot discuss the policy of the Government of Great Britain with regard to neutral trade except with that Government itself, and that it must regard the conduct of other belligerent Governments as irrelevant to any discussion with the Imperial German Government of what this Government regards as grave and unjustifiable violations of the rights of American citizens by German naval commanders. . . . .

The Government of the United States is not unmindful of the extraordinary conditions created by this war or of the radical alterations of circumstance and method of attack produced by the use of instrumentalities of naval warfare which the nations of the world cannot have had in view when the existing rules of international law were formulated, and it is ready to make every reasonable allowance for these novel and unexpected aspects of war at sea; but it cannot consent to abate any essential or fundamental right of its people because of a mere alteration of circumstance. The rights of neutrals in time of war are based upon principle, not upon expediency, and the principles are immutable. It is the duty and obligation of belligerents to find a way to adapt the new circumstances to them. . . . .

The very value which this Government sets upon the long and unbroken friendship between the people and Government of the United States and the people and Government of the German nation impels it to press very solemnly upon the Imperial German Government the necessity for a scrupulous observance of neutral rights in this critical matter. Friendship itself prompts it to say to the Imperial Government that repetition by the commanders of German naval vessels of acts in contravention of those rights must be regarded by the Government of the United States, when they affect American citizens, as deliberately unfriendly.

LANSING.

Nevertheless, in the controversy caused by the sinking of the *Lusitania,* Germany still attempted to appease this country by indirect concessions, rather than by direct disavowal. In September, she

promised not to sink any more merchant vessels, neutral or belligerent, without warning. In the same month, Germany agreed not to sink American merchant vessels carrying conditional contraband, although reserving her right to sink those carrying absolute contraband. In the case of the sinking of the *William P. Frye,* Germany agreed to pay damages; and in the case of the *Nebraskan,* Germany expressed regrets. In November, Ambassador von Bernstorff was authorized to speak for his government in the *Lusitania* case in any manner which he found desirable. But while the *Lusitania* case was still the subject of negotiations, another crisis had arisen in the sinking of the British liner *Arabic,* on September 4, 1915, with the loss of two American lives.

The "Arabic" Case

The sinking of the *Arabic* brought the relations between the United States and Germany all the closer to a rupture because of the fact that by this time the German Government had still refused to meet squarely the issues raised by the United States in the case of the *Lusitania.* Germany maintained that the *Arabic* had altered its course when approaching a submarine so that the commander of the latter believed that the liner was attempting to ram him. Nevertheless, Germany refused to admit liability for the sinking of the *Arabic* even if the intentions of the vessel had been misunderstood by the commander of the submarine which torpedoed it.

President Wilson was unqualifiedly dissatisfied by the German attitude, and informed Ambassador von Bernstorff, who handled the situation for the German Government, that the United States would be satisfied with nothing less than complete disavowal of the sinking of the *Arabic* and the payment of indemnity for the loss of American lives. Happily, to these demands Germany yielded on October 5, 1915; and also promised through her ambassador that instructions would be given submarine commanders to refrain from further attacks upon vessels under circumstances like those which had surrounded the sinking of the *Arabic.*

The "Ancona" Case

On November 7, 1915, the Italian steamer *Ancona* was sunk by an Austrian submarine in the Mediterranean, with the loss of nine American lives. The *Ancona* had at first attempted to escape but had stopped when it was apparent that escape was impossible and had been fired upon even after it had stopped. In a note to the Austro-Hungarian Government on December 6, 1915, the United States assumed a no less determined position than it had assumed with Germany—demanding that Austria should punish the commander of the submarine for his act, disavow it, and pay indemnity for its consequences.

> The Austro-Hungarian Government has been advised, through the correspondence which has passed between the United States and Germany, of the attitude of the Government of the United States as to the use of submarines in attacking vessels of commerce, and the acquiescence of Germany in that attitude, yet with full knowledge on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government of the views of the Government of the United States as expressed in no uncertain terms to the ally of Austria-Hungary, the commander of the submarine which attacked the *Ancona* failed to put in a place of safety the crew and passengers of the vessel which they purposed to destroy because, it is presumed, of the impossibility of taking it into port as a prize of war. . . . .
>
> The Government of the United States is forced, therefore, to conclude either that the commander of the submarine acted in violation of his instructions or that the Imperial and Royal Government failed to issue instructions to the commanders of its submarines in accordance with the law of nations and the principles of humanity. The Government of the United States is unwilling to believe the latter alternative and to credit the Austro-Hungarian Government with an intention to permit its submarines to destroy the lives of helpless men, women and children. It prefers to believe that the commander of the submarine committed this outrage without authority and contrary to the general or special instructions which he had received.
>
> As the good relations of the two countries must rest upon a common regard for law and humanity, the Government of the United States cannot be expected to do otherwise than to demand

> that the Imperial and Royal Government denounce the sinking of the *Ancona* as an illegal and indefensible act; that the officer who perpetrated the deed be punished, and that reparation by the payment of an indemnity be made for the citizens of the United States who were killed or injured by the attack on the vessel. . . . .

But Austria followed her ally, Germany, in temporizing with America. On December 15, 1915, Austria asked for definite information concerning the American charges. President Wilson answered by resting squarely and solely on the official Austrian report concerning the sinking of the *Ancona*.

> . . . . . In view of these admitted circumstances the Government of the United States feels justified in holding that the details of the sinking of the *Ancona*, the weight and character of the additional testimony corroborating the Admiralty's report, and the number of Americans killed or injured are in no way essential matters of discussion. The culpability of the commander is in any case established, and the undisputed fact is that citizens of the United States were killed, injured, or put in jeopardy for his lawless act.
>
> The rules of international law and the principles of humanity which were thus wilfully violated by the commander of the submarine have been so long and so universally recognized and are so manifest from the standpoint of right and justice that the Government of the United States does not feel called upon to debate them and does not understand that the Imperial and Royal Government questions or disputes them.
>
> The Government of the United States therefore finds no other course open to it but to hold the Imperial and Royal Government responsible for the act of its naval commander and to renew the definite but respectful demands made in its communication of the 6th of December, 1915. . . . .

On December 29, 1915, the Austro-Hungarian Government agreed to punish the commander of the submarine and to grant indemnity for the loss of American lives. Nevertheless, Austria expressly reserved for itself the right to keep open the question of the legal powers of submarines in sinking vessels.

The Question of Armed Merchantmen

By January, 1916, it was evident that new aspects of the question of the submarine warfare of Germany would hinge upon the right of a merchantman to arm itself against submarine attack. Early in 1916 the United States proposed to the Entente Allies that all their merchant vessels be disarmed in order to insure safety from submarine attack, but the Entente Allies were unable to agree to that proposal.

On February 12, 1916, the Central Powers formally notified the United States that Entente vessels would be sunk without warning if they were armed. The United States nevertheless took a position that merchant vessels had every right to arm themselves for defense against submarine attacks, and the United States Government refused to advise American citizens not to sail upon Entente merchant ships armed for defensive purposes only. This attitude of the United States and its further acquiescence in the entrance into and departure from American ports of armed merchant vessels, although well within the sanction of international law, resulted in further German hatred of America and in renewed charges that President Wilson was pursuing an unneutral course.

The "Sussex" Case

Germany immediately set about challenging the position of the United States in sinking four British vessels transporting American citizens—the *Eagle Point,* the *Englishman,* the *Manchester Engineer* and the *Sussex.* The latter was a ferry across the English Channel, and was torpedoed, although not sunk, on March 24, 1916. There were some 75 American citizens on board at the time, and although none of them was killed as a result of the explosion of the torpedo, several were injured.

By this time, America was standing on its dignity, and refused to make the first representations to Germany. On April 10, 1916, the German Government informed the United States that Germany could not discover that any German submarine had attacked the *Sussex,* but

that a German submarine had torpedoed a vessel of the same appearance as the *Sussex,* in the same location and under the same circumstances as the location and circumstances involved in the sinking of the *Sussex.* Germany maintained that the *Sussex* itself had struck an English mine, but asked for any information at the disposal of the United States which disproved the German contention; and in case of a complete disagreement between the two countries offered to leave the dispute to a neutral commission to be established according to the provisions of the Hague Conference of 1907.

With respect to the three other vessels attacked, Germany claimed to have no information regarding the *Manchester Engineer,* and excused the sinking of the *Englishman* and the *Eagle Point* on the ground that they had attempted to escape capture.

Feeling by this time was running so high in the United States at the continued German disregard of American rights and at the continued German evasion of American representations that President Wilson felt that the seriousness of the occasion merited an address to Congress, and through Congress to the entire country, on the relations between the United States and Germany. On April 16, 1916, the President summarized before Congress the results of the previous negotiations between the two countries, and solemnly charged Germany with so persistent and so open a disregard of America's rights and of America's protests that, unless Germany should render satisfaction in answer to the American note of the same date on the sinking of the *Sussex,* only one course would remain open to the United States. The United States would sever diplomatic relations with Germany.

> GENTLEMEN OF THE CONGRESS: A situation has arisen in the foreign relations of the country of which it is my duty to inform you frankly. . . . .
>
> In February of the present year the Imperial German Government informed this Government and the other neutral governments of the world that it had reason to believe that the Government of Great Britain had armed all merchant vessels of British ownership and had given them secret orders to attack any submarine of the enemy they might encounter upon the seas, and that the Imperial German Government felt justified in the circumstances in treating all armed merchantmen of belligerent

ownership as auxiliary vessels of war, which it would have the right to destroy without warning.

The law of nations has long recognized the right of merchantmen to carry arms for protection, to use them to repel attack, though to use them in such circumstances at their own risk, but the Imperial German Government claimed the right to set these understandings aside in circumstances which it deemed extraordinary.

Even the terms in which it announced its purpose thus still further to relax the restraints it had previously expressed its willingness and desire to put upon the operations of its submarines carried the plain implication that at least vessels which were not armed would still be exempt from destruction without warning, and that personal safety would be accorded their passengers and crews; but even that limitation, if it was ever practicable to observe it, has in fact constituted no check at all on the destruction of ships of every sort.

Again and again the Imperial German Government has given this Government its solemn assurances that at least passenger ships would not be thus dealt with, and yet it has again and again permitted its undersea commanders to disregard those assurances with entire impunity. . . . .

The Government of the United States has been very patient. At every stage of this distressing experience of tragedy after tragedy in which its own citizens were involved it has sought to be restrained from any extreme course of action, or of protest, by a thoughtful consideration of the extraordinary circumstances of this unprecedented war, and actuated in all that it said or did by the sentiments of genuine friendship which the people of the United States have always entertained, and continue to entertain, toward the German nation.

It has, of course, accepted the successive explanations and assurances of the Imperial German Government as given in entire sincerity and good faith, and has hoped, even against hope, that it would prove to be possible for the German Government so to order and control the acts of its naval commanders as to square its policy with the principles of humanity as embodied in the laws of nations.

It has been willing to wait until the significance of the facts became absolutely unmistakable and susceptible of but one interpretation.

That point has now unhappily been reached. The facts are

susceptible of but one interpretation: The Imperial German Government has been unable to put any limits or restraints upon its warfare against either freight or passenger ships.

It has therefore become painfully evident that the position which this Government took at the very outset is inevitable, namely, that the use of submarines for the destruction of an enemy's commerce is of a necessity, because of the character of the vessels employed and the methods of attack which their employment of course involves, incompatible with the principles of humanity, the long established and incontrovertible rights of neutrals and the sacred immunities of non-combatants.

I have deemed it my duty to say to the Imperial German Government that if it is still its purpose to prosecute relentless and indiscriminate warfare against vessels of commerce by the use of submarines, notwithstanding the now demonstrated impossibility of conducting that warfare in accordance with what the Government of the United States must consider the sacred and indisputable rules of international law and the universally recognized dictates of humanity, the Government of the United States is at last forced to the conclusion that there is but one course it can pursue; and that unless the Imperial German Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of warfare against passenger and freight vessels, this Government can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the Government of the German Empire altogether. . . . .

[*The formal note to Germany covered the same points as were covered in the President's address to Congress; indeed, in most cases used the same language.*]

On May 15, 1916, the German Government responded to the American threat, which had evidently sobered Germany to some extent. At least, Germany yielded to the American demand regarding the sinking of merchant vessels—Germany agreed not to sink without warning and without due regard to the lives and safety of their crews and passengers any merchant ships, not attempting to escape capture, whether armed or unarmed, and whether in the war zone around the British Isles or outside it.

Germany also admitted that a German submarine had attacked the *Sussex,* and later agreed to pay an adequate indemnity for the injuries to American citizens on the *Sussex* and to punish the submarine commander which had attacked it.

Nevertheless, the German note of May 15 fell far short of furnishing a complete satisfaction to the United States. For in that note Germany again attacked America's alleged tolerance of England's violation of international law. Germany expected that in view of her concession to America's position, America would demand similar concessions from England. And Germany in turn threatened the United States that "Should steps taken by the United States not attain the object it (Germany) desires, ... the German Government would then be facing a new situation in which it must reserve to itself complete freedom of action."

President Wilson answered the implied German threat promptly. On May 18, he informed Germany that the United States could not and would not admit that the new policy of submarine warfare announced by Germany was conditional upon the action of the United States toward England. He formally informed Germany that the United States expected the German acquiescence to the American demands to be absolute, not conditional. By opposing no objection to the American note of May 8, 1915, Germany tacitly agreed to its demands.

> . . . . . Throughout the months which have elapsed since the Imperial Government announced, on February 4, 1915, its submarine policy, now happily abandoned, the Government of the United States has been constantly guided and restrained by motives of friendship in its patient efforts to bring to an amicable settlement the critical questions arising from that policy. Accepting the Imperial Government's declaration of its abandonment of the policy which has so seriously menaced the good relations between the two countries, the Government of the United States will rely upon a scrupulous execution henceforth of the now altered policy of the Imperial Government, such as will remove the principal danger to an interruption of the good relations existing between the United States and Germany.
>
> The Government of the United States feels it necessary to state that it takes it for granted that the Imperial German Government does not intend to imply that the maintenance of its newly announced policy is in any way contingent upon the course or result of diplomatic negotiations between the Government of the United States and any other belligerent Government,

notwithstanding the fact that certain passages in the Imperial Government's note of the fourth instant might appear to be susceptible of that construction. In order, however, to avoid any possible misunderstanding, the Government of the United States notifies the Imperial Government that it cannot for a moment entertain, much less discuss, a suggestion that respect by German naval authorities for the rights of citizens of the United States upon the high seas should in any way or in the slightest degree be made contingent upon the conduct of any other Government affecting the rights of neutrals and noncombatants. Responsibility in such matters is single, not joint; absolute, not relative.

LANSING.

The Deutschland and the U-53

A striking realization of the fact that modern science had made it impossible to localize the war in Europe was brought to America when, in July, 1916, a German submarine, the *Deutschland,* crossed the Atlantic and proceeded up Chesapeake Bay to Baltimore. Every American who read of the arrival of the *Deutschland* could realize that the Atlantic Ocean might prove little defense to the United States in case the United States and Germany should become embroiled in war after the conclusion of the struggle between the Central Powers and the Entente Allies.

The *Deutschland* officers claimed to have been only sixteen days out from Bremen and to have traveled only ninety miles of the trip under water, although one whole night was spent motionless on the bottom of the ocean because of rough weather. The vessel was strictly a merchant ship, carrying a load of dye-stuffs to the United States, and was not armed in any fashion. It was 315 feet long, with a beam of thirty feet. Its engines were oil-burning and it had enough oil unused after docking in Baltimore to carry it back to Germany. Of a tonnage of 791, its speed on the surface was 14 knots and under the surface 7 knots. It was submersible to a depth of 300 feet and could remain under the water for four days. A supposed sister-submarine, the *Bremen,* never completed its predicted voyage to America, although the *Deutschland* returned for a second trip, docking at New London, Connecticut.

On October 7, 1916, a German submarine used for offensive purposes put into Newport, Rhode Island, remaining only long enough to post some dispatches to Ambassador von Bernstorff and leaving within the time limit imposed upon warships in neutral ports if they are to escape internment. After leaving Newport, the *U-53* sank five merchant vessels off Nantucket—3 British, 1 Dutch and 1 Norwegian. The sinkings were accomplished outside the 3-mile limit and were in accordance with the pledges given by Germany concerning her submarine warfare—that is to say, the vessels were warned before being sunk and due provisions were taken for the safety of their passengers and crews, so that no lives were lost. Indeed, destroyers of the American navy stood by while the vessels were sunk, and assisted in the rescue of their passengers and crew. One of the vessels sunk was a British liner plying between New York and Halifax, and transporting a number of American citizens; but the United States felt that the circumstances precluded any protest to the Imperial German Government, nor did the Entente Allies give any indication that they felt that such a protest was due.

Peace Proposals

As befitted the most powerful of all neutrals, the United States offered services of mediation immediately after the outbreak of the War. On August 5, 1914, President Wilson tendered his offices as mediator to all the nations which at that time were belligerents, but his offer was received with merely formal acknowledgments.

For many months afterwards, the conflict raged too bitterly for any offers of peace or of mediation to be acceptable, and none of any importance was officially made. Nevertheless, it is probable that throughout 1915 and 1916 the Vatican was busily using its influence in the courts of Europe in the direction of peace. Indeed, on several occasions, the Pope put out feelers for peace in public utterances.

By 1916, the leaders of the Governments at war had begun to sound out one another on the question of peace. These negotiations were not direct, but consisted of public statements from officials in one country, which were answered some days later by similar public statements from officials in an enemy country. The German chancellor on several occasions hinted at concessions which Germany would make in order to achieve peace, but was usually answered by statements from the Entente Allies which gave no indication that peace would be acceptable to them until Germany had been defeated. Nevertheless, these indirect discussions were often concentrated upon concrete problems such as an independent Poland, the future of Belgium, and the disposition of Constantinople, and hence served to clear the air somewhat concerning these problems.

At the end of 1916, therefore, the Central Powers came to the conclusion that the time was ripe for an open peace offer. The motives which actuated this step were mixed. In the first place, the enthusiasm of the German people was beginning to flag, and a small minority group of Socialists was openly clamoring for peace, and doubtless it was considered that a rejection of a peace offer by the Entente would

stimulate the German people to new war efforts. In the second place, pacifists were beginning to show enough strength in some of the countries of the Entente Allies for a peace offer to cause division in the ranks of those countries. In the third place, Germany realized that her cause was unpopular among most of the neutral nations and a peace offer might counteract that unpopularity to some extent. And, finally, it was evident by this time that, although Germany still held the upper hand as far as the past was concerned, a decisive victory for German arms seemed remote; and a peace at this time would represent a peace dictated by a Germany at the apex of her victories.

Therefore on December 12, 1916 Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria dispatched an identic note to neutrals and to the Pope, suggesting that representatives of the belligerent countries meet in order to discuss the possibilities of peace.

But the offer of the Central Powers met with refusal from the Entente Allies. France, Great Britain, Russia and Italy all announced through their governments that a peace with a victorious Germany was impossible.

Less than a week later, however, the discussion of peace was revived from another quarter. The President of the United States, averring that this action had long been contemplated by him, and that its propinquity to the offer of the Central Powers was a mere coincidence, suggested to the belligerents on December 18, 1916, that each of the two opposed groups should definitely state the terms upon which it was willing to make peace, in the hope that an agreement from among the conflicting claims might be patched up. The President called attention to the fact that all the belligerents claimed to be fighting for the same principles and for similar material ends. The President spoke of the interest of the United States in the re-arrangement of the world which would necessarily follow the War, and hinted at the willingness of the United States to enter into suitable agreements looking to that end. Describing the serious danger to civilization itself if the war were to develop into a long struggle of attrition, the President suggested that, as the abstract professions of the belligerents seemed to be identical, it might be that their concrete proposals would reveal that peace was unexpectedly near.

. . . . . The President suggests that an early occasion be sought to call out from all the nations now at war such an avowal of their respective views as to the terms upon which the war might be concluded and the arrangements which would be deemed satisfactory as a guaranty against its renewal or the kindling of any similar conflict in the future as would make it possible frankly to compare them. . . . .

In the measures to be taken to secure the future peace of the world the people and Government of the United States are as vitally and as directly interested as the Governments now at war. Their interest, moreover, in the means to be adopted to relieve the smaller and weaker peoples of the world of the peril of wrong and violence is as quick and ardent as that of any other people or Government. They stand ready, and even eager, to co-operate in the accomplishment of these ends, when the war is over, with every influence and resource at their command. But the war must first be concluded. The terms upon which it is to be concluded they are not at liberty to suggest; but the President does feel that it is his right and his duty to point out their intimate interest in its conclusion, lest it should presently be too late to accomplish the greater things which lie beyond its conclusion, lest the situation of neutral nations, now exceedingly hard to endure, be rendered altogether intolerable, and lest, more than all, an injury be done civilization itself which can never be atoned for or repaired.

The President therefore feels altogether justified in suggesting an immediate opportunity for a comparison of views as to the terms which must precede those ultimate arrangements for the peace of the world, which all desire and in which the neutral nations as well as those at war are ready to play their full responsible part. If the contest must continue to proceed toward undefined ends by slow attrition until the one group of belligerents or the other is exhausted; if million after million of human lives must continue to be offered up until on the one side or the other there are no more to offer; if resentments must be kindled that can never cool and despairs engendered from which there can be no recovery, hopes of peace and of the willing concert of free peoples will be rendered vain and idle. . . . .

The leaders of the several belligerents have, as has been said, stated those objects in general terms. But, stated in general terms, they seem the same on both sides. Never yet have the authoritative spokesmen of either side avowed the precise objects

> which would, if attained, satisfy them and their people that the war had been fought out. The world has been left to conjecture what definitive results, what actual exchange of guaranties, what political or territorial changes or readjustments, what stage of military success, even, would bring the war to an end.
>
> It may be that peace is nearer than we know; that the terms which the belligerents on the one side and on the other would deem it necessary to insist upon are not so irreconcilable as some have feared; that an interchange of views would clear the way at least for conference and make the permanent concord of the nations a hope of the immediate future, a concert of nations immediately practicable.
>
> The President is not proposing peace; he is not even offering mediation. He is merely proposing that soundings be taken in order that we may learn, the neutral nations with the belligerent, how near the haven of peace may be for which all mankind longs with an intense and increasing longing. . . . .

The Central Powers received the President's note with enthusiasm, but among the Entente Allies, it met with a hostile reception. It was misinterpreted into a declaration that the real objects of the Entente Allies and of the Central Powers were identical, and naturally such a declaration was resented.

Germany replied to the note on December 26, 1916. The German reply was brief and in no sense met the request of the President for a definite statement of the peace terms desired by Germany. The Imperial German Government stated merely that it would cooperate with the United States in ending the War and suggested to that end a meeting of delegates from the belligerent countries in a neutral place.

The Entente countries replied first to the Central Powers' peace proffer. On December 30, 1916, they joined in rehearsing the guilt of the Central Powers for the outbreak of the War, in denouncing the treatment of Belgium, in demanding reparations and guarantees from Germany, in asserting that her peace offer was empty and insincere, and therefore in refusing to consider it further.

The reply of the Entente Allies to the peace note of President Wilson was dispatched on January 11, 1917. The Entente once more asserted its belief that a secure, lasting and just peace was impossible

until Germany had been defeated. The wrongs of Belgium, Armenia, Luxemburg, Servia and Syria; the German air-raids upon unfortified places; the loss of innocent lives caused by attacks of German submarines upon merchant craft; the barbarous treatment inflicted by Germany upon prisoners of war; the deportation of civilians from northern France and Belgium; the execution of Miss Cavell and Captain Fryatt, these were cited to prove that Germany would be an ever-present threat against the security of the world, ever prepared to precipitate another world-war as she had precipitated the present one, unless she were once for all time reduced to impotence.

Nevertheless, the Entente complied with the President's request for a definite statement of peace terms. Roughly, the terms of the Entente Allies included:

1—The restoration and indemnification of Belgium, Servia and Montenegro.

2—The evacuation of and reparation for the invaded territories of France, Russia and Roumania.

3—The expulsion from Europe of Turkey, with the enfranchisement of alien nationalities under Turkish rule.

4—The similar enfranchisement of other oppressed nationalities—the Italians of "Italia Irredenta;" the Czecho-Slovaks; the South Slavs.

5—The reconstruction of an autonomous Poland along lines of nationality, but united with Russia.

6—The restoration of territory wrested by Germany from other countries in the past.

7—The reorganization of Europe so as to secure full political and economic rights to all nations, large and small.

On the same day, January 11, 1917, Germany dispatched to the United States a note in answer to the reply of the Entente Allies (December 30) to the original German peace offer of December 12, 1916. In this note, Germany denied the validity of the charges laid at her door, but asserted that the war had been caused by the "encircling" policy of England against Germany, the desire of France for revenge, the ambition of Russia to obtain Constantinople, and the Serbian instigation of the murder of the heir apparent to the

Austro-Hungarian throne. Germany moreover countered against the Allies' charges by citing the cases of Ireland and the Boers, the suppression of minor nationalities by Russia and the violation by the Entente of the neutrality of Greece. Germany also alleged barbarous treatment of prisoners by Russia and deportation of civilians from Galicia, Alsace-Lorraine, Eastern Prussia, and Bukowina, and closed with a defence of her treatment of Belgium as being "necessary in the interests of military safety."

On January 17, 1917, the Entente amplified and reiterated its assertion that Germany must be defeated before a secure world-peace could be obtained.

These answers to the President's peace note of December 18, 1916 put the finishing touches upon certain mental processes which had long been active in his mind. For months, while war raged abroad with unprecedented destruction of the best of civilization, while the United States was perching more and more unsteadily on a pinnacle of neutrality, while the very foundations of international law were being questioned, the President's mind had been turning to the world which was to follow the signing of peace. And the President had determined that that world must be one in which international anarchy would be supplanted by international order and supernationalism or internationalism placed above nationalism. His plan was no more nor less than an organization of the great nations of the world to prevent future wars and to guarantee justice among nations as it had been guaranteed within nations. From such a league of nations, the President had decided that the United States could not and should not remain aloof; and for the better success of such a league the President had determined that the present struggle should end in a "peace without victory" which would not weaken any such international political organization by enmities and rivalries inevitable between conquered and conquerors. With this purpose in mind, President Wilson delivered to the Senate, on January 22, 1917, an address which, like the shot fired at Concord, rang around the world:

> . . . . . I have sought this opportunity to address you because I thought that I owed it to you, as the council associated

with me in the final determination of our international obligations, to disclose to you without reserve the thought and purpose that have been taking form in my mind in regard to the duty of our Government in the days to come when it will be necessary to lay afresh and upon a new plan the foundations of peace among the nations.

It is inconceivable that the people of the United States should play no part in that great enterprise. To take part in such a service will be the opportunity for which they have sought to prepare themselves by the very principles and purposes of their polity and the approved practices of their Government ever since the days when they set up a new nation in the high and honourable hope that it might in all that it was and did show mankind the way to liberty. They cannot in honour withhold the service to which they are now about to be challenged. They do not wish to withhold it. But they owe it to themselves and to the other nations of the world to state the conditions under which they will feel free to render it. . . . .

No covenant of co-operative peace that does not include the peoples of the New World can suffice to keep the future safe against war; and yet there is only one sort of peace that the peoples of America could join in guaranteeing. The elements of that peace must be elements that engage the confidence and satisfy the principles of the American governments, elements consistent with their political faith and with the practical convictions which the peoples of America have once for all embraced and undertaken to defend. . . . .

Fortunately we have received very explicit assurances on this point. The statesmen of both of the groups of nations now arrayed against one another have said, in terms that could not be misinterpreted, that it was no part of the purpose they had in mind to crush their antagonists. But the implications of these assurances may not be equally clear to all,—may not be the same on both sides of the water. I think it will be serviceable if I attempt to set forth what we understand them to be.

They imply, first of all, that it must be a peace without victory. It is not pleasant to say this. I beg that I may be permitted to put my own interpretation upon it and that it may be understood that no other interpretation was in my thought. I am seeking only to face realities and to face them without soft concealments. Victory would mean peace forced upon the loser, a victor's terms imposed upon the vanquished. It would be

accepted in humiliation, under duress, at an intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory upon which terms of peace would rest, not permanently, but only as upon quicksand. Only a peace between equals can last. Only a peace the very principle of which is equality and a common participation in a common benefit. The right state of mind, the right feeling between nations, is as necessary for a lasting peace as is the just settlement of vexed questions of territory or of racial and national allegiance. . . . .

No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recognize and accept the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property. I take it for granted, for instance, if I may venture upon a single example, that statesmen everywhere are agreed that there should be a united, independent, and autonomous Poland, and that henceforth inviolable security of life, of worship, and of industrial and social development should be guaranteed to all peoples who have lived hitherto under the power of governments devoted to a faith and purpose hostile to their own. . . . .

So far as practicable, moreover, every great people now struggling towards a full development of its resources and of its powers should be assured a direct outlet to the great highways of the sea. Where this cannot be done by the cession of territory, it can no doubt be done by the neutralization of direct rights of way under the general guarantee which will assure the peace itself. With a right comity of arrangement no nation need be shut away from free access to the open paths of the world's commerce.

And the paths of the sea must alike in law and in fact be free. The freedom of the seas is the *sine qua non* of peace, equality, and co-operation. No doubt a somewhat radical reconsideration of many of the rules of international practice hitherto thought to be established may be necessary in order to make the seas indeed free and common in practically all circumstances for the use of mankind, but the motive for such changes is convincing and compelling. There can be no trust or intimacy between the peoples of the world without them. The free, constant, unthreatened intercourse of nations is an essential part of the process of peace and of development. It need not be difficult either to define or to secure the freedom of the seas if the govern-

ments of the world sincerely desire to come to an agreement concerning it.

It is a problem closely connected with the limitation of naval armaments and the co-operation of the navies of the world in keeping the seas at once free and safe. And the question of limiting naval armaments opens the wider and perhaps more difficult question of the limitation of armies and of all programmes of military preparation. . . . .

The question of armaments, whether on land or sea, is the most immediately and intensely practical question connected with the future fortunes of nations and of mankind. . . . .

And in holding out the expectation that the people and Government of the United States will join the other civilized nations of the world in guaranteeing the permanence of peace upon such terms as I have named I speak with the greater boldness and confidence because it is clear to every man who can think that there is in this promise no breach in either our traditions or our policy as a nation, but a fulfilment, rather, of all that we have professed or striven for.

I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world; that no nation should seek to extend its policy over any other nation or people, but that every people should be free to determine its own polity, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful. . . . .

These are American principles, American policies. We could stand for no others. And they are also the principles and policies of forward-looking men and women everywhere, of every modern nation, of every enlightened community. They are the principles of mankind and must prevail.

The President's policy of joining with the nations of Europe in the future maintenance of peace had not come unheralded. During the preceding year, many of his addresses had hinted at such a policy. In that connection, his speech at a banquet of the League to Enforce Peace, held in Washington, D. C., on May 27, 1916, was a notable forerunner of his Peace without Victory Address.

. . . . . The desire of the whole world now turns eagerly, more and more eagerly, toward the hope of peace, and there is just reason why we should take our part in counsel upon this great

theme. It is right that I, as spokesman of our Government, should attempt to give expression to what I believe to be the thought and purpose of the people of the United States in this vital matter.

This Great War that broke so suddenly upon the world two years ago, and which has swept within its flame so great a part of the civilized world, has affected us very profoundly, and we are not only at liberty, it is perhaps our duty, to speak very frankly of it and of the great interests of civilization which it affects.

With its causes and its objects we are not concerned. The obscure fountains from which its stupendous flood has burst forth we are not interested to search for or explore. But so great a flood, spread far and wide to every quarter of the globe, has of necessity engulfed many a fair province of right that lies very near to us. Our own rights as a nation, the liberties, the privileges, and the property of our people have been profoundly affected.

We are not mere disconnected lookers-on. The longer the War lasts the more deeply do we become concerned that it should be brought to an end and the world be permitted to resume its normal life and course again. And when it does come to an end, we shall be as much concerned as the nations at war to see peace assume an aspect of permanence, give promise of days from which the anxiety of uncertainty shall be lifted, bring some assurance that peace and war shall always hereafter be reckoned part of the common interest of mankind.

We are participants, whether we would or not, in the life of the world. The interests of all nations are our own also. We are partners with the rest. What affects mankind is inevitably our affair as well as the affair of the nations of Europe and of Asia.

One observation on the causes of the present War we are at liberty to make, and to make it may throw some light forward upon future, as well as backward upon the past. It is plain that this War could have come only as it did, suddenly and out of secret counsels, without warning to the world, without discussion, without any of the deliberate movements of counsel with which it would seem natural to approach so stupendous a contest. It is probable that if it had been foreseen just what would happen, just what alliances would be formed, just what forces arrayed against one another, those who brought the great contest on would have been glad to substitute conference for force.



Photos by International Film Service

WOUNDED IN THE LAST DRIVE

The upper panel shows French and British soldiers, wounded in the very last days of actual hostilities, waiting to be transported to the rear of the battle-lines for treatment.

GERMAN PRISONERS GIVING FIRST AID TO WOUNDED TOMMY

The centre panel shows a wounded British soldier receiving treatment from a Red Cross doctor. The doctor is being assisted by several captured "Fritzes." The British soldier has been brought in on a stretcher by German soldiers taken prisoners in the struggle and pressed into service as stretcher-bearers.

WOUNDED "ANZACS" TREATED AT THE FRONT

The lower panel shows some wounded Australian soldiers receiving first-aid treatment at an advanced dressing station situated just a few paces back of the actual fighting lines. The surgeons are working upon a man with a wounded leg, while others, whose injuries have been attended to, are waiting to be taken to base hospitals or rest quarters. England's colonial troops bore much of the burden of the conflict against Germany, their nickname, "Anzacs," being derived from the initial letters of Australia, New Zealand, Africa and Canada.

If we ourselves had been afforded some opportunity to apprise the belligerents of the attitude which it would be our duty to take, of the policies and practices against which we would feel bound to use all our moral and economic strength, and in certain circumstances even our physical strength also, our own contribution to the counsel, which might have averted the struggle, would have been considered worth weighing and regarding.

And the lesson, which the shock of being taken by surprise in a matter so deeply vital to all the nations of the world has made poignantly clear, is that the peace of the world must henceforth depend upon a new and more wholesome diplomacy. Only when the great nations of the world have reached some sort of agreement as to what they hold to be fundamental to their common interest, and as to some feasible method of acting in concert when any nation or group of nations seeks to disturb those fundamental things, can we feel that civilization is at last in a way of justifying its existence and claiming to be finally established. It is clear that nations must in the future be governed by the same high code of honor that we demand of individuals. We must, indeed, in the very same breath with which we avow this conviction admit that we have ourselves upon occasion in the past been offenders against the law of diplomacy, which we thus forecast; but our conviction is not the less clear, but rather the more clear, on that account.

If this War has accomplished nothing else for the benefit of the world, it has at least disclosed a great moral necessity and set forward the thinking of the statesmen of the world by a whole age. Repeated utterances of the leading statesmen of most of the great nations now engaged in war have made it plain that their thought has come to this: That the principle of public right must henceforth take precedence over the individual interests of particular nations and that the nations of the world must in some way band themselves together to see that right prevails as against any sort of selfish aggression; that henceforth alliance must not be set up against alliance, understanding against understanding, but that there must be a common agreement for a common object, and that at the heart of that common object must lie the inviolable rights of peoples and of mankind.

The nations of the world have become each other's neighbors. It is to their interest that they should understand each other. In order that they may understand each other it is imperative that they should agree to co-operate in a common cause and that they

should so act that the guiding principle of that common cause shall be even-handed and impartial justice.

This is undoubtedly the thought of America. This is what we ourselves will say when there comes proper occasion to say it. In the dealings of nations with one another arbitrary force must be rejected and we must move forward to the thought of the modern world, the thought of which peace is the very atmosphere. That thought constitutes a chief part of the passionate conviction of America.

We believe these fundamental things:

First, that every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live. Like other nations, we have ourselves no doubt once and again offended against that principle when for a little while controlled by selfish passion, as our franker historians have been honorable enough to admit; but it has become more and more our rule of life and action.

Second, that the small States of the world have a right to enjoy the same respect for their sovereignty and for their territorial integrity that great and powerful nations expect and insist upon.

And, third, that the world has a right to be free from every disturbance of its peace that has its origin in aggression and disregard of the rights of peoples and nations.

So sincerely do we believe in these things that I am sure that I speak the mind and wish of the people of America when I say that the United States is willing to become a partner in any feasible association of nations formed in order to realize these objects and make them secure against violation.

There is nothing that the United States wants for itself that any other nation has. We are willing, on the contrary, to limit ourselves along with them to a prescribed course of duty and respect for the rights of others, which will check any selfish passion of our own, as it will check any aggressive impulse of theirs.

If it should ever be our privilege to suggest or initiate a movement for peace among the nations now at war, I am sure that the people of the United States would wish their Government to move along these lines:

First—Such a settlement with regard to their own immediate interests as the belligerents may agree upon. We have nothing material of any kind to ask for ourselves, and are quite aware that we are in no sense or degree parties to the present quarrel. Our interest is only in peace and its future guarantees.

Second—A universal association of the nations to maintain the inviolate security of the highway of the seas for the common and unhindered use of all the nations of the world, and to prevent any war, begun either contrary to treaty covenants or without warning, and full submission of the causes to the opinion of the world—a virtual guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence.

But I did not come here, let me repeat, to discuss a program. I came only to avow a creed and give expression to the confidence I feel that the world is even now upon the eve of a great consummation, when some common force will be brought into existence which shall safeguard right as the first and most fundamental interest of all peoples and all Governments, when coercion shall be summoned not to the service of political ambition or selfish hostility, but to the service of a common order, a common justice, and a common peace.

God grant that the dawn of that day of frank dealing and of settled peace, concord, and co-operation may be near at hand!

The Diplomatic Break with Germany

The Imperial German Government, on February 1, 1917, handed to the United States an official acknowledgment of receipt of a copy of the Peace without Victory Address of President Wilson. Germany claimed that she was willing to accept the principles laid down by the President—that she accepted the principle of self-government for all nations, and asked that the principle be applied to Ireland and India; that she would be glad to forego secret alliances and to cooperate in establishing permanent peace; that she always had accepted and always would accept the principle of the freedom of the seas; and that she had never contemplated direct annexation of Belgium.

Germany then proceeded once again to denounce England's methods of utilizing the English control of the seas and England's food blockade. Germany had hoped to settle by diplomatic negotiations the disputes involved; but the rejection of Germany's peace offer revealed a determination on the part of the Entente to crush Germany. Germany therefore was forced to a new decision. That decision was outlined in an accompanying memorandum.

The accompanying memorandum described war zones in the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean. All sea traffic within those zones was to be attacked by Germany without warning. Neutral ships would approach the coasts of Germany's enemies only at their own peril. American shipping would be unmolested in those zones if but one vessel, bearing special marking and carrying no contraband according to the German definition of the term, ran each week to and from the port of Falmouth. In language no less than in intent, and in a spirit of utter defiance, Germany retracted her previous assurances to the United States.

With this note and its accompanying memorandum, Ambassador von Bernstorff submitted a second memorandum, declaring that the

change in the German attitude was in accord with the reservations made in the German note of May 4, 1916, which the United States had refused to sanction in the reply to that note.

The response of the United States to the breach of faith by the Imperial German Government was prompt and decisive. On the morning of February 3, 1917, the German ambassador and his staff were handed their passports, and all other German diplomatic representatives in the United States were ordered to leave the country. At the same time, all American diplomatic representatives were withdrawn from Germany. On the same afternoon, the President addressed Congress, giving notice of his dismissal of Ambassador von Bernstorff.

After outlining the history of the diplomatic differences between Germany and the United States from the beginning of the War and elaborating upon the new turn given them by the note received from Germany on February 1, President Wilson expressed the fervent hope that it would still be possible to avert war between the two countries. Announcing that the United States still desired to remain at peace with the German people and with the Government which represented them, the President declared that only "overt acts" on the part of Germany could convince him that Germany would compel the United States to resort to arms. Nevertheless, the President announced clearly that if the German Government should commit such overt acts, he would feel called upon to ask Congress for a declaration of war.

> . . . . . I think that you will agree with me that, in view of this declaration (of the German Government), which suddenly and without prior intimation of any kind deliberately withdraws the solemn assurance given in the Imperial Government's note of the fourth of May, 1916, this Government has no alternative consistent with the dignity and honor of the United States but to take the course which, in its note of the eighteenth of April, 1916, it announced that it would take in the event that the German Government did not declare and effect an abandonment of the methods of submarine warfare which it was then employing and to which it now purposes again to resort.
>
> I have, therefore, directed the Secretary of State to announce to His Excellency the German Ambassador that all diplomatic

relations between the United States and the German Empire are severed and that the American Ambassador at Berlin will immediately be withdrawn and, in accordance with this decision, to hand to His Excellency his passports.

Notwithstanding this unexpected action of the German Government, this sudden and deeply deplorable renunciation of its assurances, given this Government at one of the most critical moments of tension in the relations of the two Governments, I refuse to believe that it is the intention of the German authorities to do in fact what they have warned us they will feel at liberty to do. . . . .

Only actual overt acts on their part can make me believe it even now.

If this inveterate confidence on my part in the sobriety and prudent foresight of their purpose should unhappily prove unfounded; if American ships and American lives should, in fact, be sacrificed by their naval commanders in heedless contravention of the just and reasonable understandings of international law and the obvious dictates of humanity, I shall take the liberty of coming again before the Congress, to ask that authority be given me to use any means that may be necessary for the protection of our seamen and our people in the prosecution of their peaceful and legitimate errands on the high seas. I can do nothing less. I take it for granted that all neutral governments will take the same course.

We do not desire any hostile conflict with the Imperial German Government. We are the sincere friends of the German people and earnestly desire to remain at peace with the Government which speaks for them.

We shall not believe that they are hostile to us unless and until we are obliged to believe it. . . . .

Germany could not claim that the action of the United States was unexpected. Nor could Germany be blind to the fact that the rupture in diplomatic relations was the prelude to war, if Germany persisted in her course. For in a message to the German ambassador to Mexico, dispatched on January 19, 1917, but intercepted by the United States and published on February 27, 1917, the German Secretary for Foreign Affairs had predicted war between the United States and Germany, and had endeavored to align both Mexico and Japan against the United States.

On the 1st of February we intend to begin submarine warfare unrestricted. In spite of this, it is our intention to endeavor to keep neutral the United States of America.

If this attempt is not successful, we propose an alliance on the following basis with Mexico: That we shall make war together and together make peace. We shall give general financial support, and it is understood that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in New Mexico, Texas, and Arizona. The details are left to you for settlement.

You are instructed to inform the President of Mexico of the above in the greatest confidence as soon as it is certain that there will be an outbreak of war with the United States, and suggest that the President of Mexico, on his own initiative, should communicate with Japan suggesting adherence at once to this plan. At the same time, offer to mediate between Germany and Japan.

Please call to the attention of the President of Mexico that the employment of ruthless submarine warfare now promises to compel England to make peace in a few months.

ZIMMERMANN.

Germany, therefore, was staking her all upon her submarines. Thwarted in her hopes of a decisive victory on the land, she had decided to try to cripple her enemies on the sea so that they could not obtain supplies, and so that they would be compelled to sue for peace before the United States would be able to make her unorganized force effective enough to determine the final outcome of the War.

The United States as a whole rallied enthusiastically behind the President in his stand, and there was no question of Congress's assent to a declaration of war whenever he should demand it. German ships in the ports of the United States were placed under United States guard and wireless stations put under Government control. Extensive plans were drawn up under the Council of National Defence to coordinate the resources of the land for war purposes. The pacifists were silenced; the American Federation of Labor promised its unqualified support; the movement for an advisory referendum of the people to decide on peace or war was brushed aside; and the small active pro-German element bowed before the popular storm.

Soon evidence piled up that Germany indeed intended to sink all ships in the war zones without warning. On February 7, the *Califor-*

nian, a British liner, was sunk with the loss of some forty lives. On February 3, an American ship, the *Housatonic,* was sunk, but after due warning had been given by the submarine and with no loss of life. Several other British vessels were soon sunk in the Atlantic and an American merchant ship, the *Lyman M. Law,* was sunk without warning in the Mediterranean. On February 25, three American lives were lost when the British *Laconia* was torpedoed.

As a result of these sinkings, the President again addressed Congress on February 26, 1917. He stated that no overt act which would constitute a *casus belli* had yet been committed by Germany. For in the case of the two American vessels sunk, the *Lyman M. Law* and *the Housatonic,* reasonable care had been taken to safeguard the lives of the passengers and crews. The news of the loss of American lives on the *Laconia* had evidently not been imparted to the President by the time he addressed Congress. On the other hand, the President confessed gravely that there was every indication that only chance had prevented the commission of the overt act which would lead to war. Therefore it seemed to the President necessary that he should definitely be given the power to arm American merchant ships for defensive purposes, especially since the owners of such ships were keeping them in port rather than expose them to defenseless destruction and since Germany could thus accomplish her purpose without actually attacking American shipping.

> . . . . . The new German submarine policy has now been in active execution for nearly four weeks.
>
> Its practical results are not yet fully disclosed. The commerce of other neutral nations is suffering severely, but not, perhaps, very much more severely than it was already suffering before the first of February, when the new policy of the Imperial Government was put into operation. We have asked the cooperation of the other neutral governments to prevent these depredations, but so far none of them has thought it wise to join us in any common course of action. Our own commerce has suffered, is suffering, rather in apprehension than in fact, rather because so many of our ships are timidly keeping to their home ports than because American ships have been sunk. . . . .
>
> In sum, therefore, the situation we find ourselves in with regard to the actual conduct of the German submarine warfare against commerce and its effects upon our own ships and people is sub-

stantially the same that it was when I addressed you on the third of February, except for the tying up of our shipping in our own ports because of the unwillingness of our shipowners to risk their vessels at sea without insurance or adequate protection, and the very serious congestion of our commerce which has resulted, a congestion which is growing rapidly more and more serious every day. This in itself might presently accomplish, in effect, what the new German submarine orders were meant to accomplish, so far as we are concerned. We can only say, therefore, that the overt act which I have ventured to hope the German commanders would in fact avoid has not occurred.

But, while this is happily true, it must be admitted that there have been certain additional indications and expressions of purpose on the part of the German press and the German authorities which have increased rather than lessened the impression that, if our ships and our people are spared, it will be because of fortunate circumstances or because the commanders of the German submarines which they may happen to encounter exercise an unexpected discretion and restraint rather than because of the instructions under which those commanders are acting. It would be foolish to deny that the situation is fraught with the gravest possibilities and dangers. No thoughtful man can fail to see that the necessity for definite action may come at any time, if we are in fact, and not in word merely, to defend our elementary rights as a neutral nation. It would be most imprudent to be unprepared. . . . .

No one doubts what it is our duty to do. We must defend our commerce and the lives of our people in the midst of the present trying circumstances, with discretion but with clear and steadfast purpose. Only the method and the extent remain to be chosen, upon the occasion, if occasion should indeed arise. Since it has unhappily proved impossible to safeguard our neutral rights by diplomatic means against the unwarranted infringements they are suffering at the hands of Germany, there may be no recourse but to *armed* neutrality, which we shall know how to maintain and for which there is abundant American precedent. . . . .

I believe that the people will be willing to trust me to act with restraint, with prudence, and in the true spirit of amity and good faith that they have themselves displayed throughout these trying months; and it is in that belief that I request that you will authorize me to supply our merchant ships with defensive arms, should that become necessary, and with the means of using them,

> and to employ any other instrumentalities or methods that may be necessary and adequate to protect our ships and our people in their legitimate and peaceful pursuits on the seas. I request also that you will grant me at the same time, along with the powers I ask, a sufficient credit to enable me to provide adequate means of protection where they are lacking, including adequate insurance against the present war risks. . . . .

A bill giving the President power to adopt a policy of armed neutrality was passed with little opposition in the House of Representatives on February 29. It then went to the Senate, where debate upon it was opened on March 1. The term of Congress would expire on March 4, and the twelve Senators opposed to the bill were enabled to prevent a vote upon it by the process of discussing it until the term of Congress expired at noon on March 4, under the rules of the Senate which forbade the limitation of discussion.

The action of these twelve opponents of the bill called forth a withering rebuke from the White House.

> The termination of the last session of the Sixty-fourth Congress by constitutional limitation discloses a situation unparalleled in the history of the country, perhaps unparalleled in the history of any modern government.
>
> In the immediate presence of a crisis fraught with more subtle and far-reaching possibilities of national danger than any other the Government has known within the whole history of its international relations, the Congress has been unable to act either to safeguard the country or to vindicate the elementary rights of its citizens.
>
> More than five hundred of the five hundred and thirty-one members of the two Houses were ready and anxious to act; the House of Representatives had acted by an overwhelming majority; but the Senate was unable to act because a little group of eleven Senators had determined that it should not.
>
> The Senate has no rules by which debate can be limited or brought to an end, no rules by which dilatory tactics of any kind can be prevented. A single member can stand in the way of action if he have but the physical endurance.
>
> The result in this case is a complete paralysis alike of the legislative and of the executive branches of the Government. . . . .
>
> In the midst of a crisis of extraordinary peril, when only definite

and decided action can make the nation safe or shield it from war itself by the aggression of others, action is impossible.

Although as a matter of fact the nation and the representatives of the nation stand back of the executive with unprecedented unanimity and spirit, the impression made abroad will, of course, be that it is not so and that other governments may act as they please without fear that this Government can do anything at all. We cannot explain.

The explanation is incredible. The Senate of the United States is the only legislative body in the world which cannot act when its majority is ready for action. A little group of wilful men, representing no opinion but their own, have rendered the great Government of the United States helpless and contemptible.

The remedy? There is but one remedy. The only remedy is that the rules of the Senate shall be so altered that it can act. The country can be relied upon to draw the moral. I believe the Senate can be relied on to supply the means of action and save the country from disaster. . . . .

The Senate continued in executive session and revised its rules so as to provide for limitation upon discussion in such a fashion as to make impossible a repetition of the action of a small minority in balking the will of the majority. In the meantime, the President determined to use authority granted by an act of 1819, authorizing the arming of merchant ships against pirates; and thus the policy of armed neutrality was put into effect.

On March 4, 1917, Woodrow Wilson was for the second time inaugurated as President of the United States of America. His inaugural address was short, and was devoted to the existing crisis in the relations with Germany.

My Fellow Citizens:

The four years which have elapsed since last I stood in this place have been crowded with counsel and action of the most vital interest and consequence. Perhaps no equal period in our history has been so fruitful of important reforms in our economic and industrial life or so full of significant changes in the spirit and purpose of our political action. We have sought very thoughtfully to set our house in order, correct the grosser errors and abuses of our industrial life, liberate and quicken the processes of our

national genius and energy, and lift our politics to a broader view of the people's essential interests. . . . .

Although we have centered counsel and action with such unusual concentration and success upon the great problems of domestic legislation to which we addressed ourselves four years ago, other matters have more and more forced themselves upon our attention—matters lying outside our own life as a nation and over which we had no control, but which, despite our wish to keep free of them, have drawn us more and more irresistibly into their own current and influence.

It has been impossible to avoid them. They have affected the life of the whole world. They have shaken men everywhere with a passion and an apprehension they never knew before. It has been hard to preserve calm counsel while the thought of our own people swayed this way and that under their influence. We are a composite and cosmopolitan people. We are of the blood of all the nations that are at war. The currents of our thoughts as well as the currents of our trade run quickly at all seasons back and forth between us and them. The war inevitably set its mark from the first alike upon our minds, our industries, our commerce, our politics and our social action. To be indifferent to it, or independent of it, was out of the question. . . . .

As some of the injuries done us have become intolerable we have still been clear that we wished nothing for ourselves that we were not ready to demand for all mankind—fair dealing, justice, the freedom to live and to be at ease against organized wrong.

It is in this spirit and with this thought that we have grown more and more aware, more and more certain that the part we wished to play was the part of those who mean to vindicate and fortify peace. We have been obliged to arm ourselves to make good our claim to a certain minimum of right and of freedom of action. We stand firm in armed neutrality since it seems that in no other way we can demonstrate what it is we insist upon and cannot forget. We may even be drawn on, by circumstances, not by our own purpose or desire, to a more active assertion of our rights as we see them and a more immediate association with the great struggle itself. But nothing will alter our thought or our purpose. They are too clear to be obscured. They are too deeply rooted in the principles of our national life to be altered. We desire neither conquest nor advantage. We wish nothing that can be had only at the cost of another people. We always professed

unselfish purpose and we covet the opportunity to prove our professions are sincere. . . . .

We are provincials no longer. The tragic events of the thirty months of vital turmoil through which we have just passed have made us citizens of the world. There can be no turning back. Our own fortunes as a nation are involved whether we would have it so or not.

And yet we are not the less Americans on that account. We shall be the more American if we but remain true to the principles in which we have been bred. They are not the principles of a province or of a single continent. We have known and boasted all along that they were the principles of a liberated mankind. These, therefore, are the things we shall stand for, whether in war or in peace:

That all nations are equally interested in the peace of the world and in the political stability of free peoples, and equally responsible for their maintenance; that the essential principle of peace is the actual equality of nations in all matters of right or privilege; that peace cannot securely or justly rest upon an armed balance of power; that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed and that no other powers should be supported by the common thought, purpose or power of the family of nations; that the seas should be equally free and safe for the use of all peoples, under rules set up by common agreement and consent, and that, so far as practicable, they should be accessible to all upon equal terms; that national armaments shall be limited to the necessities of national order and domestic safety; that the community of interest and of power upon which peace must henceforth depend imposes upon each nation the duty of seeing to it that all influences proceeding from its own citizens meant to encourage or assist revolution in other states should be sternly and effectually suppressed and prevented.

I need not argue these principles to you, my fellow countrymen; they are your own, part and parcel of your own thinking and your own motives in affairs. They spring up native amongst us. Upon this as a platform of purpose and of action we can stand together. And it is imperative that we should stand together. We are being forged into a new unity amidst the fires that now blaze throughout the world. In their ardent heat we shall, in God's providence, let us hope, be purged of faction and division, purified of the errant humors of party and of private interest, and shall stand forth in the days to come with a new

dignity of national pride and spirit. Let each man see to it that the dedication is in his own heart, the high purpose of the nation in his own mind, ruler of his own will and desire.

I stand here and have taken the high and solemn oath to which you have been audience because the people of the United States have chosen me for this august delegation of power and have by their gracious judgment named me their leader in affairs.

I know now what the task means. I realize to the full the responsibility which it involves. I pray God I may be given the wisdom and the prudence to do my duty in the true spirit of this great people. I am their servant and can succeed only as they sustain and guide me by their confidence and their counsel. The thing I shall count upon, the thing without which neither counsel nor action will avail, is the unity of America—an America united in feeling, in purpose and in its vision of duty, of opportunity and of service.

We are to beware of all men who would turn the tasks and the necessities of the nation to their own private profit or use them for the building up of private power.

United alike in the conception of our duty and in the high resolve to perform it in the face of all men, let us dedicate ourselves to the great task to which we must now set our hand. For myself I beg your tolerance, your countenance and your united aid.

The shadows that now lie dark upon our path will soon be dispelled, and we shall walk with the light all about us if we be but true to ourselves—to ourselves as we have wished to be known in the counsels of the world and in the thought of all those who love liberty and justice and the right exalted.

Within a few days after the policy of armed neutrality had been adopted, it proved, to use President Wilson's own language, "to be impracticable." On March 9, 1917, the President therefore issued a call for the Sixty-Fifth Congress to assemble in special session on April 16. It has been semi-officially stated that the President delayed asking Congress for war until Count von Bernstorff could reach Berlin and plead in person with the heads of the Imperial German Government to abandon measures which would result in the addition of the United States to the ranks of Germany's opponents.

In the meantime, the continual sinking of Entente vessels carrying

American citizens and of American vessels, without warning and with loss of life, hastened the President's decisions. On March 21, he set forward by two weeks the assembling of the special session of the Sixty-Fifth Congress. On March 25, fourteen companies of the National Guard from the eastern states were called into the national service. States and municipalities feverishly hastened war preparations, and throughout the length and breadth of the United States men, women and children impatiently awaited the day on which the President of the United States would ask the Congress of the United States to declare that a state of war existed between the United States and the German Empire.

Congress assembled on the appointed day, April 2, 1917. On the evening of its very day of assembly, President Wilson addressed it. At half past eight o'clock in the evening, before a joint session of the Senate and the House of Representatives in the chamber of the House, with leading officials and private citizens looking down upon the scene and with the justices of the Supreme Court sitting before him, conscious that he was leading a great nation through a crisis unsurpassed in seriousness by any crisis which had confronted Washington or Lincoln, Madison or McKinley, Polk or Roosevelt, aware that the future well-being not only of America but also of the entire civilized world hung upon the words of the manuscript in his hands, reading in a vibrant tone and interrupted frequently by outburst of enthusiastic applause, the President of the United States asked that Congress recognize that the acts of the Imperial German Government constituted acts of aggression against the United States and that therefore the United States proclaimed that a state of war existed between the two countries.



© Underwood & Underwood

DESCRIPTION OF PICTURES ON REVERSE SIDE

Upper Left Hand Corner—William Howard Taft, Twenty-Seventh President of the United States; Joint Chairman, War Labor Board, April 10, 1918—.

Upper Right Hand Corner—Charles M. Schwab, Director-General, Emergency Fleet Corporation, April 19, 1918-December 8, 1918.

Center—Herbert C. Hoover, Director, Belgian Relief Commission, 1915-1917; Food Administrator of the United States, August 10, 1917—.

Lower Left Hand Corner—George Creel, Chairman, Committee on Public Information, April 14, 1917—.

Lower Right Hand Corner—Edward N. Hurley, Chairman, United States Shipping Board, and President, Emergency Fleet Corporation, July 24, 1917—.

The War Message

Gentlemen of the Congress: I have called the Congress into extraordinary session because there are serious, very serious, choices of policy to be made, and made immediately which it was neither right nor constitutionally permissible that I should assume the responsibility of making.

On the third of February last, I officially laid before you the extraordinary announcement of the Imperial German Government that on and after the first day of February it was its purpose to put aside all restraints of law or of humanity and use its submarines to sink every vessel that sought to approach either the ports of Great Britain and Ireland or the western coast of Europe or any of the ports controlled by the enemies of Germany within the Mediterranean. That had seemed to be the object of the German submarine warfare earlier in the war; but since April of last year the Imperial Government had somewhat restrained the commanders of its undersea craft, in conformity with its promise then given to us that passenger boats should not be sunk, and that due warning would be given to all other vessels which its submarines might seek to destroy, when no resistance was offered or escape attempted, and care taken that their crews were given at least a fair chance to save their lives in their open boats. The precautions taken were meager and haphazard enough, as was proved in distressing instance after instance in the progress of the cruel and unmanly business, but a certain degree of restraint was observed.

The new policy has swept every restriction aside. Vessels of every kind, whatever their flag, their character, their cargo, their destination, their errand, have been ruthlessly sent to the bottom without warning and without thought of help or mercy for those on board—the vessels of friendly neutrals along with those of belligerents. Even hospital ships and ships carrying relief to the sorely bereaved and stricken people of Belgium, though the latter were provided with safe conduct through the proscribed areas by the German Government itself, and were distinguished by unmistakable marks of identity, have been sunk with the same reckless lack of compassion or of principle.

I was for a little while unable to believe that such things would in fact be done by any government that had hitherto subscribed to the humane practices of civilized nations. International law had its origin in the attempt to set up some law which would be respected and observed upon the seas, where no nation had right of dominion and where lay the free highways of the world. By painful stage after stage has that law been built up, with meager enough results, indeed, after all was accomplished that could be accomplished, but always with a clear view, at least, of what the heart and conscience of mankind demanded.

This minimum of right the German Government has swept aside under the plea of retaliation and necessity, and because it had no weapons which it could use at sea except these which it is impossible to employ as it is employing them without throwing to the winds all scruples of humanity or of respect for the understandings that were supposed to underlie the intercourse of the world.

I am not now thinking of the loss of property involved, immense and serious as that is, but only of the wanton and wholesale destruction of the lives of non-combatants, men, women and children, engaged in pursuits which have always, even in the darkest period of modern history, been deemed innocent and legitimate. Property can be paid for; the lives of peaceful and innocent people cannot be.

The present German submarine warfare against commerce is a warfare against mankind. It is a war against all nations. American ships have been sunk, American lives taken in ways which it has stirred us very deeply to learn of, but the ships and people of other neutral and friendly nations have been sunk and overwhelmed in the waters in the same way. There has been no discrimination. The challenge is to all mankind. Each nation must decide for itself how it will meet it. The choice we make for ourselves must be made with a moderation of counsel and a temperateness of judgment befitting our character and our motives as a nation.

We must put excited feeling away. Our motive will not be revenge or the victorious assertion of the physical might of the nation, but only the vindication of right, of human right, of which we are only a single champion.

When I addressed the Congress on the 26th of February last, I thought that it would suffice to assert our neutral right with arms; our right to use the sea against unlawful interference; our right

to keep our people safe against unlawful violence. But armed neutrality, it now appears, is impracticable. Because submarines are in effect outlaws when used as the German submarines have been used against merchant shipping, it is impossible to defend ships against their attacks as the law of nations has assumed that merchantmen would defend themselves against privateers or cruisers, visible craft giving chase upon the open sea. It is common prudence in such circumstances, grim necessity indeed, to endeavor to destroy them before they have shown their own intention. They must be dealt with upon sight, if dealt with at all.

The German Government denies the right of neutrals to use arms at all within the areas of the sea which it has prescribed, even in the defense of rights which no modern publicist has ever before questioned their right to defend. The intimation is conveyed that the armed guards which we have placed on our merchant ships will be treated as beyond the pale of law and subject to be dealt with as pirates would be. Armed neutrality is ineffectual enough at best; in such circumstances and in the face of such pretensions, it is worse than ineffectual; it is likely only to produce what it was meant to prevent; it is practically certain to draw us into the war without either the rights or the effectiveness of belligerents.

There is one choice we cannot make, we are incapable of making —we will not choose the path of submission and suffer the most sacred rights of our nation and our people to be ignored or violated. The wrongs against which we now array ourselves are no common wrongs; they cut to the very roots of human life.

With a profound sense of the solemn and even tragical character of the step I am taking and of the grave responsibilities which it involves, but in unhesitating obedience to what I deem my constitutional duty, I advise that the Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial German Government to be, in fact, nothing less than war against the Government and people of the United States; that it formally accept the status of belligerent which has thus been thrust upon it; and that it take immediate steps not only to put the country in a more thorough state of defense, but also to exert all its power and employ all its resources to bring the Government of the German Empire to terms and end the war.

What this will involve is clear. It will involve the utmost practicable cooperation in counsel and action with the governments now at war with Germany; and, as incident to that, the extension to those governments of the most liberal financial credits, in order

that our resources may, so far as possible, be added to theirs. It will involve the organization and mobilization of all the material resources of the country to supply the materials of war and serve the incidental needs of the nation in the most abundant and yet the most economical and efficient way possible. It will involve the immediate full equipment of the navy in all respects, but particularly in supplying it with the best means of dealing with the enemy's submarines. It will involve the immediate addition to the armed forces of the United States already provided for by law in case of war at least 500,000 men, who should, in my opinion, be chosen upon the principle of universal liability to service, and also the authorization of subsequent additional increments of equal force so soon as they may be needed and can be handled in training.

It will involve also, of course, the granting of adequate credits to the Government, sustained, I hope, so far as they can equitably be sustained, by the present generation, by well-conceived taxation. I say sustained so far as may be equitable by taxation because it seems to me that it would be most unwise to base the credits which will now be necessary entirely on money borrowed. It is our duty, I most respectfully urge, to protect our people so far as we may against the very serious hardships and evils which would be likely to arise out of the inflation which would be produced by vast loans.

In carrying out the measures by which these things are to be accomplished, we should keep constantly in mind the wisdom of interfering as little as possible in our own preparation and in the equipment of our own military forces with the duty—for it will be a very practical duty—of supplying the nations already at war with Germany with the materials which they can obtain only from us or by our assistance. They are in the field, and we should help them in every way to be effective there.

I shall take the liberty of suggesting, through the several executive departments of the Government, for the consideration of your committees, measures for the accomplishment of the several objects I have mentioned. I hope that it will be your pleasure to deal with them as having been framed after very careful thought by the branch of the Government upon which the responsibility of conducting the war and safeguarding the nation will most directly fall.

While we do these things, these deeply momentous things, let us be very clear, and make very clear to all the world what our

motives and our objects are. My own thought has not been driven from its habitual and normal course by the unhappy events of the last two months, and I do not believe that the thought of the nation has been altered or clouded by them.

I have exactly the same things in mind now that I had in mind when I addressed the Senate on the 22d of January last; the same that I had in mind when I addressed the Congress on the 3d of February and on the 26th of February. Our object now, as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up among the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth insure the observance of those principles.

Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved and the freedom of its peoples, and the menace to that peace and freedom lies in the existence of autocratic governments backed by organized force which is controlled wholly by their will, not by the will of their people. We have seen the last of neutrality in such circumstances.

We are at the beginning of an age where it will be insisted that the same standards of conduct and of responsibility for wrong done shall be observed among nations and their governments that are observed among the individual citizens of civilized states.

We have no quarrel with the German people. We have no feeling toward them but one of sympathy and friendship. It was not upon their impulse that their Government acted in entering this war. It was not with their previous knowledge or approval.

It was a war determined upon as wars used to be determined upon in the old, unhappy days when peoples were nowhere consulted by their rulers and wars were provoked and waged in the interest of dynasties or of little groups of ambitious men who were accustomed to use their fellow-men as pawns and tools.

Self-governed nations do not fill their neighbor states with spies or set the course of intrigue to bring about some critical posture of affairs which will give them an opportunity to strike and make conquest. Such designs can be successfully worked out only under cover and where no one has the right to ask questions.

Cunningly contrived plans of deception or aggression, carried, it may be, from generation to generation, can be worked out and kept from the light only within the privacy of courts or behind the carefully guarded confidences of a narrow and privileged class. They are happily impossible where public opinion commands and

insists upon full information concerning all the nation's affairs.

A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants. It must be a league of honor, a partnership of opinion. Intrigue would eat its vitals away; the plottings of inner circles who could plan what they would and render account to no one would be a corruption seated at its very heart. Only free peoples can hold their purpose and their honor steady to a common end and prefer the interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their own.

Does not every American feel that assurance has been added to our hope for the future peace of the world by the wonderful and heartening things that have been happening within the last few weeks in Russia?

Russia was known by those who knew her best to have been always in fact democratic at heart, in all the vital habits of her thought, in all the intimate relationships of her people that spoke their natural instinct, their habitual attitude toward life.

The autocracy that crowned the summit of her political structure, long as it had stood and terrible as was the reality of its power, was not in fact Russian in origin, character or purpose; and now it has been shaken off and the great generous Russian people have been added in all their native majesty and might to the forces that are fighting for a freedom in the world, for justice and for peace. Here is a fit partner for a league of honor.

One of the things that has served to convince us that the Prussian autocracy was not and could never be our friend is that from the very outset of the present war it has filled our unsuspecting communities and even our offices of government with spies and set criminal intrigues everywhere afoot against our national unity of council, our peace within and without, our industries and our commerce.

Indeed, it is now evident that its spies were here even before the war began; and it unhappily is not a matter of conjecture, but a fact proved in our courts of justice, that the intrigues which have more than once come perilously near to disturbing the peace and dislocating the industries of the country have been carried on at the instigation, with the support, and even under the personal direction of official agents of the Imperial Government accredited to the Government of the United States.

Even in checking these things and trying to extirpate them, we

have sought to put the most generous interpretation possible upon them because we knew that their source lay, not in any hostile feeling or purpose of the German people toward us (who were, no doubt, as ignorant of them as we ourselves were), but only in the selfish designs of a government that did what it pleased and told its people nothing. But they have played their part in serving to convince us at last that that government entertains no real friendship for us and means to act against our peace and security at its convenience. That it means to stir up enemies against us at our very doors, the intercepted note to the German Minister at Mexico City is eloquent evidence.

We are accepting this challenge of hostile purpose because we know that in such a government, following such methods, we can never have a friend; and that in the presence of its organized power always lying in wait to accomplish we know not what purpose, there can be no assured security for the democratic governments of the world.

We are now about to accept gauge of battle with this natural foe to liberty and shall, if necessary, spend the whole force of the nation to check and nullify its pretensions and end its power. We are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of false pretense about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples, the German peoples included; for the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience. The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty.

We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquests, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensations for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of the nations can make them.

Just because we fight without rancor and without selfish object, seeking nothing for ourselves but what we shall wish to share with all free peoples, we shall, I feel confident, conduct our operations as belligerents without passion and ourselves observe with proud punctilio the principles of right and of fair play we profess to be fighting for.

I have said nothing of the Governments allied with the Imperial Government of Germany because they have not made war upon us or challenged us to defend our right and our honor. The

Austro-Hungarian Government has, indeed, avowed its unqualified indorsement and acceptance of the reckless and lawless submarine warfare adopted now without disguise by the Imperial German Government, and it has therefore not been possible for this Government to receive Count Tarnowski, the Ambassador recently accredited to this Government by the Imperial and Royal Government of Austria-Hungary; but that Government has not actually engaged in warfare against citizens of the United States on the seas, and I take the liberty, for the present at least, of postponing a discussion of our relations with the authorities at Vienna. We enter this war only where we are clearly forced into it because there are no other means of defending our rights.

It will be all the easier for us to conduct ourselves as belligerents in a high spirit of right and fairness because we act without animus, not in enmity toward a people nor with the desire to bring any injury or disadvantage upon them, but only in armed opposition to an irresponsible Government which has thrown aside all considerations of humanity and of right and is running amuck.

We are, let me say again, the sincere friends of the German people, and shall desire nothing so much as the early re-establishment of intimate relations of mutual advantage between us—however hard it may be for them, for the time being, to believe that this is spoken from our hearts. We have borne with their present Government through all these bitter months because of that friendship—exercising a patience and forbearance which would otherwise have been impossible. We shall, happily, still have an opportunity to prove that friendship in our daily attitude and actions toward the millions of men and women of German birth and native sympathy who live among us and share our life, and we shall be proud to prove it toward all who are in fact loyal to their neighbors and to the Government in the hour of test. They are, most of them, as true and loyal Americans as if they had never known any other fealty or allegiance. They will be prompt to stand with us in rebuking and restraining the few who may be of a different mind and purpose.

If there should be disloyalty, it will be dealt with with a firm hand of stern repression; but if it lifts its head at all, it will lift it only here and there and without countenance, except from a lawless and malignant few.

It is a distressing and oppressive duty, gentlemen of the Congress, which I have performed in thus addressing you. There are, it may be, many months of fiery trial and sacrifice ahead of

us. It is a fearful thing to lead this great peaceful people into war, into the most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself seeming to be in the balance. But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts—for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal domination of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free. To such a task we can dedicate our lives and our fortunes, everything that we are and everything that we have, with the pride of those who know that the day has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has treasured. God helping her, she can do no other.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE WAR, APRIL 6, 1917-NOVEMBER 11, 1918

[NOTE—*The military and naval activities of the United States in the Great War were conducted as part of the general military and naval activities of the Allies, and will be considered later in a military and naval history of the War.*]

By a vote of 86 to 6 in the Senate and by a vote of 373 to 50 in the House of Representatives, the resolution of war was passed on April 6, 1917, and was proclaimed by the President on the same day.

> Whereas the Congress of the United States in the exercise of the constitutional authority vested in them have resolved, by joint resolution of the Senate and House of Representatives bearing date this day "That the state of war between the United States and the Imperial German Government which has been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared;" . . . .
>
> Now, therefore, I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim to all whom it may concern that a state of war exists between the United States and the Imperial German Government; and I do specially direct all officers, civil or military, of the United States that they exercise vigilance and zeal in the discharge of the duties incident to such a state of war; and I do, moreover, earnestly appeal to all American citizens that they, in loyal devotion to their country, dedicated from its foundation to the principles of liberty and justice, uphold the laws of the land, and give undivided and willing support to those measures which may be adopted by the constitutional authorities in prosecuting the war to a successful issue and in obtaining a secure and just peace; . . . .

Austria-Hungary broke off diplomatic relations with the United States on April 9, 1917, and Turkey pursued the same course twelve days later, although the declaration of war by the United States had been directed only at Germany. Germany's other ally, Bulgaria, maintained her diplomatic intercourse with the United States.

The entrance of the United States into the Great War necessitated a completely new orientation in America. Old and respected traditions had to be discarded and new and untried methods adopted. To this end, the President directly addressed his fellow-countrymen on April 16, 1917.

MY FELLOW-COUNTRYMEN:

The entrance of our own beloved country into the grim and terrible war for democracy and human rights which has shaken the world, creates so many problems of national life and action which call for immediate consideration and settlement that I hope you will permit me to address to you a few words of earnest counsel and appeal with regard to them.

We are rapidly putting our navy upon an effective war footing and are about to create and equip a great army, but these are the simplest parts of the great task to which we have addressed ourselves. . . . .

These, then, are the things we must do, and do well, besides fighting,—the things without which mere fighting would be fruitless:

We must supply abundant food for ourselves and for our armies and our seamen not only, but also for a large part of the nations with whom we have now made common cause, in whose support and by whose sides we shall be fighting;

We must supply ships by the hundreds out of our shipyards to carry to the other side of the sea, submarines or no submarines, what will every day be needed there, and abundant materials out of our fields and our mines and our factories with which not only to clothe and equip our own forces on land and sea but also to clothe and support our people for whom the gallant fellows under arms can no longer work, to help clothe and equip the armies with which we are cooperating in Europe, and to keep the looms and manufactories there in raw material. . . . .

It is evident to every thinking man that our industries, on the farms, in the shipyards, in the mines, in the factories, must be made more prolific and more efficient than ever and that they must be more economically managed and better adapted to the particular requirements of our task than they have been; and what I want to say is that the men and the women who devote their thought and their energy to these things will be serving the country and conducting the fight for peace and freedom just as truly and

just as effectively as the men on the battlefield or in the trenches. The industrial forces of the country, men and women alike, will be a great national, a great international, Service Army,—a notable and honored host engaged in the service of the nation and the world, the efficient friends and saviors of free men everywhere. Thousands, nay, hundreds of thousands, of men otherwise liable to military service will of right and of necessity be excused from that service and assigned to the fundamental, sustaining work of the fields and factories and mines; and they will be as much part of the great patriotic forces of the nation as the men under fire.

I take the liberty, therefore, of addressing this word to the farmers of the country and to all who work on the farms: The supreme need of our own nation and of the nations with which we are cooperating is an abundance of supplies, and especially of foodstuffs. The importance of an adequate food supply, especially for the present year, is superlative. Without abundant food, alike for the armies and the peoples now at war, the whole great enterprise upon which we have embarked will break down and fail. The world's food reserves are low. Not only during the present emergency but for some time after peace shall have come both our own people and a large proportion of the people of Europe must rely upon the harvests in America. Upon the farmers of this country, therefore, in large measure, rests the fate of the war and the fate of the nations. . . . .

I particularly appeal to the farmers of the South to plant abundant food stuffs as well as cotton. They can show their patriotism in no better or more convincing way than by resisting the great temptation of the present price of cotton and helping, helping upon a great scale, to feed the nation and the peoples everywhere who are fighting for their liberties and for our own. The variety of their crops will be the visible measure of their comprehension of their national duty. . . . .

This let me say to the middlemen of every sort, whether they are handling our food stuffs or our raw materials of manufacture or the products of our mills and factories: The eyes of the country will be especially upon you. This is your opportunity for signal service, efficient and disinterested. The country expects you, as it expects all others, to forego unusual profits, to organize and expedite shipments of supplies of every kind, but especially of food, with an eye to the service you are rendering and in the spirit of those who enlist in the ranks, for their people, not for themselves. . . . .

To the men who run the railways of the country, whether they be managers or operative employees, let me say that the railways are the arteries of the nation's life and that upon them rests the immense responsibility of seeing to it that those arteries suffer no obstruction of any kind, no inefficiency or slackened power. To the merchant let me suggest the motto, "Small profits and quick service;" and to the shipbuilder the thought that the life of the war depends upon him. The food and the war supplies must be carried across the seas no matter how many ships are sent to the bottom. The places of those that go down must be supplied and supplied at once. To the miner let me say that he stands where the farmer does: the work of the world waits on him. If he slackens or fails, armies and statesmen are helpless. He also is enlisted in the great Service Army. The manufacturer does not need to be told, I hope, that the nation looks to him to speed and perfect every process; and I want only to remind his employees that their service is absolutely indispensable and is counted on by every man who loves the country and its liberties.

Let me suggest, also, that everyone who creates or cultivates a garden helps, and helps greatly, to solve the problem of the feeding of the nations; and that every housewife who practices strict economy puts herself in the ranks of those who serve the nation. This is the time for America to correct her unpardonable fault of wastefulness and extravagance. Let every man and every woman assume the duty of careful, provident use and expenditure as a public duty, as a dictate of patriotism which no one can now expect ever to be excused or forgiven for ignoring. . . . .

The supreme test of the nation has come. We must all speak, act, and serve together!

The United States immediately took over 91 German and Austrian vessels in the waters of the United States, thereby increasing its tonnage by more than 600,000, and acquiring some of the largest vessels afloat. Their crews were interned. Other Germans suspected of designs against the United States were also interned, but general internment of alien enemies was avoided during the war, although later certain restrictions regarding travel along waterfronts and near fortifications, arsenals and similar places were imposed.

On April 14, 1917, Congress passed unanimously a bill providing for a loan of $7.000,000 for war purposes.

Alien Enemies

Under section 4067 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, an enemy alien is defined as follows: Any native, citizen, denizen, or subject of a hostile government being a male of the age of fourteen years and upwards and not actually naturalized in the United States.

Amplifications of the definition are as follows:

(a) Children of naturalized enemies, even though born in the enemy country, are not enemy aliens providing naturalization of their parents is completed before the children have reached maturity. Otherwise, such children are enemy aliens until they are naturalized themselves.

(b) Children born in the United States of enemy aliens residing in the United States are not alien enemies unless after maturity they become naturalized in the enemy country.

(c) Naturalization of enemy aliens cannot be completed during the period of war with the enemy country.

(d) Children born in an enemy country of American citizens temporarily residing in that enemy country are not alien enemies. However, if the residence of the parents in the enemy country is permanent, the children are alien enemies unless they have established by suitable action citizenship in the United States.

(e) A native, citizen, denizen or subject of an enemy country remains an alien enemy even though he has taken out his first naturalization papers or has been naturalized in a country other than the United States.

During the first year of the war between the United States and the Central Powers, 2,049 alien enemies and war prisoners were confined in war prison barracks at Fort McPherson, Ga., Fort Oglethorpe, Ga., Fort Douglas, Utah. During the entire participation of America

in the Great War, some 4,000 alien enemies were interned in the United States.

During the struggle of the United States with the Central Powers, Attorney-General Gregory estimated the number of unnaturalized male alien enemies upward of 14 years of age as follows: Germans, 450,000; Austrians, 600,000; Hungarians, 400,000. Estimating three to a family, there were accordingly more than 4,000,000 persons in the United States during the war who were either male unnaturalized alien enemies or members of the families of such.

By act of Congress approved April 16, 1918, the term "alien enemies" was made to include women as well as men.

In February, 1918, all male alien enemies were required to register with the government and in June of the same year, female alien enemies.

Among the regulations for alien enemies during the war against Germany were the following:

> . . . . . All alien enemies are enjoined to preserve the peace towards the United States and to refrain from crime against the public safety, and from violating the laws of the United States and of the States and Territories thereof, and to refrain from actual hostility or giving information, aid or comfort to the enemies of the United States, and to comply strictly with the regulations which are hereby or which may be from time to time promulgated by the President; and so long as they shall conduct themselves in accordance with law, they shall be undisturbed in the peaceful pursuit of their lives and occupations and be accorded the consideration due to all peaceful and law-abiding persons, except so far as restrictions may be necessary for their own protection and for the safety of the United States; and towards such alien enemies as conduct themselves in accordance with law, all citizens of the United States are enjoined to preserve the peace and to treat them with all such friendliness as may be compatible with loyalty and allegiance to the United States.
>
> And all alien enemies who fail to conduct themselves as so enjoined, in addition to all other penalties prescribed by law, shall be liable to restraint, or to give security, or to remove and depart from the United States in the manner prescribed by Sections four thousand and sixty-nine and four thousand and seventy of the

Revised Statutes, and as prescribed in the regulations duly promulgated by the President;

And pursuant to the authority vested in me, I (Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of America) hereby declare and establish the following regulations, which I find necessary in the premises and for the public safety:

(1) An alien enemy shall not have in his possession, at any time or place, any fire-arm, weapon or implement of war, or component part thereof, ammunition, maxim or other silencer, bomb or explosive or material used in the manufacture of explosives;

(2) An alien enemy shall not have in his possession at any time or place, or use or operate any aircraft or wireless apparatus, or any form of signalling device, or any form of cipher code, or any paper, document or book written or printed in cipher or in which there may be invisible writing.

(3) All property found in the possession of an alien enemy in violation of the foregoing regulations shall be subject to seizure by the United States;


(4) An alien enemy shall not approach or be found within one-half of a mile of any Federal or State fort, camp, arsenal, aircraft station, Government or naval vessel, navy yard, factory, or workshop for the manufacture of munitions of war or of any products for the use of the army or navy:

(5) An alien enemy shall not write, print, or publish any attack or threats against the Government or Congress of the United States, or either branch thereof, or against the measures or policy of the United States, or against the person or property of any person in the military, naval, or civil service of the United States, or of the States or Territories, or of the District of Columbia, or of the municipal governments therein;

(6) An alien enemy shall not commit or abet any hostile act against the United States, or give information, aid, or comfort to its enemies;

(7) An alien enemy shall not reside in or continue to reside in, to remain in, or enter any locality which the President may from time to time designate by Executive Order as a prohibited area in which residence by an alien enemy shall be found by him to constitute a danger to the public peace and safety of the United States, except by permit from the President and except under such limitations or restrictions as the President may prescribe;

(8) An alien enemy whom the President shall have reasonable



Photos Supplied by International Film Service

TROOPS AT CAMP

The upper panel shows a band of raw negro recruits, just arrived at camp, being given their first drill in the United States Army.

In the oval central panel, a band of recruits which has advanced in training far enough to be completely uniformed, is being given instructions by a training officer as it is lined up for inspection.

In the two rectangular central panels, the centre of interest is the army "chow." In the left-hand picture, doughboys are lined up to receive breakfast and in the right-hand, a company resting in a field during a march is discussing lunch.

In the lower picture, a machine-gun company is receiving instruction in the handling of the Lewis gun

cause to believe to be aiding or about to aid the enemy, or to be at large to the danger of the public peace or safety of the United States, or to have violated or to be about to violate any of these regulations, shall remove to any location designated by the President by Executive Order, and shall not remove therefrom without a permit, or shall depart from the United States if so required by the President;

(9) No alien enemy shall depart from the United States until he shall have received such permit as the President shall prescribe, or except under order of a court, judge, or justice, under Sections 4069 and 4070 of the Revised Statutes;

(10) No alien enemy shall land in or enter the United States, except under such restrictions and at such places as the President may prescribe;

(11) If necessary to prevent violations of these regulations, all alien enemies will be obliged to register;

(12) An alien enemy whom there may be reasonable cause to believe to be aiding or about to aid the enemy, or who may be at large to the danger of the public peace or safety, or who violates or attempts to violate, or of whom there is reasonable ground to believe that he is about to violate, any regulation duly promulgated by the President, or any criminal law of the United States, or of the States or Territories thereof, will be subject to summary arrest by the United States Marshal, or his deputy, or such other officer as the President shall designate, and to confinement in such penitentiary, prison, jail, military camp, or other place of detention as may be directed by the President. . . . .

(*April 6, 1917*)

. . . . . (13) An alien enemy shall not approach or be found within one hundred yards of any canal; nor within one hundred yards of any wharf, pier or dock used directly by or by means of lighters by any vessel or vessels of over five hundred (500) tons gross engaged in foreign or domestic trade other than fishing; nor within one hundred yards of any warehouse, shed, elevator, railroad terminal or other terminal, storage or transfer facility adjacent to or operated in connection with any such wharf, pier or dock; and wherever the distance between any two of such wharves, piers or docks, measured along the shore line connecting them, is less than eight hundred and eighty yards, an alien enemy shall not approach or be found within one hundred yards of such shore line.

(14) Whenever the Attorney General of the United States deems it to be necessary, for the public safety and the protection of transportation, to exclude alien enemies from the vicinity of any warehouse, elevator or railroad depot, yard or terminal which is not located within any prohibited area designated by this proclamation or the proclamation of April 6th, 1917, then an alien enemy shall not approach or be found within such distance of any such warehouse elevator, depot, yard or terminal as may be specified by the Attorney General by regulation duly made and declared by him; and the Attorney General is hereby authorized to fix, by regulations to be made and declared from time to time, the area surrounding any such warehouse, elevator, depot, yard or terminal from which he deems it necessary, for the public safety and the protection of transportation, to exclude alien enemies.

(15) An alien enemy shall not, except on public ferries, be found on any ocean, bay, river or other waters within three miles of the shore line of the United States or its territorial possessions; said shore line for the purpose of this proclamation being hereby defined as the line of sea coast and the shores of all waters of the United States and its territorial possessions connected with the high seas and navigable by ocean going vessels; nor on any of the Great Lakes, their connecting waters or harbors, within the boundaries of the United States.

(16) No alien enemy shall ascend into the air in any airplane, balloon, airship, or flying machine.

(17) An alien enemy shall not enter or be found within the District of Columbia.

(18) An alien enemy shall not enter or be found within the Panama Canal Zone.

(19) All alien enemies are hereby required to register at such times and places and in such manner as may be fixed by the Attorney General of the United States and the Attorney General is hereby authorized and directed to provide, as speedily as may be practicable, for registration of all alien enemies and for the issuance of registration cards to alien enemies and to make and declare such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary for affecting such registration; and all alien enemies and all other persons are hereby required to comply with such rules and regulations; and the Attorney General in carrying out such registration is hereby authorized to utilize such agents, agencies, officers and departments of the United States and of the several states, territories, dependencies and municipalities thereof and of the District of Colum-

bia as he may select for the purpose, and all such agents, agencies, officers and departments are hereby granted full authority for all acts done by them in the execution of this regulation when acting by the direction of the Attorney General. After the date fixed by the Attorney General for such registration, an alien enemy shall not be found within the limits of the United States, its territories or possessions, without having his registration card on his person.

(20) An alien enemy shall not change his place of abode or occupation or otherwise travel or move from place to place without full compliance with any such regulations as the Attorney General of the United States may, from time to time, make and declare; and the Attorney General is hereby authorized to make and declare, from time to time, such regulations concerning the movements of alien enemies as he may deem necessary in the premises and for the public safety, and to provide in such regulations for monthly, weekly or other periodical report by alien enemies to federal, state or local authorities; and all alien enemies shall report at the times and places and to the authorities specified in such regulations. . . . .

(*November 16, 1917*)

. . . . . All natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of Austria-Hungary, being males of the ages of 14 years and upward, who shall be within the United States and not actually naturalized, who fail to conduct themselves as so enjoined, in addition to all other penalties prescribed by law, shall be liable to restraint, or to give security, or to remove and depart from the United States in the manner prescribed by Sections 4,069 and 4,070 of the Revised Statutes, and as prescribed in regulations duly promulgated by the President;

And pursuant to the authority vested in me I hereby declare and establish the following regulations, which I find necessary in the premises and for the public safety:

(1) No native, citizen, denizen, or subject of Austria-Hungary, being a male of the age of 14 years and upward, and not actually naturalized, shall depart from the United States until he shall have received such permit as the President shall prescribe, or except under order of a court, Judge, or Justice, under Sections 4,069 and 4,070 of the Revised Statutes;

(2) No such person shall land in or enter the United States,

except under such restrictions and at such places as the President may prescribe;

(3) Every such person of whom there may be reasonable cause to believe that he is aiding or about to aid the enemy, or who may be at large to the danger of the public peace or safety, or who violates or attempts to violate or of whom there is reasonable ground to believe that he is about to violate any regulation duly promulgated by the President, or any criminal law of the United States, or of the States or Territories thereof, will be subject to summary arrest by the United States Marshal, or his deputy, or such other officers as the President shall designate, and to confinement in such penitentiary, prison, jail, military camp, or other place of detention as may be directed by the President. . . . .

(*December 11, 1917*)

. . . . . All such natives, citizens, denizens or subjects of Germany or Austria-Hungary are enjoined to preserve the peace towards the United States and to refrain from crime against the public safety, and from violating the laws of the United States and of the States and Territories thereof, and to refrain from actual hostility or giving information, aid or comfort to the enemies of the United States, and to comply strictly with the regulations which are hereby or which have been or may be from time to time promulgated by the President; and so long as they shall conduct themselves in accordance with law, they shall be undisturbed in the peaceful pursuit of their lives and occupations and be accorded the consideration due to all peaceful and law-abiding persons, except so far as restrictions may be necessary for their own protection and for the safety of the United States; and towards such of said persons as conduct themselves in accordance with law, all citizens of the United States are enjoined to preserve the peace and to treat them with all such friendliness as may be compatible with loyalty and allegiance to the United States.

And all of such natives, citizens, denizens or subjects of Germany or Austria-Hungary who fail to conduct themselves as so enjoined, in addition to all other penalties prescribed by law, shall be liable to restraint, or to give security, or to remove and depart from the United States in the manner prescribed by sections four thousand and sixty-nine and four thousand and seventy of the Revised Statutes, and as prescribed in the regulations duly promulgated by the President;

And pursuant to the authority vested in me, I hereby declare and proclaim, as necessary in the premises and for the public safety, that Regulations 1 to 12, inclusive, in the Proclamation issued by me under date of April 6th, 1917, and Regulations 13 to 20, inclusive, in the Proclamation issued by me under date of November 16th, 1917, shall be and they hereby are, extended to and declared applicable to all natives, citizens, denizens or subjects of Germany, being females of the age of fourteen years and upwards, who shall be within the United States and not actually naturalized; provided, that this extension of Regulation 4 of the Proclamation issued by me under date of April 6th, 1917, shall not become effective until such time as may be fixed and declared by the Attorney General of the United States.

And pursuant to the authority vested in me, I hereby declare and proclaim, as necessary in the premises and for the public safety, that Regulations 1 to 3, inclusive, in the Proclamation issued by me under date of December 11th, 1917, shall be, and they are hereby, extended to and declared applicable to all natives, citizens, denizens or subjects of Austria-Hungary, being females of the age of fourteen years and upwards, who shall be within the United States and not actually naturalized. . . . .

On April 16, 1917, President Wilson issued a proclamation calling attention to the acts defined by the laws of the United States as constituting treason and misprision of treason, and warning all persons in the United States of the punishments provided for such acts.

. . . . . Whereas, all persons in the United States, citizens as well as aliens, should be informed of the penalties which they will incur for any failure to bear true allegiance to the United States;

Now, therefore, I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, hereby issue this proclamation to call especial attention to the following provisions of the Constitution and the laws of the United States:

Section 3 of Article III of the Constitution provides, in part:

Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.

The Criminal Code of the United States provides:

Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and

comfort within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason.

Section 2

Whoever is convicted of treason shall suffer death; or, at the discretion of the court, shall be imprisoned not less than five years and fined not less than ten thousand dollars, to be levied on and collected out of any or all of his property, real and personal, of which he was the owner at the time of committing such treason, any sale or conveyance to the contrary notwithstanding; and every person so convicted of treason shall, moreover, be incapable of holding any office under the United States.

Section 3

Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States and having knowledge of the commission of any treason against them, conceals and does not, as soon as may be, disclose and make known the same to the President or to some judge of the United States, or to the governor or to some judge or justice of a particular State, is guilty of misprision of treason and shall be imprisoned not more than seven years, and fined not more than one thousand dollars.

Section 6

If two or more persons in any State or Territory, or in any place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, conspire to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States, or by force to seize, take, or possess any property of the United States contrary to the authority thereof, they shall each be fined not more than five thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more than six years, or both.

The courts of the United States have stated the following acts be treasonable:

The use or attempted use of any force or violence against the Government of the United States, or its military or naval forces;

The acquisition, use, or disposal of any property with knowledge that it is to be, or with intent that it shall be, of assistance to the enemy in their hostilities against the United States;

The performance of any act or the publication of statements or information which will give or supply, in any way, aid and comfort to the enemies of the United States;

The direction, aiding, counseling, or countenancing of any of the foregoing acts.

Such acts are held to be treasonable whether committed within the United States or elsewhere; whether committed by a citizen of the United States or by an alien domiciled, or residing, in the United States, inasmuch as resident aliens, as well as citizens, owe allegiance to the United States and its laws.

Any such citizen or alien who has knowledge of the commission of such acts and conceals and does not make known the facts to the officials named in Section 3 of the Penal Code is guilty of misprision of treason.

And I hereby proclaim and warn all citizens of the United States, and all aliens, owing allegiance to the Government of the United States, to abstain from committing any and all acts which would constitute a violation of any of the laws herein set forth; and I further proclaim and warn all persons who may commit such acts that they will be vigorously prosecuted therefor. . . . .

The Selective Draft

Conscription for obtaining men for the military forces of a government depends on the general principle that it is the duty of a citizen to defend the government whose protection he enjoys. In the United States, the several state constitutions make citizens liable to military duty, and the Constitution of the United States (Article 1, section 8, clause 12) gives Congress power to raise armies, which, the courts have held, includes the right of conscription. There was some application of the draft principle in the early Colonial armies and in the Revolutionary Army. During the War of 1812, the need for troops led to the introduction of a bill in Congress, known as the "Draft of 1814," providing for a draft from the militia, but it failed to pass.

During the Civil War the need of soldiers occasioned the passage of the Conscription Bill, which became law on March 3, 1863 (afterwards amended in February and July, 1864). This bill provided for the enrollment of all able-bodied citizens between eighteen and forty-five years of age. In default of volunteers to fill the quota from a congressional district, the deficiency was to be supplied by drafts from the enrolled citizens. Provisions were made for the acceptance of substitutes or commutations of $300 each in place of drafted individuals. Persons refusing obedience were to be considered as deserters. A call for 300,000 troops was issued by the President in May, and the application of the draft created serious riots. It was alleged that a disproportionate number of men had been demanded from Democratic districts; these discrepancies were corrected by the War Department. In October, 1863, the President issued another call for 300,000 men, and a draft was ordered for the following January to supply any deficiences. Other drafts were subsequently made. The provision for exemption by the payment of $300 was repealed in 1864, but the provision for substitutes remained.

The operation of the drafts was not satisfactory in the number of

men directly obtained, and desertions were frequent among such men as were drafted, but voluntary enlistments were quickened. It is estimated that only about 20,000 men were obtained by the draft principle for the Union armies in the Civil War. The Confederate States had very stringent conscription laws, which were rigidly enforced.

In his War Message to Congress, President Wilson had advocated conscription as the best method to raise the huge armies needed by the United States in its prosecution of the war across the seas and on May 18, 1917, a bill to that effect became the law of the land. The bill provided for the drafting of an army of 500,000 men, between the ages of 21 and 30, both inclusive. It also provided for raising the regular army and the National Guards of the United States to their full legal strength, for the incorporation into national service of the National Guards of the several states, and for a day for general registration for the draft. By proclamation, the President then assigned June 5, 1917, as the day for registration. Passages from the President's proclamation are as follows:

> . . . . . And I do further proclaim and give notice to all persons subject to registration in the several States and in the District of Columbia in accordance with the above law, that the time and place of such registration shall be between 7 A. M. and 7 P. M. on the fifth day of June, 1917, at the registration place in the precinct wherein they have their permanent homes. Those who shall have attained their twenty-first birthday and who shall not have attained their thirty-first birthday on or before the day here named are required to register, excepting only officers and enlisted men of the regular army, the navy, the Marine Corps, and the National Guard and Naval Militia, while in the service of the United States, and officers in the Officers' Reserve Corps and enlisted men in the Enlisted Reserve Corps while in active service. In the territories of Alaska, Hawaii, and Porto Rico, a day for registration will be named in a later proclamation. . . . .
>
> The Power against which we are arrayed has sought to impose its will upon the world by force. To this end it has increased armament until it has changed the face of war. In the sense in which we have been wont to think of armies, there are no armies in this struggle, there are entire nations armed. Thus, the men who remain to till the soil and man the factories are no less a part of the army that is in France than the men beneath the battle flags.

It must be so with us. It is not an army that we must shape and train for war; it is a nation. . . . .

The whole nation must be a team, in which each man shall play the part for which he is best fitted. To this end, Congress has provided that the nation shall be organized for war by selection; that each man shall be classified for service in the place to which it shall best serve the general good to call him.

The significance of this cannot be overstated. It is a new thing in our history and a landmark in our progress. It is a new manner of accepting and vitalizing our duty to give ourselves with thoughtful devotion to the common purpose of us all. It is in no sense a conscription of the unwilling; it is, rather, selection from a nation which has volunteered in mass. It is no more a choosing of those who shall march with the colors than it is a selection of those who shall serve an equally necessary and devoted purpose in the industries that lie behind the battle line.

The day here named is the time upon which all shall present themselves for assignment to their tasks. It is for that reason destined to be remembered as one of the most conspicuous moments in our history. It is nothing less than the day upon which the manhood of the country shall step forward in one solid rank in defense of the ideals to which this nation is consecrated. It is important to those ideals no less than to the pride of this generation in manifesting its devotion to them, that there be no gaps in the ranks.

It is essential that the day be approached in thoughtful apprehension of its significance, and that we accord to it the honor and the meaning that it deserves. Our industrial need prescribes that it be not made a technical holiday, but the stern sacrifice that is before us urges that it be carried in all our hearts as a great day of patriotic devotion and obligation, when the duty shall lie upon every man, whether he is himself to be registered or not, to see to it that the name of every male person of the designated ages is written on these lists of honor. . . . .

Those exempted from the operation of the draft were officers and officials of the several states and of the Federal government; those in industry whom the President might deem it wise to withhold from military service; ministers and theological students; those belonging before the announcement of the draft to a well-established religious body whose tenets forbid participation in war; and those found upon

examination to be physically or morally unfit for service. To fill up gaps in the National Guard, the number to be drafted was finally placed at 687,000.

Registration for the draft occurred in June, 1917; and the numbers were drawn by lot in July. By December 31, the members of the new "National Army" were at cantonments receiving instruction.

On July 2, 1917, President Wilson made this further analysis of the principle of the selective draft:

> . . . . . Any system of selecting men for military service, whether voluntary or involuntary in its operation, necessarily selects some men to bear the burden of danger and sacrifice for the whole Nation. The system here provided places all men of military age upon an even plane and then, by a selection which neither favors the one nor penalizes the other, calls out the requisite number for service.
>
> The successful operation of this law and of these regulations depends necessarily upon the loyalty, patriotism, and justice of the members of the board to whom its operation is committed, and I admonish all members of every local board and of every district board of review that their duty to their country requires an impartial and fearless performance of the delicate and difficult duties intrusted to them. They should remember as to each individual case presented to them that they are called upon to adjudicate the most sacred rights of the individual and to preserve untarnished the honor of the Nation.
>
> Our armies at the front will be strengthened and sustained if they be composed of men free from any sense of injustice in their mode of selection, and they will be inspired to loftier efforts in behalf of a country in which the citizens called upon to perform high public functions perform them with justice, fearlessness, and impartiality.

On July 9, 1917, President Wilson issued a proclamation calling the National Guards of the several states into national service for the national defense:

> Whereas, The United States of America and the Imperial German Government are now at war, and, having in view the consequent danger of aggression by a foreign enemy upon the

territory of the United States and the necessity for proper protection against possible interference with the execution of the laws of the Union by agents of the enemy, I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, and through the Governors of the respective States, call into the service of the United States as of and from the dates hereinafter respectively indicated, all members of the National Guard and all enlisted members of the National Guard Reserve of the following States who are not now in the service of the United States, except members of staff corps and departments not included in the personnel of tactical organizations, and except such officers of the National Guard as have been or may be specifically notified by my authority that they will not be affected by this call, to wit:

On July 15, 1917—New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, West Virginia, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Nebraska.

On July 25, 1917—Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Illinois, Montana, Wyoming, Idaho, Washington, and Oregon.

The members of the National Guard of the various States affected by this call will be concentrated at such places as may be designated by the War Department.

II. And under the authority conferred upon me by Clause II of Section I of the Act of Congress "to authorize the President to increase temporarily the military establishment of the United States," approved May 18, 1917, I do hereby draft into the military service of the United States, as of and from the fifth day of August, nineteen hundred and seventeen, all members of the National Guard and all enlisted members of the National Guard Reserve of the following States, except members of staff corps and departments not included in the personnel of tactical organizations and except such other officers of the National Guard as have been or may be especially notified by my authority that they will not be drafted, to wit:

New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, West Virginia, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, District

of Columbia, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Illinois, Montana, Wyoming, Idaho, Washington, Oregon, Indiana, Kentucky, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas, Missouri, Kansas, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, and California.

III. All persons hereby drafted shall, on and from the fifth day of August, 1917, stand discharged from the militia and, under the terms of Section II of the Act of May 18, 1917, be subject to the laws and regulations governing the regular army, except as to promotions, so far as such laws and regulations are applicable to persons whose permanent retention in the military service on the active or retired list is not contemplated by law.

IV. The members of each company, battalion, regiment, brigade, division or other organization of the National Guard hereby drafted into the military service of the United States shall be embodied in organizations corresponding to those of the regular army. . . . .

In November, 1917, President Wilson issued a proclamation announcing a change of system in the selective draft. Under the new method all registrants were to be divided into five classes, which would be summoned to service in order, so that demands would not be made upon members of one class until all members of the preceding class had been called to the colors. The five classes were defined as follows:

CLASS I

Div.

A—Single man without dependent relatives.

B—Married man, with or without children, or father of motherless children, who has habitually failed to support his family.

C—Married man dependent on wife for support.

D—Married man, with or without children, or father of motherless children; man not usefully engaged, family supported by income independent of his labor.

E—Unskilled farm laborer.

F—Unskilled industrial laborer.

Registrant by or in respect of whom no deferred classification is claimed or made.

Registrant who fails to submit questionnaire and in respect of whom no deferred classification is claimed or made.

All registrants not included in any other division in this schedule.

CLASS II

A—Married man with children or father of motherless children, where such wife or children or such motherless children are not mainly dependent upon his labor for support, for the reason that there are other reasonably certain sources of adequate support (excluding earnings or possible earnings from the labor of the wife) available, and that the removal of the registrant will not deprive such dependents of support.

B—Married man, without children, whose wife, although the registrant is engaged in a useful occupation, is not mainly dependent upon his labor for support, for the reason that the wife is skilled in some special class of work which she is physically able to perform and in which she is employed, or in which there is an immediate opening for her under conditions that will enable her to support herself decently and without suffering or hardship.

C—Necessary skilled farm laborer in necessary agricultural enterprise.

D—Necessary skilled industrial laborer in necessary industrial enterprise.

CLASS III

A—Man with dependent children (not his own), but toward whom he stands in relation of parent.

B—Man with dependent aged or infirm parents.

C—Man with dependent helpless brothers or sisters.

D—County or municipal officer.

E—Highly trained fireman or policeman, at least three years in service of municipality.

F—Necessary custom house clerk.

G—Necessary employe of United States in transmission of the mails.
H—Necessary artificer or workman in United States army or arsenal.
I—Necessary employe in service of United States.
J—Necessary assistant, associate or hired manager of necessary agricultural enterprise.
K—Necessary highly specialized technical or mechanical expert of necessary industrial enterprise.
L—Necessary assistant or associate manager of necessary industrial enterprise.

CLASS IV

A—Man whose wife or children are mainly dependent on his labor for support.
B—Mariner actually employed in sea service of citizen or merchant in the United States.
C—Necessary sole managing, controlling or directing head of necessary agricultural enterprise.
D—Necessary sole managing, controlling or directing head of necessary industrial enterprise.

CLASS V

A—Officer—legislative, executive or judicial—of the United States or of state, territory or District of Columbia.
B—Regular or duly ordained minister of religion.
C—Student who on May 18, 1917, was preparing for ministry in recognized school.
D—Person in military or naval service of United States.
E—Alien enemy.
F—Resident alien (not an enemy) who claims exemption.
G—Person totally and permanently physically or mentally unfit for military service.
H—Person morally unfit to be a soldier of the United States.
I—Licensed pilot actually employed in the pursuit of his vocation.
Member of well recognized religious sect or organization, organized

> and existing on May 18, 1917, whose then existing creeds or principles forbid its members to participate in war in any form and whose religious convictions are against war or participation therein.

Aliens, except enemy aliens, were held subject to the draft if they had taken out their first papers, that is, their declaration of intention to become citizens of the United States. On July 31, 1918, an agreement was reached between Great Britain and the United States concerning the drafting of citizens of one country residing in the other. By the terms of the agreement, the United States was empowered to apply the draft laws to citizens of Great Britain and Canada living in the United States, who were between the ages of 20 and 45, the English draft limits; while Great Britain and Canada might apply their draft law to Americans living in those countries who were from 21 to 31 years of age. It was estimated that 250,000 persons in the United States were affected by the British-American agreement and 60,000 more by the Canadian-American agreement. It was estimated also that some 55,000 citizens of the United States were affected. Similar arrangements were perfected with the governments of Italy and France.

In a proclamation of August 31, 1918, President Wilson analyzed the principle represented in the selective draft, and announced an extension of the draft, as follows:

> . . . . . Fifteen months ago the men of the country from twenty-one to thirty years of age were registered. Three months ago, and again this month, those who have just reached the age of twenty-one were added. It now remains to include all men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five.
>
> This is not a new policy. A century and a quarter ago it was deliberately ordained by those who were then responsible for the safety and defense of the Nation that the duty of military service should rest upon all able-bodied men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five. We now accept and fulfill the obligation which they established, an obligation expressed in our national statutes from that time until now. We solemnly purpose a decisive victory of arms and deliberately devote the larger part of the military

man power of the Nation to the accomplishment of that purpose. . . . .

By the men of the older group now called upon, the opportunity now opened to them will be accepted with the calm resolution of those who realize to the full the deep and solemn significance of what they do. Having made a place for themselves in their respective communities, having assumed at home the graver responsibilities of life in many spheres, looking back upon honorable records in civil and industrial life, they will realize as perhaps no others could how entirely their own fortunes and the fortunes of all whom they love are put at stake in this war for right, and will know that the very records they have made render this new duty the commanding duty of their lives. They know how surely this is the Nation's war, how imperatively it demands the mobilization and massing of all our resources of every kind. They will regard this call as the supreme call of their day and will answer it accordingly. . . . .

All must be registered in order that the selection for military service may be made intelligently and with full information. This will be our final demonstration of loyalty, democracy, and the will to win, our solemn notice to all the world that we stand absolutely together in a common resolution and purpose. It is the call to duty to which every true man in the country will respond with pride and with the consciousness that in doing so he plays his part in vindication of a great cause at whose summons every true heart offers its supreme service. . . . .

In the registration for the draft, on September 12, 1918, of all men between the ages of 18 and 20, inclusive, and 31 and 45, inclusive, exactly 12,966,594 registrations were recorded, exceeding the Provost-General's estimate by almost 1½%. The above figures, however, do not include registrations by mail, not received by September 12, although mailed before that date. Nor do they include the registrations in Hawaii, the Philippines, Alaska and Porto Rico, where later dates were to be set for registration.

All in all, there were four great days of registration in the United States during the European War, the second and third being of those who had attained the age of 21 since the previous day of registration. The totals within Continental United States were as follows:

June 5, 1917	9,586,508
June 5, 1918	744,865
August 24, 1918	158,054
September 12, 1918	12,966,594
Grand total	23,456,021

The movement of the new draft to the cantonments, however, was checked by an outbreak of Spanish influenza which swept the entire country through October and November, abating only in the latter part of the latter month, and killing in the camps more men than had died in France directly as a result of the war. Nevertheless, by the ending of hostilities on November 11, 1917, thousands of men from the draft which registered on September 12, 1917 were being trained for the army in the national army cantonments.

American Expeditionary Force

On May 18, 1917, the following announcement was issued from the White House:

> The President has directed an expeditionary force of approximately one division of regular troops under command of Major General John J. Pershing to proceed to France at as early a date as practicable. General Pershing and staff will precede the troops abroad. It is requested that no details or speculations with regard to the mobilization of this command, dates of departure, composition, or other items, be carried by the press, other than the official bulletins given out by the War Department relating thereto.

Colonel Roosevelt's Offer of Volunteers Declined

In the above statement, the following clauses pertained to the desire of Colonel Theodore Roosevelt to recruit a force of volunteers to fight abroad.

> I understand that the section of this act which authorizes the creation of volunteer divisions in addition to the draft was added with a view to providing an independent command for Mr. Roosevelt and giving the military authority an opportunity to use his fine vigor and enthusiasm in recruiting forces now at the Western front.
>
> It would be very agreeable to me to pay Mr. Roosevelt this compliment and the Allies the compliment of sending to their aid one of our most distinguished public men, an ex-President who has rendered many conspicuous public services and proved his gallantry in many striking ways. Politically, too, it would no doubt have a very fine effect and make a profound impression. But this is not the time or the occasion for compliment or for any action not calculated to contribute to the immediate success of the war. The business now in hand is undramatic, practical, and of scientific definiteness and precision. I shall act with regard to it at every step and in every particular under expert and professional advice from both sides of the water.

That advice is that the men most needed are men of the ages contemplated in the draft provision of the present bill, not men of the age and sort contemplated in the section which authorizes the formation of volunteer units, and that for the preliminary training of the men who are to be drafted we shall need all of our experienced officers. Mr. Roosevelt told me, when I had the pleasure of seeing him a few weeks ago, that he would wish to have associated with him some of the most effective officers of the regular army. He named many of those whom he would desire to have designated for the service, and they were men who cannot possibly be spared from the too small force of officers at our command for the much more pressing and necessary duty of training regular troops to be put into the field in France and Belgium as fast as they can be got ready.

The first troops sent to France will be taken from the present forces of the regular army, and will be under the command of trained soldiers only.

The responsibility for the successful conduct of our own part in this great war rests upon me. I could not escape it if I would. I am too much interested in the cause we are fighting for to be interested in anything but success. The issues involved are too immense for me to take into consideration anything whatever except the best, most effective, most immediate means of military action. What these means are I know from the mouths of men who have seen war as it is now conducted, who have no illusions, and to whom grim matter is a matter of business. I shall center my attention upon those means and let everything else wait.

I should be deeply to blame should I do otherwise, whatever the argument of policy, for a personal gratification or advantage. . . . .

When the National Army of the United States began to form in France, its commander-in-chief sent it the following message:

THE WHITE HOUSE, *September 3, 1917.*

To the Soldiers of the National Army:

You are undertaking a great duty. The heart of the whole country is with you.

Everything that you do will be watched with the deepest interest and with the deepest solicitude, not only by those who are near and dear to you, but by the whole Nation besides. For this Great War draws us all together, makes us all comrades and

brothers, as all true Americans felt themselves to be when we first made good our national independence.

The eyes of all the world will be upon you, because you are in some special sense the soldiers of freedom. Let it be your pride, therefore, to show all men everywhere not only what good soldiers you are, but also what good men you are, keeping yourselves fit and straight in everything and pure and clean through and through.

Let us set for ourselves a standard so high that it will be a glory to live up to it, and then let us live up to it and add a new laurel to the crown of America.

My affectionate confidence goes with you in every battle and every test. God keep and guide you!

Food Control

The United States soon realized the importance of the conservation of food in its program for prosecuting the war, and on May 19, 1917, the following statement was issued from the White House:

> . . . . . The objects sought to be served by the legislation asked for are: Full inquiry into the existing available stocks of foodstuffs and into the costs and practices of the various food producing and distributing trades; the prevention of all unwarranted hoarding of every kind and of the control of foodstuffs by persons who are not in any legitimate sense producers, dealers, or traders; the requisitioning when necessary for the public use of food supplies and of the equipment necessary for handling them properly; the licensing of wholesome and legitimate mixtures and milling percentages, and the prohibition of the unnecessary or wasteful use of foods.
>
> Authority is asked also to establish prices, but not in order to limit the profits of the farmers, but only to guarantee to them when necessary a minimum price which will insure them a profit where they are asked to attempt new crops and to secure the consumer against extortion by breaking up corners and attempts at speculation, when they occur, by fixing temporarily a reasonable price at which middlemen must sell.
>
> I have asked Mr. Herbert Hoover to undertake this all-important task of food administration. He has expressed his willingness to do so on condition that he is to receive no payment for his services and that the whole of the force under him, exclusive of clerical assistance, shall be employed, so far as possible, upon the same volunteer basis. He has expressed his confidence that this difficult matter of food administration can be successfully accomplished through the voluntary cooperation and direction of legitimate distributors of foodstuffs and with the help of the women of the country. . . . .
>
> It is of vital interest and importance to every man who produces food and to every man who takes part in its distribution that these policies thus liberally administered should succeed, and succeed

altogether. It is only in that way that we can prove it to be absolutely unnecessary to resort to the rigorous and drastic measures which have proved to be necessary in some of the European countries.

The main provisions of the Food Control Law, approved by the President on August 10, 1917, were as follows:

Section 3 provides that no person acting as an agent of the United States shall induce or attempt to induce any person to make a contract of any kind or to furnish goods of any kind to the United States if such agent has any pecuniary interest in such contract or furnishing or is connected with any person or association thus pecuniarily interested. Any such agent must, moreover, if such contract be consummated without his influence, make a statement of the extent to which he is materially interested in such contract; nor shall he participate in the awarding of such contract.

Section 4 forbids any person to destroy any necessaries for the purpose of enhancing their price or restricting the supply; knowingly to commit waste or to permit preventable deterioration; to hoard any necessities, as defined in section 6; to monopolize or to attempt to monopolize any necessities; to engage in any discriminatory, unfair, deceptive or wasteful practice or to make any unreasonable charge in connection with the handling of necessities; to conspire or combine to limit the facilities for handling necessaries, to restrict their supply or distribution, to limit their manufacture or production, or to exact excessive prices for any necessaries.

Section 5 provides that no person shall engage in the importation, manufacture, mining, storage or distribution of any necessaries without procuring a license therefor, after the President has made public announcement that such license must be procured. The President is authorized to prescribe regulations and details concerning this licensing system. The President is further authorized to stop any unfair practice by any licensee, and to find what is a just and fair storage charge, commission, profit and practice. Punishment by a fine of not more than $5,000, or imprisonment for not more than two years, or both are provided for those violating the provisions of this section. It is expressly stated, however, that this section does not apply to farmers

nor to retailers doing a business of less than $100,000 annually nor to common carriers.

Section 6 provides punishment by fine of not more than $5,000 or imprisonment for not more than two years, or both, for wilful hoarding, which is defined as holding or contracting for any necessaries beyond reasonable requirements for a reasonable time, whether for private consumption or for seasonable business needs or withheld from the market for the purpose of increasing prices. The activities of any exchange, however, as defined in section 13 and of farmers, etc., are not to be defined as hoarding.

Section 7 provides for the seizure and sale of such commodities found to have been hoarded.

Sections 8 and 9 provide for the punishment of persons found guilty of limiting output, destroying necessaries, etc.

Section 10 permits the President to requisition foods, feeds, fuels and other supplies necessary for the common defense, to provide storage facilities for the same and to pay just compensation therefor. If such compensation be not satisfactory in amount to the person to be compensated, he shall be paid 75% of it and may bring suit against the United States to recover the remainder of what he shall conceive to be due him. Requisition may not be taken, however, of any foods or seeds necessary for the consumption or use of any individual and his dependents.

Section 11 authorizes the President to buy and to sell at reasonable prices, for cash, wheat, flour, meal, beans and potatoes, such prices not to be lower than the minimum prices theretofore fixed for them, according to section 14.

Section 12 authorizes the President to take over, for Government use or operation, whenever he finds it necessary for the common defense, any factory, packing house, mine, oil pipe line, or other plants, or any parts thereof. The compensation provided for such action follows the procedure described in section 10.

Section 13 authorizes the President to prescribe regulations for the activities of any exchange, board of trade, etc., in order to prevent undue fluctuation of prices, speculation, etc. It also authorizes him to require the keeping of records, accounts, and the making of state-

ments to disclose all the facts relating to transactions, not only of the above organizations, but also of clearing houses and similar organizations.

Section 14 authorizes the President, in case of necessity, to fix and announce a reasonable guaranteed price for wheat, according to the different grades, to assure producers of a reasonable profit. The Government thereupon guarantees that each producer obeying the Government regulations will receive not less than the guaranteed price within eighteen months of the period prescribed in such notice. The guaranteed prices for the crop of 1918 shall be based upon No. 1 northern spring or its equivalent at not less than $2.00 a bushel, to be binding until May 1, 1919. Wheat imported into the United States shall be taxed, if necessary, sufficiently to prevent its lowering of the domestic price below the standard fixed. The President is authorized also to purchase and sell wheat whenever necessary to make the provisions of this section effective.

Section 15 forbids the utilization, after thirty days of the approval of the act, of any foods or food materials in the production of distilled spirits exclusively for other than beverage purposes, or for the fortification of sweet vines as defined in the revenue act approved distilled spirits exclusively for other than beverage purposes, or for the fortification of sweet wines as defined in the revenue act approved September 8, 1916. Nor shall any distilled spirits be imported into the United States. Whenever the President finds it necessary, he may also limit or prohibit the use of food or of food materials in the production of malt or vinous liquors for beverage purposes or to limit the alcoholic content of such. Nothing in this section permits the licensing of the manufacture of any liquors where the manufacture of such is already prohibited by law.

Section 16 authorizes the President to commandeer any distilled spirits, when necessary, for redistillation, the compensation for such action to be determined as above.

Section 20 provides that no person employed under this act shall thereby be excused from the operations of the draft law.

Section 23 defines the word person as used in the act to include business, partnerships, etc.

Section 24 provides that the provisions of the act are effective only during the existing war with Germany.

Section 25 authorizes the President, in case of necessity, to fix the price of coal and coke, wherever and whenever sold, and to regulate their production, transportation, distribution, etc. It also authorizes him, in case this plan be preferred in his discretion, to have all coal and coke sold to the United States, through an agency to be designated by the President, and thence to redistribute and sell them.

Section 27 authorizes the President to procure such stocks of nitrate of soda and to sell them at cost, for increasing agricultural production, as may be necessary.

The terms of the Act define necessaries as foods, fuels, feeds, fuel oil and natural gas, fertilizer and fertilizer ingredients, and tools, utensils, implements, machinery and equipment required for the actual production of foods, feeds and fuel.

Accordingly, the Food Administration headed and guided by Mr. Hoover was but a temporary branch of the Government, deriving its powers through executive orders directly from the President. The administration itself was not sub-divided into a great number of bureaus with sharply divided duties like a permanent Government department; but the entire food question was treated as a series of problems and each problem was placed in the hands of an individual, Mr. Hoover having called to his assistance men from all parts of the country who were qualified to serve him.

Through the hotel and restaurant section of the Food Administration, all public eating places fell into a food conservation arrangement by which no meat was served on Tuesdays (later Saturday becoming a day on which no pork was served), and Wednesdays (and later Mondays) became days on which no wheat was served. There was to be one wheatless meal and one meatless meal per day. The pledge card division of the Administration achieved similar results in private households by getting pledges to this effect from more than two-thirds of the seventeen million households in the country.

Each state had a federal food administrator appointed by the President, to attend to the detailed program of the food conservation campaign within that state, and there was created a separate division of

the United States Food Administration to correlate the work of the separate state food administrations. All in all, therefore, the work depended more on voluntary cooperation than on the food dictation practised in Europe.

On October 28, 1917, and again on January 18, 1918, the President of the United States appealed to the civilians of the United States to support the work of the military and naval forces of the United States by practicing strict economy in the use of food.

> The chief part of the burden of finding food supplies for the peoples associated with us in war falls for the present upon the American people, and the drain upon supplies on such a scale necessarily affects the prices of our necessaries of life. Our country, however, is blessed with an abundance of foodstuffs, and if our people will economize in their use of food, providently confining themselves to the quantities required for the maintenance of health and strength; if they will eliminate waste; and if they will make use of those commodities of which we have a surplus, and thus free for export a large proportion of those required by the world now dependent upon us, we shall not only be able to accomplish our obligations to them, but we shall obtain and establish reasonable prices at home.
>
> To provide an adequate supply of food both for our own soldiers on the other side of the seas and for the civil populations and the armies of the Allies, is one of our first and foremost obligations; for, if we are to maintain their constancy in this struggle for the independence of all nations, we must first maintain their health and strength. The solution of our food problems, therefore, is dependent upon the individual service of every man, woman, and child in the United States.
>
> The great voluntary effort in this direction which has been initiated and organized by the Food Administration under my direction offers an opportunity of service in the War which is open to every individual and by which every individual may serve both his own people and the peoples of the world. We cannot accomplish our objects in this Great War without sacrifice and devotion, and in no direction can that sacrifice and devotion be shown more than by each home and public eating place in the country pledging its support to the Food Administration and complying with its requests.

Many causes have contributed to create the necessity for a more intensive effort on the part of our people to save food in order that we may supply our associates in the War with the sustenance vitally necessary to them in these days of privation and stress. The reduced productivity of Europe because of the large diversion of man power to the War, the partial failure of the harvests, and the elimination of the more distant markets for foodstuffs through the destruction of shipping places the burden of their subsistence very largely on our shoulders.

The Food Administration has formulated suggestions which, if followed, will enable us to meet this great responsibility, without any real inconvenience on our part.

In order that we may reduce our consumption of wheat and wheat products by 30 per cent—a reduction imperatively necessary to provide the supply for overseas—wholesalers, jobbers and retailers should purchase and resell to their customers only 70 per cent of the amount used in 1917. All manufacturers of alimentary pastes, biscuits, crackers, pastry, and breakfast cereals should reduce their purchases and consumption of wheat and wheat flour to 70 per cent of their 1917 requirements, and all bakers of bread and rolls to 80 per cent of their current requirements. Consumers should reduce their purchases of wheat products for home preparation to at most 70 per cent of those of last year, or when buying bread should purchase mixed cereal breads from the bakers.

To provide sufficient cereal food, homes, public eating-places, dealers, and manufacturers should substitute potatoes, vegetables, corn, barley, oats, and rice products, and the mixed cereal bread and other products of the bakers which contain an admixture of other cereals.

In order that consumption may be restricted to this extent, Mondays and Wednesdays should be observed as wheatless days each week, and one meal each day should be observed as a wheatless meal.

In both homes and public eating-places, in order to reduce the consumption of beef, pork, and sheep products, Tuesdays should be observed as meatless days in each week, one meatless meal should be observed in each day, while, in addition, Saturday in each week should further be observed as a day upon which there should be no consumption of pork products.

A continued economy in the use of sugar will be necessary until later in the year.

It is imperative that all waste and unnecessary consumption of all sorts of foodstuffs should be rigidly eliminated.

The maintenance of the health and strength of our own people is vitally necessary at this time, and there should be no dangerous restriction of the food supply; but the elimination of every sort of waste and the substitution of other commodities of which we have more abundant supplies for those which we need to save will in no way impair the strength of our people and will enable us to meet one of the most pressing obligations of the War.

I, therefore, in the national interest, take the liberty of calling upon every loyal American to take fully to heart the suggestions which are being circulated by the Food Administration and of begging that they be followed. I am confident that the great body of our women, who have labored so loyally in co-operation with the Food Administration for the success of food conservation, will strengthen their efforts and will take it as a part of their burden in this period of national service to see that the above suggestions are observed throughout the land.

The following table presents eloquent testimony to the part played by the United States in feeding Europe during the War. The figures speak for themselves:

	3-yr. pre-war average	Fiscal Year, 1916-17	Fiscal Year, 1917-18
Beef, lbs.	186,375,372	405,427,417	565,462,445
Pork, lbs.	996,230,627	1,498,302,713	1,691,437,435
Dairy Products, lbs.	26,037,790	351,958,336	590,798,274
Vegetable Oils, lbs.	332,430,537	206,708,490	151,029,893
Grains, bushels	183,777,331	395,140,238	349,123,235
Sugar, lbs.	621,745,507	3,084,390,281	2,149,787,050

In connection with the grain exports of 1917-18, it must be remembered that the wheat crop of the year was more than 200,000,000 bushels below the average.

Among the achievements of the Food Administration during the first year of its existence may be mentioned the following: The fixing of wheat prices had saved the American people about $60,000,000 monthly. From July 1, 1917, to March 31, 1918, 80,000,000 bushels of wheat had been shipped to our Allies. On May 15, 1917, when

Mr. Hoover was appointed Food Administrator, the price of flour at Minneapolis was $16.75 per barrel, whereas one year later it had decreased to $9.80. On the former date, the difference between the price paid the farmer for his wheat and the wholesale price for flour was $5.68 a barrel, whereas on the latter date the difference had decreased to about $0.65.

Sugar prices declined one cent during 1917, and the margin between the prices of raw and refined sugar decreased almost 50%. Pork exports for March, 1918, were more than 50% higher than in any month in the preceding seven years; of beef products, more than 20% higher; of rye and rye flour, 32% higher than in the preceding year; of barley, 55% higher; and of oats and oatmeal, 35% higher.

It was estimated that 10,000,000 signatures were obtained in the house-to-house campaign inaugurated in November, 1917, pledging cooperation with the Food Administration. Efforts in the home concentrated upon saving and using substitutes for wheat; pork, mutton and beef; milk; fats and eggs. The greater use of corn and oat products, fish and vegetables was encouraged.

In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1918 (approximately the harvest year), the value of all food shipments to Allied countries for our and their armies, the civilian population, the Belgian relief and the Red Cross was $1,400,000,000. The shipments of meats and fats, including meat products, dairy products, oils, etc., was 3,011,100,000 pounds, as compared with 2,166,500,000 pounds in the fiscal year 1916-17. In the latter half of the fiscal year 1917-18, the shipments were 2,133,-100,000 pounds as contrasted with 1,266,500,000 pounds in the latter half of 1916-17.

In cereals and cereal products, the shipments were 340,800,000 cereal bushels, as compared with 260,000,000 bushels in the fiscal year 1916-17. Of the cereal shipments in 1917-18, 131,000,000 bushels were wheat, with 10,000,000 additional bushels of the 1917 wheat awaiting shipment to Allied ports. Some 10,000,000 additional bushels were shipped to dependent neutrals.

These figures must be read in the light of a 1917 crop which in nutrition value was about 8% below the average nutrition value of the crops of the preceding three years.

The value of the Red Cross was also appreciated, and the following proclamation was issued on May 26, 1917:

> Inasmuch as our thoughts as a nation are now turned in united purpose toward the performance to the utmost of the services and duties which we have assumed in the cause of justice and liberty;
>
> Inasmuch as but a small proportion of our people can have the opportunity to serve upon the actual field of battle, but all men, women, and children alike may serve and serve effectively by making it possible to care properly for those who do serve under arms at home and abroad;
>
> And inasmuch as the American Red Cross is the official recognized agency for voluntary effort in behalf of the armed forces of the nation and for the administration of relief,
>
> Now, therefore, by virtue of my authority as President of the United States and President of the American Red Cross, I, Woodrow Wilson, do hereby proclaim the week ending June 25, 1917, as Red Cross Week, during which the people of the United States will be called upon to give generously and in a spirit of patriotic sacrifice for the support and maintenance of this work of national need.

The following appeal to the school children of the United States from the President of the Red Cross indicated how earnestly the young as well as the old assisted the Red Cross in its work of relief and succor:

> *To the School Children of the United States:*
>
> *September 15, 1917.*
>
> The President of the United States is also President of the American Red Cross. It is from these offices joined in one that I write you a word of greeting at this time when so many of you are beginning the school year.
>
> The American Red Cross has just prepared a Junior Membership with School Activities in which every pupil in the United

States can find a chance to serve our country. The school is the natural center of your life. Through it you can best work in the great cause of freedom to which we have all pledged ourselves.

Our Junior Red Cross will bring to you opportunities of service to your community and to other communities all over the world and guide your service with high and religious ideals. It will teach you how to save in order that suffering children elsewhere may have the chance to live. It will teach you how to prepare some of the supplies which wounded soldiers and homeless families lack. It will send to you through the Red Cross Bulletins the thrilling stories of relief and rescue. And best of all, more perfectly than through any of your other school lessons, you will learn by doing those kind things under your teacher's direction to be the future good citizens of this great country which we all love.

And I commend to all school teachers in the country the simple plan which the American Red Cross has worked out to provide for your co-operation, knowing as I do that school children will give their best service under the direct guidance and instruction of their teachers. Is not this perhaps the chance for which you have been looking to give your time and efforts in some measure to meet our national needs?

When the first Christmas during our struggle against Germany rolled around, President Wilson issued the following appeal for 10,000,000 members of the Red Cross, showing how the spirit of the Red Cross and the spirit of Christmas were identical:

Ten million Americans are invited to join the American Red Cross during the week ending with Christmas Eve. The times require that every branch of our great national effort shall be loyally upheld and it is peculiarly fitting that at Christmas season the Red Cross should be the branch through which your willingness to help is expressed.

You should join the American Red Cross because it alone can carry the pledges of Christmas good will to those who are bearing for us the real burdens of the World War both in our Army and Navy and in the nations upon whose territory the issues of the World War are being fought out. Your evidence of faith in this work is necessary for their heartening and cheer.

You should join the Red Cross because this arm of the national



© Underwood & Underwood

© International Film Service

DESCRIPTION OF PICTURES ON REVERSE SIDE

Upper Left Hand Corner—Bernard M. Baruch, Chairman, War Industries Board, March 5, 1918-January 1, 1919.

Upper Right Hand Corner—A. Mitchell Palmer, Alien Property Custodian, October 22, 1917-March 4, 1919; Attorney General of the United States, March 4, 1919—.

Center—Harry A. Garfield, Fuel Administrator, August 23, 1917—.

Lower Left Hand Corner—John D. Ryan, Director, Aircraft Production, Chairman, Aircraft Board, and Second Assistant Secretary of War, April 24, 1918-November 30, 1918.

Lower Right Hand Corner—Walker D. Hines, Assistant Director-General of Railroads, February 4, 1918-January 25, 1919, and Director-General, January 25, 1919—.

service is steadfastly and efficiently maintaining the overseas relief in every suffering land, administering our millions wisely and well and awakening the gratitude of every people.

Our conscience will not let us enjoy the Christmas season if this pledge of support to our cause and the world's weal is left unfulfilled. Red Cross membership is the Christmas spirit in terms of action.

The Red Cross is "a confederation of societies in different countries for the amelioration of the condition of wounded soldiers in the armies, in campaigns on land or sea." It carries on its work under the sign of a red cross on a white ground used as a flag, always with the national flag, or as an arm badge. By Article 7 of the Geneva Convention this sign protects its wearers as neutral. The society originated with Henri Dunant after the battle of Solferino in 1859. Gustave Moynier of Geneva, president of the "Society of Public Utility of Switzerland," called a meeting "to consider the formation of permanent societies for the relief of wounded soldiers" on February 9, 1863, which resulted in an international meeting on the following October 26, and a treaty between twelve European governments, assuring neutrality and protection to all working under the Red Cross. This treaty was concluded at Geneva, August 22, 1864. It was adopted by Great Britain, February 18, 1865; Prussia, June 22, 1865; Turkey, July 5, 1865; and Russia, May 22, 1867. The United States Senate acceded to it, March 16, 1882, and it was proclaimed by President Arthur, July 26, 1882. The treaty is now generally observed by civilized governments of the world.

The American National Association of the Red Cross was organized at Washington, D. C., May 21, 1881. Miss Clara Barton was elected first president. It was reincorporated April 17, 1893, for the relief of suffering by war, pestilence, famine, flood, fires, and other calamities of sufficient magnitude to be deemed national in extent.

On January 1, 1917, the number of chapters was 250 and the number of members, 286,400. The cash receipts for the previous eleven months were $1,544,245.43 and the total disbursements, $1,352,100. Of the receipts, 30% was devoted to the European War Relief and 16% to the Preparedness Fund.

With the entrance of the United States into the European War, the Red Cross naturally both altered and broadened its organization. President Wilson placed in general charge of its activities Mr. H. P. Davidson, a New York financier, who inaugurated and completed before the beginning of the summer of 1917 a campaign for contributions for war purposes to the amount of $100,000,000. On September 10, 1917, Mr. Davidson made public an account of the activities of the Red Cross since the announcement of war on April 6, 1917, as follows:

Along the route followed by the troops the Red Cross has established infirmaries and rest stations, each in charge of an American trained nurse with an American man to assist her.

Additional infirmaries and rest stations will be established in the near future, and adequate buildings are also being erected wherever needed.

Canteens are being established by the Red Cross at railway stations where American soldiers on reserve duty or on leave, and those returning to or from duty, may find rest and refreshment. Baths, food, games, and other comforts will be made available at these canteens.

The war council has appropriated $100,000 for medical research work in France.

To be able to do its work without delay, the Red Cross is establishing warehouses at different points of importance in the French theater of war. An appropriation of $500,000 has been voted to establish this service and provide its first stock of supplies.

In response to a cable from the commission in France, the war council appropriated $1,500,000 to purchase foodstuffs to be sent to France.

It has also appropriated $1,000,000 for the purchase of supplies in France, all for use in the hospital supply service.

At the military railroad stops the Red Cross is establishing shower baths, laundries, and mending and disinfecting rooms. Then there will be rest rooms, with books, writing materials, and games. Some of the stations will have dormitories and lunch rooms.

Near the firing line the Red Cross is establishing field canteens. Extending the work already begun by the French Red Cross, it will provide one of these canteens for every corps of the French Army and as well as later for the American Army.

To carry out these plans the war council has made appropriations of about $700,000, which will establish the canteens and maintain them for about three months.

A Red Cross transportation service through the cooperation of the French, British, and Italian Governments, the United States Shipping Board, and the leading steamship and railroad companies has been established to handle the vast quantities of medical and relief supplies now being shipped almost daily to France, Belgium, Serbia, Russia, and other belligerent countries.

The Red Cross will have cargo space on every steamer chartered by the United States Shipping Board. Army transports also will carry Red Cross supplies.

The French railroads are overtaxed, and their facilities must be available for the military needs of the army. The Red Cross has accordingly determined to develop its own motor transport service.

The first unit of trucks has been forwarded.

In advance of the fighting forces the United States sent to the European battle fields six base hospitals organized during the last year by the Red Cross—the first United States Army organization sent to Europe. These were sent at the request of the British commission.

More than a dozen base hospitals organized by the American Red Cross are now seeing active service in France, and others are rapidly being made ready for foreign service.

It is estimated that some 500,000 persons are afflicted with tuberculosis as the direct result of the war. Scientific efforts to control the spread of the malady are not only of supreme concern to France herself, but they are of great importance in making France healthy for our own troops.

All work is being done under the general administration of the French Government, and by French people.

The American Red Cross has appropriated $1,000,000 for the relief of sick and wounded French soldiers and their families.

The Red Cross plans to be able to take care temporarily of these returning populations.

It is not the policy of the Red Cross to rebuild the villages of France, but it is our hope to be able to give a new start in life to a large number

of persons who have been left destitute by the ravages of the German army.

The Red Cross has accordingly appropriated $40,090 for a provisional experiment in this direction, the plans for the experiment having been worked out in France by Mr. Homer Folks.

Most of those in charge for the Red Cross of the work in France are giving their own time and paying their own expenses.

The appropriations made for use in Europe outside of France, covering drugs and medical supplies, relief funds, and expenses, are as follows:

For Russia	$322,780.87
For Roumania	247,000.00
For Italy	210,000.00
For Serbia	222,500.00
For England	8,800.00
For Armenia	600,000.00
Other appropriations	36,000.00

The total appropriations by the war council for Red Cross work in Europe are as follows:

In France	$10,692,601.00
Outside of France	1,647,080.87
Grand total	$12,339,681.87

Some of the European appropriations are to cover a full year, but the greater part will have been spent by November of the current year.

By November 1, 1917, the Red Cross was prosecuting in Europe the following additional endeavors:

Needful gifts and pensions to sick and wounded French soldiers and to French families in distress.

Twenty dispensaries for both resident civilians and for better health conditions in the war zones to be occupied by the American soldiers.

A dental ambulance and a nurses' service for American soldiers.

A distributing service supplying 3,423 French military hospitals; a

surgical dressings service supplying 2,000 French hospitals; and an extensive service preparing for all future American hospital needs.

Ten canteens operated at the French front, with provision for 20 more. Similar canteens for soldiers coming and going in Paris. Twelve rest stations and a number of recuperation stations for American soldiers.

An artificial limb factory near Paris, and special plants for the manufacture of splints and nitrous oxide gas.

Recreation in connection with hospitals and diet kitchens; a movable hospital in four units accommodating 1,000 men; a casualty service for gathering information regarding wounded and missing.

A medical research bureau.

A children's refuge and hospital within the war zone; a medical centre and traveling hospital in wrecked villages, accommodating 1,200 children; medical work along extensive lines for re-patrie children returned (about 500 daily) from points within the German lines; a hospital and convalescent home for such children and an ambulance service for other re-patries.

Infant welfare stations in connection with each dispensary along the national lines planned by the Rockefeller Foundation.

Extensive tuberculosis endeavors, including the work previously done along these lines by volunteer Americans. Completion of an unfinished tuberculosis sanitarium near Paris, and extensions to the barracks erected by the city of Paris. A comprehensive health centre in a large French Department.

Elaborate arrangements for helping refugee families during the winter with clothing, beds and shelter. For this work, the entire devastated district of France was divided into six districts, with large warehouses in each. In this connection, four devastated villages were repaired so as to permit families to live in them during the winter. A number of portable houses were also furnished.

Barracks for training disabled soldiers, and experimental agricultural stations for them.

Extensive Belgian relief work, with preparations for helping all those Belgians liberated by each change in the battle-line. Transportation of

many Belgian children into places in France where they might be cared for.

By November 1, 1917, 15,000 nurses had been enrolled in the Red Cross, many of them volunteering their services. Of this number, 2,000 had already been sent abroad.

During the first year of the participation of the United States in the European War, the American Red Cross expended $82,217,943 in the course of its work. The total receipts during that period had been $110,134,360, of which $17,401,069 had been refunded to chapters. The chief items of appropriation were as follows:

FRANCE	$30,936,103
Reconstruction and relief	2,709,740
Refugees' relief and care	2,867,866
Tuberculosis work	2,147,327
Children and infant mortality	1,149,129
Recreation and welfare U. S. Army	1,145,868
Canteen service	1,671,789
Hospital supplies, etc.	6,631,613
Revitalizing, dental ambulances, disinfecting plants, etc.	4,263,385
Miscellaneous	8,349,386
ITALY	$4,588,826
Military and hospital service	1,248,310
Civil Relief	2,718,832
Miscellaneous	621,684
RUSSIA	$1,206,906
Medical and ambulance work	469,359
Milk for babies and foodstuffs, and miscellaneous	738,548
SERVIA	$ 894,581
ROUMANIA	$2,676,369
GREAT BRITAIN	$3,260,231
To British Red Cross	2,146,125
Supplies and miscellaneous	1,114,106

BELGIUM	$2,086,131
Canteens and hospital supplies	401,360
Relief for refugees and children	1,451,514
Miscellaneous	233,257
ARMENIAN AND SYRIAN RELIEF	$2,600,000
CANADIAN RED CROSS	$500,000
PALESTINE	$390,000
POLAND	$200,000
UNITED STATES PRISONERS IN GERMANY	$361,664
PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT	$201,300
UNITED STATES	$9,723,123
Army and Navy Base Hospitals	110,000
Medical and hospital work	568,500
Sanitary and safeguarding service	428,500
Camp service, comforts and convalescent houses	7,476,150
Miscellaneous	1,138,973
RESTRICTED AS TO USE BY DONOR	$2,520,410
SUPPLIES FOR CHAPTERS	$15,000,000
CASH ADVANCES, FRANCE AND UNITED STATES	$4,286,000
MISCELLANEOUS	$786,300

In the week beginning with May 20, 1918, the second national campaign of the Red Cross for funds took place, and netted approximately $150,000,000.

In an address in New York City on May 18, 1918, President Wilson thus analyzed the significance of the Red Cross:

> . . . . . But behind all this grim purpose, my friends, lies the opportunity to demonstrate not only force, which will be demonstrated to the utmost, but the opportunity to demonstrate character, and it is that opportunity which we have most con-

spicuously in the work of the Red Cross. Not that our men in arms do not represent our character, for they do, and it is a character which those who see and realize appreciate and admire; but their duty is the duty of force. The duty of the Red Cross is the duty of mercy and succor and friendship. . . . .

Friendship is the only cement that will ever hold the world together. And this intimate contact of the Red Cross with the peoples who are suffering the terrors and the deprivations of this war is going to be one of the greatest instrumentalities of friendship that the world ever knew. And the centre of the heart of it all, if we sustain it properly, will be this land that we so dearly love.

My friends, a great day of duty has come, and duty finds a man's soul as no kind of work can ever find it. May I say this? The duty that faces us all now is to serve one another, and no man can afford to make a fortune out of this war. There are men among us who have forgotten that, if they ever saw it. Some of you are old enough—I am old enough—to remember men who made fortunes out of the Civil War, and you know how they were regarded by their fellow-citizens. That was a war to save one country—this is a war to save the world. And your relation to the Red Cross is one of the relations which will relieve you of the stigma.

You can't give anything to the Government of the United States; it won't accept it. There is a law of Congress against accepting even services without pay. The only thing that the Government will accept is a loan, and duties performed; but it is a great deal better to give than to lend or to pay, and your great channel for giving is the American Red Cross. . . . .

And think what we have here! We call it the American Red Cross, but it is merely a branch of a great international organization, which is recognized not only by the statutes of each of the civilized governments of the world, but is recognized by international agreement and treaty, as the recognized and accepted instrumentality of mercy and succor. And one of the deepest stains upon the reputation of the German Army is that it has not respected the Red Cross. That goes to the root of the matter. They have not respected the instrumentality they themselves participated in setting up as the thing which no man was to touch because it was the expression of common humanity.

We are members, by being members of the American Red Cross, of a great fraternity and fellowship which extends all over the

world, and this cross which these ladies bore here today is an emblem of Christianity itself. It fills my imagination, ladies and gentlemen, to think of the women all over this country who are busy tonight and are busy every night and every day doing the work of the Red Cross, busy with a great eagerness to find out the most serviceable thing to do, busy with a forgetfulness of the old frivolities of their social relationships, ready to curtail the duties of the household in order that they may contribute to this common work that all their hearts are engaged in, and in doing which their hearts become acquainted with each other. . . . .

In the last previous foreign war of the United States, the Red Cross also performed valiant services. Its activities in aiding the Cuban natives and in alleviating the suffering in the Spanish-American War were thus discussed by President McKinley:

. . . . . On the 24th of December last (1897) I caused to be issued an appeal to the American people inviting contributions in money or in kind for the succor of the starving sufferers in Cuba, following this on the 8th of January by a similar public announcement of the formation of a central Cuban relief committee, with headquarters in New York City, composed of three members representing the American National Red Cross and the religious and business elements of the community.

The efforts of that committee have been untiring and have accomplished much. Arrangements for free transportation to Cuba have greatly aided the charitable work. The president of the American Red Cross and representatives of other contributory organizations have generously visited Cuba and cooperated with the consul-general and the local authorities to make effective distribution of the relief collected through the efforts of the central committee. Nearly $200,000 in money and supplies has already reached the sufferers, and more is forthcoming. The supplies are admitted duty free, and transportation to the interior has been arranged, so that the relief, at first necessarily confined to Havana and the larger cities, is now extended through most, if not all, of the towns where suffering exists.

Thousands of lives have already been saved. The necessity for a change in the condition of the reconcentrados is recognized by the Spanish Government. Within a few days past the orders of General Weyler have been revoked. The reconcentrados, it is said, are to be permitted to return to their homes and aided to

resume the self-supporting pursuits of peace. Public works have been ordered to give them employment and a sum of $600,000 has been appropriated for their relief. . . . .

. . . . . By the end of December the mortality among them (the Cuban natives) had frightfully increased. Conservative estimates from Spanish sources placed the deaths among these distressed people at over 40 per cent from the time General Weyler's decree of reconcentration was enforced. With the acquiescence of the Spanish authorities, a scheme was adopted for relief by charitable contributions raised in this country and distributed, under the direction of the consul-general and the several consuls, by noble and earnest individual effort through the organized agencies of the American Red Cross. Thousands of lives were thus saved, but many thousands more were inaccessible to such forms of aid. . . . .

. . . . . It is a pleasure for me to mention in terms of cordial appreciation the timely and useful work of the American National Red Cross, both in relief measures preparatory to the campaigns, in sanitary assistance at several of the camps of assemblage, and later, under the able and experienced leadership of the president of the society, Miss Clara Barton, on the fields of battle and in the hospitals at the front in Cuba. Working in conjunction with the governmental authorities and under their sanction and approval, and with the enthusiastic cooperation of many patriotic women and societies in the various States, the Red Cross has fully maintained its already high reputation for intense earnestness and ability to exercise the noble purposes of its international organization, thus justifying the confidence and support which it has received at the hands of the American people. To the members and officers of this society and all who aided them in their philanthropic work the sincere and lasting gratitude of the soldiers and the public is due and is freely accorded. . . . .

Flag Day Address of President Wilson, 1917

In connection with the war against Germany, Flag Day, June 14, held an especial significance for America in the year 1917. Notable passages from President Wilson's address on that occasion are as follows:

My Fellow Citizens:

We meet to celebrate Flag Day because this flag which we honor and under which we serve is the emblem of our unity, our power, our thought and purpose as a Nation. It has no other character than that which we give it from generation to generation. The choices are ours. It floats in majestic silence above the hosts that execute those choices, whether in peace or in war. And yet, though silent, it speaks to us—speaks to us of the past, of the men and women who went before us and of the records they wrote upon it. We celebrate the day of its birth; and from its birth until now it has witnessed a great history, has floated on high the symbol of great events, of a great plan of life worked out by a great people. We are about to carry it into battle, to lift it where it will draw the fire of our enemies. We are about to bid thousands, hundreds of thousands, it may be millions, of our men, the young, the strong, the capable men of the Nation, to go forth and die beneath it on fields of blood far away—for what? For some unaccustomed thing? For something for which it has never sought the fire before? American armies were never before sent across the seas. Why are they sent now? For some new purpose, for which this great flag has never been carried before, or for some old, familiar heroic purpose for which it has seen men, its own men, die on every battle field upon which Americans have borne arms since the Revolution?

These are questions which must be answered. We are Americans. We in our turn serve America, and can serve her with no private purpose. We must use her flag as she has always used it. We are accountable at the bar of history and must plead in utter frankness what purpose it is we seek to serve.

It is plain enough how we were forced into the war. The

extraordinary insults and aggressions of the Imperial German Government left us no self-respecting choice but to take up arms in defense of our rights as a free people and of our honor as a sovereign government. The military masters of Germany denied us the right to be neutral. They filled our unsuspecting communities with vicious spies and conspirators and sought to corrupt the opinion of our people in their own behalf. When they found that they could not do that, their agents diligently spread sedition amongst us and sought to draw our own citizens from their allegiance—and some of those agents were men connected with the official embassy of the German Government itself here in our own Capital. They sought by violence to destroy our industries and arrest our commerce. They tried to incite Mexico to take up arms against us and to draw Japan into a hostile alliance with her—and that, not by indirection, but by direct suggestion from the foreign office in Berlin. They impudently denied us the use of the high seas and repeatedly executed their threat that they would send to their death any of our people who ventured to approach the coasts of Europe. And many of our own people were corrupted. Men began to look upon their own neighbors with suspicion and to wonder in their hot resentment and surprise whether there was any community in which hostile intrigue did not lurk. What great nation in such circumstances would not have taken up arms? Much as we had desired peace, it was denied us, and not of our own choice. This flag under which we serve would have been dishonored had we withheld our hand. . . . .

The war was begun by the military masters of Germany, who proved to be also the masters of Austria-Hungary. These men have never regarded nations as peoples, men, women, and children of like blood and frame as themselves, for whom governments existed and in whom governments had their life. They have regarded them merely as serviceable organizations which they could by force or intrigue bend or corrupt to their own purpose. They have regarded the smaller States, in particular, and the peoples who could be overwhelmed by force, as their natural tools and instruments of domination. Their purpose has long been avowed. . . . .

The facts are patent to all the world, and nowhere are they more plainly seen than in the United States, where we are accustomed to deal with facts and not with sophistries; and the great fact that stands out above all the rest is that this is a people's

war, a war for freedom and justice and self-government amongst all the nations of the world, a war to make the world safe for the peoples who live upon it and have made it their own, the German people themselves included; and that with us rests the choice to break through all these hypocrisies and patent cheats and masks of brute force and help set the world free, or else stand aside and let it be dominated a long age through by sheer weight of arms and the arbitrary choices of self-constituted masters, by the nation which can maintain the biggest armies and the most irresistible armaments—a power to which the world has afforded no parallel and in the face of which political freedom must wither and perish.

For us there is but one choice. We have made it. Woe be to the man or group of men that seeks to stand in our way in this day of high resolution, when every principle we hold dearest is to be vindicated and made secure for the salvation of the nations. We are ready to plead at the bar of history, and our flag shall wear a new luster. Once more we shall make good with our lives and fortunes the great faith to which we were born, and a new glory shall shine in the face of our people.

Liberty Loans

The term "Liberty Loan" was applied originally to the $5,000,000,000 of the $7,000,000,000 first war budget voted by Congress on April 14, 1917, which was to be met outside of taxation. Soon, however, the term was applied to the $2,000,000,000 of the $5,000,000,000 which was offered to popular subscription. The rate of interest was 3½%, with the provision that it would be raised equal to any higher rate of interest which might be paid on later loans. Bearer bonds were offered in amounts of $50, $100, $500, and $1,000; and registered bonds from denominations of $100 to $100,000. The bonds mature in 30 years from the date of issue, June 15, 1917, but are redeemable in whole or in part, at the option of the United States, on or after 15 years, at par and accrued interest. Two per cent of the amount of the bonds was payable on application, 18% on June 28, 20% July 30, 30% August 15, and 30% August 30. Interest is payable on June 15 and December 15 of each year. Bonds are exempt from all Federal, State and local taxation, excepting estate and inheritance taxes. When subscriptions were closed on June 15, it was found that the loan had been largely oversubscribed.

The Second Liberty Loan campaign occupied most of the month of October, 1917. The details were much the same as those of the First Loan, as described above; but the rate of interest was 4%, thus automatically making the rate of interest for the First Liberty Bonds equal to this rate. The minimum subscription was placed at $3,000,000,000; and it was announced that half of the subscriptions between this sum and $5,000,000,000 would also be issued. Total subscriptions by the public amounted to $4,617,532,300; so that the amount issued became $3,808,766,150.

The Third Liberty Loan campaign was inaugurated on April 6, 1918, the first anniversary of the entrance of the United States into the

European War. The campaign closed on the following May 4. The amount of the loan was $3,000,000,000 and oversubscriptions, and the rate of interest was 4¼%, to which the bonds of the First and Second Liberty Loans were as a consequence converted. The bonds were issued to mature in ten years from the date of issue. Five per cent of the amount subscribed for the various bonds was due on subscription, 20% on the following May 28, 35% on the following July 18, and 40% on the following August 15. The lowest denomination of the bonds of the Third Liberty Loan was $50.

The bonds of the Third Liberty Loan were not convertible to any higher rate of interest.

The total subscriptions to the Third Liberty Loan were $4,176,517,550, an oversubscription of 39%, every federal reserve district oversubscribing its quota.

The campaign for the Fourth Liberty Loan opened on September 28, 1918, and closed on October 19, 1918. The amount was set at $6,000,000,000; the rate of interest was 4¼%; and the bonds will mature on October 15, 1938, although they may be redeemed at the pleasure of the United States at par and accrued interest any time after October 15, 1933.

In spite of undeniable evidence that the Central Powers were in the last stages of their resistance to the Allies and that the end of the war would probably be in sight before the end of the year, and despite a violent epidemic of influenza which swept the country from one end to another, disarranging all activities of the American people and bringing sorrow and desolation to tens of thousands of American households, the loan was an unqualified success. When the books had closed, it was found that the loan had been oversubscribed more than 14%, the total subscriptions being above $6,850,000,000, making this the largest popular loan ever floated in the history of the world. The number of subscribers was above 21,000,000, as compared with 4,500,000; 9,500,000; and 18,300,000 in the First, Second, and Third Liberty Loans respectively.

The quotas and the subscriptions of the several Federal Reserve Districts were as follows:


District	Quota	Subscription	P. C.
Boston	$ 500,000,000	$ 632,221,850	126.44
Richmond	280,000,000	352,688,200	125.95
Philadelphia	500,000,000	598,763,650	119.75
Cleveland	600,000,000	702,059,800	117
Dallas	126,000,000	145,944,450	115.82
Minneapolis	210,000,000	241,028,300	115.06
San Francisco	402,000,000	459,000,000	114.17
St. Louis	260,000,000	296,388,550	113.99
New York	1,800,000,000	2,044,778,000	113.59
Atlanta	192,000,000	217,885,200	113.48
Kansas City	260,000,000	294,646,450	113.32
Chicago	870,000,000	969,209,000	111.40
U. S. Treasury	.....	33,329,850	.....
Total	$6,000,000,000	$6,987,943,300	116.45

The amount of the war obligations of the United States, at the time of the signing of the armistice on November 11, 1918, was as follows:

	Amount	Redeemable
First Liberty Loan	$ 2,000,000,000	1932-1947
Second Liberty Loan	3,808,000,000	1927-1942
Third Liberty Loan	4,176,000,000	1928
Fourth Liberty Loan	6,988,000,000	1933-1938
War Savings Stamps	879,000,000	1923
Total	$17,851,000,000	

On October 12, 1917, the President set aside October 24, 1917, as Liberty Day, for the stimulation of the Second Liberty Loan.

> . . . . . The Second Liberty Loan gives the people of the United States another opportunity to lend their funds to their Government to sustain their country at war. The might of the United States is being mobilized and organized to strike a mortal blow at autocracy in defense of outraged American rights and of the cause of Liberty. Billions of dollars are required to arm, feed and clothe the brave men who are going forth to fight our country's



© Western Newspaper Union

A FLEET OF TRANSPORTS AT SEA

In the upper picture is shown the formation adopted by the transports which carried the American Expeditionary Force to far-off shores to assist materially in overcoming the armed force of the Imperial German Government. The photograph was taken from one of the scout airplanes accompanying the fleet as it approached the seas where submarines were expected.

SMOKE SCREENS

In the lower picture, the use of smoke screens to foil submarines is vividly portrayed. The smoke in this picture was furnished by especially prepared "smoke-boxes," although in the background may be seen also the columns of smoke poured out for screening purposes from the funnels of destroyers accompanying the transports. The camouflage device on the vessel to the extreme left is plainly visible.

battles and to assist the nations with whom we are making common cause against a common foe. To subscribe to the Liberty Loan is to perform a service of patriotism.

Now, therefore, I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of America, do appoint Wednesday, the twenty-fourth of October, as Liberty Day, and urge and advise the people to assemble in their respective communities and pledge to one another and to the Government that represents them the fullest measure of financial support. . . . .

A similar proclamation was issued on April 18, 1918:

An enemy who has grossly abused the power of organized government and who seeks to dominate the world by the might of the sword, challenges the rights of America and the liberty and life of all the free nations of the earth. Our brave sons are facing the fire of battle in defense of the honor and rights of America and the liberty of nations. To sustain them and to assist our gallant associates in the war, a generous and patriotic people have been called upon to subscribe to the Third Liberty Loan.

Now, therefore, I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of America, do appoint Friday, the twenty-sixth day of April, one thousand nine hundred and eighteen, as Liberty Day. . . . .

In an address at Baltimore, Md., on April 6, 1918, the anniversary of the entrance of the United States into the Great War, the President analyzed the significance of the Liberty Loans as follows:

Fellow-citizens: This is the anniversary of our acceptance of Germany's challenge to fight for our right to live and be free, and for the sacred rights of freemen everywhere. The nation is awake. There is no need to call to it. We know what the war must cost, our utmost sacrifice, the lives of our fittest men, and, if need be, all that we possess. The loan we are met to discuss is one of the least parts of what we are called upon to give and to do, though in itself imperative. The people of the whole country are alive to the necessity of it, and are ready to lend to the utmost, even where it involves a sharp skimping and daily sacrifice to lend out of meagre earnings. They will look with reprobation and contempt upon those who can and will not, upon those who demand a higher rate of interest, upon those who think of it as a mere commercial transaction. . . . .

On May 29, 1918, President Wilson issued the following appeal to the people of the United States to purchase War Savings Stamps and Thrift Stamps, and to practice strict economy and thrift in their daily lives:

> This War is one of nations—not of armies—and all of our 100,000,000 people must be economically and industrially adjusted to war conditions if this Nation is to play its full part in the conflict. The problem before us is not primarily a financial problem, but rather a problem of increased production of war essentials, and the saving of the materials and the labor necessary for the support and equipment of our army and our navy. Thoughtless expenditure of money for nonessentials uses up the labor of men, the products of the farm, mines, and factories, and overburdens transportation, all of which must be used to the utmost and at their best for war purposes.
>
> The great results which we seek can be obtained only by the participation of every member of the nation, young and old, in a national concerted thrift movement. I therefore urge that our people everywhere pledge themselves, as suggested by the Secretary of the Treasury, to the practice of thrift; to serve the Government to their utmost in increasing production in all fields necessary to the winning of the war; to conserve food and fuel and useful materials of every kind; to devote their labor only to the most necessary tasks; and to buy only those things which are essential to individual health and efficiency; and that the people, as evidence of their loyalty, invest all that they can save in Liberty Bonds and War Savings Stamps.
>
> The securities issued by the Treasury Department are so many of them within the reach of every one that the door of opportunity in this matter is wide open to all of us. To practice thrift in peace times is a virtue and brings great benefit to the individual at all times; with the desperate need of the civilized world today for materials and labor with which to end the war, the practice of individual thrift is a patriotic duty and a necessity.
>
> I appeal to all who now own either Liberty Bonds or War Savings Stamps to continue to practice economy and thrift and to appeal to all who do not own Government securities to do likewise and purchase them to the extent of their means. The man who buys Government securities transfers the purchasing power of his money to the United States Government until after this war, and to that same degree does not buy in competition with the Government.

Control of Exports, Prices and Fuel

It soon became necessary to establish control over the exports of the United States, and the principles of that control were thus stated by the President on June 26, 1917:

> . . . . . There will, of course, be no prohibition of exports. The normal course of trade will be interfered with as little as possible, and, so far as possible, only its abnormal course directed. The whole object will be to direct exports in such a way that they will go first and by preference where they are most needed and most immediately needed, and temporarily to withhold them, if necessary, where they can best be spared.
>
> Our primary duty in the matter of foodstuffs and like necessaries is to see to it that the peoples associated with us in the war get as generous a proportion as possible of our surplus; but it will also be our wish and purpose to supply the neutral nations whose peoples depend upon us for such supplies as nearly in proportion to their need as the amount to be divided permits.
>
> There will thus be little check put upon the volume of exports, and the prices obtained for them will not be affected by this regulation.
>
> This policy will be carried out, not by prohibitive regulations, therefore, but by a system of licensing exports which will be as simply organized and administered as possible, so as to constitute no impediment to the normal flow of commerce. In brief, the free play of trade will not be arbitrarily interfered with; it will only be intelligently and systematically directed in the light of full information with regard to needs and market conditions throughout the world and the necessities of our people at home and our armies and the armies of our associates abroad. . . . .

Before many months had elapsed after the declaration of war between the United States and Germany, it became evident that the best interests of this country would be subserved by Government regulation of prices in many fields. In an address to his fellow-countrymen on July 11, 1917, the President said:

The Government is about to attempt to determine the prices at which it will ask you henceforth to furnish various supplies which are necessary for the prosecution of the war and various materials which will be needed in the industries by which the war must be sustained. We shall, of course, try to determine them justly and to the best advantage of the nation as a whole. . . . .

A just price must, of course, be paid for everything the Government buys. By a just price I mean a price which will sustain the industries concerned in a high state of efficiency, provide a living for those who conduct them, enable them to pay good wages, and make possible the expansions of their enterprises which will from time to time become necessary as the stupendous undertakings of this great war develop. We could not wisely or reasonably do less than pay such prices. They are necessary for the maintenance and development of industry, and the maintenance and development of industry are necessary for the great task we have in hand. . . . .

We ought not to put the acceptance of such prices on the ground of patriotism. Patriotism has nothing to do with profits in a case like this. Patriotism and profits ought never in the present circumstances be mentioned together. It is perfectly proper to discuss profits as a matter of business, with a view to maintaining the integrity of capital and the efficiency of labor in these tragical months when the liberty of free men everywhere and of industry itself trembles in the balance, but it would be absurd to discuss them as a motive for helping to serve and save our country.

Patriotism leaves profits out of the question. In these days of our supreme trial, when we are sending hundreds of thousands of our young men across the seas to serve a great cause, no true man who stays behind to work for them and sustain them by his labor will ask himself what he is personally going to make out of that labor. No true patriot will permit himself to take toll of their heroism in money or seek to grow rich by the shedding of their blood. He will give as freely and with as unstinted self-sacrifice as they. When they are giving their lives will he not give at least his money? . . . .

And there is something more that we must add to our thinking. The public is now as much part of the Government as are the army and navy themselves; the whole people in all their activities are now mobilized and in service for the accomplishment of the nation's task in this war; it is in such circumstances impossible

justly to distinguish between industrial purchases made by the Government and industrial purchases made by the managers of individual industries; and it is just as much our duty to sustain the industries of the country, all the industries that contribute to its life, as it is to sustain our forces in the field and on the sea. We must make the prices to the public the same as the prices to the Government.

Prices mean the same thing everywhere now. They mean the efficiency or the inefficiency of the nation, whether it is the Government that pays them or not. They mean victory or defeat. They mean that America will win her place once for all among the foremost free nations of the world, or that she will sink to defeat and become a second-rate power alike in thought and in action. This is a day of her reckoning and every man amongst us must personally face that reckoning along with her. . . . .

On July 9, 1917, the Administration issued the following statement explaining its program for the control of exports during the War:

. . . . . In controlling by license the export of certain indispensable commodities from the United States, the Government has first and chiefly in view the amelioration of the food conditions which have arisen or are likely to arise in our own country before new crops are harvested. Not only is the conservation of our prime food and fodder supplies a matter which vitally concerns our own people, but the retention of an adequate supply of raw materials is essential to our program of military and naval construction and the continuance of our necessary domestic activities. We shall therefore similarly safeguard all our fundamental supplies.

It is obviously the duty of the United States, in liberating any surplus products over and above our own domestic needs, to consider first the necessities of all the nations engaged in war against the Central Empires. As to neutral nations, however, we also recognize our duty. The Government does not wish to hamper them. On the contrary, it wishes and intends, by all fair and equitable means, to cooperate with them in their difficult task of adding from our available surpluses to their own domestic supply and of meeting their pressing necessities or deficits. In considering the deficits of food supplies the Government means only to fulfill its obvious obligation to assure itself that

neutrals are husbanding their own resources and that our supplies will not become available, either directly or indirectly, to feed the enemy.

In a proclamation of August 27, 1917, the President published two lists of commodities placed under export control—the first applicable to enemy countries and the second, to all countries. His statement explaining the proclamation was as follows:

> The purpose and effect of this proclamation (of August 27, 1917, forbidding the exportation of certain commodities) is not export prohibition, but merely export control. It is not the intention to interfere unnecessarily with our foreign trade; but our own domestic needs must be adequately safeguarded and there is the added duty of meeting the necessities of all the nations at war with the Imperial German Government. After these needs are met it is our wish and intention to minister to the needs of the neutral nations as far as our resources permit. This task will be discharged without other than the very proper qualification that the liberation of our surplus products shall not be made the occasion of benefit to the enemy, either directly or indirectly.
>
> The two lists have been prepared in the interests of facility and expediency. The first list, applicable to the enemy and his allies and to the neutral countries of Europe, brings under control practically all articles of commerce, while the second list, applicable to all the other countries of the world, makes only a few additions to the list of commodities controlled by the proclamation of July 9, 1917. It is obvious that a closer supervision and control of exports is necessary with respect to those European neutrals within the sphere of hostilities than is required for those countries farther removed.
>
> The establishment of these distinctions will simplify the administrative processes and enable us to continue our policy of minimizing the interruption of trade. . . . .

After some months, President Wilson decided that expansion in price-fixing by the Government was necessary, and stated in his address to Congress on December 4, 1917:

> . . . . . Recent experience has convinced me that the Congress must go further in authorizing the Government to set limits

to prices. The law of supply and demand, I am sorry to say, has been replaced by the law of unrestrained selfishness. While we have eliminated profiteering in several branches of industry, it still runs impudently rampant in others. The farmers, for example, complain with a great deal of justice that, while the regulation of food prices restricts their incomes, no restraints are placed upon the prices of most of the things they must themselves purchase; and similar inequities obtain on all sides. . . . .

In a statement issued on August 30, 1917, President Wilson made the following announcement about the prices fixed by the Government for wheat:

THE WHITE HOUSE, *August 30, 1917.*

Section 11 of the Food Act provides, among other things, for the purchase and sale of wheat and flour by the government, and appropriates money for that purpose. The purchase of wheat and flour for our allies, and to a considerable degree for neutral countries also, has been placed under the control of the Food Administration. I have appointed a committee to determine a fair price to be paid in government purchases. The price now recommended by that committee—$2.20 per bushel at Chicago for the basic grade—will be rigidly adhered to by the Food Administration.

It is the hope and expectation of the Food Administration, and my own also, that this step will at once stabilize and keep within moderate bounds the price of wheat for all transactions throughout the present crop year, and in consequence the prices of flour and bread also. The Food Act has given large powers for the control of storage and exchange operations, and these powers will be fully exercised. An inevitable consequence will be that financial dealings cannot follow their usual course. Whatever the advantages and disadvantages of the ordinary machinery of trade, it cannot function well under such disturbed and abnormal conditions as now exist. In its place, the Food Administration now fixes for its purchases a fair price, as recommended unanimously by a committee representative of all interests and all sections, and believes that thereby it will eliminate speculation, make possible the conduct of every operation in the full light of day, maintain the publicly stated price for all and, through economies made possible by stabilization and control, better the position of consumers also. . . . .

The increased consumption of fuel due to the increased demand in industry as a result of the European War led to the inclusion of fuel among the products over which the President was given control in the so-called Food Control Bill. The general powers granted under that bill are described under the head of "Food Administration," but separate provisions regarding fuel in the bill authorize the President to requisition and take over mines for use or operation by the Government; to fix the price of coal and coke, when sold by either producer or dealer; and to establish rules for their distribution and transportation. He is further empowered to prescribe regulations governing the work of employees in the mines, and to require, if necessary, all producers to sell only to the United States through an agency to be designated by the President.

To give merely one example of the difficulties attending the fuel problem, it might be stated that whereas the railroads of the country used approximately 125,000,000 tons of coal in 1916, some 170,000,000 tons were used by them in 1917. If the same ratio was preserved in all the other forms of American industrial activity, our net consumption of coal increased in 1917 to 635,000,000 tons from 475,000,000 tons in 1916. The scarcity of labor, due to increasing wages in other industries and the draft, combined with the severest winter in 1917 known in the recent history of the Weather Bureau, made the coal problem among the most serious met by our Government in its prosecution of the war.

On August 21, 1917, the President officially fixed coal prices, altering them later on November 28, 1917.

The following executive order was issued by the President on August 23, 1917:

> By virtue of the power conferred upon me under the Act of Congress approved August 10, 1917, entitled "An Act to provide further for the national security and defense by encouraging the production, conserving the supply, and controlling the distribution of food products and fuel," and particularly for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of said Act relating to fuel, Harry A. Garfield is hereby designated and appointed United States Fuel Administrator, to hold office during the pleasure of the President.
>
> Said fuel administrator shall supervise, direct and carry into

effect the provisions of said Act and the powers and authority therein given to the President so far as the same apply to fuel as set forth in said Act, and to any and all practices, procedure and regulations authorized under the provisions of said Act applicable to fuel, including the issuance, regulation and revocation under the name of said United States Fuel Administrator of licenses under said Act. In this behalf he shall do and perform such acts and things as may be authorized and required of him from time to time by direction of the President and under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed.

Said fuel administrator shall also have the authority to employ such assistants and subordinates, including such counsel as may from time to time be deemed by him necessary and to fix the compensation of such assistants, subordinates and counsel. . . . .

On August 9, 1918, the following appeal for increased coal production was made by President Wilson to all engaged in the production of coal:

The existing scarcity of coal is creating a grave danger—in fact, the most serious which confronts us—and calls for prompt and vigorous action on the part of both operators and miners. Without an adequate supply, our war program will be retarded; the effectiveness of our fighting forces in France will be lessened; the lives of our soldiers will be unnecessarily endangered and their hardships increased, and there will be much suffering in many homes throughout the country during the coming Winter.

I am well aware that your ranks have been seriously depleted by the draft, by voluntary enlistment, and by the demands of other essential industries. This handicap can be overcome, however, and sufficient coal can be mined in spite of it, if every one connected with the industry, from the highest official to the youngest boy, will give his best work each day for the full number of work hours.

The operators must be zealous as never before to bring about the highest efficiency of management, to establish the best possible working conditions, and to accord fair treatment to everybody, so that the opportunity to work at his best may be accorded every workman.

The miners should report for work every day unless prevented by unavoidable causes, and should not only stay in the mines the full time, but also see to it that they get more coal than ever

before. The other workers in and about the mines should work as regularly and faithfully, so that the work of the miner may not be retarded in any way. This will be especially necessary from this time forward, for your numbers may be further lessened by the draft, which will induct into the army your fair share of those not essential to industry.

Those who are drafted but who are essential will be given deferred classification, and it is their patriotic duty to accept it. And it is the patriotic duty of their friends and neighbors to hold them in high regard for doing so.

The only worker who deserves the condemnation of his community is the one who fails to give his best in this crisis; not the one who accepts deferred classification and works regularly and diligently to increase the coal output.

A great task is to be performed. The operators and their staffs alone cannot do it, nor can the mine workers alone do it: but both parties, working hand in hand, with a grim determination to rid the country of its greatest obstacle to winning the war, can do it.

It is with full confidence that I call upon you to assume the burden of producing an ample supply of coal. You will, I am sure, accept this burden, and will successfully carry it through, and in so doing you will be performing a service just as worthy as service in the trenches, and will win the applause and gratitude of the whole nation.

The seriousness of the coal situation was probably the determining factor in the federalization of the railroads in the country. But the severe and unprecedented cold waves and snow storms of January, 1918, hindered the solution of the coal problem, industries shut down because no coal could be obtained, private homes remained unheated, suffering became intense, especially among the poor; and accordingly Fuel Administrator Garfield announced on January 17, 1918, that all factories and manufacturing plants except those specifically mentioned as being engaged in the production of essential war materials would remain closed from January 18 to January 22, inclusive; and that on all Mondays from January 21 to March 18, inclusive, all work except that absolutely indispensable to the public health and welfare would cease. The suddenness with which the order came caused a furor throughout

the country, but it was loyally and faithfully obeyed; and the results, especially those concerned with the coaling of ships, were favorable.

Indeed, the order regarding "Workless Mondays" was rescinded for Southern states after February 4, 1918, and for the remainder of the country after February 11, 1918.

Another noteworthy feature of the campaign for fuel conservation during the war was the elimination of unnecessary lighting, such as that of an ornamental or advertising nature. In addition, there was organized a campaign for more economical firing, etc., in both domestic and industrial heating plants.

Among the agencies used by the Fuel Administration were a campaign to urge that rooms and houses be not heated above 68° Fahrenheit and the reduction of the supply of fuel whenever necessary to industries classed as non-essential.

The program of the Fuel Administration for 1918 called for 51,258,029 tons of anthracite coal, as compared with 49,195,706 tons in 1916 (the last normal year). By October 1, this program had been exceeded by 760,000 tons. In 1918, it was estimated that 600,000,000 short tons of bituminous coal were delivered, as compared with 550,000,000 tons in 1917 and 500,000,000 in 1916. By October 1, 37,000,000 more tons had been delivered than for the previous six-month period in 1917. (The coal year begins on April 1.)

The Pope's Peace Proposal and Its Reception

On August 15, 1917, Pope Benedict XV published a note to the belligerents, urging that they come to an agreement on the fundamental issues upon which peace might be arranged. After announcing that he had ceaselessly striven for peace, without favoring either group of belligerents, from the very outbreak of hostilities, the Pope described the awful toll of life and property which the war had taken. When contemplating the further destruction which must ensue if the war were to continue, he felt it his duty to make a public appeal for peace. To the Vatican, the fundamental issue upon which peace might be arranged was a recognition of the moral force of right above the material force of arms. Arrangements for international arbitration, for the freedom of the seas, for disarmament, would then be necessary. Concretely, Germany would have to evacuate and guarantee the independence of Belgium, of northern France, and of the other invaded lands occupied by her, whereas on their side the Entente Allies would be expected to restore the German colonies. The problems of the territory disputed by Austria and Italy, by Germany and France, would be settled by conciliation, taking into account the rights of nationality and placing the welfare of the world above the welfare of any one nation. The problems of Poland, of Armenia, and of the Balkan states must similarly be solved.

President Wilson replied to the Pope's peace proffer on August 27, 1917. After paying tribute to the high motives actuating His Holiness, the President declared that all the agony of the war would have been experienced in vain if the world were to revert but to the *status quo ante bellum,* and leave uncrushed the power of the Imperial German Government. Renouncing all desire to crush or to punish the people of Germany, the President declared openly that it was impossible to treat with Germany while its people enjoyed no control over their government. Only a peace based upon the will of free peoples in-

stead of merely upon the words of a faithless government could be enduring and just, and hence at that moment peace with Germany was impossible in the eyes of the United States.

> . . . . . Every heart that has not been blinded and hardened by this terrible war must be touched by this moving appeal of His Holiness the Pope, must feel the dignity and force of the humane and generous motives which prompted it, and must fervently wish that we might take the path of peace he so persuasively points out. But it would be folly to take it if it does not in fact lead to the goal he proposes. Our response must be based upon the stern facts and upon nothing else. It is not a mere cessation of arms he desires; it is a stable and enduring peace. This agony must not be gone through with again, and it must be a matter of very sober judgment what will insure us against it. . . . .
>
> To deal with such a power (as Germany) by way of peace upon the plan proposed by His Holiness the Pope would, so far as we can see, involve a recuperation of its strength and a renewal of its policy; would make it necessary to create a permanent hostile combination of nations against the German people, who are its instruments; and would result in abandoning the new-born Russia to the intrigue, the manifold subtle interference, and the certain counter-revolution which would be attempted by all the malign influences to which the German Government has of late accustomed the world. Can peace be based upon a restitution of its power or upon any word of honor it could pledge in a treaty of settlement and accommodation? . . . .
>
> The test, therefore, of every plan of peace is this: Is it based upon the faith of all the peoples involved or merely upon the word of an ambitious and intriguing government, on the one hand, and of a group of free peoples, on the other? This is a test which goes to the root of the matter; and it is the test which must be applied. . . . .
>
> We can not take the word of the present rulers of Germany as a guarantee of anything that is to endure, unless explicitly supported by such conclusive evidence of the will and purpose of the German people themselves as the other peoples of the world would be justified in accepting. Without such guarantees treaties of settlement, agreements for disarmament, covenants to set up arbitration in the place of force, territorial adjustments, reconstitutions of small nations, if made with the German Government, no man, no nation could now depend on. We must await some new

> evidence of the purposes of the great peoples of the Central Powers. God grant it may be given soon and in a way to restore the confidence of all peoples everywhere in the faith of nations and the possibility of a covenanted peace.

Germany replied to the Pope's peace offer on September 17, 1917. The Kaiser opened by asserting that since he had ascended the throne of the German Empire his efforts had uniformly been directed toward peace and that the present war had been forced upon Germany. The remainder of the German reply was occupied chiefly with assent to the Pope's theoretical theses in favor of arbitration, the freedom of the seas and disarmament. The Austrian reply was similar to the German.

War with Austria

By the end of the year, the presence of American troops in Europe made inevitable their engagement on occasion with forces of the allies of Germany. Up to this time, President Wilson had evidently hoped that the absence of an open declaration of war upon Austria by the United States would be of greater service in weakening the internal unity of Austria than an open declaration of war. But in his annual address to Congress on December 4, 1917, he stated that:

> . . . . . One very embarrassing obstacle that stands in our way is that we are at war with Germany but not with her allies. I, therefore, very earnestly recommend that the Congress immediately declare the United States in a state of war with Austria-Hungary. Does it seem strange to you that this should be the conclusion of the argument I have just addressed to you? It is not. It is in fact the inevitable logic of what I have said. Austria-Hungary is for the time being not her own mistress but simply the vassal of the German Government.
>
> We must face the facts as they are and act upon them without sentiment in this stern business. The Government of Austria and Hungary is not acting upon its own initiative or in response to the wishes and feelings of its own peoples, but as the instrument of another nation. We must meet its force with our own and regard the Central Powers as but one. The war can be successfully conducted in no other way.
>
> The same logic would lead also to a declaration of war against Turkey and Bulgaria. They also are the tools of Germany, but they are mere tools and do not yet stand in the direct path of our necessary action. We shall go wherever the necessities of this war carry us, but it seems to me that we should go only where immediate and practical considerations lead us, and not heed any others. . . . .

On December 11, 1917, therefore, the President was able to announce in a proclamation:

Whereas, the Congress of the United States, in the exercise of the constitutional authority vested in them, have resolved, by joint resolution of the Senate and House of Representatives, bearing date of December 7, 1917, as follows:


"Whereas, the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government has committed repeated acts of war against the Government and the people of the United States of America; therefore, be it

"Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that a state of war is hereby declared to exist between the United States of America and the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government; and that the President be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government; and to bring the conflict to a successful termination all the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States." . . . .

Now, Therefore, I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim to all whom it may concern that a state of war exists between the United States and the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government; and I do specially direct all officers, civil or military, of the United States that they exercise vigilance and zeal in the discharge of the duties incident to such a state of war, and I do, moreover, earnestly appeal to all American citizens, that they, in loyal devotion to their country, dedicated from its foundation to the principles of liberty and justice, uphold the laws of the land, and give undivided and willing support to those measures which may be adopted by the constitutional authorities in prosecution of the war to a successful issue and in obtaining a secure and just peace. . . . .

Other striking passages in President Wilson's annual address to Congress on December 4, 1917, were as follows:

. . . . . I shall not go back to debate the causes of the war. The intolerable wrongs done and planned against us by the sinister masters of Germany have long since become too grossly obvious and odious to every true American to need to be rehearsed. But I shall ask you to consider again and with a very grave scrutiny our objectives and the measures by which we mean to attain them; for the purpose of discussion here in this place is action, and our



Photos Supplied by International Film Service

RECONSTRUCTION OF DAMAGED AIRPLANES

As the upper panel indicates, the term "reconstruction" may be applied to the implements of warfare as well as to wounded soldiers and disarranged economic processes. The scene shows an "airship hospital" in France. Damaged planes are being repaired and prepared once more for battle.

ABOVE THE CLOUDS OVER PARIS

The central panel shows an airplane joy-riding over Paris and photographed from another plane accompanying it.

TRACTOR TOWING AIRPLANE

The lower panel shows a small motor tractor towing into position, preparatory to flight, a huge British bombing plane.

action must move straight toward definite ends. Our object is, of course, to win the war; and we shall not slacken or suffer ourselves to be diverted until it is won. But it is worth while asking and answering the question, When shall we consider the war won?

From one point of view it is not necessary to broach this fundamental matter. I do not doubt that the American people know what the war is about and what sort of an outcome they will regard as a realization of their purpose in it.

As a nation we are united in spirit and intention. I pay little heed to those who tell me otherwise. I hear the voices of dissent —who does not? I hear the criticism and the clamor of the noisily thoughtless and troublesome. I also see men here and there fling themselves in impotent disloyalty against the calm, indomitable power of the Nation. I hear men debate peace who understand neither its nature nor the way in which we may attain it with uplifted eyes and unbroken spirits. But I know that none of these speaks for the Nation. They do not touch the heart of anything. They may safely be left to strut their uneasy hour and be forgotten.

But from another point of view I believe that it is necessary to say plainly what we here at the seat of action consider the war to be for and what part we mean to play in the settlement of its searching issues. We are the spokesmen of the American people, and they have a right to know whether their purpose is ours. They desire peace by the overcoming of evil, by the defeat once for all of the sinister forces that interrupt peace and render it impossible, and they wish to know how closely our thought runs with theirs and what action we propose. They are impatient with those who desire peace by any sort of compromise—deeply and indignantly impatient—but they will be equally impatient with us if we do not make it plain to them what our objectives are and what we are planning for in seeking to make conquest of peace by arms.

I believe that I speak for them when I say two things: First, that this intolerable thing of which the masters of Germany have shown us the ugly face, this menace of combined intrigue and force which we now see so clearly as the German power, a thing without conscience or honor or capacity for covenanted peace, must be crushed and, if it be not utterly brought to an end, at least shut out from the friendly intercourse of the nations; and second, that when this thing and its power are indeed defeated and the time comes that we can discuss peace—when the German people have

spokesmen whose word we can believe and when those spokesmen are ready in the name of their people to accept the common judgment of the nations as to what shall henceforth be the bases of law and of covenant for the life of the world—we shall be willing and glad to pay the full price for peace, and pay it ungrudgingly.

We know what that price will be. It will be full, impartial justice—justice done at every point and to every nation that the final settlement must affect, our enemies as well as our friends.

You catch, with me, the voices of humanity that are in the air. They grow daily more audible, more articulate, more persuasive, and they come from the hearts of men everywhere. They insist that the war shall not end in vindictive action of any kind; that no nation or people shall be robbed or punished because the irresponsible rulers of a single country have themselves done deep and abominable wrong. It is this thought that has been expressed in the formula, "No annexations, no contributions, no punitive indemnities."

Just because this crude formula expresses the instinctive judgment as to right of plain men everywhere, it has been made diligent use of by the masters of German intrigue to lead the people of Russia astray—and the people of every other country their agents could reach—in order that a premature peace might be brought about before autocracy has been taught its final and convincing lesson and the people of the world put in control of their own destinies. . . . .

Let there be no misunderstanding. Our present and immediate task is to win the war and nothing shall turn us aside from it until it is accomplished. Every power and resource we possess, whether of men, of money, or of materials, is being devoted and will continue to be devoted to that purpose until it is achieved. Those who desire to bring peace about before that purpose is achieved I counsel to carry their advice elsewhere. We will not entertain it. We shall regard the war as won only when the German people say to us, through properly accredited representatives, that they are ready to agree to a settlement based upon justice and reparation of the wrongs their rulers have done. They have done a wrong to Belgium which must be repaired. They have established a power over other lands and peoples than their own—over the great empire of Austria-Hungary, over hitherto free Balkan states, over Turkey and within Asia—which must be relinquished.

Germany's success by skill, by industry, by knowledge, by enter-

prise we did not grudge or oppose, but admired, rather. She had built up for herself a real empire of trade and influence, secured by the peace of the world. We were content to abide by the rivalries of manufacture, science and commerce that were involved for us in her success, and stand or fall as we had or did not have the brains and the initiative to surpass her. But at the moment when she had conspicuously won her triumphs of peace she threw them away, to establish in their stead what the world will no longer permit to be established, military and political domination by arms, by which to oust where she could not excel the rivals she most feared and hated. The peace we make must remedy that wrong. It must deliver the once fair lands and happy peoples of Belgium and Northern France from the Prussian conquest and the Prussian menace, but it must deliver also the peoples of Austria-Hungary, the peoples of the Balkans and the peoples of Turkey, alike in Europe and Asia, from the impudent and alien dominion of the Prussian military and commercial autocracy.

We owe it, however, to ourselves, to say that we do not wish in any way to impair or to rearrange the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It is no affair of ours what they do with their own life, either industrially or politically. We do not purpose or desire to dictate to them in any way. We only desire to see that their affairs are left in their own hands, in all matters, great or small. We shall hope to secure for the peoples of the Balkan peninsula and for the people of the Turkish Empire the right and opportunity to make their own lives safe, their own fortunes secure against oppression or injustice and from the dictation of foreign courts or parties.

And our attitude and purpose with regard to Germany herself are of a like kind. We intend no wrong against the German Empire, no interference with her internal affairs. We should deem either the one or the other absolutely unjustifiable, absolutely contrary to the principles we have professed to live by and to hold most sacred throughout our life as a nation.

The people of Germany are being told by the men whom they now permit to deceive them and to act as their masters that they are fighting for the very life and existence of their empire, a war of desperate self-defense against deliberate aggression. Nothing could be more grossly or wantonly false, and we must seek by the utmost openness and candor as to our real aims to convince them of its falseness. We are in fact fighting for their emancipation from the fear, along with our own—from the fear as well as from the fact of unjust attack by neighbors or rivals or schemers

after world empire. No one is threatening the existence or the independence of the peaceful enterprise of the German Empire.

The worst that can happen to the detriment of the German people is this, that if they should still, after the war is over, continue to be obliged to live under ambitious and intriguing masters interested to disturb the peace of the world, men or classes of men whom the other peoples of the world could not trust, it might be impossible to admit them to the partnership of nations which must henceforth guarantee the world's peace. That partnership must be a partnership of peoples, not a mere partnership of governments. It might be impossible, also, in such untoward circumstances, to admit Germany to the free economic intercourse which must inevitably spring out of the other partnerships of a real peace. But there would be no aggression in that; and such a situation, inevitable, because of distrust, would in the very nature of things sooner or later cure itself, by processes which would assuredly set in.

The wrongs, the very deep wrongs, committed in this war will have to be righted. That, of course. But they cannot and must not be righted by the commission of similar wrongs against Germany and her allies. The world will not permit the commission of similar wrongs as a means of reparation and settlement. Statesmen must by this time have learned that the opinion of the world is everywhere wide awake and fully comprehends the issues involved. No representative of any self-governed nation will dare disregard it by attempting any such covenants of selfishness and compromise as were entered into at the Congress of Vienna. The thought of the plain people here and everywhere throughout the world, the people who enjoy no privilege and have very simple and unsophisticated standards of right and wrong, is the air all governments must henceforth breathe if they would live.

It is in the full disclosing light of that thought that all policies must be received and executed in this midday hour of the world's life. German rulers have been able to upset the peace of the world only because the German people were not suffered under their tutelage to share the comradeship of the other peoples of the world either in thought or in purpose. They were allowed to have no opinion of their own which might be set up as a rule of conduct for those who exercised authority over them. But the Congress that concludes this war will feel the full strength of the tides that run now in the hearts and consciences of free men everywhere. Its conclusions will run with those tides.

All those things have been true from the very beginning of this stupendous war; and I cannot help thinking that if they had been made plain at the very outset the sympathy and enthusiasm of the Russian people might have been once for all enlisted on the side of the Allies, suspicion and distrust swept away, and a real and lasting union of purpose effected. Had they believed these things at the very moment of their revolution, and had they been confirmed in that belief since, the sad reverses which have recently marked the progress of their affairs towards an ordered and stable government of free men might have been avoided. The Russian people have been poisoned by the very same falsehoods that have kept the German people in the dark, and the poison has been administered by the very same hand. The only possible antidote is the truth. It cannot be uttered too plainly or too often. . . . .

. . . . . We know that for us this is a war of high principle, debased by no selfish ambition of conquest or spoliation; because we know, and all the world knows, that we have been forced into it to save the very institutions we live under from corruption and destruction. The purpose of the Central Powers strikes straight at the very heart of everything we believe in; their methods of warfare outrage every principle of humanity and of knightly honor; their intrigue has corrupted the very thought and spirit of many of our people; their sinister and secret diplomacy has sought to take our very territory away from us and disrupt the union of the states. Our safety would be at an end, our honor forever sullied and brought into contempt, were we to permit their triumph. They are striking at the very existence of democracy and liberty.

It is because it is for us a war of high, disinterested purpose, in which all the free peoples of the world are banded together for the vindication of right, a war for the preservation of our nation, of all that it has held dear, of principle and of purpose, that we feel ourselves doubly constrained to propose for its outcome only that which is righteous and of irreproachable intention, for our foes as well as for our friends. The cause being just and holy, the settlement must be of like motive and equality. For this we can fight, but for nothing less noble or less worthy of our traditions. For this cause we entered the war and for this cause will we battle until the last gun is fired.

I have spoken plainly because this seems to me the time when it is most necessary to speak plainly, in order that all the world

may know that, even in the heat and ardor of the struggle and when our whole thought is of carrying the war through to its end, we have not forgotten any ideal or principle for which the name of America has been held in honor among the nations and for which it has been our glory to contend in the great generations that went before us. A supreme moment of history has come. The eyes of the people have been opened and they see. The hand of God is laid upon the nations. We will show them favor, I devoutly believe, only if they rise to the clear heights of His own justice and mercy.

Government Control of Transportation

Before the end of the year 1917, it became necessary for the Government to assume control of the major transportation systems of the United States. On December 26, 1917, President Wilson issued a proclamation to that effect.

> . . . . . Whereas, it is provided by Section I of the act approved August 29, 1916, entitled "An Act Making Appropriations for the Support of the Army for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1917, and for Other Purposes," as follows:
>
> > "The President, in time of war, is empowered, through the Secretary of War, to take possession and assume control of any system or systems of transportation, or any part thereof, and to utilize the same, to the exclusion as far as may be necessary of all other traffic thereon, for the transfer or transportation of troops, war material and equipment, or for such other purposes connected with the emergency as may be needful or desirable."
>
> And, whereas, it has now become necessary in the national defense to take possession and assume control of certain systems of transportation and to utilize the same, to the exclusion as far as may be necessary of other than war traffic thereon, for the transportation of troops, war material and equipment therefor, and for other needful and desirable purposes connected with the prosecution of the war;
>
> Now, therefore, I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, under and by virtue of the powers vested in me by the foregoing resolutions and statute, and by virtue of all other powers thereto enabling, do hereby, through Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War, take possession and assume control at twelve o'clock noon on the twenty-eighth day of December, 1917, of each and every system of transportation and the appurtenances thereof located wholly or in part within the boundaries of the continental United States and consisting of railroads, and owned or controlled systems of coastwise and inland transportation, engaged in gen-

eral transportation, whether operated by steam or by electric power, including also terminals, terminal companies and terminal associations, sleeping and parlor cars, private cars and private car lines, elevators, warehouses, telegraph and telephone lines, and all other equipment and appurtenances commonly used upon or operated as a part of such rail or combined rail and water systems of transportation—to the end that such systems of transportation be utilized for the transfer and transportation of troops, war material and equipment to the exclusion so far as may be necessary of all other traffic thereon, and that so far as such exclusive use be not necessary or desirable, such systems of transportation be operated and utilized in the performance of such other services as the national interest may require and of the usual and ordinary business and duties of common carriers.

It is hereby directed that the possession, control, operation, and utilization of such transportation systems hereby by me undertaken shall be exercised by and through William G. McAdoo, who is hereby appointed and designated Director General of Railroads. Said Director may perform the duties imposed upon him so long, and to such extent, as he shall determine, through the boards of directors, receivers, officers, and employes of said systems of transportation. Until and except so far as said Director shall from time to time by general or special orders otherwise provide, the board of directors, receivers, officers, and employes of the various transportation systems shall continue the operation thereof in the usual and ordinary course of the business of common carriers in the names of their respective companies.

Until and except so far as said Director shall from time to time otherwise by general or special orders determine, such systems of transportation shall remain subject to all existing statutes and orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and to all statutes and orders of regulating commissions of the various States in which said systems or any part thereof may be situated. But any orders, general or special, hereafter made by said Director shall have paramount authority and be obeyed as such.

Nothing herein shall be construed as now affecting the possession, operation, and control of street electric passenger railways, including railways commonly called interurbans, whether such railways be or be not owned or controlled by such railroad companies or systems. By subsequent order and proclamation, if and when it shall be found necessary or desirable, possession, control, or operation may be taken of all or any part of such street railway

systems, including subways and tunnels, and by subsequent order and proclamation possession, control, and operation in whole or in part may also be relinquished to the owners thereof of any part of the railroad systems or rail and water systems, possession and control of which are hereby assumed.

The Director shall, as soon as may be after having assumed such possession and control, enter upon negotiations with the several companies looking to agreements for just and reasonable compensation for the possession, use, and control of the respective properties on the basis of an annual guaranteed compensation above accruing depreciation and the maintenance of their properties, equivalent, as nearly as may be, to the average of the net operating income thereof for the three-year period ending June 30, 1917, the results of such negotiations to be reported to me for such action as may be appropriate and lawful.

But nothing herein contained, expressed or implied, or hereafter done or suffered hereunder shall be deemed in any way to impair the rights of the stockholders, bondholders, creditors, and other persons having interests in said systems of transportation or in the profits thereof, to receive just and adequate compensation for the use and control and operation of their property hereby assumed.

Regular dividends hitherto declared, and maturing interest upon bonds, debentures, and other obligations, may be paid in due course; and such regular dividends and interest may continue to be paid until and unless the said Director shall from time to time otherwise by general or special orders determine. And, subject to the approval of the Director, the various carriers may agree upon and arrange for the renewal and extension of maturing obligations.

Except with the prior written assent of said Director, no attachment by mesne process or on execution shall be levied on or against any of the property used by any of said transportation systems in the conduct of their business as common carriers; but suits may be brought by and against said carriers and judgments rendered as hitherto until and except so far as said Director may, by general or special orders, otherwise determine.

From and after twelve o'clock on said twenty-eighth day of December, 1917, all transportation systems included in this order and proclamation shall conclusively be deemed within the possession of said Director, without further act or notice. But for the

purposes of accounting said possession and control shall date from twelve o'clock midnight on December 31, 1917. . . . .

The following explanatory statement accompanied the above proclamation:

WASHINGTON, D. C., *December 26, 1917.*

I have exercised the powers over the transportation systems of the country which were granted me by the act of Congress of August, 1916, because it has become imperatively necessary for me to do so. This is a war of resources no less than of men, perhaps even more than of men, and it is necessary for the complete mobilization of our resources that the transportation systems of the country should be organized and employed under a single authority and a simplified method of coördination, which has not proved possible under private management and control.

The committee of railroad executives who have been coöperating with the government in this all-important matter have done the utmost that it was possible for them to do; have done it with patriotic zeal and with great ability; but there were differences that they could neither escape nor neutralize. Complete unity of administration in the present circumstances involves upon occasion and at many points a serious dislocation of earnings, and the committee was, of course, without power or authority to rearrange charges or effect proper compensations and adjustments of earnings.

Several roads which were willingly and with admirable public spirit accepting the orders of the committee have already suffered from these circumstances and should not be required to suffer further. In mere fairness to them the full authority of the government must be substituted. The government itself will thereby gain an immense increase of efficiency in the conduct of the war and of the innumerable activities upon which its successful conduct depends.

The public interest must be first served and, in addition, the financial interests of the government and the financial interests of the railways must be brought under a common direction. The financial operations of the railways need not then interfere with the borrowings of the government, and they themselves can be conducted at a great advantage. . . . . .

. . . . . Investors in railway securities may rest assured that their rights and interests will be as scrupulously looked after

by the government as they could be by the directors of the several railway systems. Immediately upon the reassembling of Congress I shall recommend that these definite guarantees be given: First, of course, that the railway properties will be maintained during the period of Federal control in as good repair and as complete equipment as when taken over by the government, and, second, that the roads shall receive a net operating income equal in each case to the average net income of the three years preceding June 30, 1917; and I am entirely confident that the Congress will be disposed in this case, as in others, to see that justice is done and full security assured to the owners and creditors of the great systems which the government must now use under its own direction or else suffer serious embarrassment.

The Secretary of War and I are agreed that, all the circumstances being taken into consideration, the best results can be obtained under the immediate executive direction of the Honorable William G. McAdoo, whose practical experience peculiarly fits him for the service and whose authority as Secretary of the Treasury will enable him to coördinate as no other man could the many financial interests which will be involved and which might, unless systematically directed, suffer very embarrassing entanglements.

The government of the United States is the only great government now engaged in the war which has not already assumed control of this sort. It was thought to be in the spirit of American institutions to attempt to do everything that was necessary through private management, and if zeal and ability and patriotic motive could have accomplished the necessary unification of administration it would certainly have been accomplished; but no zeal or ability could overcome insuperable obstacles, and I have deemed it my duty to recognize that fact in all candor now that it is demonstrated and to use without reserve the great authority reposed in me. A great national necessity dictated the action and I was therefore not at liberty to abstain from it.

WOODROW WILSON.

When Congress re-assembled after the Christmas recess of 1917, President Wilson addressed it on the control assumed by the Government over the railroads. His address of January 4, 1918, was as follows:

. . . . . I am sure that I am speaking the mind of all thoughtful Americans when I say that it is our duty as the repre-

sentatives of the nation to do everything that it is necessary to do to secure the complete mobilization of the whole resources of America by as rapid and effective means as can be found. Transportation supplies all the arteries of mobilization. Unless it be under a single and unified direction, the whole process of the nation's action is embarrassed.

It was in the true spirit of America, and it was right, that we should first try to effect the necessary unification under the voluntary action of those who were in charge of the great railway properties, and we did try it. The directors of the railways responded to the need promptly and generously. The group of railway executives who were charged with the task of actual coördination and general direction performed their difficult duties with patriotic zeal and marked ability, as was to have been expected, and did, I believe, everything that it was possible for them to do in the circumstances. If I have taken the task out of their hands, it has not been because of any dereliction or failure on their part, but only because there were some things which the Government can do and private management cannot. We shall continue to value most highly the advice and assistance of these gentlemen, and I am sure we shall not find them withholding it.

It had become unmistakably plain that only under Government administration can the entire equipment of the several systems of transportation be fully and unreservedly thrown into a common service without injurious discrimination against particular properties. Only under Government administration can absolutely unrestricted and unembarrassed common use be made of all tracks, terminal facilities and equipment of every kind. Only under that authority can new terminals be constructed and developed without regard to the requirements or limitations of particular roads. But under Government administration all these things will be possible —not instantly, but as fast as practical difficulties, which cannot be merely conjured away, give way before the new management.

The common administration will be carried out with as little disturbance of the present operating organizations and personnel of the railways as possible. Nothing will be altered or disturbed which it is not necessary to disturb. We are serving the public interest and safeguarding the public safety, but we are also regardful of the interest of those by whom these great properties are owned and glad to avail ourselves of the experience and trained ability of those who have been managing them. It is necessary that the transportation of troops and of war materials, of food

and of fuel, and of everything that is necessary for the full mobilization of the energies and resources of the country should be first considered, but it is clearly in the public interest also that the ordinary activities and the normal industrial and commercial life of the country should be interfered with and dislocated as little as possible, and the public may rest assured that the interest and convenience of the private shipper will be as carefully served and safeguarded as it is possible to serve and safeguard it in the present extraordinary circumstances.

While the present authority of the Executive suffices for all purposes of administration, and while, of course, all private interests must for the present give way to the public necessity, it is, I am sure you will agree with me, right and necessary that the owners and creditors of the railways, the holders of their stocks and bonds, should receive from the Government an unqualified guarantee that their properties will be maintained throughout the period of Federal control in as good repair and as complete equipment as at present, and that the several roads will receive under Federal management such compensation as is equitable and just alike to their owners and to the general public. I would suggest the average net railway operating income of the three years ending June 30, 1917. I earnestly recommend that these guarantees be given by appropriate legislation, and given as promptly as circumstances permit.

I need not point out the essential justice of such guarantees and their great influence and significance as elements in the present financial and industrial situation of the country. Indeed, one of the strong arguments for assuming control of the railroads at this time is the financial argument. It is necessary that the values of railway securities should be justly and fairly protected, and that the largest financial operations every year necessary in connection with the maintenance, operation, and development of the roads should, during the period of the war, be wisely related to the financial operations of the Government. . . . .

It is an obligation of public conscience and of public honor that the private interests we disturb should be kept safe from unjust injury, and it is of the utmost consequence to the Government itself that all great financial operations should be stabilized and coordinated with the financial operations of the Government. No borrowing should run athwart the borrowings of the Federal Treasury, and no fundamental industrial values should anywhere be unnecessarily impaired. In the hands of many thousands of

small investors in the country, as well as in national banks, in insurance companies, in savings banks, in trust companies, in financial agencies of every kind, railway securities, the sum total of which runs up to some ten or eleven thousand millions, constitute a vital part of the structure of credit, and the unquestioned solidity of that structure must be maintained.

The Secretary of War and I easily agreed that, in view of the many complex interests which must be safeguarded and harmonized, as well as because of his exceptional experience and ability in this new field of governmental action, the Honorable William G. McAdoo was the right man to assume direct administrative control of this new executive task. At our request, he consented to assume the authority and duties of organizer and director-general of the new railway administration. He has assumed those duties, and his work is in active progress.

It is probably too much to expect that even under the unified railway administration which will now be possible sufficient economies can be effected in the operation of the railways to make it possible to add to their equipment and extend their operative facilities as much as the present extraordinary demands upon their use will render desirable, without resorting to the national Treasury for the funds. If it is not possible, it will, of course, be necessary to resort to the Congress for grants of money for that purpose. The Secretary of the Treasury will advise with your committees with regard to this very practical aspect of the matter. For the present, I suggest only the guarantees I have indicated and such appropriations as are necessary at the outset of this task.

I take the liberty of expressing the hope that the Congress may grant these promptly and ungrudgingly. We are dealing with great matters, and will, I am sure, deal with them greatly.

A law enacted by Congress and approved by the President on March 21, 1918, provided for the operation of the railroads under federal control and for the compensation of their owners, etc. During the period of federal control each carrier is to receive annually a sum equal to its average annual operating income for the three years ending June 30, 1917. Any income above that amount remains the property of the United States, the figures to be obtained by the Interstate Commerce Commission.

War taxes for the period beginning with January 1, 1918, and all

taxes prior thereto must be paid by the carrier from its own funds, later taxes being paid out of revenues derived by the Government under federal control. The Government shall consider as part of the expenses of operation the cost of maintenance, repair, and depreciation and the creation of reserves, etc., necessary to return the roads to the owners at the end of federal control in the same condition as when acquired. Wherever it is apparent to the President that abnormal conditions in 1914-7 make the above remuneration unfair, he may make with the carriers concerned such other agreement as seems to him just and fair.

Street and interurban electric lines, however, are excluded from the provisions of the Act.

All claims for compensation not adjusted as provided above and below may be submitted to boards appointed by the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Dividends paid by carriers under federal control must not be beyond those paid in 1914-7, except with the approval of the President.

Five hundred million dollars is appropriated for the expenses of Government control. The President may order carriers to make improvements, etc., to be paid for from this fund.

The carriers may issue securities during federal control, with the approval of the President, and the latter may, out of the fund above-mentioned, buy such at a price not above par and may sell them not below the cost thereof. The President may delegate the powers granted him by the Bill, but no Government official may receive extra compensation for additional duties thus performed.

All carriers are subject to all laws and suits, etc., as before federal control, except that no process, final or mesne, may be filed against a property under federal control. The President is given authority over fares and rates, etc., subject, however, to the veto of the Interstate Commerce Commission after hearing and investigation in the case of rates concerning which complaint has been made.

All property and moneys derived from operation under federal control become the property of the United States, but in the custody of the same officers as before federal control. Expenditures follow

a similar course. Federal control must end twenty-one months after the end of the war, but the President may relinquish his authority over all or any of the carriers previously to that time. Nothing in the Act may be construed as affecting the powers of the several states over the carriers, except where the transportation of troops and war materials or the issue of stocks and bonds are concerned; nor to indicate nor to express the post-war attitude of the Government toward the railroads.

The average net income of the railroads for 1914-7 was the highest in the history of the railroads of the country, as indicated by the following figures:

1915	$ 728,212,079
1916	1,043,839,822
1917	1,069,750,514
Average	947,267,472

On May 26, 1918, Director-general of Railroads McAdoo announced wage increases of more than $300,000,000, retroactive to January 1, 1918, and affecting nearly 2,000,000 employees. The wages policy of the Federal Administration was announced as based on the need for a decent standard of living, rather than on the law of supply and demand for labor; on equal pay for similar work; on the eight-hour day as a basis of wages computation in all railroad work; on equal pay for men and women, and for negroes and whites for identical or similar work. A standing wage board consisting of three representatives of the employees and three of the employers was established to adjust problems in the development of the Government's wages policy. Simultaneously a general increase of approximately 25% in both passenger and freight rates was announced, in order to meet these and other increases in the operating expenses of the railroads.

In connection with the Federal Railroad Administration, the great express companies of the nation were combined in one body under Government control in June, 1918.

> Whereas the organizations for the conduct of the express business over numerous systems of transportation which have been

duly placed under Federal control, and pertaining to such systems of transportation, have been consolidated into the American Railway Express Company which has been made the sole agent of the Government for conducting the express business, with the result that the entire transportation system of said Express Company has been necessarily in substance and effect placed under Federal control, and

Whereas it is desirable, in order to administer to the best advantage the transportation business and operations of the American Railway Express System to make it specifically clear by this Proclamation that the President has the possession, use, control and operation of the entire transportation system of the American Railway Express Company,

Now, therefore, I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, under and by virtue of the powers vested in me by law do hereby, through Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War, take possession, and assume control at 12 o'clock noon on the 18th day of November, 1918, of that certain system of transportation called the American Railway Express Company and all of its appurtenances and property of every kind or nature, directly or indirectly, owned, leased, chartered, controlled, or used in the conduct of, or in connection with, its express business.

It is hereby further directed that the possession, control, operation and utilization of said express transportation system hereby by me undertaken shall be exercised by and through William G. McAdoo, heretofore appointed Director General of Railroads, with all the powers conferred upon him by the said Proclamations of December 26, 1917, and March 29, 1918, respectively, together with all and singular the powers conferred upon the President by the Act of Congress entitled, "An Act to Provide for the Operation of Transportation Systems while under Federal Control, for the Just Compensation of their Owners, and for Other Purposes," approved March 21, 1918.

The said Director General of Railroads may perform the duties hereby imposed upon him, so long and to such an extent as he shall determine, through the Board of Directors, officers and employees of the said American Railway Express Company, under the contract already made, and dated the twenty-sixth day of June, 1918, between the said Director General of Railroads and said American Railway Express Company, and until and except so far as said Director General shall from time to time by general or special orders otherwise provide, the Board of Directors, officers

and employees of said Company shall continue the operation thereof in the usual and ordinary course under such contract.

From and after 12 o'clock noon on said 18th November, 1918, the said transportation system shall conclusively be deemed within the possession and control of said Director General without further act or notice. . . . .

The following orders explain the control exercised over the railroads during the Civil War:

WAR DEPARTMENT, *May 25, 1862.*

Ordered: By virtue of the authority vested by act of Congress, the President takes military possession of all the railroads in the United States from and after this date until further order, and directs that the respective railroad companies, their officers and servants, shall hold themselves in readiness for the transportation of such troops and munitions of war as may be ordered by the military authorities, to the exclusion of all other business.

By order of the Secretary of War:

M. C. MEIGS,
Quartermaster-General.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, September 24, 1863.

Ordered by the President of the United States, That Major-General Hooker be, and he is hereby, authorized to take military possession of all railroads, with their cars, locomotives, plants, and equipments, that may be necessary for the execution of the military operation committed to his charge; and all officers, agents, and employees of said roads are directed to render their aid and assistance therein and to respect and obey his commands, pursuant to the act of Congress in such case made and provided.

EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

Nevertheless, President Wilson expressly did not advocate a policy of Government operation of the railroads after the emergencies of war had passed. In this respect, he was but following the traditional American feeling in favor of private ownership, as well expressed, for instance, in the Fifth Annual Message of President Roosevelt, on December 5, 1905.

. . . . . The question of transportation lies at the root of all industrial success, and the revolution in transportation which

has taken place during the last half century has been the most important factor in the growth of the new industrial conditions. Most emphatically we do not wish to see the man of great talents refused the reward for his talents. Still less do we wish to see him penalized; but we do desire to see the system of railroad transportation so handled that the strong man shall be given no advantage over the weak man. We wish to insure as fair treatment for the small town as for the big city; for the small shipper as for the big shipper. In the old days the highway of commerce, whether by water or by a road on land, was open to all; it belonged to the public and the traffic along it was free. At present the railway is this highway, and we must do our best to see that it is kept open to all on equal terms. Unlike the old highway it is a very difficult and complex thing to manage, and it is far better that it should be managed by private individuals than by the Government. But it can only be so managed on condition that justice is done the public. It is because, in my judgment, public ownership of railroads is highly undesirable and would probably in this country entail far-reaching disaster, but I wish to see such supervision and regulation of them in the interest of the public as will make it evident that there is no need for public ownership. The opponents of Government regulation dwell upon the difficulties to be encountered and the intricate and involved nature of the problem. Their contention is true. It is a complicated and delicate problem, and all kinds of difficulties are sure to arise in connection with any plan of solution, while no plan will bring all the benefits hoped for by its more optimistic adherents. Moreover, under any healthy plan, the benefits will develop gradually and not rapidly. Finally, we must clearly understand that the public servants who are to do this peculiarly responsible and delicate work must themselves be of the highest type both as regards integrity and efficiency. They must be well paid, for otherwise able men cannot in the long run be secured; and they must possess a lofty probity which will revolt as quickly at the thought of pandering to any gust of popular prejudice against rich men as at the thought of anything even remotely resembling subserviency to rich men. But while I fully admit the difficulties in the way, I do not for a moment admit that these difficulties warrant us in stopping in our effort to secure wise and just system. They should have no other effect than to spur us on to the exercise of the resolution, the even-handed justice, and the fertility of resource, which we like to think of as typically American, and which will in the end achieve good

results in this as in other fields of activity. The task is a great one and underlies the task of dealing with the whole industrial problem. But the fact that it is a great problem does not warrant us in shrinking from the attempt to solve it. At present we face such utter lack of supervision, such freedom from the restraints of law, that excellent men have often been literally forced into doing what they deplored because otherwise they were left at the mercy of unscrupulous competitors. To rail at and assail the men who have done as they best could under such conditions accomplishes little. What we need to do is to develop an orderly system, and such a system can only come through the gradually increased exercise of the right of efficient Government control. . . . .

Trading with the Enemy Act

One of the most helpful measures in prosecuting the war against Germany was the Trading with the Enemy Act. This act, approved by the President on October 6, 1917, was designed, as its name implies, to prevent commercial intercourse with firms with German interests, and thus to cripple to that extent the commercial strength of Germany. The chief provisions of the Act were as follows:

Under severe criminal penalties, trading without a license with a person who there is reason to believe is an enemy or an ally of enemy is made unlawful. "Trade" is defined to mean to pay, satisfy, compromise, or give security for the payment of any debt or obligation; to draw, accept, pay, draw for acceptance or payment, or endorse any negotiable instrument; to enter into, carry on, complete or perform any contract, agreement or obligation; to buy, sell, loan, extend credit, trade in, deal with, exchange, transmit, transfer, assign, or otherwise receive or dispose of any form of property; to have any form of business communication or intercourse with.

An "enemy" or "ally of enemy" is defined as a person of any nationality residing within the territory of or occupied by Germany and any of her allies, including even citizens of the United States who may be thus situated. The term includes any person doing business within such territory, wherever he reside or of whatever nationality he be. (The term "person" includes a business or corporation.) The term includes also every enemy government of the United States, and every agent of such government, wherever located. Enemy aliens (q. v.) in the United States are not included in this term, although they may be subject to internment, and the President is given power to issue licenses to trade with the enemy.

It is similarly unlawful to trade with any person whatsoever who may be acting as agent for or for the benefit of an enemy or ally of enemy.

A person who is an enemy or ally of enemy may apply for a license to do business within the United States, and may continue to do business until such application is passed upon. An enemy alien in the United States need not apply for such license unless he falls under the above definition of an enemy or an ally of the enemy. An enemy or ally of enemy granted a license to do business within the United States may be traded with by every one but such enemy or ally of enemy may not transmit outside the United States any money or property, and may not use such money or property to establish credit inside or outside the United States for or for the benefit of an enemy or ally of enemy.

It is made unlawful to take or send outside of the United States any communication intended for an enemy or ally of enemy, and also to bring in or take out any form of communication except by mail—unless through license.

The War Trade Board succeeds the Exports Administrative Board in all the latter's functions, including complete control over exports, under the powers created in the Espionage Act. The War Trade Board also licenses importations, the Act giving the President the power to prohibit the importation of any article or to regulate its importation.

A War Trade Council is created to replace the Exports Council and to act as an advisory body in all matters referred to it by the President of the War Trade Board. It is composed of the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce and the Food Administrator, and the Chairman of the United States Shipping Board.

The Federal Trade Commission is empowered to carrry out various provisions in the Act relating to patents.

Control over foreign exchange and transfers of bullion, etc., are also vested in the President by the Act.

A Censorship Board administers the regulations of the President concerning cable, telegraph and mail communication between the United States and foreign countries. This Board is composed of representatives of the Postmaster-general, the Secretaries of War and Navy, the War Trade Board, and the Chairman of the Committee on Public Information.

Every paper printed in a foreign language must furnish a translation to the Postmaster-general of all matter concerning the War printed by it.

It is made unlawful for any person without a license therefor to transport to or from the United States, or for any vessel of the United States registry to transport anywhere, any citizen of an enemy or ally of an enemy nation.

Alien Property Custodian

Another measure of prime importance to the United States in prosecuting the war against Germany was that designed to take over all property in the United States of German ownership. The chief duties assigned the Alien Property Custodian, A. Mitchell Palmer, were as follows:

The word "enemy" for the purposes of the work of the Alien Property Custodian covers all persons within the military or naval lines of the Central Powers, and all persons residing outside the United States transacting business with any one within such military or naval lines. A German citizen in the United States (unless interested) is not an enemy under the Trading-with-the-Enemy Act, whereas an American citizen in Germany may be so considered.

All who hold enemy property or any interest therein, by knowledge or by suspicion, must report on the same through blanks furnished by the Alien Property Custodian, under penalty of not more than ten years' imprisonment or a fine of $10,000 or both.

The purpose of the work of the Alien Property Custodian is to make available for war financing any funds in the United States belonging to enemies, to prevent such funds being used so as to give aid and comfort to the enemy, and to safeguard property of enemies for such disposition after the war as Congress might make.

For all property which comes into his hands, the Custodian acts as a common law trustee, depositing all money with the Treasurer of the United States, to be invested in United States bonds or certificates of indebtedness. In the discretion of the Custodian, enemy property may be used or supervised, without confiscation. In certain cases licenses are issued to permit the property of enemies to be carried on, especially to enemy insurance companies.

On May 1, 1918, the Alien Property Custodian's trust accounts comprised $282,067,927, of which $115,824,409 represented stocks;

$46,016,434, bonds, $51,325,434, accounts receivable; $27,965,975, cash; $6,522,279, mortgages; $4,267,618, notes receivable; $4,503,142, real estate; and $25,612,633, miscellaneous.

The extent to which the Government ended German ownership of property in the United States during the war may be seen from the following table. The figures extended to November 1, 1918, and show the different forms in which capital invested by Germans in the United States for German purposes was used to help the United States in the prosecution of war against Germany.

Cash Invested in Government Securities	$ 54,786,444
Cash deposited in Treasury	4,544,126
Cash with Depositaries	9,546
Stocks	169,366,860
Bonds, other than Government	59,365,453
Mortgages	11,720,996
Notes Receivable	6,167,032
Accounts Receivable	50,648,582
Real Estate	7,567,988
General business in liquidation, operation, mdse., etc.	89,278,885
Ships	34,193,690
Total	$487,649,702

By March 1, 1919, these figures had risen to almost $800,000,000.

The Espionage Law

One of the features of the prosecution of war against Germany by the United States was the passage and enforcement of a bill designed to prevent or to punish opposition by act or word to the country's prosecution of the war. It was estimated that between the passage of the bill and the signing of the armistice on November 11, 1918, some 1,500 or 2,000 persons had been sentenced to imprisonment under the terms of the Espionage Law. Infliction of the maximum sentence (twenty years' imprisonment) for the offenses outside of espionage was very common, and among those convicted were many of the leaders of radical political movements in the United States. A large number of the active leaders of the I. W. W. were among those sentenced, and many prominent Socialists of both sexes also fell under the penalties of the Law.

In March, 1919, the attorney-general under whom most of the prosecutions under the Espionage Law were conducted urged that some eighty sentences imposed under the Law be commuted—a request with which President Wilson immediately complied. For the majority of cases, however, Mr. Gregory insisted that commutation of sentence was undesirable, and objected to the classification of those sentenced under the Espionage Law as "political prisoners."

In the last session of the Sixty-fourth Congress, a bill, commonly called the Espionage Bill, or Spy Bill, was introduced to extend and to clarify the regulations concerning espionage and treason, but the Bill, although it passed the Senate, was not reported out of the committee in the House. A similar bill was passed by the Sixty-fifth Congress and was approved by the President on June 15, 1917. Its main provisions were as follows:

Title I—Whoever obtains information respecting any place connected with the national defense with intent or reason to believe that such

information is to be used to the injury of the United States, including the taking of photographs or blue prints, etc.; or who receives or agrees to receive or stimulates the acquisition of such information for such intent or reason; or who permits the transmission of such information to any one not entitled to receive it, through intent or through gross negligence, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or by both.

Whoever, with such intent or reason, transmits or assists in the transmission of such information relating to the national defense to a foreign government or to any agent thereof shall be punished by imprisonment of not more than 20 years; *provided* that whoever so acts in time of war shall be punished by death or by imprisonment of not more than 30 years, and that whoever, with intent that it shall be furnished the enemy, collects or attempts to collect such information, in time of war, is punishable by death or by imprisonment for not more than 30 years.

Whoever in time of war wilfully makes false statements to interfere with the operation of the forces of the United States or attempts to cause insubordination in the forces of the United States or to obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States, to the injury of the service or of the United States, is punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or by imprisonment for not more than 20 years or by both.

Any person who conspires to violate the above provisions shall be punishable as any person who performs them. Any person concealing or harboring a person who he suspects has violated these provisions is punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or by imprisonment for not more than two years or by both.

Title II gives the Secretary of the Treasury power over all vessels in the territorial waters of the United States whenever the President proclaims that a national emergency for this purpose exists. Punishment is provided for those who resist the exercise of such power or who cause or permit the destruction or injury of such vessels or permit them to harbor persons who have committed offenses against the United States.

Title III provides punishment for any person who injures or tampers with or places bombs on any vessel in the territorial waters of the United States or any vessel of American registry anywhere.

Title IV provides punishment for any person who attempts to interfere with the exportation abroad of articles or to injure such articles.

Title V gives the President the right to refuse clearance and to detain vessels during a war in which the United States is a neutral. It also provides for the arrest and confinement of any person breaking internment and for the punishment of any person under the jurisdiction of the United States who shall aid or persuade any such person to break internment.

Title VI provides for the regulation of the seizure of arms or ammunitions of war unlawfully attempted to be exported from the United States.

Title VII gives the President power to proclaim certain exports unlawful, but only during the war against the Central Powers.

Title VIII provides for the punishment of any person who wilfully makes an untrue statement under oath, with knowledge of a possibility that such statement may influence the conduct of any foreign government or of the United States, to the injury of the latter; and of any person who falsely pretends to be an official of a foreign government, and obtains any thing of value because of such misrepresentation; and of any person within the jurisdiction of the United States who carries out a conspiracy, wherever made, to injure property, etc.

Title IX changes passport regulations.

Title X provides for the punishment of any person who attempts to counterfeit a Government seal or uses a Government seal unlawfully.

Title XI provides extensive regulations concerning search warrants and their applicability.

Title XII refers to the use of the mails. Any writing or publication of any kind violating any of the above provisions is declared to be non-mailable. No person, however, except an employee of the Dead Letter Office authorized thereto or another person working upon an

authorized search warrant, is permitted to open a letter not addressed to himself.

Any writing or publication containing any matter advocating treason or resistance to the laws of the United States is declared non-mailable. Whoever attempts to use the mails or the Postal Service to mail matter thus declared to be unmailable shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years or both.

Title XIII contains general provisions and definitions regarding the language and jurisdiction of the preceding articles.

By regulations of Postmaster-general Burleson, made at the direction of President Wilson, seditious publication in accord with the provisions of the Espionage Act is defined as follows:

Any matter advocating or urging treason, insurrection, or forcible resistance to the laws of the United States.

Any matter conveying false reports or false statements intended to interfere with the operation or success of the military or naval forces of the United States, or to promote the success of its enemies.

Any matter intended to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty in military or naval forces of the United States.

Any matter intended to obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States, to the injury of the service of the United States.

Any matter the circulation or the publication of which involves the violation of any of the criminal provisions of the Espionage Act.

By act of Congress approved May 16, 1918, the penalty of twenty years' imprisonment or fine of $10,000 or both was extended to cover cases of any one who utters, writes or publishes any "disloyal, profane, scurrilous or abusive language" regarding the United States Government, Constitution, Flag, military or naval forces, and uniform or any language intended to bring them into contempt or disrepute; and of any one who shall urge the curtailment of the production of any goods of value to the country in the prosecution of the war, with intent to hinder such prosecution; and of any one who advocates or defends such acts, or supports or favors the cause of a country with which

the United States is at war or by word or act opposes the cause of the United States in that war.

Moreover, during the war the Postmaster-general "upon evidence satisfactory to him" that any person is using the mails in violation of the provisions of the law may declare that all mail addressed to such person is undeliverable.

Under the terms of the Espionage Law many newspapers, magazines, and other publications—mostly of radical views—were barred from the mails. President Wilson's attitude in this connection was set forth in the following letter to the editor of one of the magazines denied the mails:

THE WHITE HOUSE, *September 18, 1917.*

MY DEAR MR. EASTMAN:

I thank you very warmly for your generous appreciation of my reply to the Pope, and I wish that I could agree with those parts of your letter which concern the other matters we were discussing when you were down here. I think that a time for war must be regarded as wholly exceptional and that it is legitimate to regard things which would in ordinary circumstances be innocent as very dangerous to the public welfare. But the line is manifestly exceedingly hard to draw, and I cannot say that I have any confidence that I know how to draw it. I can only say that a line must be drawn and that we are trying—it may be clumsily, but genuinely—to draw it without favor or prejudice. Cordially and sincerely yours,

WOODROW WILSON.

CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS

When the draft law was applied for raising forces in the United States adequate to cope with the armed might of Germany, it was found that there were a number of men in the United States who refused to engage in the war against the Central Powers. Altogether there were some 6,000 of these "conscientious objectors" to war. On March 20, 1918, the President issued the following order prescribing certain forms of non-combatant service for such persons:

1. By virtue of authority contained in Section 4 of the Act approved May 18, 1917, entitled, "An Act to authorize the Presi-

dent to increase temporarily the military establishment of the United States," whereby it is provided—

> "And nothing in this Act contained shall be construed to require or compel any person to serve in any of the forces herein provided for who is found to be a member of any well recognized religious sect or organization at present organized and existing and whose existing creed or principles forbid its members to participate in war in any form and whose religious convictions are against war or participation therein in accordance with the creed or principles of said religious organizations; but no person so exempted shall be exempted from service in any capacity that the President shall declare to be noncombatant."

I hereby declare that the following military service is noncombatant service:

a. Service in the Medical Corps wherever performed. This includes service in the sanitary detachments attached to combatant units at the front; service in the divisional sanitary trains composed of ambulance companies and field hospital companies, on the line of communications, at the base in France, and with the troops and at hospitals in the United States; also the service of supply and repair in the Medical Department.

b. Any service in the Quartermaster Corps, in the United States may be treated as noncombatant. Also, in rear of zone of operations, service in the following: Stevedore companies, labor companies, remount depots, veterinary hospitals, supply depots, bakery companies, the subsistence service, the bathing service, the laundry service, the salvage service, the clothing renovation service, the shoe repair service, the transportation repair service, and motor-truck companies.

c. Any engineer service in the United States may be treated as noncombatant service. Also, in rear of zone of operations, service as follows: Railroad building, operation and repair; road building and repair; construction of rear line fortifications, auxiliary defenses, etc.; construction of docks, wharves, storehouses and of such cantonments as may be built by the Corps of Engineers; topographical work; camouflage; map reproduction; supply depot service; repair service; hydraulic service; and forestry service.

2. Persons ordered to report for military service under the above Act who have (*a*) been certified by their Local Boards to be members of a religious sect or organization as defined in Section 4 of said Act; or (*b*) who object to participating in war because of conscientious scruples but have failed to receive certificates as members of a religious sect or organization from their Local Board, will be assigned to noncombatant military service as defined in paragraph 1 to the extent that such persons are able to accept service as aforesaid without violation of the religious or other conscientious scruples by them in good faith entertained. Upon the promulgation of this order it shall be the duty of each Division, Camp, or Post Commander, through a tactful and considerate officer, to present to all such persons the provisions hereof with adequate explanation of the character of noncombatant service herein defined, and upon such explanations to secure acceptance of assignment to the several kinds of noncombatant service above enumerated; and wherever any person is assigned to noncombatant service by reason of his religious or conscientious scruples, he shall be given a certificate stating the assignment and reason thereof, and such certificate shall thereafter be respected as preventing the transfer of such persons from such noncombatant to combatant service by any Division, Camp, Post, or other Commander under whom said person may thereafter be called to serve, but such certificate shall not prevent the assignment of such person to some other form of noncombatant service with his own consent. So far as may be found feasible by each Division, Camp, or Post Commander, future assignments of such persons to noncombatant military service will be restricted to the several detachments and units of the Medical Department in the absence of a request for assignment to some other branch of noncombatant service as defined in paragraph 1 hereof.

3. On the first day of April, and thereafter monthly, each Division, Camp, or Post Commander shall report to The Adjutant General of the Army, for the information of the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War, the names of all persons under their respective commands who profess religious or other conscientious scruples as above described and who have been unwilling to accept, by reason of such scruples, assignment to noncombatant military service as above defined, and as to each such person so reported a brief, comprehensive statement as to the nature of the objection to the acceptance of such noncombatant military



DESCRIPTION OF PICTURES ON REVERSE SIDE

Upper Left Hand Corner—Samuel Gompers, President, American Federation of Labor, 1882-1894 and 1895—; and Member, Advisory Committee, Council of National Defense, October 11, 1916—.

Upper Right Hand Corner—Daniel Willard, Chairman, Advisory Commission, Council of National Defense, March, 1917-November 17, 1917; Chairman, War Industries Board, November 17, 1917-February 28, 1918.

Center—Frank P. Walsh, Joint Chairman, War Labor Board, April 10, 1918-December 4, 1918.

Lower Left Hand Corner—Raymond B. Fosdick, Chairman, United States Army Committee on Training Camp Activities, May 6, 1917—.

Lower Right Hand Corner—Vance McCormick, Chairman, War Trade Board, October 15, 1917—.

service entertained. The Secretary of War will from time to time classify the persons so reported and give further directions as to the disposition of them. Pending such directions from the Secretary of War, all such persons not accepting assignment to noncombatant service shall be segregated as far as practicable and placed under the command of a specially qualified officer of tact and judgment, who will be instructed to impose no punitive hardship of any kind upon them, but not to allow their objections to be made the basis of any favor or consideration beyond exemption from actual military service which is not extended to any other soldier in the service of the United States.

4. With a view to maintaining discipline, it is pointed out that the discretion of courts-martial, so far as any shall be ordered to deal with the cases of persons who fail or refuse to comply with lawful orders by reason of alleged religious or other conscientious scruples, should be exercised, if feasible, so as to secure uniformity of penalties in the imposition of sentences under Articles of War 64 and 65, for the wilful disobedience of a lawful order or command. It will be recognized that sentences imposed by such courts-martial, when not otherwise described by law, shall prescribe confinement in the United States Disciplinary Barracks or elsewhere as the Secretary of War or the reviewing authority may direct, but not in a penitentiary; but this shall not apply to the cases of men who desert either before reporting for duty to the military authorities or subsequently thereto.

5. The Secretary of War will review the sentences and findings of courts-martial heretofore held of persons who come within any of the classes herein described, and bring to the attention of the President for remedy, if any be needed, sentences and judgments found at variance with the provisions hereof.

A great number of the conscientious objectors accepted these forms of non-combatant service. Many others, however, declared that their consciences would not permit them to perform any service under military control or in military uniform. For these latter, a Federal board of inquiry was then organized; and all conscientious objectors found by it to be sincere were permitted to work on farms under private direction, but still under the surveillance of the War Department and without cancelling their obligations for military service. Less than 500 conscientious objectors refused both non-combatant service and farm service, and were hence incarcerated by the time of the signing of the armistice on November 11, 1918.

Prayers for Victory

October 30, 1917, and May 30, 1918, were set apart by Presidential proclamations as days on which the people of the United States were urged to pray for victory:

> Whereas, the Congress of the United States, by a concurrent resolution adopted on the fourth day of the present month of October, in view of the entrance of our nation into the vast and awful war which now afflicts the greater part of the world, has requested me to set apart by official proclamation a day upon which our people should be called upon to offer concerted prayer to Almighty God for His divine aid in the success of our arms;
>
> And, Whereas, it behooves a great free people, nurtured as we have been in the eternal principles of justice and of right, a nation which has sought from the earliest days of its existence to be obedient to the divine teachings which have inspired it in the exercise of its liberties, to turn always to the supreme Master and cast themselves in faith at His feet, praying for His aid and succor in every hour of trial, to the end that the great aims to which our fathers dedicated our power as a people may not perish among men, but be always asserted and defended with fresh ardor and devotion and, through the Divine blessing, set at last upon enduring foundations for the benefit of all the free peoples of the earth:
>
> Now, therefore, I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, gladly responding to the wish expressed by the Congress, do appoint October twenty-eighth, being the last Sunday of the present month, as a day of supplication and prayer for all the people of the nation, earnestly exhorting all my countrymen to observe the appointed day, according to their several faiths, in solemn prayer that God's blessing may rest upon the high task which is laid upon us, to the end that the cause for which we give our lives and treasure may triumph and our efforts be blessed with high achievement. . . . .

> Whereas the Congress of the United States, on the second day of April last, passed the following resolution:

"Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That, it being a duty peculiarly incumbent in a time of war humbly and devoutly to acknowledge our dependence on Almighty God and to implore His aid and protection, the President of the United States be, and he is hereby, respectfully requested to recommend a day of public humiliation, prayer, and fasting, to be observed by the people of the United States with religious solemnity and the offering of fervent supplications to Almighty God for the safety and welfare of our cause, His blessings on our arms, and a speedy restoration of an honorable and lasting peace to the nations of the earth;"

And Whereas it has always been the reverent habit of the people of the United States to turn in humble appeal to Almighty God for His guidance in the affairs of their common life.

Now, therefore, I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim Thursday, the thirtieth day of May, a day already freighted with sacred and stimulating memories, a day of public humiliation, prayer, and fasting, and do exhort my fellow-citizens of all faiths and creeds to assemble on that day in their several places of worship and there, as well as in their homes, to pray Almighty God that He may forgive our sins and shortcomings as a people and purify our hearts to see and love the truth, to accept and defend all things that are just and right, and to purpose only those righteous acts and judgments which are in conformity with His will; beseeching Him that He will give victory to our armies as they fight for freedom, wisdom to those who take counsel on our behalf in these days of dark struggle and perplexity, and steadfastness to our people to make sacrifice to the utmost in support of what is just and true, bringing us at last the peace in which men's hearts can be at rest because it is founded upon mercy, justice and good will. . . . .

Sabbath Observance in the Army and Navy

On January 20, 1918, President Wilson enjoined upon the military and naval forces of the United States as strict an observance of the Sabbath as was compatible with their duties.

The President, commander in chief of the Army and Navy, following the reverent example of his predecessors, desires and

enjoins the orderly observance of the Sabbath by the officers and men in the military and naval service of the United States. The importance for man and beast of the prescribed weekly rest, the sacred rights of Christian soldiers and sailors, a becoming deference to the best sentiment of a Christian people, and a due regard for the Divine Will demand that Sunday labor in the Army and Navy be reduced to the measure of strict necessity. Such an observance of Sunday is dictated by the best traditions of our people and by the convictions of all who look to Divine Providence for guidance and protection, and, in repeating in this order the language of President Lincoln, the President is confident that he is speaking alike to the hearts and to the consciences of those under his authority.

The order of President Lincoln, referred to in the above order of President Wilson, was as follows:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, November 15, 1862.

The President, Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, desires and enjoins the orderly observance of the Sabbath by the officers and men in the military and naval service. The importance for man and beast of the prescribed weekly rest, the sacred rights of Christian soldiers and sailors, a becoming deference to the best sentiment of a Christian people, and a due regard for the divine will demand that Sunday labor in the Army and Navy be reduced to the measure of strict necessity.

The discipline and character of the national forces should not suffer nor the cause they defend be imperiled by the profanation of the day or name of the Most High. "At this time of public distress," adopting the words of Washington in 1776, "men may find enough to do in the service of God and their country without abandoning themselves to vice and immorality." The first general order issued by the Father of his Country after the Declaration of Independence indicates the spirit in which our institutions were founded and should ever be defended:

The General hopes and trusts that every officer and man will endeavor to live and act as becomes a Christian soldier defending the dearest rights and liberties of his country.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

The War and Public Education

The Great War affected the processes of education no less than the processes of all other activities in the United States. The new national orientation necessitated by our participation in the struggle against Germany is well shown by the two following letters of President Wilson:

The White House, *August 23, 1917.*

To School Officers:

The war is bringing to the minds of our people a new appreciation of the problems of national life and a deeper understanding of the meaning and aims of democracy. Matters which heretofore have seemed commonplace and trivial are seen in a truer light. The urgent demand for the production and proper distribution of food and other national resources has made us aware of the close dependence of individual on individual and nation on nation. The effort to keep up social and industrial organizations in spite of the withdrawal of men for the army has revealed the extent to which modern life has become complex and specialized.

These and other lessons of the war must be learned quickly if we are intelligently and successfully to defend our institutions. When the war is over we must apply the wisdom which we have acquired in purging and ennobling the life of the world.

In these vital tasks of acquiring a broader view of human possibilities the common school must have a large part. I urge that teachers and other school officers increase materially the time and attention devoted to instruction bearing directly on the problems of community and national life.

Such a plea is in no way foreign to the spirit of American public education or of existing practices. Nor is it a plea for a temporary enlargement of the school program appropriate merely to the period of the war. It is a plea for a realization in public education of the new emphasis which the war has given to the ideals of democracy and to the broader conceptions of national life.

In order that there may be definite material at hand with which the schools may at once expand their teaching, I have asked Mr. Hoover and Commissioner Claxton to organize the proper agencies for the preparation and distribution of suitable lessons for the elementary grades and for the high school classes. Lessons thus suggested will serve the double purpose of illustrating in a concrete way what can be undertaken in the schools and of stimulating teachers in all parts of the country to formulate new and appropriate materials drawn directly from the communities in which they live. Sincerely yours,

WOODROW WILSON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *July 31, 1918.*

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I am pleased to know that despite the unusual burdens imposed upon our people by the war they have maintained their schools and other agencies of education so nearly at their normal efficiency. That this should be continued throughout the war and that, in so far as the draft law will permit, there should be no falling off in attendance in elementary schools, high schools or colleges is a matter of the very greatest importance, affecting both our strength in war and our national welfare and efficiency when the war is over. So long as the war continues there will be constant need of very large numbers of men and women of the highest and most thorough training for war service in many lines. After the war there will be urgent need not only for trained leadership in all lines of industrial, commercial, social and civil life, but for a very high average of intelligence and preparation on the part of all the people. I would therefore urge that the people continue to give generous support to their schools of all grades and that the schools adjust themselves as wisely as possible to the new conditions to the end that no boy or girl shall have less opportunity for education because of the war and that the Nation may be strengthened as it can only be through the right education of all its people. I approve most heartily your plans for making through the Bureau of Education a comprehensive campaign for the support of the schools and for the maintenance of attendance upon them, and trust that you may have the cooperation in this work of the American Council on Education. Cordially and sincerely yours,

WOODROW WILSON.

Hon. Franklin K. Lane, *Secretary of the Interior.*

Indirect Peace Negotiations

Toward the end of the year 1917, there arose in the countries leading the opposition to the Central Powers a strong movement for a re-statement of the war aims of the Entente. Almost without exception, the press, the pulpit, and other sources of public leadership denounced the movement for a re-statement of war aims as unnecessary, even as calculated to play the game of the pacifists and pro-Germans. But the movement had found lodgement among the masses of the plain people in Europe, if not in America, and finally it became too strong to be denied.

Perhaps the strongest single factor making for a re-statement of the Entente's war aims was the presence of a number of secret treaties drawn up by the Allies during the course of the war. These secret treaties will be discussed more fully later; here it will suffice to say that they were in direct contradiction to the aims for which the Entente was striving as those aims had been expounded by President Wilson. In the first place, the treaties were secret, and it was only through publication of them by the Bolshevist leaders of Russia after the overthrow of Kerenski in November, 1917, that the world knew of them. They contained provisions for turning Constantinople over to the Russia of the Tsar, although Russian possession of Constantinople would almost inevitably provoke another European war sooner or later. Italy was promised land along the Adriatic far outstripping the boundaries of Italia Irredenta proper, and inhabited almost entirely by South Slavs. France was not only to regain Alsace-Lorraine, but was also to acquire from Germany new territory inhabited by Germans and thus to be annexed only in violation of the principle of nationality. France, moreover, was to establish what amounted virtually to protectorates over certain sections of Asia Minor, as was England.

Indeed, the existence of these secret treaties was one of the deter-

mining factors in the downfall of Kerenski and the rise to power of the Bolsheviki in Russia. The developments in Russia will also be considered in a later section—here it will suffice to say that Kerenski's opponents in Russia challenged him to publish the agreements into which the Allies had entered. Kerenski refused, but exerted strong pressure upon the Allies publicly to revise their war aims so that the secret treaties would not remain in force. The Allies, however, were deaf to Kerenski's entreaties; with the result that the Bolshevist leaders were able finally to persuade the Russian people that the ambitions of the Allies were imperialistic and that a Socialist Russia therefore had no place in the War on either side.

With the accession to power of the Bolsheviki in November, 1917, Russia immediately opened negotiations with Germany at Brest-Litovsk, negotiations calculated by the astute Russian leaders to lead not only to peace between Russia and Germany, but even to a general peace. To that end, Trotski came down to Brest-Litovsk with a peace formula since become famous as the Russian Peace Formula—"No forcible annexations, no punitive indemnities, and the right of self-determination for all nationalities." The Bolshevist leaders were under no delusions that such a formula was acceptable to the leaders of the German government, but by every conceivable method they prolonged the peace negotiations with the idea of keeping their peace formula before the world, and especially before the people of Germany and Austria-Hungary. The Bolsheviki urged the Allies to accept their peace formula, declaring that if the German people realized that peace could be had on terms of no forcible annexations, no *punitive* indemnities and the self-determination of all nationalities, one of two things would result. Either the rulers of Germany would yield to that formula or the long-desired German revolution would break out. Of course, it was hope of the latter event which was cherished most ardently by the Bolsheviki, for they were playing for bigger stakes than even the end of the War—they were playing for the outbreak of a social revolution in every civilized land and the universal establishment of the Socialist State.

But the Entente, enfuriated by the withdrawal of Russia from the War, refused to support the Bolsheviki and declined to send dele-

gates to the Brest-Litovsk conference. Consequently, Russia was left to the tender mercies of the Imperial German Government; and after Germany found that she could not bring Russia to terms by fair words, she forced a humiliating peace upon the Bolsheviki, which the Bolsheviki finally accepted rather than continue the war against Germany. Both David R. Francis, United States Ambassador to Russia, and Colonel Raymond Robins, the head of the American Red Cross in Russia, have asserted that even after the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Lenin informed the Entente that Russia would continue to oppose Germany as best she could if the Entente would render certain forms of assistance to Russia; and that the Entente did not even reply to the offer.

The withdrawal of Russia from the War stimulated radical minorities in France and England to support the demand for a re-statement of war aims; and the French and Italian Socialists and the British Labor Party were making political capital out of the indefinite nature of the aims announced as those of the Entente. On November 30, 1917, the agitation to that end was brought to a head in England by an open demand from Lord Landsdowne that the Allies re-formulate their peace-terms. Lord Landsdowne was a Unionist peer, and a man of conservative principles, with an unimpeachable record of having supported the War whole-heartedly and with many years to his credit of honorable service to his country in the highest offices. He had been Minister of Foreign Affairs under the premierships of Lord Salisbury and of Mr. Balfour, had been Viceroy of India and Governor General of Canada, and had been a minister without portfolio in the coalition cabinet of Mr. Asquith during the War.

Lord Landsdowne opened his letter on November 30, 1917 to the *Daily Telegraph* of London with a solemn account of the losses in the War up to that time, and with an expression of fear that all civilization itself might go down to ruin if peace did not soon appear—a peace of which there still seemed to be no trace on the horizon. Agreeing that Germany must be defeated, he asserted that the defeat of Germany was not enough. The chief aim of the Allies, after the defeat of Germany, must be steps to make impossible a recurrence of the War. Lord Landsdowne then went into the need for the or-

ganization of a League of Nations, and quoted extensively from the speech of President Wilson in May, 1917, before the League to Enforce Peace. He asserted that the mass of the people in Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey were anxious for peace; and that therefore peace would be brought immeasurably nearer if the Allies were to re-state their peace-terms along the following lines:

1. That we do not desire the annihilation of Germany as a great power.

2. That we do not seek to impose upon her people any form of government other than that of their own choice.

3. That, except as a legitimate war measure, we have no desire to deny to Germany her place among the great commercial communities of the world.

4. That we are prepared, when war is over, to examine in concert with other powers a group of international problems, some of them of recent origin, which are connected with the question of the freedom of the seas.

5. That we are prepared to enter into an international pact under which ample opportunities would be afforded for the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.

The attitude of Lord Landsdowne stimulated the movement for indirect discussion of peace, and at the end of 1917, as at the end of 1916, leaders in the belligerent countries were putting out feelers for peace. Perhaps the most striking of such indirect negotiations in December, 1917, was one from Count Czernin, of Austria-Hungary, tentatively accepting in large measure the peace formula of Russia at Brest-Litovsk. The character of Count Czernin's proposal is discussed in Premier Lloyd-George's address below.

Address of Premier Lloyd-George, of Great Britain, on January 6, 1918.

By the beginning of 1918, the movement for a re-statement of war-aims had become too strong in England for further disregard of it. Accordingly, on January 6, 1918, Premier Lloyd-George publicly re-

stated England war-aims in an address to Parliament. Notable passages from that address are as follows:

> When the Government invite organized labor in this country to assist them to maintain the might of their armies in the field, its representatives are entitled to ask that any misgivings and doubts which any of them may have about the purpose to which this precious strength is to be applied should be definitely cleared. And what is true of organized labor is equally true of all citizens in this country, without regard to grade or avocation.
>
> When men by the million are being called upon to suffer and die, and vast populations are being subjected to sufferings and privations of war on a scale unprecedented in the history of the world, they are entitled to know for what cause or causes they are making the sacrifice.
>
> It is only the clearest, greatest, and justest of causes that can justify the continuance, even for one day, of this unspeakable agony of the nation, and we ought to be able to state clearly and definitely not only the principles for which we are fighting, but also their definite and concrete application to the war map of the world. . . . .
>
> We may begin by clearing away some misunderstandings and stating what we are not fighting for.
>
> We are not fighting a war of aggression against the German people. Their leaders have persuaded them that they are fighting a war of self-defense against a league of rival nations, bent on the destruction of Germany. That is not so. The destruction or disruption of Germany or the German people has never been a war aim with us from the first day of this war to this day. . . . .
>
> The British people have never aimed at a break-up of the German people or the disintegration of their State or country. Germany has occupied a great position in the world. It is not our wish or intention to question or destroy that position for the future, but rather to turn her aside from hopes and schemes of military domination.
>
> Nor did we enter this war merely to alter or destroy the imperial constitution of Germany, much as we consider that military and autocratic constitution a dangerous anachronism in the twentieth century. Our point of view is that the adoption of a really democratic constitution by Germany would be the most convincing evidence that her old spirit of military domination

has, indeed, died in this war and would make it much easier for us to conclude a broad, democratic peace with her. But, after all, that is a question for the German people to decide.

We are not fighting to destroy Austria-Hungary or to deprive Turkey of its capital or the rich lands of Asia Minor and Thrace which are predominantly Turkish.

It is now more than a year since the President of the United States, then neutral, addressed to the belligerents a suggestion that each side should state clearly the aims for which they were fighting.

We and our allies responded by the note of January 10, 1917. To the President's appeal the Central Empires made no reply and in spite of many adjurations, both from their opponents and from neutrals, they have maintained complete silence as to the objects for which they are fighting. Even on so crucial a matter as their intention with regard to Belgium they have uniformly declined to give any trustworthy indication.

On December 25, last, however, Count Czernin, speaking on behalf of Austria-Hungary and her allies, did make a pronouncement of a kind. It is, indeed, deplorably vague.

We are told that it is not the intention of the Central Powers to appropriate forcibly any occupied territories or to rob of its independence any nation which has lost its political independence during the war.

It is obvious that almost any scheme of conquest and annexation could be perpetrated within the literal interpretation of such a pledge. Does it mean that Belgium, Servia, Montenegro, and Roumania will be as independent and as free to direct their own destinies as Germany or any other nation? Or does it mean that all manner of interferences and restrictions, political and economic, incompatible with the status and dignity of free and self-respecting people, are to be imposed? If this is the intention, then there will be one kind of independence for the great nation and an inferior kind of independence for the small nation.

We must know what is meant, for equality of right among the nations, small as well as great, is one of the fundamental issues this country and her allies are fighting to establish in this war.

Reparation for the wanton damage inflicted on Belgian towns and villages and their inhabitants is emphatically repudiated. The rest of the so-called offer of the Central Powers is almost entirely a refusal of all concessions. All suggestions about the autonomy of subject nationalities are ruled out of the peace terms

altogether. The question whether any form of self-government is to be given to the Arabs, Armenians or Syrians is declared to be entirely a matter for the Sublime Porte. A pious wish for the protection of minorities, "in so far as it is practically realizable," is the nearest approach to liberty which the Central statesmen venture to make.

On one point only are they perfectly clear and definite. Under no circumstances will the German demand for the restoration of the whole of Germany's colonies be departed from. All principles of self-determination, or, as our earlier phrase goes, government by the consent of governed, here vanish into thin air.

It is impossible to believe that any edifice of permanent peace could be erected on such a foundation as this. Mere lip-service to the formula of no annexations and no indemnities or the right of self-determination is useless. Before any negotiations can even be begun the Central Powers must realize the essential facts of the situation.

The days of the treaty of Vienna are long past. We can no longer submit the future of European civilization to the arbitrary decisions of a few negotiators, trying to secure by chicanery or persuasion the interests of this or that dynasty or nation.

The settlement of the new Europe must be based on such grounds of reason and justice as will give some promise of stability. Therefore, it is that we feel that government with the consent of the governed must be the basis of any territorial settlement in this war. For that reason also, unless treaties be upheld, unless every nation is prepared, at whatever sacrifices, to honor the national signature, it is obvious that no treaty of peace can be worth the paper on which it is written.

The first requirement, therefore, always put forward by the British Government and their allies, has been the complete restoration, political, territorial, and economic, of the independence of Belgium and such reparation as can be made for the devastation of its towns and provinces.

This is no demand for a war indemnity, such as that imposed on France by Germany in 1871. It is not an attempt to shift the cost of warlike operations from one belligerent to another, which may or may not be defensible. It is no more and no less than an insistence that before there can be any hope for stable peace, this great breach of the public law of Europe must be repudiated and so far as possible repaired.

Reparation means recognition. Unless international right is

recognized by insistence on payment for injury, done in defiance of its canons, it can never be a reality.

Next comes the restoration of Servia, Montenegro, and the occupied parts of France, Italy, and Roumania. The complete withdrawal of the allied (Teutonic) armies, and the reparation for injustice done is a fundamental condition of permanent peace.

We mean to stand by the French democracy to the death in the demand they make for a reconsideration of the great wrong of 1871, when, without any regard to the wishes of the population, two French provinces were torn from the side of France and incorporated in the German Empire.

This sore has poisoned the peace of Europe for half a century, and, until it is cured, healthy conditions will not have been restored. There can be no better illustration of the folly and wickedness of using a transient military success to violate national right.

I will not attempt to deal with the question of the Russian territories, now in German occupation. The Russian policy since the revolution has passed so rapidly through so many phases that it is difficult to speak without some suspension of judgment as to what the situation will be when the final terms of European peace come to be discussed.

Russia accepted war with all its horrors because, true to her traditional guardianship of the weaker communities of her race, she stepped in to protect Servia from a plot against her independence. It is this honorable sacrifice which not merely brought Russia into the war, but France as well.

France, true to the conditions of her treaty with Russia, stood by her ally in a quarrel which was not her own. Her chivalrous respect for her treaty led to the wanton invasion of Belgium, and the treaty obligations of Great Britain to that little land brought us into the war.

The present rulers of Russia are now engaged, without any reference to the countries whom Russia brought into the war, in separate negotiations with their common enemy. I am indulging in no reproaches. I am merely stating the facts with a view to making it clear why Great Britain cannot be held accountable for decisions, taken in her absence, and concerning which she has not been consulted or her aid invoked.

No one who knows Prussia and her designs upon Russia can for a moment doubt her ultimate intention. Whatever phrases

she may use to delude Russia, she does not mean to surrender one of the fair provinces or cities of Russia now occupied by her forces. Under one name or another (and the name hardly matters), those Russian provinces will henceforth be in reality a part of the dominions of Prussia. They will be ruled by the Prussian sword in the interests of the Prussian autocracy, and the rest of the people of Russia will be partly enticed by specious phrases and partly bullied by the threat of continued war against an impotent army into a condition of complete economic and ultimate political enslavement to Germany.

We all deplore the prospect. The democracy of this country means to stand to the last by the democracies of France and Italy and all our other allies. We shall be proud to stand side by side by the new democracy of Russia. So will America and so will France and Italy. But if the present rulers of Russia take action which is independent of their allies, we have no means of intervening to arrest the catastrophe which is assuredly befalling their country. Russia can only be saved by her own people.

We believe, however, that an independent Poland, comprising all those genuinely Polish elements who desire to form a part of it, is an urgent necessity for the stability of Western Europe.

Similarly, though we agree with President Wilson that a break-up of Austria-Hungary is no part of our war aims, we feel that unless genuine self-government on true democratic principles is granted to those Austro-Hungarian nationalities who have long desired it, it is impossible to hope for a removal of those causes of unrest in that part of Europe which have so long threatened the general peace.

On the same grounds we regard as vital the satisfaction of the legitimate claims of the Italians for union with those of their own race and tongue. We also mean to press that justice be done to the men of Roumanian blood and speech in their legitimate aspirations. If these conditions are fulfilled, Austria-Hungary would become a power whose strength would conduce to the permanent peace and freedom of Europe instead of being merely an instrument for the pernicious military autocracy of Prussia that uses the resources of its allies for the furtherance of its own sinister purposes.

Outside of Europe we believe that the same principles should be applied. While we do not challenge the maintenance of the Turkish Empire in the homelands of the Turkish race with its capital at Constantinople, the passage between the Mediterranean and the

Black Sea being internationalized and neutralized, Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine are, in our judgment, entitled to a recognition of their separate national conditions.

What the exact form of that recognition in each particular case should be need not here be discussed beyond stating that it would be impossible to restore to their former sovereignty the territories to which I have already referred.

Much has been said about the arrangements we have entered into with our allies on this and on other subjects. I can only say that as the new circumstances, like the Russian collapse and the separate negotiations, have changed the conditions under which those arrangements were made, we are, and always have been, perfectly ready to discuss them with our allies.

With regard to the German colonies, I have repeatedly declared that they are held at the disposal of a conference whose decision must have primary regard to the wishes and interests of the native inhabitants of such colonies. None of those territories are inhabited by Europeans. The governing consideration, therefore, must be that the inhabitants should be placed under the control of an administration acceptable to themselves, one of whose main purposes will be to prevent their exploitation for the benefit of European capitalists or Governments.

The natives live in their various tribal organizations under chiefs and councils who are competent to consult and speak for their tribes and members and thus to represent their wishes and interests in regard to their disposal. The general principle of national self-determination is, therefore, as applicable in their cases as in those of the occupied European territories.

The German declaration that the natives of the German colonies have through their military fidelity in war shown their attachment and resolve under all circumstances to remain with Germany is applicable, not to the German colonies generally, but only to one of them, and in that case, German East Africa, the German authorities secured the attachment, not of the native population as a whole, which is and remains profoundly anti-German, but only of a small warlike class, from whom their askaris, or soldiers, were selected. These they attached to themselves by conferring on them a highly privileged position, as against the bulk of the native population, which enabled these askaris to assume a lordly and oppressive superiority over the rest of the natives.

By this and other means they secured the attachments of a

very small and insignificant minority, whose interests were directly opposed to those of the rest of the population and for whom they have no right to speak. The German treatment of the native populations in their colonies has been such as amply to justify their fear of submitting the future of those colonies to the wishes of the natives themselves.

Finally, there must be reparation for the injuries done in violation of international law. The peace conference must not forget our seamen and the services they have rendered to and the outrages they have suffered for the common cause of freedom.

One omission we notice in the proposal of the Central Powers which seems to us especially regrettable. It is desirable and essential that the settlement after this war shall be one which does not in itself bear the seed of future war. But that is not enough. However wisely and well we may make territorial and other arrangements, there will still be many subjects of international controversy. Some, indeed, are inevitable.

Economic conditions at the end of the war will be in the highest degree difficult owing to the diversion of human effort to warlike pursuits. There must follow a world shortage of raw materials, which will increase the longer the war lasts, and it is inevitable that those countries which have control of raw materials will desire to help themselves and their friends first. Apart from this, whatever settlement is made will be suitable only to the circumstances under which it is made, and as those circumstances change, changes in the settlement will be called for.

So long as the possibility of a dispute between nations continues—that is to say, so long as men and women are dominated by impassioned ambition and war is the only means of settling a dispute—all nations must live under a burden, not only of having from time to time to engage in it, but of being compelled to prepare for its possible outbreak.

The crushing weight of modern armaments, the increasing evil of compulsory military service, the vast waste of wealth and effort involved in warlike preparation—these are blots on our civilization, of which every thinking individual must be ashamed. For these and other similar reasons we are confident that a great attempt must be made to establish, by some international organization, an alternative to war as a means of settling international disputes.

After all, war is a relic of barbarism, and, just as law has succeeded violence as a means of settling disputes between indi-

viduals, so we believe that it is destined ultimately to take the place of war in the settlement of controversies between nations.

If, then, we are asked what we are fighting for, we reply, as we have often replied, We are fighting for a just and a lasting peace, and we believe that before permanent peace can be hoped for three conditions must be fulfilled: First, the sanctity of treaties must be re-established; secondly, a territorial settlement must be secured, based on the right of self-determination or the consent of the governed, and, lastly, we must seek, by the creation of some international organization, to limit the burden of armaments and diminish the probability of war. On these conditions its peoples are prepared to make even greater sacrifices than those they have yet endured.

"The Fourteen Points."

This open discussion of the aims of the war fitted in admirably with President Wilson's methods of diplomacy. His statements of the principles involved in the gigantic conflict were at variance with many of the official utterances and treaties made by our associates in the struggle, and the opportunity was thus presented to him to lift the official purposes of the Entente Allies to a higher plane. Indeed, it is possible that America itself had been bringing pressure to bear upon the Entente leaders for a re-statement of war-aims.

But President Wilson utilized his public utterances on the war to much greater purpose than mere re-clarification of issues. He used them to speak to the German people over the heads of the German officials, and to create, as best he could, discontent within the German and Austrian Empires. He seized every occasion to point out to the German people the contrast between their cause and the cause of the Entente, and every such contrast to the disadvantage of the Central Powers was a blow at German morale. Moreover, the very vagueness of many of the war-aims of the Entente Allies had given the German leaders the opportunity to beguile their people with pictures of the dark future awaiting them unless they supported the German Government without quibble. The President was determined that Germany must be defeated before the war could be brought to a close, but a political offensive against Germany would prove of

material assistance to the military offensive, and Germany could be weakened from within as well as from without.

To that end, President Wilson addressed Congress on January 8, 1917, as follows:

Gentlemen of the Congress:

Once more, as repeatedly before, the spokesmen of the Central Empires have indicated their desire to discuss the objects of the war and the possible basis of a general peace. Parleys have been in progress at Brest-Litovsk between Russian representatives and representatives of the Central Powers, to which the attention of all the belligerents has been invited for the purpose of ascertaining whether it may be possible to extend these parleys into a general conference with regard to terms of peace and settlement. The Russian representatives presented not only a perfectly definite statement of the principles upon which they would be willing to conclude peace, but also an equally definite program for the concrete application of those principles. The representatives of the Central Powers, on their part, presented an outline of settlement which, if much less definite, seemed susceptible of liberal interpretation until their specific program of practical terms was added. That program proposed no concessions at all, either to the sovereignty of Russia or to the preferences of the population with whose fortunes it dealt, but meant, in a word, that the Central Empires were to keep every foot of territory their armed forces had occupied—every province, every city, every point of vantage—as a permanent addition to their territories and their power. It is a reasonable conjecture that the general principles of settlement which they at first suggested originated with the more liberal statesmen of Germany and Austria, the men who have begun to feel the force of their own peoples' thought and purpose, while the concrete terms of actual settlement came from the military leaders who have no thought but to keep what they have got. The negotiations have been broken off. The Russian representatives were sincere and in earnest. They cannot entertain such proposals of conquest and domination.

The whole incident is full of significance. It is also full of perplexity. With whom are the Russian representatives dealing? For whom are the representatives of the Central Empires speaking? Are they speaking for the majorities of their respective Parliaments or for the minority parties, that military and imperialistic minority which has so far dominated their whole policy

and controlled the affairs of Turkey and of the Balkan States which have felt obliged to become their associates in this war? The Russian representatives have insisted, very justly, very wisely, and in the true spirit of modern democracy, that the conferences they have been holding with the Teutonic and Turkish statesmen should be held with open, not closed, doors, and all the world has been audience, as was desired. To whom have we been listening, then? To those who speak the spirit and intention of the resolutions of the German Reichstag of the ninth of July last, the spirit and intention of the liberal leaders and parties of Germany, or to those who resist and defy that spirit and intention and insist upon conquest and subjugation? Or are we listening, in fact, to both, unreconciled and in open and hopeless contradiction? These are very serious and pregnant questions. Upon the answer to them depends the peace of the world.

But whatever the results of the parleys at Brest-Litovsk, whatever the confusions of counsel and of purpose in the utterances of the spokesmen of the Central Empires, they have again attempted to acquaint the world with their objects in the war and have again challenged their adversaries to say what their objects are and what sort of settlement they would deem just and satisfactory. There is no good reason why that challenge should not be responded to, and responded to with the utmost candor. We did not wait for it. Not once, but again and again, we have laid our whole thought and purpose before the world, not in general terms only, but each time with sufficient definition to make it clear what sort of definite terms of settlement must necessarily spring out of them. Within the last week Mr. Lloyd George has spoken with admirable candor and in admirable spirit for the people and Government of Great Britain. There is no confusion of counsel among the adversaries of the Central Powers, no uncertainty of principle, no vagueness of detail. The only secrecy of counsel, the only lack of fearless frankness, the only failure to make definite statement of the objects of the war, lie with Germany and her allies. The issues of life and death hang upon these definitions. No statesman who has the least conception of his responsibility ought for a moment to permit himself to continue this tragical and appalling outpouring of blood and treasure unless he is sure beyond a peradventure that the objects of the vital sacrifice are part and parcel of the very life of society and that the people for whom he speaks think them right and imperative as he does.

There is, moreover, a voice calling for these definitions of principle and of purpose which is, it seems to me, more thrilling and more compelling than any of the many moving voices with which the troubled air of the world is filled. It is the voice of the Russian people. They are prostrate and all but helpless, it would seem, before the grim power of Germany, which has hitherto known no relenting and no pity. Their power apparently is shattered. And yet their soul is not subservient. They will not yield either in principle or in action. Their conception of what is right, of what is humane and honorable for them to accept, has been stated with a frankness, a largeness of view, a generosity of spirit, and a universal human sympathy which must challenge the admiration of every friend of mankind; and they have refused to compound their ideals or desert others that they themselves may be safe. They call to us to say what it is that we desire, in what, if in anything, our purpose and our spirit differ from theirs; and I believe that the people of the United States would wish me to respond with utter simplicity and frankness. Whether their present leaders believe it or not, it is our heartfelt desire and hope that some way may be opened whereby we may be privileged to assist the people of Russia to attain their utmost hope of liberty and ordered peace.

It will be our wish and purpose that the processes of peace, when they are begun, shall be absolutely open, and that they shall involve and permit henceforth no secret understandings of any kind. The day of conquest and aggrandizement is gone by; so is also the day of secret covenants entered into in the interest of particular governments and likely at some unlooked-for moment to upset the peace of the world. It is this happy fact, now clear to the view of every public man whose thoughts do not still linger in an age that is dead and gone, which makes it possible for every nation whose purposes are consistent with justice and the peace of the world to avow now or at any other time the objects it has in view.

We entered this war because violations of right had occurred which touched us to the quick and made the life of our own people impossible unless they were corrected and the world secured once for all against their recurrence. What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institu-

tions, be assured of justice and fair dealings by the other peoples of the world, as against force and selfish aggression. All the peoples of the world are in effect partners in this interest, and for our own part we see very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us.

The program of the world's peace, therefore, is our program, and that program, the only possible program, as we see it, is this:

I.—Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

II.—Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

III.—The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

IV.—Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

V.—Free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the population concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.

VI.—The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest co-operation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy, and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good-will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

VII.—Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired.

VIII.—All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.

IX.—A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

X.—The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.

XI.—Roumania, Servia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territory restored; Servia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan States to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan States should be entered into.

XII.—The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

XIII.—An independent Polish State should be erected which should include the territorities inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

XIV.—A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.

In regard to these essential rectifications of wrong and assertions of right, we feel ourselves to be intimate partners of all the governments and peoples associated together against the imperialists. We cannot be separated in interest or divided in purpose. We stand together until the end.

For such arrangements and covenants we are willing to fight and to continue to fight until they are achieved; but only because we wish the right to prevail and desire a just and stable peace, such as can be secured only by removing the chief provocations to war, which this program does remove. We have no jealousy of German greatness, and there is nothing in this program that impairs it. We grudge her no achievement or distinction of learning or of pacific enterprise such as have made her record very bright and very enviable. We do not wish to injure her or to block in any way her legitimate influence or power. We do not wish to fight her either with arms or with hostile arrangements of trade, if she is willing to associate herself with us and the other peace-loving nations of the world in covenants of justice and law and fair dealing. We wish her only to accept a place of equality among the peoples of the world—the new world in which we now live—instead of a place of mastery.

Neither do we presume to suggest to her any alteration or modification of her institutions. But it is necessary, we must frankly say, and necessary as a preliminary to any intelligent dealings with her on our part, that we should know whom her spokesmen speak for when they speak to us, whether for the Reichstag majority or for the military party and the men whose creed is imperial domination.

We have spoken, now, surely, in terms too concrete to admit of any further doubt or question. An evident principle runs through the whole program I have outlined. It is the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety wtih one another, whether they be strong or weak. Unless this principle be made its foundation, no part of the structure of international justice can stand. The people of the United States could act upon no other principle, and to the vindication of this principle they are ready to devote their lives, their honor, and everything that they possess.

> The moral climax of this, the culminating and final war for human liberty, has come, and they are ready to put their own strength, their own highest purpose, their own integrity and devotion to the test.

The "Fourteen Points" proved too powerful for the Central Powers to evade them. On January 24, both Count Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian minister for foreign affairs, and Count von Hertling, the German chancellor, replied to President Wilson. In the opening passages of his address to Congress of February 11, 1917, President Wilson analyzed very briefly these replies of Austria and Hungary to his "fourteen points." Striking passages from Count Czernin's answer, as reported by the Associated Press, are as follows:

> I think there is no harm in stating that I regard the recent proposals of President Wilson as an appreciable approach to the Austro-Hungarian point of view, and that to some of them Austria-Hungary joyfully could give her approval. But she must first lay down this principle—that in so far as these propositions concern her allies, whether in the case of Germany's possession of Belgium or in the case of Turkey, Austria-Hungary, faithful to her engagements to fight to the end in defense of her allies, will defend the possessions of her war allies as she would her own. That is the standpoint of our allies, in regard to which there is perfect reciprocity.
>
> Count Czernin proceeded to say that he must, politely but categorically, refuse the suggestions as to the manner in which Austria and Hungary should manage their internal administration, and that there was not a more democratic parliament in the world than the Austrian Parliament, which, in agreement with the other authorized constitutional organizations, alone had the right to decide the internal affairs of Austria.
>
> Referring to President Wilson's peace program, Count Czernin said that he had no objection to the suppression of secret diplomacy, although he doubted whether that method was in every case the most practical or rapid way to arrive at results. The public discussion of diplomatic treaties might, for example, in the case of economic agreements, he said, make impossible the conclusion of such agreements, "which are nothing but commercial transactions and might increase friction between States."
>
> It is the same in the case of political agreements. If by the suppression of secret diplomacy is meant that there should no longer be any secret treaties, I have no objection to make to the realization of this idea, although I do not know how one can execute and control this realization. But those are supplementary details which could be discussed.
>
> Count Czernin said as to the second point in President Wilson's peace aims, freedom of the seas, the President had responded to the views of all and that he (Czernin) absolutely and entirely supported this paragraph. Regarding Paragraph 3 in President Wilson's proposals—the re-

moval of economic barriers and the establishment of equality of trade conditions—Count Czernin said:

This article, which pronounces in a formal manner hostility against a future economic war, is so just and reasonable, and its application so often has been urged by us, that we have nothing to add to it.

Count Czernin said that Article IV of President Wilson's proposals, which demanded the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety,

Expresses in a particularly clear and just manner the necessity of bringing rivalries in armament to the limit already indicated, and therefore I greet with gratitude any voice which makes itself heard in the sense of my previous statement.

On the subject of Italy, Serbia, Montenegro, and Roumania:

I refuse to place a premium on the military adventures of our enemies. I refuse to our enemies, who obstinately persist in wishing to wage war until a final victory is achieved by one side, concessions by which the monarchy would permanently suffer and which would give them an infinite advantage in being able to drag on the war relatively without risk.

Count Czernin invited President Wilson to use his great influence to make the Entente Allies declare on their side the conditions on which they were ready to speak, and added:

I will speak as freely and frankly as I have done here with President Wilson, and will with all those who would like to speak. But naturally the duration of the war will not be without its influence on this situation.

Italy is a striking illustration of this. Before the war Italy had the opportunity of realizing a great territorial expansion without firing a shot. She refused this and joined in the war. She has lost hundreds of thousands in killed or wounded, and millions of money in war expenses and destroyed her riches. Her population is in distress and misery—all this solely in order to lose the advantage which she would have been able to gain.

Discussing Mr. Wilson's views on Poland, Count Czernin proceeded:

We also are supporters of an independent Polish State, which would include all territories and populations which indisputably are Polish. On this point we believe we should quickly come to an understanding with President Wilson.

Finally, in his idea of a league of peoples the President probably will meet with no opposition in the monarchy.

We, therefore, are in agreement in the main. Our views are identical not only on the broad principles regarding a new organization of the world after the war, but also on several concrete questions, and differences which still exist do not appear to me to be so great that a conversation regarding them would not lead to enlightenment and a rapprochement.

This situation, which doubtless arises from the fact that Austria-Hungary on the one side and the United States on the other are composed of States whose interests are at least at variance with one another, tempts one to ask if an exchange of ideas between the two powers could not

be the point of departure for a personal conversation among all States which have not yet joined in peace negotiations.

The value of the reply of Germany may best be understood by considering Count von Hertling's reply to the "Fourteen Points" point by point:

I

We are quite ready to accept this proposal and declare publicity of negotiations to be a general political principle.

II

There is here no difference of opinion. The limitation introduced by Mr. Wilson at the end, which I need not quote textually, is not intelligible, appears superfluous, and would therefore best be left out.

It would, however, be highly important for the freedom of shipping in future if strongly fortified naval bases on important international routes, such as England has at Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, Hongkong, the Falkland Island, and many other places, were removed.

III

We, too, are in thorough accord with the removal of economic barriers which interfere with trade in superfluous manner. We, too, condemn economic war, which would inevitably bear within it causes of future warlike complications.

IV

As already declared by us, the idea of limitation of armaments is entirely discussable. The financial position of all European States after the War might most effectively promote a satisfactory solution.

V

Practical realization of Mr. Wilson's principles in the realm of reality will encounter some difficulties in any case. I believe that for the present it may be left for England, which has the greatest colonial empire, to make what she will of this proposal of her ally. This point of the program also will have to be discussed in due time, on the reconstitution of the world's colonial possessions.

VI

Now that the Entente has refused, within the period agreed upon by Russia and the Quadruple Alliance, to join in the negotiations, I must in the name of the latter decline to allow any subsequent interference. We are dealing there with questions which concern only Russia and the four allied powers.

VII

My precedessors in office repeatedly declared that at no time did the annexation of Belgium to Germany form a point in the program of German policy. The Belgian question belongs to those questions the details of which are to be settled by negotiation at the peace conference. So long as our opponents have unreservedly taken the standpoint that the

integrity of the Allies' territory can offer the only possible basis of peace discussion, I must adhere to the standpoint hitherto always adopted and refuse the removal in advance of the Belgian affair from the entire discussion.

VIII

The occupied parts of France are a valued pawn in our hands. Here, too, forcible annexation forms no part of the official German policy. The conditions and methods of procedure of the evacuation, which must take account of Germany's vital interest, are to be agreed upon between Germany and France. I can only again expressly accentuate the fact that there can never be a question of dismemberment of imperial territory.

IX, X, XI

The questions dealt with by Mr. Wilson under Points 9, 10, and 11 touch both the Italian frontier question and questions of the future development of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and the future of the Balkan States; questions in which, for the greater part, the interests of our ally, Austria-Hungary, preponderate. Where German interests are concerned, we shall defend them most energetically. But I may leave the answer to Mr. Wilson's proposals on these points in the first place to the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister.

XII

The matters touched upon by Mr. Wilson in Point 12 concern our loyal, brave ally, Turkey. I must in nowise forestall her statesmen in their attitude. The integrity of Turkey and the safeguarding of her capital, which is connected closely with the question of the straits, are important and vital interests of the German Empire, also. Our ally can always count upon our energetic support in this matter.

XIII

The German Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy liberated Poland from the Czaristic régime which was crushing her national characteristics. It may thus be left to Germany and Austria-Hungary and Poland to come to an agreement on the future constitution of this country. . . . . We are on the road to this goal.

XIV

If the idea of a band of nations, as suggested by President Wilson, proves on closer examination really to be conceived in a spirit of complete justice and complete impartiality toward all, then the Imperial Government is gladly ready, when all other pending questions have been settled, to begin the examination of the basis of such a band of nations.


RUSSIA
CHINA
JAPAN
4396 M.
3379 M.
MIDWAY ISL.
WAKE ISL.
PHILIPPINE ISL.
2231 M.
SAMOA ISL
AUSTRALIA



This book should be returned to the Library on or before the last date stamped below.

A fine is incurred by retaining it beyond the specified time.

Please return promptly.

CANCELLED
FEB - 1983
JAN 1983
CANCELLED
1983

H 799.19.85
A history of the great war.
Widener Library 004030385
3 2044 087 983 623